# Capitalism K – Starter Pack – Michigan National Debate Institutes – 2022 – NATO Emerging Tech Topic

# NEG

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### 1NC – Short

#### NATO is the militarized front for racial capitalism on both a material and ideological level – psy-ops, imperialism, and weaponization of everything overcodes every move to peace the aff will claim and means their ASSURANCES shore up western imperialism.

Campbell, 19 [Horace, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science @ Syracuse,  author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya (Monthly Review Press, 2013): “[Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis](https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/),” published 4-9-2019, Counter Punch, https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/]

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran. Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted. There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima. The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO. NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans. In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise had been authored by clandestine paramilitary network code-named “Operation Gladio” that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose citizens and organizations in Western Europe that were anti-capitalists. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies. “NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5] The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States. War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America. At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn, “The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7] In the spring of 1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is now known, from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states thatwithin 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Trumanadministration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%. NATO was born on April 4, 1949 out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The task of organizing the deception of the citizens of the West was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9] Racists and anticommunists in the propaganda war It was not by accident that the thinkers and planners of these secret operations were known racists and Nazi sympathizers. Frank Wisner who hailed from Mississippi in the USA was a good example of the upright US citizen who was an architect of the false flag operations and the deception associated with NATO and western intelligence agencies. After the War, in 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects. Soon afterwards under the direction of Allen Dulles, this Office of Special Projects was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. Later James Jesus Angleton was to take this brand of counter intelligence work to the highest levels of state assassinations. Wisner had been mandated told to create an organization that concentrated on “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” It was from this opaque sounding name of Office of Policy Coordination where the brainwashing and virulent anti-communism of the Cold War era was refined. Evan Thomas reported in The Very Best Men: the Daring Early Days of the CIA, the OPC’s charter gave it responsibility for “propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” NATO as the principal prop for international capitalism today. In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street. At that historical moment in 1949, the justification for starting this organization was that it constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.” The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis in order to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine. James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany. One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills. The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. The merging of fascist ideas with the ideas of Jim Crow in the United States were refined in the secret operation called, Operation Paperclip. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space. The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Of the twelve founding members, six were outright colonial powers and at that moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies. In the specific case of France, in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO. Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa. It is not widely known that, initially, the Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination. Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of the State Department on Cooperative Development of Africa had stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism. [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration. The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF, IBRD (World Bank), the NATO, GATT, to guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance. By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town South Africa across to Malaysia. [13] The racist apartheid regime had persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’ After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate. [14] This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15] Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists. Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009. The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO. Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’ Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries. Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe, “Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17] The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism. The fiction of collective western security was effectively broken while after the Asian economic crisis, US capital mobilized NATO to defend Wall Street. In this defense of Wall Street, NATO incessantly bombed Kosovo for 79 days in 1999 as it gave itself a new mission to enlarge US military power right up to the doorstep of Moscow. Gingerly, NATO expanded under US President Bill Clinton from 12 members to 16, then to 19, then to 26 by 2004 and by 2009 to 28 members. Despite vocal opposition from Russia, the discussion of expanding NATO now proceeded to develop the idea of Global NATO. In 2019 there were 29 members of NATO. In his presentation before the US Congress Stoltenberg advocated for a further expansion of NATO and boasted of the high state of readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) which had been created in 2002. NATO and the Weaponization of finance Global NATO was the preeminent force to orchestrate the weaponization of everything. Michael Hudson has outlined finance as warfare and the weaponization of finance in the current phase of imperialism. It will be important to grasp the present sanctions regime of the USA as a form of warfare. In the current literature on imperialism, the term weaponization of finance refers to the foreign policy strategy of using incentives (access to capital markets) and penalties (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive diplomacy. The multiple wars agains Iran represent a model example of the weaponization of finance, the weaponization of information and the weaponization of trade. Under the Presidency of Barack Obama,Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, noted that the weaponization of finance offers to the US “a new battlefield…one that enables [the US] to go after those who wish [the US] harm without putting [US] troops in harm’s way or using lethal force.” Instead of fighting countries militarily, the US can now “cripple them financially. The Obama administration had retreated from a full scale weaponization of finance with Iran by signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ) with Iran in 2015. Under the terms of this agreement in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany),[a] and the European Union, it was agreed that Iran would accept the P5+1 would ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel had opposed this agreement. When Donald Tromp became President of the United States, his administration renounced the JCPOA in 2018 and then signed an executive order reimposing sanctions on any foreign company that continues to do business with Iran. The order gave companies 90-day or 180-day grace periods to extract themselves from existing Iranian contacts or face punitive US measures. Those NATO partners of the USA who signed the JCPOA refused to accept the sanctions imposed on Iran and in 2019 agreed to create a special purpose vehicle to manage their trade with Iran. Britain, Germany and France rolled out INSTEX in February 2019 as one way to break the weaponization of Finance by the USA but in the cat and mouse game of economic warfare, the Foreign Ministers of Europe have not yet been transparent on the full mandate of the special purpose vehicle. These developments mirror the weaponization of trade [19] and finance within NATO and the problems of inter imperialist rivalry in West Asia. The threats against the countries that created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to help facilitate trade with Iran must be taken very seriously, especially in the context of the political insecurity generated by BREXIT. This period reminds the world that of the depression when trade wars and currency wars eventually fueled open fighting in World War II. Finance as warfare Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, there have been efforts by countries holding US debt to limit their exposure to the dollar. In 2009, the Russians and the Chinese worked to establish an alternative international institution involving Brazil, Russia, India and China, later including South Africa and called BRICS. Within the context of BRICS, the Chinese set about a slow process to internationalize its currency, the RMB and undertook currency swaps to avoid the US dollar. After failing to negotiate successfully within the Bretton Woods institution for an increase of its drawing rights commensurate with its volume of international trade, the Chinese embarked on major economic and financial ventures under the banner of One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. When the AIIB was launched in 2015 with 57 countries, the former Treasury Secretary of the US, Lawrence Summers noted that the launch of the AIIB was a turning point and ‘the creation of the AIIB will undermine the leadership role the U.S. has long enjoyed in global finance.’ Both Russia and China intensified their swap trading efforts and Russia settled its crude sales to China. “In March 2018 news broke that Beijing is planning a pilot project for the second half of the year to pay for imported crude oil with renminbi instead of dollars. The two countries allegedly selected for the pilot are Russia and Angola, with rumors that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may become involved. If this venture is successful, it will act as a spur to similar schemes for other imports and primary products.” China was joining the leaders of Europe and the countries in Asia and West Asia who were calling for a multi-currency financial system. Many progressive economists noted that it was not a matter if more countries would flee the dollar, but when. One economist writing from Singapore wrote, “the emergence of a multicurrency or multi-asset international payments system will take time. It doesn’t portend a collapse of the global payments system, but does point to a redistribution of global wealth. The seigniorage harvested by the US as the world’s banker will gradually fall, narrowing the room for maneuver in US economic policy, which for the last 70 years has had the greatest influence on markets globally. As the power of the dollar wanes, the US will be pressured to adjust to a world economy vastly changed since 1945.” [20] The German financial leaders along with France were maneuvering to speed this change with the establishment of the special purpose vehicle to continue trading with Iran. At this time of writing the specific details of the specific purpose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is still being worked out, but the statements of former Ambassador Nicholas Burns before Congress on March 26 made it clear that the Foreign Policy establishment in the USA will not retreat from the weaponization of Finance, especially since INSTEX allows members of NATO to continue trading and financial arrangements with Iran, China and Russia. In so far as Global NATO is serving the task of defending the dollar, the extent to which China has created an alternative clearing system in the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) will be seen as another blow to US financial hegemony. Although in its first rollout of the CIPS system, the Chinese went to great length that it would cooperate with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, the current US intelligence war against the Chinese telecom firm Huawei point to the integration between Finance, information warfare and cyberwarfare. [21] In the book, The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger discussed the debates within this highest levels of US intelligence and the Federal Reserve of whether the USA should use its Federal Reserve and cyber warfare to backdoor into the Russian Central Bank to make money disappear. It is in this context where one can note in the planning of NATO strengthening the cyber capabilities is at the top of the Agenda. The Harvard study emphasized the importance of winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age. The convergence of cyberwarfare, economic warfare and information warfare is being taken to new levels under the current administration with its wide ranging sanctions against countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Traditional books on NATO had surveyed the integration of diplomacy, sanctions and weapons procurement, but the new push of the USA in formulating its position of unrivalled dominance is turning out to be another front for defending the dollar. In a world where the USA had imposed sanctions on Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, North Korea, Syria, Sudan along with individual sanctions against individuals in Somalia, South Sudan, Libya, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, the logic of these sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury has now clarified to the allies of the USA in NATO the importance finance was warfare. It was the former Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, who had warned that the over use of sanctions could dull their effectiveness. His logic was simple: Sanctions work because they cut targets off from dealing with U.S. citizens and American financial institutions—a complete severance from the world’s largest economy and its most important financial center. If Washington used this power idly, Lew suggested, it could encourage countries to find partners outside of the United States, and undermine sanctions’ deterrent effect. What Lew did not acknowledge was the relationship between the Treasury, Global NATO and the financial wars. Much of the scholarship on the printing of dollars miss the way in which the infusion of capital in emerging economies further enmesh these societies into the instability of the system. Ultimately, the export of the oscillation of the US economy deepens social and political challenges on the world and reinforces the militarization of the international political economy. Michael Hudson outlined three ways in which flooding of dollars through debt leverage and QE supported the military: (1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers; (2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media, (3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit. He continued, “Strange as it may seem and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.” After the financial crisis in Europe, Quantitative Easing was extended to the Eurozone and Japan, but in the continuing re alignment, of global capitalism, US capital is working hard to decapitate Russia and China as opponents of Global NATO. The currency wars and weaponization of finance is now accompanied by the weaponization of trade and the weaponization of information. Sanger’s The Perfect Weapon War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Agehas opened one window into how full spectrum dominance and the militarization of space is now linked to the weaponization of information and cognitive hacking. We now have new terms of warfare, terms such as “fake news”, “disinformation,” “weaponized information,” “post-truth” and “alternative facts.” Weaponized information (WI) defines a new method messaging and dissemination of content that contains falsehoods, facts taken out of context and pieces of truth strategically released, in an attempt to manipulate knowledge and beliefs. The NATO destruction of Libya was one clear example of how falsehoods were refined to lull workers in Europe to support the destruction of Libya The weaponization of Finance and the Destruction of Libya Not enough is being done to expose the real role of Global NATO and the role of so called humanitarian operatives in ensuring that humanitarian interventions become a force multiplier. Currently, many countries of the EU collaborate with France in the North African region in the fabrication of terror to ensure the deployment of the US Africa Command and French forces in Africa. In Western Europe, NATO has been very successful in ensuring confusion, demoralization, paralysis, and apathy in relation to western imperialism in Africa. African scholars and progressives are very clear that while calling for the dismantling of NATO there must be a call for the EURO to break from the CFA franc zone. Nicolas Sarkozy was very clear that the intervention in Libya was to save the Euro. Africans cannot have a Newtonian view of the struggle against imperialism to assure those from the European left who want solidarity with Africans while supporting French imperialism in Africa. Global NATO and French machinations are involved in a delicate dance and there is silence from the left in the EU when it comes to Europe’s 4000 km strategic radius that covers the entire area of West Africa, North Africa and down through East Africa to Somalia. It is beyond this commentary to delineate the ways in which German scholars, religious organizations, German foundations and non-governmental organizations are now implicated in the criminal acts of France in Africa, especially the war on terror. It is the task of the progressive movement to penetrate the areas of cooperation and conflict between European capitalists and Wall Street so that European workers do not continue to complicity support ‘humanitarian interventions.’ When 200 African scholars wrote the open letter on the impending crime against the peoples of Libya, there has been and continue to be silence on the part of the left in Europe and the United States. Barack Obama had described the intervention in Libya as a mistake and the British Parliamentary Committee outlined how the Libyan intervention had been based on lies. Obama may have considered the intervention a mistake, but his understanding of the process did not reveal how Goldman Sachs was thoroughly implicated the destruction of Libya. The case in the London High Court of the Libyan Investment Authority vs Goldman Sachs brought out revealing evidence of how firms such as Goldman Sachs and others involved in the financialization of the energy markets sought to mobilize the resources of oil rich states with Sovereign Wealth Funds to keep alive the private equity, hedge funds and structured derivatives markets of the global capitalist economy. Most societies and peoples in the world want these banks to be brought under control. But Goldman Sachs benefitted in the ruling because in 2014, two and a half years after the case was brought before the High Court, there was a war in Libya and there was no government therefore one could not represent the Libyan Investment Authority in this arena. We see therefore that the financial institutions are direct beneficiaries of the warfare that is going on in Libya. When the United Nations passed Resolution 1970 and resolution 1973 in 2011, those who had signed these resolutions did not understand then that the resolution was for regime in Libya.[22] The current fighting in Libya remains one of the most inglorious aspects of the 70 year history of NATO but there is silence among those celebrating 70 years of NATO. [23] Since the writings on Finance capital over a century ago by Rudolph Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Nikolai Bukharin the role of finance in the international system has grown beyond the parameters outlined by those who linked finance capital to modern imperialism.[24] After the collapse of the dollar/gold system of 1944 the financial industry of the West has become the axis on which international capitalism spins.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and locks in planetary extinction.

Foster '19 [John Bellamy; 2/1/19; Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, PhD in Political Science from York University, President and Board Member of the Monthly Review; "Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?" https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/]

The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38

If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40

Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity.

Capitalism is best understood as a competitive class-based mode of production and exchange geared to the accumulation of capital through the exploitation of workers’ labor power and the private appropriation of surplus value (value generated beyond the costs of the workers’ own reproduction). The mode of economic accounting intrinsic to capitalism designates as a value-generating good or service anything that passes through the market and therefore produces income. It follows that the greater part of the social and environmental costs of production outside the market are excluded in this form of valuation and are treated as mere negative “externalities,” unrelated to the capitalist economy itself—whether in terms of the shortening and degradation of human life or the destruction of the natural environment. As environmental economist K. William Kapp stated, “capitalism must be regarded as an economy of unpaid costs.”42

We have now reached a point in the twenty-first century in which the externalities of this irrational system, such as the costs of war, the depletion of natural resources, the waste of human lives, and the disruption of the planetary environment, now far exceed any future economic benefits that capitalism offers to society as a whole. The accumulation of capital and the amassing of wealth are increasingly occurring at the expense of an irrevocable rift in the social and environmental conditions governing human life on earth.43

**Thus the alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only democratic centralist dual power organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.**

**Escalante 18**  
(Alyson Escalante, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> rvs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

### 1NC – Long

#### NATO is the militarized front for racial capitalism on both a material and ideological level – psy-ops, imperialism, and weaponization of everything overcodes every move to peace the aff will claim and means their ASSURANCES shore up western imperialism.

Campbell, 19 [Horace, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science @ Syracuse,  author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya (Monthly Review Press, 2013): “[Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis](https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/),” published 4-9-2019, Counter Punch, https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/]

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran. Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted. There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima. The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO. NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans. In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise had been authored by clandestine paramilitary network code-named “Operation Gladio” that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose citizens and organizations in Western Europe that were anti-capitalists. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies. “NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5] The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States. War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America. At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn, “The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7] In the spring of 1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is now known, from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states thatwithin 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Trumanadministration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%. NATO was born on April 4, 1949 out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The task of organizing the deception of the citizens of the West was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9] Racists and anticommunists in the propaganda war It was not by accident that the thinkers and planners of these secret operations were known racists and Nazi sympathizers. Frank Wisner who hailed from Mississippi in the USA was a good example of the upright US citizen who was an architect of the false flag operations and the deception associated with NATO and western intelligence agencies. After the War, in 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects. Soon afterwards under the direction of Allen Dulles, this Office of Special Projects was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. Later James Jesus Angleton was to take this brand of counter intelligence work to the highest levels of state assassinations. Wisner had been mandated told to create an organization that concentrated on “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” It was from this opaque sounding name of Office of Policy Coordination where the brainwashing and virulent anti-communism of the Cold War era was refined. Evan Thomas reported in The Very Best Men: the Daring Early Days of the CIA, the OPC’s charter gave it responsibility for “propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” NATO as the principal prop for international capitalism today. In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street. At that historical moment in 1949, the justification for starting this organization was that it constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.” The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis in order to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine. James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany. One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills. The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. The merging of fascist ideas with the ideas of Jim Crow in the United States were refined in the secret operation called, Operation Paperclip. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space. The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Of the twelve founding members, six were outright colonial powers and at that moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies. In the specific case of France, in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO. Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa. It is not widely known that, initially, the Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination. Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of the State Department on Cooperative Development of Africa had stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism. [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration. The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF, IBRD (World Bank), the NATO, GATT, to guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance. By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town South Africa across to Malaysia. [13] The racist apartheid regime had persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’ After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate. [14] This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15] Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists. Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009. The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO. Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’ Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries. Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe, “Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17] The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism. The fiction of collective western security was effectively broken while after the Asian economic crisis, US capital mobilized NATO to defend Wall Street. In this defense of Wall Street, NATO incessantly bombed Kosovo for 79 days in 1999 as it gave itself a new mission to enlarge US military power right up to the doorstep of Moscow. Gingerly, NATO expanded under US President Bill Clinton from 12 members to 16, then to 19, then to 26 by 2004 and by 2009 to 28 members. Despite vocal opposition from Russia, the discussion of expanding NATO now proceeded to develop the idea of Global NATO. In 2019 there were 29 members of NATO. In his presentation before the US Congress Stoltenberg advocated for a further expansion of NATO and boasted of the high state of readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) which had been created in 2002. NATO and the Weaponization of finance Global NATO was the preeminent force to orchestrate the weaponization of everything. Michael Hudson has outlined finance as warfare and the weaponization of finance in the current phase of imperialism. It will be important to grasp the present sanctions regime of the USA as a form of warfare. In the current literature on imperialism, the term weaponization of finance refers to the foreign policy strategy of using incentives (access to capital markets) and penalties (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive diplomacy. The multiple wars agains Iran represent a model example of the weaponization of finance, the weaponization of information and the weaponization of trade. Under the Presidency of Barack Obama,Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, noted that the weaponization of finance offers to the US “a new battlefield…one that enables [the US] to go after those who wish [the US] harm without putting [US] troops in harm’s way or using lethal force.” Instead of fighting countries militarily, the US can now “cripple them financially. The Obama administration had retreated from a full scale weaponization of finance with Iran by signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ) with Iran in 2015. Under the terms of this agreement in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany),[a] and the European Union, it was agreed that Iran would accept the P5+1 would ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel had opposed this agreement. When Donald Tromp became President of the United States, his administration renounced the JCPOA in 2018 and then signed an executive order reimposing sanctions on any foreign company that continues to do business with Iran. The order gave companies 90-day or 180-day grace periods to extract themselves from existing Iranian contacts or face punitive US measures. Those NATO partners of the USA who signed the JCPOA refused to accept the sanctions imposed on Iran and in 2019 agreed to create a special purpose vehicle to manage their trade with Iran. Britain, Germany and France rolled out INSTEX in February 2019 as one way to break the weaponization of Finance by the USA but in the cat and mouse game of economic warfare, the Foreign Ministers of Europe have not yet been transparent on the full mandate of the special purpose vehicle. These developments mirror the weaponization of trade [19] and finance within NATO and the problems of inter imperialist rivalry in West Asia. The threats against the countries that created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to help facilitate trade with Iran must be taken very seriously, especially in the context of the political insecurity generated by BREXIT. This period reminds the world that of the depression when trade wars and currency wars eventually fueled open fighting in World War II. Finance as warfare Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, there have been efforts by countries holding US debt to limit their exposure to the dollar. In 2009, the Russians and the Chinese worked to establish an alternative international institution involving Brazil, Russia, India and China, later including South Africa and called BRICS. Within the context of BRICS, the Chinese set about a slow process to internationalize its currency, the RMB and undertook currency swaps to avoid the US dollar. After failing to negotiate successfully within the Bretton Woods institution for an increase of its drawing rights commensurate with its volume of international trade, the Chinese embarked on major economic and financial ventures under the banner of One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. When the AIIB was launched in 2015 with 57 countries, the former Treasury Secretary of the US, Lawrence Summers noted that the launch of the AIIB was a turning point and ‘the creation of the AIIB will undermine the leadership role the U.S. has long enjoyed in global finance.’ Both Russia and China intensified their swap trading efforts and Russia settled its crude sales to China. “In March 2018 news broke that Beijing is planning a pilot project for the second half of the year to pay for imported crude oil with renminbi instead of dollars. The two countries allegedly selected for the pilot are Russia and Angola, with rumors that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may become involved. If this venture is successful, it will act as a spur to similar schemes for other imports and primary products.” China was joining the leaders of Europe and the countries in Asia and West Asia who were calling for a multi-currency financial system. Many progressive economists noted that it was not a matter if more countries would flee the dollar, but when. One economist writing from Singapore wrote, “the emergence of a multicurrency or multi-asset international payments system will take time. It doesn’t portend a collapse of the global payments system, but does point to a redistribution of global wealth. The seigniorage harvested by the US as the world’s banker will gradually fall, narrowing the room for maneuver in US economic policy, which for the last 70 years has had the greatest influence on markets globally. As the power of the dollar wanes, the US will be pressured to adjust to a world economy vastly changed since 1945.” [20] The German financial leaders along with France were maneuvering to speed this change with the establishment of the special purpose vehicle to continue trading with Iran. At this time of writing the specific details of the specific purpose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is still being worked out, but the statements of former Ambassador Nicholas Burns before Congress on March 26 made it clear that the Foreign Policy establishment in the USA will not retreat from the weaponization of Finance, especially since INSTEX allows members of NATO to continue trading and financial arrangements with Iran, China and Russia. In so far as Global NATO is serving the task of defending the dollar, the extent to which China has created an alternative clearing system in the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) will be seen as another blow to US financial hegemony. Although in its first rollout of the CIPS system, the Chinese went to great length that it would cooperate with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, the current US intelligence war against the Chinese telecom firm Huawei point to the integration between Finance, information warfare and cyberwarfare. [21] In the book, The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger discussed the debates within this highest levels of US intelligence and the Federal Reserve of whether the USA should use its Federal Reserve and cyber warfare to backdoor into the Russian Central Bank to make money disappear. It is in this context where one can note in the planning of NATO strengthening the cyber capabilities is at the top of the Agenda. The Harvard study emphasized the importance of winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age. The convergence of cyberwarfare, economic warfare and information warfare is being taken to new levels under the current administration with its wide ranging sanctions against countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Traditional books on NATO had surveyed the integration of diplomacy, sanctions and weapons procurement, but the new push of the USA in formulating its position of unrivalled dominance is turning out to be another front for defending the dollar. In a world where the USA had imposed sanctions on Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, North Korea, Syria, Sudan along with individual sanctions against individuals in Somalia, South Sudan, Libya, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, the logic of these sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury has now clarified to the allies of the USA in NATO the importance finance was warfare. It was the former Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, who had warned that the over use of sanctions could dull their effectiveness. His logic was simple: Sanctions work because they cut targets off from dealing with U.S. citizens and American financial institutions—a complete severance from the world’s largest economy and its most important financial center. If Washington used this power idly, Lew suggested, it could encourage countries to find partners outside of the United States, and undermine sanctions’ deterrent effect. What Lew did not acknowledge was the relationship between the Treasury, Global NATO and the financial wars. Much of the scholarship on the printing of dollars miss the way in which the infusion of capital in emerging economies further enmesh these societies into the instability of the system. Ultimately, the export of the oscillation of the US economy deepens social and political challenges on the world and reinforces the militarization of the international political economy. Michael Hudson outlined three ways in which flooding of dollars through debt leverage and QE supported the military: (1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers; (2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media, (3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit. He continued, “Strange as it may seem and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.” After the financial crisis in Europe, Quantitative Easing was extended to the Eurozone and Japan, but in the continuing re alignment, of global capitalism, US capital is working hard to decapitate Russia and China as opponents of Global NATO. The currency wars and weaponization of finance is now accompanied by the weaponization of trade and the weaponization of information. Sanger’s The Perfect Weapon War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Agehas opened one window into how full spectrum dominance and the militarization of space is now linked to the weaponization of information and cognitive hacking. We now have new terms of warfare, terms such as “fake news”, “disinformation,” “weaponized information,” “post-truth” and “alternative facts.” Weaponized information (WI) defines a new method messaging and dissemination of content that contains falsehoods, facts taken out of context and pieces of truth strategically released, in an attempt to manipulate knowledge and beliefs. The NATO destruction of Libya was one clear example of how falsehoods were refined to lull workers in Europe to support the destruction of Libya The weaponization of Finance and the Destruction of Libya Not enough is being done to expose the real role of Global NATO and the role of so called humanitarian operatives in ensuring that humanitarian interventions become a force multiplier. Currently, many countries of the EU collaborate with France in the North African region in the fabrication of terror to ensure the deployment of the US Africa Command and French forces in Africa. In Western Europe, NATO has been very successful in ensuring confusion, demoralization, paralysis, and apathy in relation to western imperialism in Africa. African scholars and progressives are very clear that while calling for the dismantling of NATO there must be a call for the EURO to break from the CFA franc zone. Nicolas Sarkozy was very clear that the intervention in Libya was to save the Euro. Africans cannot have a Newtonian view of the struggle against imperialism to assure those from the European left who want solidarity with Africans while supporting French imperialism in Africa. Global NATO and French machinations are involved in a delicate dance and there is silence from the left in the EU when it comes to Europe’s 4000 km strategic radius that covers the entire area of West Africa, North Africa and down through East Africa to Somalia. It is beyond this commentary to delineate the ways in which German scholars, religious organizations, German foundations and non-governmental organizations are now implicated in the criminal acts of France in Africa, especially the war on terror. It is the task of the progressive movement to penetrate the areas of cooperation and conflict between European capitalists and Wall Street so that European workers do not continue to complicity support ‘humanitarian interventions.’ When 200 African scholars wrote the open letter on the impending crime against the peoples of Libya, there has been and continue to be silence on the part of the left in Europe and the United States. Barack Obama had described the intervention in Libya as a mistake and the British Parliamentary Committee outlined how the Libyan intervention had been based on lies. Obama may have considered the intervention a mistake, but his understanding of the process did not reveal how Goldman Sachs was thoroughly implicated the destruction of Libya. The case in the London High Court of the Libyan Investment Authority vs Goldman Sachs brought out revealing evidence of how firms such as Goldman Sachs and others involved in the financialization of the energy markets sought to mobilize the resources of oil rich states with Sovereign Wealth Funds to keep alive the private equity, hedge funds and structured derivatives markets of the global capitalist economy. Most societies and peoples in the world want these banks to be brought under control. But Goldman Sachs benefitted in the ruling because in 2014, two and a half years after the case was brought before the High Court, there was a war in Libya and there was no government therefore one could not represent the Libyan Investment Authority in this arena. We see therefore that the financial institutions are direct beneficiaries of the warfare that is going on in Libya. When the United Nations passed Resolution 1970 and resolution 1973 in 2011, those who had signed these resolutions did not understand then that the resolution was for regime in Libya.[22] The current fighting in Libya remains one of the most inglorious aspects of the 70 year history of NATO but there is silence among those celebrating 70 years of NATO. [23] Since the writings on Finance capital over a century ago by Rudolph Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Nikolai Bukharin the role of finance in the international system has grown beyond the parameters outlined by those who linked finance capital to modern imperialism.[24] After the collapse of the dollar/gold system of 1944 the financial industry of the West has become the axis on which international capitalism spins.

#### NATO erodes deterrence and sends countries towards war – the problem is that neoliberal decisionmakers actually BELIEVE their own propaganda that Russia is revisionist rather than NATO provoking them – causes extinction.

Burrowes, 19 [Robert J, lifetime commitment to understanding and ending human violence, has done extensive research since 1966 to understand why human beings are violent and has been a nonviolent activist since 1981: "Understanding NATO, Ending War," CounterPunch.org, published 5-23-2019, https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/05/23/understanding-nato-ending-war/]//AD

Different authors offer a variety of reasons for the establishment of NATO. For example, Yves Engler argues that two of the factors driving the creation of NATO were ‘to blunt the European Left’ and ‘a desire to bolster colonial authority and bring the world under a US geopolitical umbrella’. See ‘On NATO’s 70th anniversary important to remember its anti-democratic roots’ and ‘Defense of European empires was original NATO goal’. But few would disagree with Professor Jan Oberg’s brief statement on the origin of NATO: ‘Its raison d’etre… had always and unambiguously been the very existence of the Soviet Union… and its socialist/communist ideology.’ See ‘NATO at 70: An unlawful organisation with serious psychological problems’. In other words, NATO was established as one response to the deep fear the United States government harbored in relation to the Soviet Union which, despite western propaganda to the contrary and at staggering cost to its population and industrial infrastructure, had led the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. As Professor Michel Chossudovsky elaborates this point: The NATO ‘alliance’ of 29 member states (with Israel also a de facto member), most with US military bases, US military (and sometimes nuclear) weapons and significant or substantial deployments of US troops on their territory, was designed to sustain ‘the de facto “military occupation” of Western Europe’ and to confront the Soviet Union as the US administration orchestrated the Cold War to justify its imperial agenda – global domination guaranteed by massive US military expansion – in service of elite interests (including the profit maximization of the military industrial complex, its fossil fuel and banking corporations, and its media and information technology giants). While NATO has the appearance of a multinational military alliance, the US controls NATO command structures with the Pentagon dominating NATO decision-making. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) are Americans appointed by Washington with the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg performing merely bureaucratic functions. In light of the above, Chossudovsky observes: ‘Under the terms of the military alliance, NATO member states are harnessed into endorsing Washington’s imperial design of World conquest under the doctrine of collective security.’ Even worse, he argues, given the lies and fabrications that permeate US-NATO military doctrine, key decision-makers believe their own propaganda. ‘Immediately after the Cold War, a new nuclear doctrine was formulated, focused on the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, meaning a nuclear first strike as a means of self-defense.’ More recently: ‘Not only do they believe that tactical nuclear weapons are peace-making bombs, they are now putting forth the concept of a “Winnable Third World War”. Taking out China and Russia is on the drawing board of the Pentagon.’ See ‘NATO-Exit: Dismantle NATO, Close Down 800 US Military Bases, Prosecute the War Criminals’ and ‘NATO Spending Pushes Europe from Welfare to Warfare’. So, given the ongoing military threats – with an expanding range of horrific weapons (including, to nominate just two, ‘more usable’ low yield nuclear weapons and technologies on ‘weather warfare’ offered by the military/nuclear corporate war planners) that threaten previously unimagined outcomes – and interventions by a US-led NATO, with Venezuela and now Iran the latest countries to be directly threatened – see ‘“Dangerous game”: US, Europe and the “betrayal” of Iran’ – as well as a gathering consensus among peace activists and scholars of the importance of stopping NATO (particularly given the many opportunities, beginning with aborting its origin, that have been missed already as explained by Professor Peter Kuznick: see ‘“Obscene” Bipartisan Applause for NATO in Congress’) how do we actually stop NATO? While several authors, including those with articles cited above, offer ideas on what should be done about ending NATO, Chossudovsky offers the most comprehensive list of ideas in this regard well aware that stopping NATO is intimately connected to the struggle to end war and globalization. Chossudovsky’s ideas range from organizational suggestions such as integrating anti-war protest with the campaign against the gamut of neoliberal economic ‘reforms’ and the development of a broad based grassroots network independent of NGOs funded by Wall Street, objectives such as dismantling the propaganda apparatus which sustains the legitimacy of war and neoliberalism, challenging the corporate media (including by using alternative media outlets on the Internet), providing encouragement (including information about the illegality of their orders) for military personnel to refuse to fight (perhaps like the GI coffeehouse movement during the US war on Vietnam: see ‘The story of the GI coffeehouses’), working to close down weapons assembly plants and many other suggestions. See Towards a World War III Scenario: The Dangers of Nuclear War and ‘NATO-Exit: Dismantle NATO, Close Down 800 US Military Bases, Prosecute the War Criminals’. Given my own deep interest in this subject of US/NATO wars and in developing and implementing a strategy that ends their war-making, let me elaborate Chossudovsky’s explanation of NATO’s function in the world today by introducing a book by Professor Peter Phillips. In his book Giants: The Global Power Elite, Phillips observes that the power elite continually worries about rebellion by the ‘unruly exploited masses’ against their structure of concentrated wealth. This is why the US military empire has long played the role of defender of global capitalism. As a result, the United States has more than 800 military bases (with some scholars suggesting 1,000) in 70 countries and territories. In comparison, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia have about 30 foreign bases. In addition, US military forces are now deployed in 70 percent of the world’s nations with US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) having troops in 147 countries, an increase of 80 percent since 2010. These forces conduct counterterrorism strikes regularly, including drone assassinations and kill/capture raids. ‘The US military empire stands on hundreds of years of colonial exploitation and continues to support repressive, exploitative governments that cooperate with global capital’s imperial agenda. Governments that accept external capital investment, whereby a small segment of a country’s elite benefits, do so knowing that capital inevitably requires a return on investment that entails using up resources and people for economic gain. The whole system continues wealth concentration for elites and expanded wretched inequality for the masses…. ‘Understanding permanent war as an economic relief valve for surplus capital is a vital part of comprehending capitalism in the world today. War provides investment opportunity for the Giants and TCC elites and a guaranteed return on capital. War also serves a repressive function of keeping the suffering masses of humanity afraid and compliant.’ As Phillips elaborates: This is why defense of global capital is the prime reason that NATO countries now account for 85 percent of the world’s military spending; the United States spends more on the military than the rest of the world combined. In essence, ‘the Global Power Elite uses NATO and the US military empire for its worldwide security. This is part of an expanding strategy of US military domination around the world, whereby the US/ NATO military empire, advised by the power elite’s Atlantic Council, operates in service to the Transnational Corporate Class for the protection of international capital everywhere in the world’. In short, ending NATO requires recognition of its fundamental role in preserving the US empire (at the expense of national sovereignty) and maintaining geopolitical control to defend the global elite’s capital interests – reflected in the capitalist agenda to endlessly expand economic growth – and particularly the profits the elite makes by inciting, supplying and justifying the massively profitable wars that the US/NATO conduct on its behalf. So if you thought that wars were fought for reasons other than profit (like defense, a ‘just cause’ or ‘humanitarian’ motives) you have missed the essential function of US/NATO wars. And while these wars might be promoted by the corporate media as conflicts over geostrategic considerations (like ‘keeping open the Straits of Hormuz’), access to resources (‘war for oil’) or even markets (so that we can have US junk-food chains in every country on Earth), these explanations are all merely more palatable versions of the word ‘profit’ and are designed to obscure the truth. And this raises another question worth pondering. Given that wars are the highly organized industrial-scale killing of fellow human beings (for profit) as well as the primary means of expanding the number of fellow human beings who are drawn into the global capitalist economy to be exploited (for profit) and the primary method used for destroying Earth’s climate and environment (for profit), you might wander if those who conduct wars are sane. Well, as even posing the question suggests, the global elite – which drives wars, the highly exploitative capitalist economy and destruction of the biosphere – is quite insane. And there is a brief explanation of this insanity and how it is caused in the article ‘The Global Elite is Insane Revisited’.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and locks in planetary extinction.

Foster '19 [John Bellamy; 2/1/19; Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, PhD in Political Science from York University, President and Board Member of the Monthly Review; "Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?" https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/]

The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38

If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40

Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity.

Capitalism is best understood as a competitive class-based mode of production and exchange geared to the accumulation of capital through the exploitation of workers’ labor power and the private appropriation of surplus value (value generated beyond the costs of the workers’ own reproduction). The mode of economic accounting intrinsic to capitalism designates as a value-generating good or service anything that passes through the market and therefore produces income. It follows that the greater part of the social and environmental costs of production outside the market are excluded in this form of valuation and are treated as mere negative “externalities,” unrelated to the capitalist economy itself—whether in terms of the shortening and degradation of human life or the destruction of the natural environment. As environmental economist K. William Kapp stated, “capitalism must be regarded as an economy of unpaid costs.”42

We have now reached a point in the twenty-first century in which the externalities of this irrational system, such as the costs of war, the depletion of natural resources, the waste of human lives, and the disruption of the planetary environment, now far exceed any future economic benefits that capitalism offers to society as a whole. The accumulation of capital and the amassing of wealth are increasingly occurring at the expense of an irrevocable rift in the social and environmental conditions governing human life on earth.43

**Their cessation of revolutionary institution building abdicates the potential for true communual power, reducing revolution to reactive bursts of energy. This debate must be a question of the speed, scope, and scale of revolutionary strategy. Only dual power organizing can build institutions that meet the material needs of community and construct a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.**

**Escalante, 19** [Alyson, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," *Failing That, Invent*, https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/02/15/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/]//AD

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to **dual power** **strategy** is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist **institutions** which can directly provide for **material needs** in times of **capitalist crisis.** **Socialist agricultural** and **food distribution programs** can take ground that the **capitalist state** cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist **self-management** and **political** **institutions** can function **independently** of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of **literally saving lives** in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the **possibility of a revolutionary project** which seeks to **destroy rather than reform** capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are **inevitable**, and we are now in a **post-brink world**, where damage control is the primary concern. **The question is not whether we can escape** a future of **climate change, but whether we can survive it**. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends. **The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point**. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels **requires caustic chemicals** such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and **the process uses water as well as electricity**, the production of which **emits greenhouse gases**.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure **only perpetuates environmental harm**. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant **militarism** from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates **constant warfare** as imperial states compete for **spheres of influence** in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and **if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility.** The pressing question we now face is: **how are we going to save ourselves?** Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, **we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years**. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development. Dual power is tooled towards this project best. **The Marxist Center** network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through **tenants organizing** and **serve the people programs**. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop **mutual aid programs** that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, **mutual aid is not enough**. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a **broader revolutionary movement** and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather **they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends**. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to **radicalize** the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet **the needs of** its members and the **communities** in which it operates. **Revolutionary institutions** that **can provide food, housing**, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for **build**ing **a base** among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

**Thus the alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only democratic centralist dual power organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.**

**Escalante 18**  
(Alyson Escalante, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> rvs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

## Links – Top Level

### Top Level Link

#### Weaponization of [AI, biotechnology, cyber capabilities] for NATO is a militarization of brain science that results in massive extensions of Western neoliberal violence against all populations via cognitive warfare – turns and outweighs the entirety of the aff

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**NATO is developing new forms of warfare to wage a “battle for the brain,”** as the military alliance put it.

**The US-led NATO military cartel has tested novel modes of hybrid warfare against its self-declared adversaries, including economic warfare, cyber warfare, information warfare, and psychological warfare**.

Now, NATO is spinning out an entirely new kind of combat it has branded cognitive warfare. **Described as the “weaponization of brain sciences,” the new method involves “hacking the individual” by exploiting “the vulnerabilities of the human brain” in order to implement more sophisticated “social engineering.”**

Until recently, NATO had divided war into five different operational domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyber. But with its development of cognitive warfare strategies, the military alliance is discussing a new, sixth level: the “human domain.”

A 2020 NATO-sponsored study of this new form of warfare clearly explained,

While actions taken in the five domains are executed in order to have an effect on the human domain, cognitive warfare’s objective is to make everyone a weapon.

“**The brain will be the battlefield of the 21st century,” the report stressed**. “Humans are the contested domain,” and “future conflicts will likely occur amongst the people digitally first and physically thereafter in proximity to hubs of political and economic power.”

While the NATO-backed study insisted that much of its research on cognitive warfare is designed for defensive purposes, **it** also **conceded that the military alliance is developing offensive tactics**, stating,

The human is very often the main vulnerability and it should be acknowledged in order to protect NATO’s human capital but also to be able to benefit from our adversaries’s vulnerabilities.

**In a chilling disclosure, the report said explicitly that “**the objective of Cognitive Warfare is to harm societies and not only the military.”

**With entire civilian populations in NATO’s crosshairs, the report emphasized that Western militaries must work more closely with academia to weaponize social sciences and human sciences and help the alliance develop its cognitive warfare capacities**.

The study described this phenomenon as “the militarization of brain science.” But it appears clear that NATO’s development of cognitive warfare will lead to a militarization of all aspects of human society and psychology, from the most intimate of social relationships to the mind itself.

**Such all-encompassing militarization of society is reflected in the paranoid tone of the NATO-sponsored report, which warned of “an embedded fifth column, where everyone, unbeknownst** to ~~him or her~~ [**themselves**], **is behaving according to the plans of one of our competitors**.” The study makes it clear that those “competitors” purportedly exploiting the consciousness of Western dissidents are China and Russia.

In other words, this document shows that figures in the NATO military cartel increasingly see their own domestic population as a threat, fearing civilians to be potential Chinese or Russian sleeper cells, dastardly “fifth columns” that challenge the stability of “Western liberal democracies.”

**NATO’s development of novel forms of hybrid warfare come at a time when member states’ military campaigns are targeting domestic populations on an unprecedented level**.

The Ottawa Citizen reported this September that the Canadian military’s Joint Operations Command took advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to wage an information war against its own domestic population, testing out propaganda tactics on Canadian civilians.

**Internal NATO-sponsored reports suggest that this disclosure is just scratching the surface of a wave of new unconventional warfare techniques that Western militaries are employing around the world**.

Canada hosts ‘NATO Innovation Challenge’ on cognitive warfare

**Twice each year, NATO holds a “pitch-style event” that it brand as an “Innovation Challenge.”** These campaigns–one hosted in the Spring and the other in the Fall, **by alternating member states–call on private companies, organizations, and researchers to help develop new tactics and technologies for the military alliance**.

The shark tank-like challenges reflect the predominant influence of neoliberal ideology within NATO, as participants mobilize the free market, public-private partnerships, and the promise of cash prizes to advance the agenda of the military-industrial complex.

NATO’s Fall 2021 Innovation Challenge is hosted by Canada, and is titled “The invisible threat: Tools for countering cognitive warfare.”

“Cognitive warfare seeks to change not only what people think, but also how they act,” the Canadian government wrote in its official statement on the challenge.

**Attacks against the cognitive domain involve the integration of cyber, disinformation/misinformation, psychological, and social-engineering capabilities**.

Ottawa’s press release continued:

Cognitive warfare positions the mind as a battle space and contested domain. Its objective is to sow dissonance, instigate conflicting narratives, polarize opinion, and radicalize groups. **Cognitive warfare can motivate people to act in ways that can disrupt or fragment an otherwise cohesive society**.

NATO-backed Canadian military officials discuss cognitive warfare in panel event

An advocacy group called the NATO Association of Canada has mobilized to support this Innovation Challenge, working closely with military contractors to attract the private sector to invest in further research on behalf of NATO–and its own bottom line.

While the NATO Association of Canada (NAOC) is technically an independent NGO, its mission is to promote NATO, and the organization boasts on its website,

The NAOC has strong ties with the Government of Canada including Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence.

As part of its efforts to promote Canada’s NATO Innovation Challenge, the NAOC held a panel discussion on cognitive warfare on October 5.

The researcher who wrote the definitive 2020 NATO-sponsored study on cognitive warfare, François du Cluzel, participated in the event, alongside NATO-backed Canadian military officers.

The panel was overseen by Robert Baines, president of the NATO Association of Canada. It was moderated by Garrick Ngai, a marketing executive in the weapons industry who serves as an adviser to the Canadian Department of National Defense and vice president and director of the NAOC.

Baines opened the event noting that participants would discuss “cognitive warfare and new domain of competition, where state and non-state actors aim to influence what people think and how they act.”

The NAOC president also happily noted the lucrative “opportunities for Canadian companies” that this NATO Innovation Challenge promised.

NATO researcher describes cognitive warfare as ‘ways of harming the brain’

The October 5 panel kicked off with François du Cluzel, a former French military officer who in 2013 helped to create the NATO Innovation Hub (iHub), which he has since then managed from its base in Norfolk, Virginia.

Although the iHub insists on its website, for legal reasons, that the “opinions expressed on this platform don’t constitute NATO or any other organization points of view,” the organization is sponsored by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), described as “one of two Strategic Commands at the head of NATO’s military command structure.”

The Innovation Hub, therefore, acts as a kind of in-house NATO research center or think tank. Its research is not necessarily official NATO policy, but it is directly supported and overseen by NATO.

In 2020, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) tasked du Cluzel, as manager of the iHub, to conduct a six-month study on cognitive warfare.

Du Cluzel summarized his research in the panel this October. He initiated his remarks noting that **cognitive warfare “right now is one of the hottest topics for NATO,” and “has become a recurring term in military terminology in recent years**.”

Although French, Du Cluzel emphasized that cognitive warfare strategy “is being currently developed by my command here in Norfolk, USA.”

The NATO Innovation Hub manager spoke with a PowerPoint presentation, and opened with a provocative slide that described cognitive warfare as “A Battle for the Brain.”

“Cognitive warfare is a new concept that starts in the information sphere, that is a kind of hybrid warfare,” du Cluzel said.

“**It starts with hyper-connectivity. Everyone has a cell phone**,” he continued.

**It starts with information because information is**, if I may say, **the fuel of cognitive warfare**. **But it goes way beyond solely information, which is a standalone operation–information warfare is a standalone operation**.

Cognitive warfare overlaps with Big Tech corporations and mass surveillance, because “it’s all about leveraging the big data,” du Cluzel explained.

We produce data everywhere we go. Every minute, every second we go, we go online. **And this is extremely easy to leverage those data in order to better know you and use that knowledge to change the way you think**.

Naturally, the NATO researcher claimed foreign “adversaries” are the supposed aggressors employing cognitive warfare. **But** at the same time, **he made it clear that the Western military alliance is developing its own tactics**.

Du Cluzel defined cognitive warfare as the “art of using technologies to alter the cognition of human targets.”

Those technologies, he noted, incorporate the fields of NBIC–nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. All together, “it makes a kind of very dangerous cocktail that can further manipulate the brain,” he said.

Du Cluzel went on to explain that the exotic new method of attack “goes well beyond” information warfare or psychological operations (psyops).

“Cognitive warfare is not only a fight against what we think, but it’s rather a fight against the way we think, if we can change the way people think,” he said.

It’s much more powerful and it goes way beyond the information [warfare] and psyops.

De Cluzel continued:

It’s crucial to understand that it’s a game on our cognition, on the way our brain processes information and turns it into knowledge, rather than solely a game on information or on psychological aspects of our brains. It’s not only an action against what we think, but also an action against the way we think, the way we process information and turn it into knowledge.

In other words, cognitive warfare is not just another word, another name for information warfare. **It is a war on our individual processor, our brain**.

**The NATO researcher stressed that “this is extremely important for us in the military,” because “it has the potential, by developing new weapons and ways of harming the brain, it has the potential to engage neuroscience and technology in many, many different approaches to influence human ecology**… because you all know that it’s very easy to turn a civilian technology into a military one.”

As for who the targets of cognitive warfare could be, du Cluzel revealed that anyone and everyone is on the table.

“Cognitive warfare has universal reach, from starting with the individual to states and multinational organizations,” he said.

**Its field of action is global and aim to seize control of the human being, civilian as well as military.**

**And the private sector has a financial interest in advancing cognitive warfare research**, he noted:

The massive worldwide investments made in neurosciences suggests that the cognitive domain will probably one of the battlefields of the future.

The development of cognitive warfare totally transforms military conflict as we know it, du Cluzel said, adding “a third major combat dimension to the modern battlefield: to the physical and informational dimension is now added a cognitive dimension.”

This “creates a new space of competition beyond what is called the five domains of operations–or land, sea, air, cyber, and space domains. Warfare in the cognitive arena mobilizes a wider range of battle spaces than solely the physical and information dimensions can do.”

In short, humans themselves are the new contested domain in this novel mode of hybrid warfare, alongside land, sea, air, cyber, and outer space.

NATO’s cognitive warfare study warns of “embedded fifth column”

The study that NATO Innovation Hub manager François du Cluzel conducted, from June to November 2020, was sponsored by the military cartel’s Allied Command Transformation, and published as a 45-page report in January 2021 (PDF).

The chilling document shows how contemporary warfare has reached a kind of dystopian stage, once imaginable only in science fiction.

“The nature of warfare has changed,” the report emphasized.

The majority of current conflicts remain below the threshold of the traditionally accepted definition of warfare, but new forms of warfare have emerged such as Cognitive Warfare (CW), while the human mind is now being considered as a new domain of war.

For NATO, research on cognitive warfare is not just defensive; it is very much offensive as well.

“Developing capabilities to harm the cognitive abilities of opponents will be a necessity,” du Cluzel’s report stated clearly.

In other words, **NATO will need to get the ability to safeguard** ~~her~~ [**its**] **decision making process and disrupt the adversary’s one**.

**And anyone could be a target of these cognitive warfare operations**: “**Any user of modern information technologies is a potential target. It targets the whole of a nation’s human capital**,” the report ominously added.

“**As well as the potential execution of a cognitive war to complement to a military conflict, it can also be conducted alone, without any link to an engagement of the armed forces**,” the study went on.

Moreover, cognitive warfare is potentially endless since there can be no peace treaty or surrender for this type of conflict.

**Just as this new mode of battle has no geographic borders, it also has no time limit:**

**This battlefield is global via the internet. With no beginning and no end, this conquest knows no respite, punctuated by notifications from our smartphones, anywhere, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week**.

The NATO-sponsored study noted that “some NATO Nations have already acknowledged that neuroscientific techniques and technologies have high potential for operational use in a variety of security, defense and intelligence enterprises.”

It spoke of breakthroughs in “neuroscientific methods and technologies” (neuroS/T), and said “uses of research findings and products to directly facilitate the performance of combatants, the integration of human machine interfaces to optimise combat capabilities of semi autonomous vehicles (e.g., drones), and development of biological and chemical weapons (i.e., neuroweapons).”

The Pentagon is among the primary institutions advancing this novel research, as the report highlighted:

Although a number of nations have pursued, and are currently pursuing neuroscientific research and development for military purposes, perhaps the most proactive efforts in this regard have been conducted by the United States Department of Defense; with most notable and rapidly maturing research and development conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).

Military uses of neuroS/T research, the study indicated, include intelligence gathering, training, “optimising performance and resilience in combat and military support personnel,” and of course “direct weaponisation of neuroscience and neurotechnology.”

**This weaponization of neuroS/T can and will be fatal, the NATO-sponsored study was clear to point out**. The research can “be utilised to mitigate aggression and foster cognitions and emotions of affiliation or passivity; induce morbidity, disability or suffering; and ‘neutralise’ potential opponents or incur mortality”–in other words, to maim and kill people.

The report quoted U.S. Major General Robert H. Scales, who summarized NATO’s new combat philosophy:

Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground.

And **as NATO develops tactics of cognitive warfare to “capture the psycho-cultural,” it is also increasingly weaponizing various scientific fields**.

The study spoke of “the crucible of data sciences and human sciences,” and stressed that “the combination of Social Sciences and System Engineering will be key in helping military analysts to improve the production of intelligence.”

“If kinetic power cannot defeat the enemy,” it said,

psychology and related behavioural and social sciences stand to fill the void.

“Leveraging social sciences will be central to the development of the Human Domain Plan of Operations,” the report went on.

It will support the combat operations by providing potential courses of action for the whole surrounding Human Environment including enemy forces, but also determining key human elements such as the Cognitive center of gravity, the desired behaviour as the end state.

All academic disciplines will be implicated in cognitive warfare, not just the hard sciences. “Within the military, expertise on anthropology, ethnography, history, psychology among other areas will be more than ever required to cooperate with the military,” the NATO-sponsored study stated.

**The report nears its conclusion with an eerie quote**:

**Today’s progresses in** nanotechnology, **biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science** (NBIC), **boosted by the seemingly unstoppable march of a triumphant troika made of Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and civilisational ‘digital addiction’ have created a much more ominous prospect: an embedded fifth column, where everyone**, unbeknownst to ~~him or her~~ [themselves], **is behaving according to the plans** of one of our competitors.

“The modern concept of war is not about weapons but about influence,” it posited.

Victory in the long run will remain solely dependent on the ability to influence, affect, change or impact the cognitive domain.

**The NATO-sponsored study then closed with a final paragraph that makes it clear beyond doubt that the Western military alliance’s ultimate goal is not only physical control of the planet, but also control over people’s minds**:

Cognitive warfare may well be the missing element that allows the transition from military victory on the battlefield to lasting political success. The human domain might well be the decisive domain, wherein multi-domain operations achieve the commander’s effect. The five first domains can give tactical and operational victories; only the human domain can achieve the final and full victory.

Canadian Special Operations officer emphasizes importance of cognitive warfare

When François du Cluzel, the NATO researcher who conducted the study on cognitive warfare, concluded his remarks in the October 5 NATO Association of Canada panel, he was followed by Andy Bonvie, a commanding officer at the Canadian Special Operations Training Centre.

With more than 30 years of experience with the Canadian Armed Forces, Bonvie spoke of how Western militaries are making use of research by du Cluzel and others, and incorporating novel cognitive warfare techniques into their combat activities.

“Cognitive warfare is a new type of hybrid warfare for us,” Bonvie said.

And it means that we need to look at the traditional thresholds of conflict and how the things that are being done are really below those thresholds of conflict, cognitive attacks, and non-kinetic forms and non-combative threats to us. We need to understand these attacks better and adjust their actions and our training accordingly to be able to operate in these different environments.

**Although he portrayed NATO’s actions as “defensive,” claiming “adversaries” were using cognitive warfare against them, Bonvie was unambiguous about the fact that Western militaries are developing these tecniques themselves, to maintain a “tactical advantage.”**

“We cannot lose the tactical advantage for our troops that we’re placing forward as it spans not only tactically, but strategically,” he said.

Some of those different capabilities that we have that we enjoy all of a sudden could be pivoted to be used against us. So we have to better understand how quickly our adversaries adapt to things, and then be able to predict where they’re going in the future, to help us be and maintain the tactical advantage for our troops moving forward.

‘Cognitive warfare is the most advanced form of manipulation seen to date’

Marie-Pierre Raymond, a retired Canadian lieutenant colonel who currently serves as a “defence scientist and innovation portfolio manager” for the Canadian Armed Forces’ Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security Program, also joined the October 5 panel.

“**Long gone are the days when war was fought to acquire more land**,” Raymond said.

Now the new objective is to change the adversaries’ ideologies, which makes the brain the center of gravity of the human. And it makes the human the contested domain, and the mind becomes the battlefield.

“When we speak about hybrid threats, cognitive warfare is the most advanced form of manipulation seen to date,” she added, noting that it aims to influence individuals’ decision-making and “to influence a group of a group of individuals on their behavior, with the aim of gaining a tactical or strategic advantage.”

Raymond noted that **cognitive warfare also heavily overlaps with** artificial intelligence**, big data, and social media, and reflects “the rapid evolution of neurosciences as a tool of war.”**

Raymond is helping to oversee the NATO Fall 2021 Innovation Challenge on behalf of Canada’s Department of National Defence, which delegated management responsibilities to the military’s Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) Program, where she works.

In highly technical jargon, Raymond indicated that the cognitive warfare program is not solely defensive, but also offensive:

This challenge is calling for a solution that will support NATO’s nascent human domain and jump-start the development of a cognition ecosystem within the alliance, and that will support the development of new applications, new systems, new tools and concepts leading to concrete action in the cognitive domain.”

She emphasized that this “will require sustained cooperation between allies, innovators, and researchers to enable our troops to fight and win in the cognitive domain. This is what we are hoping to emerge from this call to innovators and researchers.”

To inspire corporate interest in the NATO Innovation Challenge, Raymond enticed, “Applicants will receive national and international exposure and cash prizes for the best solution.” She then added tantalizingly,

This could also benefit the applicants by potentially providing them access to a market of 30 nations.

Canadian military officer calls on corporations to invest in NATO’s cognitive warfare research

The other institution that is managing the Fall 2021 NATO Innovation Challenge on behalf of Canada’s Department of National Defense is the Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).

A Canadian military officer who works with CANSOFCOM, Shekhar Gothi, was the final panelist in the October 5 NATO Association of Canada event. Gothi serves as CANSOFCOM’s “innovation officer” for Southern Ontario.

He concluded the event appealing for corporate investment in NATO’s cognitive warfare research.

The bi-annual Innovation Challenge is “part of the NATO battle rhythm,” Gothi declared enthusiastically.

He noted that, in the spring of 2021, Portugal held a NATO Innovation Challenge focused on warfare in outer space.

In spring 2020, the Netherlands hosted a NATO Innovation Challenge focused on COVID-19.

**Gothi reassured corporate investors that NATO will bend over backward to defend their bottom lines**:

I can assure everyone that the NATO innovation challenge indicates that all innovators will maintain complete control of their intellectual property. So NATO won’t take control of that. Neither will Canada. Innovators will maintain their control over their IP.

**The comment was a fitting conclusion** to the panel, **affirming that NATO and its allies in the military-industrial complex not only seek to dominate the world and the humans that inhabit it with unsettling cognitive warfare techniques, but to also ensure that corporations and their shareholders continue to profit from these imperial endeavors**.

### Biodefense Link

#### International “biodefense” is just a veil for the US to give out bioweapons when they need them used and then to punish those same nations for possessing them – Iraq proves

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

The United States has dominated international arms control since the end of the Cold War. International regulatory mechanisms are designed to favor global powers via their uneven application as well as in the structure of the laws themselves. As gender and global politics scholar Liz Philipose (2008) has noted, international law has “developed in tandem with imperial needs to justify colonization, slavery, occupation and decision-making authority over the lands and peoples of non-European extraction” and, further, reflects a civilizing project aiming to “sustain the ongoing dichotomy between the civilized and the backward” (104–105). The 1972 international ban on biological weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), arose in the context of global powers (notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) abandoning biological weapons in favor of nuclear ones, which they both possessed and believed much more effective (Guillemin 2005a). Thus, the protocol banned a weapon global powers presumed they no longer needed, while arming them with a regulatory mechanism to police the biological weapons of other nations. The BWC, coupled with subsequent verification processes authorized by the UN Security Council in the early 1990s, provided the basis for the United States and its allies to control targets like Iraq. U.S. (and European) control over Iraq had begun in the 1980s when they supplied Iraq with biological and chemical weapons as a strategic move against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (Barnaby 2000; Central Intelligence Agency 2007; L. Cole 1997). The United States had overlooked Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, even though it violated the Geneva Protocol’s ban on the first use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war (Rapoport 1999).2 But once Iraq fell out of favor with the United States, leading to the First Gulf War in 1991, the United States and other powerful nations targeted Iraq’s weapons programs with the verification protocols of the BWC. Iraq was subject to UN weapons inspections following the war, and again in 2002. These inspections set the stage for further U.S. domination of Iraq: Iraqi biological weapons possession served as a primary rationale for a second invasion of the country in 2003. The pro-war propaganda leading up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 maligned Iraq as flouting international law—the United States accused Iraq of possessing biological weapons (and other WMDs). President Bush, members of the Defense Department, and high-level weapons experts, as well as mass media and other pundits, vigorously painted the specter of Iraq as embodying the threat of bioterrorism. Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, had been demonized as an Arab / Muslim Other since the First Gulf War, and in the post-9 / 11 context U.S. pundits easily floated connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda, WMDs, terrorism, and the anthrax attacks.3 While most of these claims proved baseless, and were later revealed to be either exaggerated or altogether false (Center for Public Integrity 2008; Kimball 2003; Pitt 2002), in the lead-up to the invasion their symbolic utility proved undeniable. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a speech to the UN Security Council about Iraqi biological weapons. He showed pictures of mobile research laboratories and held up a small container of white talcum powder (figure 2) meant to simulate dry anthrax (Vogel 2012), stating, “Less than a teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall of 2001,” followed by “Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons” (Powell 2003). By visually and rhetorically reducing Iraqi bioweapons capability to anthrax powder, Powell drew on the gripping image of the Arab / Muslim Other as menacing germ. Like the figure of the suicide infector I described in the previous chapter, this germ figure further stoked the construction of Iraq as a potent biothreat, and state officials used it to rally action. This threat imaginary about Iraq bolstered U.S. rationale for invasion, reinforcing the United States’ ostensible role as global police of the biological weapons capacity of nations around the world. The image of Colin Powell also represented U.S. exceptionalist narratives during the period: pictorial and rhetorical invocations of high-ranking people of color in the Bush administration, particularly Secretary of State Powell and his successor, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, served in the political theater of the war on terror to present the United States—by virtue of its multiculturalism—as democratic and fair, a land of equality and justice.4 Like discursive gestures to morality, civilizational advancement, and feminism described in the previous chapter, these depictions rendered U.S. actions domestically and abroad as serving these lofty, benevolent ideals. The horrific effects of U.S. empire cannot be overstated. Consider the catalogue of topics about the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the anthology Feminism and War: Confronting U.S. Imperialism (Riley, Mohanty, and Pratt 2008): record numbers of civilian casualties; the body count in general; racialized, sexualized torture; enlistment of U.S. women into the dangerous culture of gendered violence in the U.S. military; an increase in domestic and sexual violence against women and children worldwide; not to mention the decimation of the economies and infrastructure of targeted countries and the cuts to U.S. social services and the effects on marginalized populations within the United States. In this context, U.S. ability to determine the course of biological warfare globally constitutes cause for great concern—it is one more node in a constellation of U.S. power augmented during the war on terror.

#### Militarism, capitalism, and imperialism are all intimately tied to the development of biodefense

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

Laboratories that are designed to enclose infectious agents are designated with Biological Safety Levels (BSL) set from 1 through 4 (with 4 pertaining to the most dangerous pathogens, such as smallpox or Ebola); they house specialized equipment and require scientists to follow specific safety protocols and best practices. In 2002 the Department of Homeland Security spent $70 million to open more of these labs (Guillemin 2005a). The Sunshine Project, an international bioweapons watchdog NGO, took a snapshot in November 2004 of the national array of high-containment labs —specifically BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs for containing lethal pathogens. The map (figure 3) showed existing as well as planned labs: the former designated with a biohazard sign, the latter designated with a biohazard sign plus a dot in the sign’s upper-right corner (Sunshine Project 2004). This proliferation of biodefense continued to be outsourced to the civilian sector (mainly the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS] agencies) as well as private industry. The National Institutes of Health (NIH)—the research agency of HHS—was funded to conduct research and development for new biomedical countermeasures at over $1.5 billion per year in fiscal year 2003—thirty times the investment in fiscal year 2001 (Bush 2004a).13 The pharmaceuticals industry—the face of neoliberal capitalism in the biomedical sphere—played an increasingly large role. The government enlisted this large and powerful congressional lobby14 to produce vaccines and other drugs against biological agents by offering incentives such as tax breaks and indemnities (since vaccines are not the most lucrative of pharmaceutical products).15 This reliance of government on private industry, begun under the Clinton administration, has reduced compliance monitoring. Since the late 1990s, the U.S. state has sought to decrease U.S. transparency in international weapons compliance. In particular, the U.S. Congress and the pharmaceutical industry, arguing that transparency through onsite inspections of military and pharmaceutical facilities would endanger commercial proprietary and national security interests, pressured Clinton into weakening the treaty’s inspections regime at the fourth review of the BWC in 199716 (Guillemin 2005b; S. Wright 2002). The Bush administration unabashedly maintained this corporate biodefense policy, rejecting the ratification of a strengthened international bioweapons treaty during its quintennial review in 2001, and thereby halting the verification protocol. Once again, the United States cited national security and commercial interests (Dando 2006; Findlay 2006). In this way, the profit imperative of the private sector worked hand in hand with U.S. imperialism, further enabling what some have termed the “biodefense industrial complex” (Fidler and Gostin 2007, 148). Empire and capitalism easily superseded international disarmament aims, enabling the U.S. state to shrug off substantive limits to its industry’s activities.

### Biotechnology Link

#### NATO biotechnology schemes are driven by a desire to win geoeconomics competition and secure hegemony of capital

General John Allen, Dr. Heiko Borchert, and Marcin Zaborowski ‘21, \*President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, \*\*Director of Borchert Consulting & Research AG, \*\*\*Policy Director of the Future of Security Programme, GLOBSEC, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address”, GLOBSEC, 12/14/21, https://www.globsec.org/news/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/

Emerging technologies are the geo-economics Achilles heel NATO needs to address to deter aggressors, write General John Allen, Heiko Borchert and Marcin Zaborowski. To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment.

To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. **DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users** to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies. The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. **Artificial intelligence**, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, **and other technologies** are at the heart of geo-economic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals.

Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations**. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies**. **NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic**. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond.

#### Biotech greed is at all time highs with very little of the money going to “innovation” – don’t buy the aff’s lies

Jag Bhalla ’21, is an entrepreneur and writer. His current project is Errors We Live By, a series of short illustrated exoteric essays atbigthink.com. They include errors in how evolution and economics are understood and used, “Biotechnology greed is prolonging the pandemic. It’s inexcusable”, Salon, 8/13/21, https://www.salon.com/2021/08/13/biotechnology-greed-is-prolonging-the-pandemic-its-inexcusable\_partner/

Among the pandemic's many lessons, however, is that greed can easily work against the common good. We **rightly celebrate the near-miraculous development of effective vaccines, which have been widely deployed in rich nations. But the global picture reveals not even a semblance of justice**: As of May, **low-income nations received just 0.3 percent of the global vaccine supply**. **At this rate it would take 57 years for them to achieve full vaccination**.

This disparity has been dubbed "vaccine apartheid," and it's exacerbated by greed. **A year after the launch of the World Health Organization's Covid-19 Technology Access Pool** — a program aimed at encouraging the collaborative exchange of intellectual property, knowledge, and data — "**not a single company has donated its technical knowhow**," wrote politicians from India, Kenya, and Bolivia in a June essay for The Guardian. As of that month, the U.N.-backed COVAX initiative, a vaccine sharing scheme established to provide developing countries equitable access, had delivered only about 90 million out of a promised 2 billion doses. **Currently, pharmaceutical companies, lobbyists, and conservative lawmakers continue to oppose proposals for patent waivers that would allow local drug makers to manufacture the vaccines without legal jeopardy**. They claim the waivers would slow down existing production, "foster the proliferation of counterfeit vaccines," and, as North Carolina Republican Sen. Richard Burr said, "undermine the very innovation we are relying on to bring this pandemic to an end."

**All these views echo the idea that patents and high drug prices are necessary motivators for biomedical innovation. But examine that logic closely, and it quickly begins to fall apart**.

A great deal of difficult, innovative work is done in industries and fields that lack patents. Has the lack of patent protections for recipes led to any dearth of innovation in restaurants? An irritating irony here is that economists who espouse the need-greed theory themselves innovate for comparative peanuts. For instance, in 2018, the median compensation for economists was about $104,000. The typical pharmaceutical CEO, meanwhile, earned a whopping $5.7 million in total compensation that year. (The hands-on innovators aren't the need-greeders here; the median compensation for pharmaceutical employees — including benefits — was about $177,000 in 2018.) Even in Silicon Valley, writes ever-astute technology insider Tim O'Reilly, "the notion that entrepreneurs will stop innovating if they aren't rewarded with billions is a pernicious fantasy."

To be sure, it was not greed but rather a vast collaborative effort — funded largely with public dollars — that generated effective coronavirus vaccines. The technology behind mRNA vaccines such as those produced by Pfizer and Moderna took decades of work by University of Pennsylvania scientists you've likely never heard of. According to The New York Times, one of those scientists, Katalin Kariko, "never made more than $60,000 a year" while doing her innovative foundational research. The researchers at Oxford University who developed the technology behind AstraZeneca's vaccine, which was mostly publicly funded, initially set out with the intention of "non-exclusive, royalty-free" licensing for their vaccine. Only after pressure to work with a multinational pharmaceutical company from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, among others, did they renege and license the technology solely to AstraZeneca.

It was astonishing, then, when Pascal Soriot, AstraZeneca's CEO, said that intellectual property, or IP, "is a fundamental part of our industry and if you don't protect IP, then essentially there is no incentive for anybody to innovate." The Oxford scientists whose work AstraZeneca licensed literally just innovated without the incentives Soriot claimed are essential. Why do journalists present need-greeder claims, such as Soriot's, without holding the specific role of profit seeking to account?

It's no secret that innovators (and people generally) often aren't necessarily greed-driven. For instance, as Walter Isaacson notes in his book about superstar biochemist Jennifer Doudna's work on Crispr gene manipulation technology, she was never motivated primarily by money. In fact, he reports that corporate maneuvering over her work made her "physically ill." Countless cases like hers show that innovations in science and technology typically aren't the result of genius lightning strikes but rather of field-wide efforts with multiple teams circling the same goal. If anyone withdraws for lack of greed-gratifying incentives, no problem: They're welcome to write themselves out of history. Others will gladly grasp the glory. And we, the public, lose nothing.

Perhaps Soriot meant, more generally, that reduced revenues would cut AstraZeneca's overall research and development (R&D) spending. But even that claim is detectably dubious. **When drug makers claim that high prices are essential for innovation, they are "flat out lying"** financial expert Yves Smith wrote in 2019. Smith cited data published with the Institute for New Economic Thinking showing that, **between 2009 and 2018, 18 drug makers listed in the S&P 500 spent 14 percent more on stock buybacks and dividends than they did on R&D.** These companies could easily ramp up investments in innovative drugs, the authors wrote, simply by reining in distributions to shareholders. (Don't forget that share buybacks were effectively classified as illegal market manipulation until the Securities and Exchange Commission, under Reagan, relaxed the rules in 1982.)

**Of the money that drug companies do invest in R&D, a significant amount for many goes not toward innovative research but to "finding ways to suppress generic and biosimilar competition while continuing to raise prices," according to a recent report from the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform**. In these cases, executive and investor greed demonstrably impede innovation. A recent Congressional hearing dramatized this issue when Rep. Katie Porter, a California Democrat, grilled the CEO of AbbVie, a biopharmaceutical company which she said spent $2.45 billion on research and development, $4.71 billion a year on marketing and advertising, and $50 billion on shareholder payouts between 2013 and 2018. She characterized the idea that R&D justified astronomical prices as "the Big Pharma fairy tale."

Even if greed makes sense for some for-profit ventures, it would be unwise for us to rely only on for-profit enterprise to harness innovation for social goals. **There are many things that we must do whether they are profitable or not, and the horrific fiasco over vaccine patents has shown us that biotech executives and other members of the "thinkerati" are not above putting profits ahead of saving lives**. As White House adviser Anthony Fauci noted to the Hill earlier this year, America has a "moral obligation" to "make sure that the rest of the world does not suffer and die" from something that we can help to prevent. Our government is failing in its duty to act in the public interest if it allows "your money or your life" to pass as an acceptable business model.

As an open letter signed by more than a hundred intellectual property scholars recently stated, IP rights (which includes patents) "are not, and have never been, absolute rights and are granted and recognized under the condition that they serve the public interest." The scholars noted precedents like last year's use of the Defense Production Act to increase production of medical supplies, and the U.S.'s commandeering of penicillin production during World War II. If Covid-19 vaccine makers refuse to make life-saving technology publicly available, governments should enact mandatory licensing or similar measures.

There are also compelling reasons to develop a standing, publicly operated rapid-response vaccine manufacturing capability. Pfizer's CFO suggested that prices on vaccines will go up once we are out of the "pandemic-pricing environment," noting that the company can charge nearly nine times more than they have been ("$150, $175 per dose," the CFO said, versus the $19.50 Pfizer is charging the U.S. in one supply deal). Even if those who haven't received a single dose of the vaccine never do, that could mean roughly a $30 billion bonanza from U.S. booster shots alone. Patient advocates estimate that it would cost just $4 billion for the U.S. to set up a public-private operation capable of manufacturing enough mRNA vaccines to immunize the whole planet, with each shot costing $2. This would be a great way for America to show global leadership, and would surely be way cheaper, both individually and collectively, than being annually "Pfizered." Plus, the usefulness of such a facility would long outlast the current pandemic, with climate change making zoonotic spillover events more likely (not to mention the risks of weaponized viruses). Covid-19 was our "starter pandemic," as Ed Yong usefully dubbed it.

If greed-driven companies fail to exercise their powers responsibly, they should face competition from the public sector. President Biden let the cat out of the bag when he said that "capitalism without competition isn't capitalism; it's exploitation." While many people applauded his sentiment, stop and think about the implication: The president was, in essence, saying that we expect corporations to exploit us if given half a chance.

**We pay a huge price in blood and treasure when we give the need-greeders free rein to lie to and exploit the public with impunity**. We must be clear-eyed about exactly when greed can help our collective interests and when it hinders them. During a crisis as dire as a global pandemic, greed won't save us.

### Bioterror Link

#### Their deployment of fear of a bioterror attack is rooted in a Cold War suspicion of “communist” threats and mobilization to protect racialized capitalism from unnamed “terrorists” in Eurasia while ignoring the bio attacks by white men within their own borders

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

Not more than a month after the events of September 11, 2001, letters laced with deadly anthrax spores arrived at the offices of several news media outlets and two U.S. senators, causing five deaths and seventeen injuries.1 The “anthrax attacks” swiftly shifted into position as a central node of the burgeoning war on terror, elevating its focus on bioterrorism, that is, the intentional spread of disease via germ or biological weapons. The FBI launched a massive, broad-scale investigation to find the perpetrator, enlisting advisers from science, national security, and policy and scholarly bodies, and even investigative journalists. Early speculation reflected dominant national security discourse: the perpetrator was thought to be Al Qaeda or Iraq—the “usual suspects” of the post-9 / 11 era—or possibly Russia, a remnant of earlier Cold War era antagonism. Former vice president Dick Cheney conjectured that Al Qaeda “actually used to train people” in how “to deploy and use these kinds of substances [biological and chemical weapons]” (“The Anthrax Source” 2001). Weapons inspector Dick Spertzel was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article, “The Anthrax War,” suggesting that “there are people in Iraq who know how to do it” (Wall Street Journal 2001b). There was little evidence for these theories.2 It took the FBI only a few months to determine that the anthrax used was the potent Ames strain, which derived from a U.S. government biodefense lab (USAMRIID).3 By early 2002, the FBI had turned to investigating the high-level scientists who research pathogens for the U.S. national security apparatus, eventually identifying its final suspect, U.S. white male scientist Bruce E. Ivins.4 The investigation’s findings were consistent with bioterrorism’s historical pattern in the United States as a phenomenon carried out almost exclusively by domestic sources, specifically, white men.5 While the federal government did not commission any political or other social scientific studies of white male violence, it continued to invest vast resources in soliciting scholars to study Arab and Muslim cultures as part of the war on terror. 6 (In fact, profilers in the anthrax investigation continued to focus on Al Qaeda and Iraq even after evidence pointed toward involvement by a U.S. government lab scientist.)7 The lack of scrutiny of white male violence was consonant with dominant ideas about white masculinity as sources of authority and protection, ideas particularly entrenched during the war on terror (Shepherd 2006). As has been theorized by cultural studies scholars, discourse—or ways of speaking about the world—constrains and limits the way that knowledge is constructed. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall defines discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed” (Hall 1992, 291). Dominant discourse marginalizes explanations—in this case the culpability of white masculinity—that do not fit its dictates. Discourse is connected to power: knowledge production promotes some power arrangements over others. Again I cite Hall, who draws on social theorist Michel Foucault to explain the connection between thought and action, between language and practice: “Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But it is itself produced by a practice: ‘discursive practice’—the practice of producing meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all social practices” (Hall 1992, 291). Discourse, then, has material effects; it is in fact formative of the material. Failure to problematize white masculinity in the anthrax case supported existing arrangements keeping white men in power—in the high-level U.S. biodefense industry, and at the helm of the U.S. national security apparatus more generally. 8 Discourse surrounding the anthrax mailings not only marginalized the culpability of white masculinity; it also carefully bounded discussions about the vast research industry from which the anthrax came. The biodefense research apparatus spanned government, university, and industry labs, where bioscientists, mainly microbiologists, toil away on dangerous pathogens—in the name of national security. Over the course of the nearly nine-year anthrax investigation, the mass news media brought attention to the industry’s ongoing lab accidents—accidental exposures, lab leakages, and unintentional shipments of live germs instead of dead ones. Media attention peaked in 2006, when several lab workers at Texas A&M University were exposed to and infected with Q fever and brucellosis, resulting in the lab’s temporary suspension of activities. In response, federal officials insisted that the gains for national security outweighed the costs; security pundits concentrated on better training for scientists to reduce accidents. Absent among the proposed solutions, however, was a deeper questioning of the merits of the industry itself: What purpose does an active U.S. biodefense program serve? Bio-Imperialism seeks to unravel the discursive edifices of U.S. biodefense: assumptions about bioterrorism and U.S. vulnerability, about germs and technoscientific capabilities to control them. It examines, moreover, the constitutive role that gender and race, along with U.S. imperial ambitions, play in U.S. bioterror and disease response. Post–Cold War National Security Discourse: Race, Gender, Terror The focus on Al Qaeda and Iraq during the anthrax investigation highlights the role of the racial Other in dominant national security discourse. The end of the Cold War saw the U.S.-USSR axis, and the concomitant capitalismcommunism binary, 9 give way to the geopolitical and military supremacy of the United States, and the unprecedented acceleration of neoliberal capitalism and U.S.-led globalization (Masco 1999). The new lone superpower shifted its attention from the Soviet Union and nuclear stalemate to an increasingly visible number of smaller enemies —“terrorists”10 and “rogue states”—and their possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which include weapons of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warfare. Foreswearing de-escalation and disarmament, the United States turned to the platform of counterterrorism, most notably intervening in the Middle East. U.S. involvement in the Middle East resulted in the targeting of Arabs and Muslims in the region as well as domestically. The United States passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrated by U.S. white male Timothy McVeigh and two others, resulting in the deaths of 168 people and injuring over 800 in April 1995. Despite the domestic origins of the perpetrators, AEDPA focused heavily on “international terrorism” and “alien terrorists,” and in practice was used to apprehend Arabs and Muslims. It authorized the secretary of state to designate “foreign terrorist organizations” that the United States could sanction. About half were Muslim or Arab groups (Whidden 2001).11 As Arab American studies scholars have demonstrated, the U.S. state justified these actions by mobilizing trenchant U.S. racial discourses villainizing Arabs and Muslims as uncivilized, violent Others12 (Cainkar 2008; Naber 2000). By the time of the September 11 incident, the specter of Arab /Muslim13 terror had been firmly entrenched, serving as the lynchpin for a new iteration of U.S. empire. The war on terror entailed the brutal invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to maintain U.S. oil interests and a foothold in the Middle East.14 In President George W. Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, he called for military action that would begin with Al Qaeda and continue “until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Bush 2001a). The war’s boundless scope was in part enabled through the larger shift in governmental power during the war on terror—what social theorist Brian Massumi (2010) has called “preemptive power.” This anticipatory mode of governance enhanced the U.S. state’s ability to act upon security threats of indeterminate potential in the name of preserving life. Preemptive state power was, moreover, yoked to the language of freedom and civilization. In his September 20 speech, Bush justified military action as necessary to “defend freedom” and invoked “civilization” as the war’s protagonist: “This is civilization’s fight” (Bush 2001a). Narratives of the United States as freedom-loving, democratic, just, and other markers of “civilized” can be traced to long-standing Orientalist discourse that positions the West as beacon of progress and opposes it to the Arab / Muslim Other. These discursive practices began in the late eighteenth century, when European narratives of the “East” extolled the superiority of the “West” in order to rationalize colonial endeavors in the Middle East (Said 1978). Critical race and ethnic studies scholar Sylvia Chan-Malik discusses how this Orientalist narrative has functioned in relation to U.S. aggression in the Middle East: as “the liberal vision of a free, feminist, and multicultural nation as a fundamental necessary counterpart to the decidedly unfree, antifeminist, and antidemocratic ideology of Islamic Terror” (2011, 134). In other words, the construction of Arabs and Muslims as a racialized enemy Other helped inculcate a national imaginary of the United States as progressive vis-à-vis feminism and multiculturalism.15 Bush’s speech on September 20 included numerous nods to multicultural tolerance, such as “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends” (Bush 2001a). This rhetoric belied the fact that the war clearly targeted Arabs, Muslims, and the Middle East. Bush’s speech also touched on the plight of women in Afghanistan: “Women are not allowed to attend school” (Bush 2001a). Arab American feminist studies scholars have thoroughly described the construction of Arab and Muslim women as always and everywhere oppressed, wherein regional distinctions are flattened, and women are seen solely as victims of a patriarchal culture. These scholars have demonstrated how this image has propped up the war on terror—the war’s proponents articulate the war as an attempt to liberate oppressed Arab and Muslim women (Moallem 2002; Nayak 2006). In fact, Chan-Malik’s discussion of the role feminism has played in exceptionalist constructions of the United States illustrates a dialectic in which the oppressed Arab /Muslim woman is the counterpoint to the liberated Western woman, further bolstering an image of U.S. progressivism despite U.S. imperial aggression.

#### And this securitization creates the very pathogens that could be lethally spread due to any number of safety breaches – turns the aff

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

As the bioterror imaginary took root, government officials, with the help of pundits from the national security and bioscience fields, formulated a regime of bioterrorism preparedness. Prominent biodefense pundits Tara O’Toole and Thomas Inglesby outlined three focal areas in the inaugural issue of the peer-reviewed journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science: 19 biodefense research and development, medical and public health capacity, and prevention of bioweapons development and use (2004, 2). The first, the revamping of the biodefense industry, tackled the system of high-level labs that Ivins was involved in, where scientists conduct research and development on lethal pathogens and their countermeasures (e.g., diagnostic tests and vaccines). From fiscal years 2002 to 2004, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the government agency responsible for conducting infectious disease research, had increased its budget by more than twentyfold for research into anthrax, smallpox, plague, and other lethal pathogens used in biological warfare (Sunshine Project 2005). This research on lethal pathogens was driven not only by the bioterror imaginary, but also by a faith in the ability of technoscience to yield solutions to social problems.20 This faith has its origins in Euro-American modernity and its centering of science and technology as vehicles of cultural progress and advancement (Foucault 1977). It has meant the promotion of innovation and the prioritization of technological solutions over social ones. In the context of biodefense, it has entailed pouring resources into, for example, new vaccine development and “threat characterization” studies. The latter entail research involving the production of lethal pathogens—sometimes new variants such as the anthrax Ivins worked with—so that new vaccines may be tested against them, or simply to gain knowledge about possible new biological weapons that enemies of the United States might produce. While many bioweapons specialists were supportive of the lean into technoscientific innovation in germ research, bioweapons specialist Jonathan B. Tucker voiced a cautionary note on this unbounded germ research, noting that “creating putative bioengineered pathogens in the laboratory for purposes of threat characterization would be exceedingly dangerous and counterproductive” and that “there is an important distinction between ‘knowledge gaps’ that are worth filling and those whose exploration could generate new dangers” (Tucker 2006, 195–196). For Tucker, the production of dangerous new pathogens had myriad issues whose blowback would inevitably harm the United States: the danger posed to scientists via accidental exposure, the acquisition of U.S. weapons by its enemies, and possible negative perception that U.S. creation of biological weapons for research was a ruse for the creation of biological weapons for warfare (Tucker 2006). Tucker’s critique highlights that the Bush administration’s pursuit of innovation in the name of bioterrorism preparedness, and its expectation of future benefit deriving from technoscientific advancements, obscures the significant dangers such innovation produces. In chapter 2, I discuss the way the dangers of germ research were sidelined vis-à-vis discourses of the racial Other encoded in both legal measures (the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response section of the PATRIOT Act and the new Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002) and “biosecurity” practices instituted in the biosciences. A Short History of Biological Warfare Biodefense research has a longer history that precedes its post-9 / 11 makeover. Biodefense research on lethal pathogens was the legacy of earlier regimes of biological warfare. European settler-colonists during the 1700s waged the very first intentional deployment of lethal pathogens in the United States—spreading smallpox to indigenous populations, decimating them (Christopher et al. 1997; Duffy 2002; USAMRIID 2004). Following its role in the genesis of U.S. settler-empire, biological warfare played an important role in U.S. military programs during the early- to mid-twentieth century, when many nations developed large-scale programs21 to weaponize a variety of germs (i.e., bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa) and other biological weapons22 (Barnaby 2000; Bernstein 1987; Clarke 1968; Hersh 1968). After World War II, U.S. engagement with biological weapons receded in light of the rise of nuclear weapons as well as the global decline of state biological weapons programs. In 1972, an international treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), banned the development, possession, and transfer of biological weapons. Only scaled-down “defensive” programs remained. These programs ebbed and flowed over subsequent presidencies, until the late 1990s, when they received a substantial boost. The Clinton administration developed a two-pronged program. On one end, the administration focused on domestic preparedness, emphasizing broad technological solutions and emergency response, establishing the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and the Health Alert Network and Laboratory Response Network in 1999 (Guillemin 2005a; Khan, Morse, and Lillibridge 2000). On the other end, the administration monitored enemy nations such as the former Soviet Union as well as nonstate groups and individuals the United States deemed terrorists. The United States surveilled, for example, the biological warfare activities of nonstate groups such as Aum Shinrikyo23 and investigated whether the dissolved former Soviet Union24 had transferred any biological weapons to states in the Middle East, such as Iraq25 (Fidler 2002; Mueller 2005; O’Toole 2001). The attention to biological weapons stemmed in part from U.S. post– Cold War focus on terrorism and efforts to secure its global hegemony. Another basis of concern was the advances in biotechnology that had emerged since the birth of genomics in the 1980s, and in genetic engineering in the 1990s, which created the possibility of enhanced germ weaponry. 26 Since offensive biological weapons were banned, the U.S. government exerted dominance by developing biodefense and suppressing weapons capacity in others. Clinton’s global watchdog approach would become the foundation for post-9 / 11 engagement. Under the Bush administration, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with the rationale of preempting Iraqi use of bioweapons (and other WMDs). The administration offered no proof of either Iraqi weapons possession or plans to attack the United States; instead, it offered alarmist allusions—to, for example, Iraqi connections to Al Qaeda or the active Iraqi bioweapons program in the 1970s and 1980s (which had been destroyed during UN inspections in the 1990s). Bioweapons had become a powerful rhetorical tool in U.S. designs on Iraq and signaled that the United States would attempt to justify drastic military action in the name of countering bioweapons threats. At the same time the Bush administration maintained a tight grip over the bioweapons capacities of others, it dramatically expanded Clinton’s domestic preparedness program—in areas such as biodefense research, vaccine stockpiling, disease surveillance networks, and response planning infrastructure. On June 12, 2002, Bush outlined this far-reaching approach in his remarks accompanying the signing of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002: “Bioterrorism is a real threat to our country. It’s a threat to every nation that loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have them.… It’s important that we confront these real threats to our country and prepare for future emergencies” (Bush 2002c). The quote illustrates the key logic of preparedness—it assumes the inevitability of catastrophes like bioterrorism and opts to prepare for their aftermath (Ben Anderson 2010).27 Moreover, the degree of resources devoted to preparing for a given catastrophe is determined not by the catastrophe’s probability of occurrence, but by its potential magnitude; thus, threats viewed as low probability, high impact—like bioterrorism—garnered massive resources that would otherwise be devoted to more frequent, everyday concerns (Lakoff 2008b). Like preemption, preparedness has the effect of making extreme actions seem necessary, and other options, namely, complete disarmament and an end to biodefense research, seem inadequate. Preparedness is an anticipatory mode of governance that, as social theorist Melinda Cooper (2008) has described, is highly generative—it calls forth a future that “is effectively generated de novo out of our collective apprehensiveness” (125). Preparedness, then, typified the profound feat of the war on terror—its adoption of the narrative of victimhood. To be prepared for outside threats presumed U.S. fragility, 28 rendering U.S. global aggression invisible. Centuries after European settlers used biological weapons against Native Americans, the United States—now a white-dominant imperialist nation with an augmented biowarfare capacity—articulated itself as at the mercy of Iraq, Al Qaeda, and other Arab / Muslim groups and nations.29

### Cybersecurity Link

#### Cybersecurity materializes the boundary conflicts of peoples, territories, and orders-of-meaning into constitutive threats that are then installed at the center of security concerns

Kaiser, 15 (Robert, Professor of Geography @ Univ. Wisconsin-Madison, PhD (Geography) from Columbia University, recipient of a Visiting Fellowship on Estonia and the Birth of Cyberwar @ Aleksanteri Institute via the University of Helsinki; "The Birth of Cyberwar," *Political Geography*. 46 (2015) 11-20.)

It is not as if cyberwar had not been conceived of prior to 2007. It was imaginatively produced in science fiction novels and films, from Shockwave Rider in 1975 (Lesk 2007: 77), to War Games (1983) and Terminator (1984), capping the period off with the 2007 blockbuster Live Free or Die Hard, which was playing in theaters in Tallinn during the summer of the cyberattacks. The 2007 film is particularly important here, since it featured a disgruntled former cybersecurity military analyst who used a broad-based cyberassault to take down the critical infrastructure (CI) of the United States. In Tallinn, the movie fed into the affective intensity surrounding the riots and cyberattacks, firing the imagination of policymakers and publics alike. Cyberwar was also being discursively produced in political and military think tanks beginning in the early 1990s. One of the first examples of this is the 1993 publication “Cyberwar is coming!” which recently celebrated its 20th anniversary (Arquilla, 2013, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993). This work too sought to fire the imagination of its readers, spinning out anticipatory cyberwar scenarios and advocating a cyberwar doctrine to military and political analysts and other cyberwar “managers of unease” (Bigo 2002). Published at about the same time, and foreshadowing the proliferation of drone strikes in what Gregory, 2011, Gregory, 2014 has called “the everywhere war,” “Welcome to hyperwar” painted a more dystopian vision of smart weaponry and war machinery taking over the battlespaces of the future (Arnett 1992). Later in the 1990s, due in part to concerns surrounding Y2K and also to the rising number of denial of service (DoS) cyberattacks, increasing US governmental attention was devoted to computer security and the threat posed by cyberwarfare. In 1998, the Clinton White House issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 to assess the vulnerabilities of CI to cyberattack, and followed this up with the National Plan for Information Systems Protection in 2000. Titled Defending America's Cyberspace, this document presented cyberspace as a vulnerable dimension of the sovereign territory needing protection, largely due to the failure to build in adequate defenses when cyberspace first emerged. The authors of this document – including President Clinton and Richard Clarke, then National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism – billed it as “the first attempt by any national government to design a way to protect its cyberspace” (White House, 2000, iv), and also sought to fire the imaginations of their readership, conjuring up a whole host of cyber-villains meaning to do America harm. We are at risk. The United States depends more on computers today then ever before … We have created a gaping vulnerability in our national security and economic stability … We are vulnerable to mischief-making hackers, hardware and software failures, cyber criminals and, most alarmingly, to deliberate attack from nation states and terrorists (White House, 2000, 1). These efforts were paralleled by Congressional hearings on the threat of cyberwar and America's preparedness – or lack thereof – to counter it (e.g., US House of Representatives, 2000). The increasing academic, political and popular attention paid to cyberwar was matched by a growing number of high profile cyberattacks. In 1998, Tamil ‘hacktivists’ organized an email inundation campaign of Sri Lankan embassies. In 1999, Chinese hackers responded to the US bombardment of China's Embassy in Belgrade by attacking the American Embassy's webpage in Beijing. In 2000, Israeli and Palestinian hackers attacked the websites of Hezbollah and Israel's Foreign Ministry respectively, and American and Chinese hackers exchanged broad-based attacks against Chinese and US websites following the downing of an American spy plane over Chinese territorial waters in 2001 (Denning, 2001, Lesk, 2007). On the cusp of the new millennium, a rapid escalation and intensification of discursive practices were working to materialize cyberwar as a new policy object. The events of September 11, 2001 changed all that, as the “global war on terror” (GWOT) remade the security landscape. Initiatives begun to prepare for cyberwarfare were shelved, meetings were canceled, and “critical infrastructure protection” shifted from cyberspace to more conventional spaces of security. Although some policy documents and studies continued to be produced (e.g., Billo and Chang, 2004, Clarke and Knake, 2010, 120), cyberspace and cybersecurity themselves were re-imagined and re-purposed to combat global terrorist networks, and were folded into and made an integral part of the Patriot Act of 2001 and the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. If cyberwar's performative materialization had been preempted by the GWOT in the United States, in Europe it had not yet been taken up. Although the Council of Europe had passed a Convention on Cybercrime in 2001, cyberwar itself was not considered. And at NATO's 2002 Prague Summit, which went to great lengths in discussing the ways NATO needed to transform and adapt in the wake of 9/11, cybersecurity was barely mentioned (NATO, 2002). The birth of cyberwar would have to await both the declining importance of terror as a policy object and a catalyzing event. The birth of cyberwar On 26 April 2007, workers under orders from the Estonian government began the process of removing a bronze soldier statue and the bodies of Red Army soldiers from a public park in Tallinn. The monument, built to commemorate the Red Army's liberation of Tallinn during WWII, had become the site of intensifying contestation between self-identifying Russians and others who felt disenfranchised in independent Estonia, and Estonian nationalists who viewed the USSR, Russia, and Russians as unwanted occupiers of their national homeland (Bruggemann and Kasekamp, 2008, Kaiser, 2012, Lehti et al., 2008, LICHR., 2007, Paabo, 2008). Throughout April 26th, a crowd of protesters gathered, growing larger and angrier by nightfall. Rioting erupted at the site and spread to Old Town, continuing off and on for two days, in an event named the Bronze Night. Beginning on April 27 and lasting until mid-May, a series of cyberattacks were launched against governmental, media, banking and political party websites, in a politically motivated effort to participate in the Bronze Night and extend it into cyberspace. Estonia's political and military elite, as well as news media, blamed Russia and a disloyal fifth column of Russians living in Estonia for both the riots and the cyberattacks, “remediating” (Grusin 2004) the latter as a cyberwar launched by Russia against Estonia. A cyberwar resonance machine quickly developed throughout western security assemblages, and by the end of May 2007 the cyberattacks were being widely hailed as the world's first cyberwar (BBC, 2007, Kirk, 2007, Landler and Markoff, 2007, Mite, 2007, Tanner, 2007, Traynor, 2007). First, it is important to acknowledge that if this event had happened immediately after 9/11, its affective capacity would almost certainly not have been sufficient to actualize cyberwar. Coming at a time when public and political support for the GWOT had significantly waned provided the event with the temporal distance needed for cyberwar managers of unease to capture the imagination of western policymakers and publics. However, not just any cyberattack would do. Both the sociospatial context of the event, and also how it was managed, were critical for the production of resonance. The success of Estonia's cyberwarriors “in providing a compelling narrative for their analysis” (Salter, 2008, 237) may be attributed to their performative enactment of a familiar and believable set of Cold War place-identities featuring Russia and Russian-ness as enemy Other of Estonia, Europe and the US, and Estonia and Estonian-ness as small, vulnerable victim. Western imaginations, primed for such a threat scenario, were easily captured (Blank, 2008, Davis, 2007, Robert, 2012, Ruus, 2008, Weiss, 2007). Waking the World Up to Cyberwar World governments are trying to figure out how to defend themselves against cyber-warfare, and Estonia leads the way (Public Radio International, 2010). That cyberspace “makes us vulnerable” is a central characteristic of cybersecurity discourse, and the more technologically advanced, the more vulnerable one is imagined to be (Bernard-Wills and Ashenden 2012, 118). Since independence Estonia had become one of the most wired countries in the world, and in this regard at least is imagined to occupy a future timespace toward which the rest of the world is headed. This, coupled with Estonia's small size and location on the border of Europe's ‘Other’, was prominently featured in explanations of why the cyberattacks had occurred. This “architecture of enmity” (Amoore, 2009) displaced the internal place-identity conflicts between Russian-ness and Estonian-ness that produced the Bronze Night, even as it remediated the cyberattacks into the world's first cyberwar. Estonia as a small, modern, technology-savvy country was an ideal test-ground for cyberattackers with political motivations … Estonia happened to experience the first large-scale attacks, but … vulnerabilities are growing in both the developed and developing world (Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2011a, 1–2). The 2007 cyberattacks were universally described in media, in official documents and by cybersecurity specialists as a “wakeup call.” The first question confronting policymakers charged with defending against the cyberattacks was whether or not to issue the call, to go public. Given the widespread use of the sites that were targeted, the cyberattacks would have been difficult to deny. A debate within government circles occurred, and the decision to go public owed as much to international as to domestic considerations. This event seemed to be just what western cyberwar managers of unease were waiting for: Here we had this example of cyberattacks actually being part of a political campaign, affecting the whole of society … In the United States lots of agencies and lots of people recognized the problem (of cyberwar) but were not successful in communicating it. Or were unable because of classification reasons to communicate it. And now we have Estonia who is willing to communicate it and to use their country as an example of what may happen. And I think Estonia and the United States together sort of … I mean, the level of conferences I participated in after 2007 was just insane. We were in the Air Force national conference with thousands of very high-ranking officers, we were briefing Congress, we were briefing the White House, at the very highest level (Interview, former Estonian Defense Ministry official, Tallinn, October 2012). President Ilves took the lead in issuing the wakeup call, and in remediating the cyberattacks as a cyberwar launched by Russia – imagined as the constitutive outside of the civilized spaces of Estonia and Europe: “Finally, I turn to Russia, Estonia's neighbour, with a clear message – try to remain civilized! It is not customary in Europe to use computers belonging to public institutions for cyber-attacks against another country's public institutions” (Ilves, 2007a). Describing the Bronze Night as “the greatest challenge to the security” of Estonia since independence and the cyberattacks as “cyber-war” (Ilves, 2007b), Ilves proclaimed that “Estonia was attacked with a weapon and in a manner whose full significance is just beginning to dawn on the whole world in the 21st century” (Ilves, 2007c). Former Defense Minister Aaviksoo raised the issue of invoking Article 5 (common defense) with NATO while the event was still underway (Traynor, 2007), and asserted that “what took place was according to our interpretation cyber warfare and cyber terrorism. In essence, cyberattacks against Estonia demonstrated that the Internet already is a perfect battlefield of the 21st century” (Aaviksoo 2007a). Although “NATO's political leaders judged that the cyberattacks were not an act of war, NATO's Department of Public Diplomacy later created a short film about the episode entitled War in Cyberspace” (Singer and Friedman 2014, 122), allowing Estonia's cyberwarriors a NATO-sanctioned platform from which to present their ‘compelling narrative’. Following Derrida, Burke (2002, 4–5) defines an aporia as “an untotalizable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure.” He identifies two interlocking aporias of security: first, that claims to universal security for all humans are challenged by a foundational “aporetic distance between our ‘humanity’ and a secure identity bounded and defined by the state;” and second, that securing oneself “must be purchased at the expense of another” (Burke, 2002, 6). These aporias are central to the performative enactment of our sociospatial selves, which are bordered against a constitutive outside that is both totally excluded and at the same time occupies the very center of our place-identities (Butler, 1993, Kaiser, 2014, Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008). The 2007 events that materialized cyberwar as a new policy object were created by these aporias of security, and at the same time embedded them at the very heart of cybersecurity. The Bronze Night and the accompanying cyberattacks were a ‘war event’ that ruptured the surface calm in Estonian society, exposing the ways in which Russia and Russian-ness performatively materialize as the constitutive outside of Estonia and Estonian-ness through a wide range of everyday discursive practices, and without which Estonia and Estonian-ness could not exist in their present form (Feldman, 2001, Kaiser, 2014, Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008). Through these performative enactments, Estonia's and Estonians' security are purchased at the expense of Russia and Russians (Feldman, 2001, Kuus, 2004). Both the Bronze Night and the cyberattacks were remediated as acts of war, attacks on Estonia's sovereignty by Russia and a disloyal fifth column of Russian enemy Others within (Kaiser 2012). Cyberwar's materialization through this event carried this aporia of security into cyberspace, and helped to reconstitute a familiar geopolitical imaginary from the Cold War in cyberspace, now conceived as a battlespace where states – aligned into camps of western defenders and eastern attackers – wage cyberwar. “Of course, you know, when you look on the map, then it's very clear. Estonia's a small nation but we have to be concerned about our neighbors. Thank God we are now members of NATO and the EU, and we are not alone anymore. And in cyberwar we are not alone too” (Interview, Cyber Defense League, Tallinn, May 2011). Within this battlespace, Estonia is imagined as occupying a vulnerable border between East and West, where cyberwar is an ever-present threat. This danger is also seen as an opportunity: “We are still living between the East and the West – we are a playground for bad guys … We are looking to increase cooperation with the US. Why should the US cooperate with us? Because we are on the border. If something happens, we can give you a warning that something is coming” (Interview, Cyber Defense League, Tallinn, September 2012). Bigo argues that those acknowledged as security experts “transfer the legitimacy they gain from struggles against terrorists, criminals, spies, and counterfeiters toward other targets, most notably transnational political activists, people crossing borders, or people born in the country but with foreign parents” (Bigo 2002, 63). However, given the aporias of security, and the reiterative citationality of security practices, it seems more accurate to assert that the managers of unease derive their status as security experts from the boundary effects that performatively materialize such threatening Others, who in turn become embedded at the very core of the security discourse that such specialists claim expertise over. Securitization is thus a border performative, continually producing insecurity within the population and territory that must then be secured. Insecurity can never be banished and security finally procured, since insecurity occupies the very heart of securitization practices, with security itself always occupying the promised timespace of the future (Anderson, 2010a). The cyberattacks, re-imagined as a cyberwar launched against a small, technologically advanced state by a large and aggressive neighbor, displaced the problematic relationship between Estonian nationalists in power and self-identifying Russians who felt victimized in independent Estonia that produced the Bronze Night's actualization and the cyberattacks themselves. The remediation of the cyberattacks as Russia engaging in cyberwar against Estonia and the West also transposed a familiar geopolitical b/ordering onto cyberspace: Estonia/Estonian-ness – good guys, small but capable cyberdefenders of ‘the West’ vs. Russia/Russian-ness – bad guys, perpetrators of cyberwar, ‘the East’. At the same time, the event provided Estonian security professionals an important opportunity to reiterate to European and American audiences that Russia remains an ever-present threat, securing for themselves the role of “transactors” (Kuus, 2004) of cybersecurity.

### Cyberwar Link

#### Computational propaganda mystifies occupations and conflicts to make any coherent theory of warfare or alliances impossible. In the sea of misattribution, there is always another opinion, and the inescapably provisional and easily falsified nature of all accounts of cyberwar energizes the death of meaning itself. In the face of the opacity of cyberconflict, desire tends toward militarized paranoia, accepting the experts of Empire just as easily as fake news. The impact is a global civil war operating at every level that far surpasses any Russian threat.

Matviyenko et al. 19 (Svitlana Matviyenko, Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication of Simon Fraser University in Vancouver. Nick Dyer-Witheford, associate professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at University of Western Ontario. “Introduction,” *Cyberwar and Revolution, Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism,* University of Minnesota Press,Mar 12, 2019) \*modified for ableist language

Within cyberwar apparatuses, humans, for the moment, remain a necessary link or relay enlisted in multiple ways, voluntary and involuntary. Yet while humans remain in the loop, or on the loop (that is to say, with a veto on otherwise automatic processes), it is within a war-fighting system that increasingly decenters subjectivity as a “peripheral” (Gibson 2015). Because of this, the human subject of cyberwar is dazed and confused. This is in part a consequence of the intentional secrecy of cyberwar, but the possibilities of such stealth, and its intensification by contingency and accident, arise from the speed, scope, and complexity of the technology of cyberwar apparatuses. Deeply implicated as users are in the militarization of networks, their involvement is frequently unknowing or misrecognized. We are indeed “empowered” by technology—but not necessarily in the way we are told. Rather than acting as globally aware networked individuals, intervening purposefully in great political events with a few deft touches to an iPhone, our cyberwar involvement is as likely to be a misapprehending, deceived, or involuntary conduit for war whose outbreak has either passed by unnoticed or was only imagined (at least until this imagined onset provoked real counteraction), or whose combatants are drastically misidentified. In conflicts where a crucial action may be the opening of virally contaminated email, the retweeting of a message from a software agent mistaken for a human, or the invisible contribution of a hijacked computer (or digitalized refrigerator) to a massive botnet, we are in the realm of Marx’s “they do it, but they do not know it.” “Even if you do not see the war, the war sees you” is the logic of the ~~blind~~ [unknowing] gaze of cyberwar, a regime in which although “the subject does not see where [this regime] is leading, he follows” (Lacan 1998, 75). The obscurity inherent to cyberwar afflicts even those most expert in its prosecution. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the CIA and Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service set up a “fake” jihadi website to monitor Islamic extremist activity. In 2008, the U.S. Army and the NSA concluded that the “fake” site was actually serving as an operational planning hub for attacks by Saudi Arabian jihadists joining the Sunni insurgency. When they proposed the site be destroyed, the CIA objected, but Pentagon hackers proceeded with the “take-down.” They inadvertently disrupted more than three hundred servers in Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Texas. As a task force participant ruefully explained, “to take down a Web site that is up in Country X, because the cyber-world knows no boundaries, you may end up taking out a server that is located in Country Y.” The Saudi Arabian intelligence service, which regarded the “fake” site as a “boon,” was furious; mollification required “a lot of bowing and scraping.” The CIA, too, was resentful; the agency “understood that intelligence would be lost, and it was; that relationships with cooperating intelligence services would be damaged, and they were; and that the terrorists would migrate to other sites, and they did” (Nakashima 2010). A more serious example of unintended consequences is Stuxnet, the computer worm planted in the computers at the uranium enrichment plant outside Natanz to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, an operation now widely attributed to a joint U.S.–Israeli intelligence operation. As we noted in chapter 1, the worm’s impeccable simulation of a mechanical failure apparently unrelated to software performance is considered a watershed in the development of cyberweaponry. What it is not so generally recognized, however, is that it went out of control. Stuxnet’s discovery by the security company VirusBlokAda in mid-June 2010 was the result of the virus accidentally spreading beyond its intended target due to a programming error introduced in an update. This allowed the worm to enter into an engineer’s computer connected to the centrifuges and thence travel to the internet. It then propagated to industrial sites far from Natanz, not only in Iran but in Indonesia and India, and beyond, reportedly infecting the systems of oil giant Chevron and a Russian nuclear plant. As one cybersecurity expert puts it, “By allowing Stuxnet to spread globally, its authors committed collateral damage worldwide” (Schneier 2010). Although in many of these cases, the virus did not activate, because of differences between the Natanz system it targeted and the others it accidentally infected, another consequence was that the Stuxnet code became widely available for use or adaptation by hackers other than those who developed it. Such probably inadvertent propagation can be considered what Paul Virilio (2000) terms an “integral accident,” a malfunction intrinsic to, and inevitable for, viral cyberweapons.15 Once one passes to the civilian perception of real or imagined cyberwar effects, the scope for misrecognition increases and potentially ranges from imagining wars where none exists to not noticing those that are actually raging. Zetter (2016b) reports a “misrecognized” attack on a power grid in Ukraine that occurred on December 23, 2015, when twenty-seven substations of the Prykarpattya Oblenergo, a Ukrainian power distributor that serves 538,000 customers, went dead after the company’s computers were infected by a version of a high-powered web-based malware BlackEnergy 3, in what is generally regarded as an act of Russian aggression, although the attribution, as always, is inconclusive. The cyberevent attracted the attention of cybersecurity and hacking communities: the blogosphere and specialized online channels and platforms competed for the most informed interpretation of the blackout. In Ukraine, however, where the cyberattack took place, it was unnoticed, despite successfully plunging hundreds of cities and villages into darkness. With the exception of security, administration, and technical personnel of the power station, the local population took the blackout for a common power shutdown, a nationally centralized procedure aimed at saving electricity in the country’s declining and war-afflicted economy. In a reverse example, in August 2008, cyberattacks took place in the midst of a broader armed conflict between Russia and Georgia over the disputed territory of South Ossetia. Although these attacks, allegedly coordinated or encouraged by the Russian state, did not significantly affect the ongoing kinetic action, distribution of malicious software; defacement of political, governmental, and financial websites; and multiple DoS and DDoS attacks on governmental, financial, news, and media websites generated confusion and panic among the population of the country at a time when “Georgia was the most dependent on the availability of information channels” (Tikk, Kaska, and Vihul 2010, 69–79, 72). Then, on March 28, 2011, the internet in Georgia and Armenia went down for nearly the entire day after a seventy-five- year- old Georgian woman named Hayastan Shakarian, while digging for scrap copper, accidentally cut a fiber-optic cable owned by Georgian Railway Telecom that runs through the two countries (Millar 2011). It would not have been too strange if, to a traumatized wartime population, this accident had signaled another kinetic offensive (Deibert 2013, 29). How many times would such suspicions need to be shared and commented on in social networks to become someone’s “knowledge”? To scale and speed up to the status of “fake news”? To serve as a useful context or leverage for a future cyberattack? To premediate an invasion? The cybernetic autopoiesis of unplanned and undesired incidents, unavoidable and unpreventable accidents, as well as the masterminded and preplanned operations constitute the ongoing production of events and semblances constitutive of cyberwar dynamics. Everything, even what did not have place, did not happen, or was misattributed, has a positive value in the cyberwar economy. This trompe l’oeil creates ~~blind~~ spots in the field of vision of all observers of cyberwar.16 It accelerates what Žižek (1999, 322) calls the “decline of symbolic efficiency” in digital capitalism. As Jodi Dean (2014, 213) explains, this develops the Lacanian idea that there is no longer a Master-Signifier that stabilizes meaning, that knits together the chain of signifiers and hinders their tendencies to float off into indeterminacy. While the absence of such a master might seem to produce a situation of complete openness and freedom—no authority is telling the subject what to do, what to desire, how to structure its choices—Žižek argues that in fact the result is unbearable, suffocating closure. A “setting of electronically mediated subjectivity [that] is one of infinite doubt and ultimate reflexifisation” intensifies “the fundamental uncertainty accompanying the impossibility of totalization” in a symbolic environment where “there is always another option, link, opinion, nuance or contingency that we haven’t taken into account” (Dean 2014, 212). Computational propaganda that aims to mystify invasions and occupations, or promote cynical disaffection from an adversary’s political system, actively weaponizes the “decline in symbolic efficiency,” but it is endemic to the whole field of cyberwar. The extreme uncertainty and opacity of cyberwar do not, however, inhibit the interpellative effects of contending cyberwar apparatuses as they summon up cybersoldiers, patriotic hackers, vigilante militias, and security-conscious digital citizens. On the contrary, the problems of verifying or disproving multiple alarms and accusations accelerates these processes and puts them into overdrive. To put this point in psychoanalytic terms, as we noted previously, commentators on Althusser have criticized the appropriation of Lacan’s theories of the subject in his account of ISAs. These critics point out that what Althusser misses in Lacan’s account is that the subject is always incomplete; it is precisely what can never be fixed by a specific subject position or identity. However, the implication of this incompletion is not that the subject remains some untouched and primordial haven of authenticity but rather that this lack drives to ever more compulsive (because unfulfillable) attempts to attain a definitive identity. Translating this into political terms, we would say that it is the inescapably incomplete, provisional, and easily falsified nature of all accounts of cyberwar that energizes the adoption of increasingly militarized, extreme, paranoid, and unshakable subject positions vis-à- vis its alleged events. For example, shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion that grew into the Syrian civil war, there was an abrupt but near-total shutdown of the Syrian internet. A common assumption, at least in the West, was that this was an attempt by the Assad regime to black out online dissent, as Mubarak had attempted in Egypt. But according to Edward Snowden, the event was caused by intrusion into the system conducted by the NSA—not intentionally, however, but by accident, in a botched hack of the Syrian state’s communication and electronic defense system (Ackerman 2014). Whereas the first attribution cast the Assad regime in the conventional role of despotic suppressor of civil rights, rightly opposed by liberal democracies, the second reversed the significance of the blackout, making it evidence of—once again—NSA cyberaggression against foreign states, and incompetent aggression at that. But those opposed to this characterization could point out that at the time Snowden made his diagnosis, he was reliant on Russia, a supporter of the Assad regime, for political asylum. The blackout of Syria’s internet connection thus also becomes an epistemological blackout about its cause, a blackout in which every initial position on the politics of Syria’s civil war could be preserved and reinforced. To provide a final example that is closer to home for many readers, as we suggested in chapter 1, there is now fairly convincing evidence that Russian intelligence agencies, whether directly or by proxy, attempted some intervention in the 2016 U.S. presidential election by way of “fake news.” It is also clear that some of the news reports claiming to substantiate or expand this claim, by claiming, for example, to detect Russian hackers in Vermont’s power grid or by broadly characterizing a sweepingly wide range of U.S. media outlets as accomplices of Russian cyberwar, are inaccurate and tendentious. The abyss of this double falsification—“ fake news” compounding “fake news”—becomes a zero-gravity free-fire zone within which contending factions within the U.S. political system trade charges of treason, producing a civil war effect possibly beyond the wildest dreams of the toilers at the dreary offices of St. Petersburg’s Internet Research Group.

#### Cyberwar reveals the collapse of meaning through informatic erasure, as all information becomes flooded with computational propaganda where militarized digital catastrophe shapes the present by its future possibility that mirrors and exceeds nuclear war.

Joque, 18 (Justin Joque, researcher and visualization librarian @ UMich, Master's of Science of Information at the UMich School of Information, PhD in Communications at the European Graduate School. *Deconstruction machines: Writing in the age of cyberwar*. University of Minnesota Press, 2018) \*modified for ableist language

The systems that are attacked through cyberwar are dual entities: on one hand, they are defined by a series of connections, and on the other hand, they are defined by the text of programs and messages that are sent through the network. The networked structure of the global Internet allows malicious programs to quickly propagate, but it is the insecurity of individual systems and the computer programs they run that are exploited to attack these networks. Without the insecurity of these programs and messages, cyberwar would never be a strategic possibility. While computer programs are often considered to be overly deterministic and simply a series of rules for a machine to follow, the very existence of cyberwar suggests that programs are not so straightforward. Programming is a textual and linguistic practice that is always carried out in languages and at levels of complexity that preclude complete mastery over what is written. Cyberwar infiltrates and subverts these programs, turning the text and logic of the program against itself. To fully grasp what is at stake in cyberwar, it is then critical to understand the logic of writing, especially the logic of writing at its most vulnerable. In this light, cyberwar is ultimately a process of deconstructing programs and undermining them from within their own logical and linguistic systems. As such, it is a form of writing itself, a writing that is aimed at both shoring up and deconstructing other texts. To understand cyberwar in this way, then, also requires a reconceptualization of deconstruction and its functioning. Admitting the textual nature of code and the machinic force of deconstruction overwhelms any attempt to maintain that deconstruction has ever been an exclusively theoretical matter or could ever be secured against its possible usage by the state and military. Cyberwar, in harnessing and exploiting the vulnerable and machinic nature of writing, is thus both a form of deconstruction and a deconstructive threat to deconstruction itself. Still, this threat to deconstruction and the logic of writing does not spell the end of deconstruction but rather guarantees its continued importance to the history of both writing and metaphysics. GLIMPSES OF THE FUTURE CATASTROPHE One of the earliest glimpses of the possible impact of an all-­out cyberwar occurred in June 1997. A small team of hackers using publicly available tools and programs was supposedly able to gain access to the power grid in nine U.S. cities, those cities’ emergency response systems, and a number of critical Pentagon networks, including those that managed military supply chains and the command-­ and-­ control structure. According to James Adams, who has written at length about these attacks, the hackers also managed to infect the human command-­ and-­ control system with a ~~paralyzing~~ level of mistrust. Orders that appeared to come from a commanding general were fake, as were bogus news reports on the crisis and instructions from the civilian command authorities. As a result, nobody in the chain of command, from the president on down, could believe anything. This group of hackers using publicly available resources was able to prevent the United States from waging war effectively.1 Luckily, the series of attacks, which have been code-­ named Eligible Receiver, were carried out by the [NSA] National Security Agency as an unannounced test of military and civilian digital infrastructure. The attackers, who were working as part of a No-­Notice Interoperability Exercise Program, were asked only to prove what was possible and not actually to destroy anything. Though the military provided no substantial evidence about Eligible Receiver, aside from interviews with the media and vague congressional testimony, for a while, Eligible Receiver was repeatedly referenced as a brief glimpse of future war and the dark nature of our digital technologies.2 Of course, there were those who were sure it was merely the media-­ security complex displaying its newest boogeyman. In a hacking publication titled The Crypt Newsletter, whose provenance and history seem to have gone the way of dial-­ up modems but which still lingers in search-­engine-­indexed text files in various parts of the Internet, Joseph K refers to Eligible Receiver as “a Pentagon ghost story repeated ad nauseum to journalists and the easily frightened in which ludicrous or totally unsubstantiated claims about menaces from cyberspace are passed off as astonishing deeds of techno-­ legerdemain performed by cybersoldiers working within a highly classified wargame.” Although Joseph K meant to dismiss Eligible Receiver, the discourse surrounding it still tells an interesting ghost story, especially if it is treated as such and read not as baseless but as a myth that functions even without proof. John Arquilla summed up the state of the public relation to the event aptly when, in an interview with PBS, he said, “Eligible Receiver is a classified event about which I can’t speak. What I can say is that when people say there is no existence proof of the seriousness of the cyber threat, to my mind, Eligible Receiver provides a convincing existence proof of the nature of the threat that we face.”3 This Kafkaesque claim is telling: he cannot tell us what transpired, but its existence, despite being under classified erasure, proves his point. This event appears in this light not then as an attack against military information systems but instead as an attack against our belief in the digital systems that increasingly provide the fabric of our everyday lives. Perhaps in Adams’s claims that no one could believe anything from the president on down, we should read a warning that we, too, outside the wargame, can no longer believe anything— ­that, ultimately, the collapse of the entire system may already be upon us. It takes little extra imagination to suggest that the implied result is some catastrophic social collapse, which may already be under way. It is not merely our military communication technologies that are at stake in Eligible Receiver but the entirety of society. Computer systems, especially when seen as data storage devices, function to guarantee that past inscriptions persist into the future. Computer security is often discussed as being founded on the “CIA triad,” standing for confidentiality, integrity, and access. Confidentially requires that only authorized users have access to information. Integrity is the need that the information that is put into a system is the same information that is retrieved, and access suggests that if authorized users cannot retrieve information, no matter how secure that information is, the system is useless.4 All of these function not just in the present but as guarantees of past and future. For a system to be secure under these conditions, the system must assure that the data entered in the past extend into the future and avoid unauthorized compromise. Cyberattacks instantly call all three of these into question in the past, present, and future. The futurity of a “real” attack like Eligible Receiver infects our belief in these systems in the present. Garrett Schubert, of EMC’s Critical Incident Response Center, tasked with protecting EMC’s data centers from cyberattacks, describes his work directly in relation to a change in temporality: “When I started in my career, the idea was, we wanted to stop a bad thing from happening. Now, we assume that the bad thing has already happened. Every single day, we walk in and we assume there is an active attack going on.”5 The future catastrophe has become a part of the daily operations of our technologies. As Parikka claims, the inscription of information in media is the invention of the accident of information erasure.6 The database always contains within it the immanent possibility that the data are, or may be, corrupted. As much as this unannounced test exercise may have been a test of military security, it is also a test of our belief in the future of our digital world. Joseph K’s mocking dismissal then appears, like a pithy sermon by an unknown sage of our digital belief, to reassure us that these events are merely phantasms thought up to terrify the gullible and will never come to pass. At the same time, the complete dismissal of this ghost story bifurcates the future: on one hand, the possibility of utter collapse, and on the other, complete faith and resilience. Likewise, it doubles the structure of belief and skepticism. Are the believers those who put faith in our technological world or those who blindly take the military’s word that the catastrophe is around any corner? If we cannot believe “anyone from the president on down,” how can we believe those who call that belief into question? THE INFORMATIONAL UNCANNY We arrive at an impasse that mirrors the Cold War nuclear catastrophe, not in terms of the destruction of life but in terms of the destruction of meaning. Though the relationship between the digital and the symbolic is complex, if the material support of meaning— be it magnetic bits, flashes of light in a fiber optic cable, or paper writing— is destroyed, then so too is the possibility of meaning. If the bits that store our digital writing are effaced, so too is any message they may carry. A nuclear catastrophe destroys meaning by destroying potential readers and the material of writing, whereas a digital catastrophe destroys meaning and inscription by destroying the microscopic material support. As these digital communications are entrusted more and more, what is at stake is the whole system of believing in the integrity of one’s information, and with it the integrity of all systems. We arrive, then, at a similar situation to what Paul Saint-­Amour refers to as the nuclear uncanny: “Because it offers the possibility of a future without symptoms, without a symbolic order— ­ in other words, no future at all— the nuclear condition can, in a sense, only cause anticipatory symptoms.”7 Likewise, the militarized digital catastrophe shapes the present by its future possibility. Saint-­Amour’s argument is helpful in that it places the futurity of such events clearly in the present. He suggests that such a catastrophe, especially because it destroys the symbolic, must produce its effects in the present. If this future catastrophe undermines the symbolic in the present, we begin to enter a space of what we could call militarized deconstruction. The ability for any program, database, or text to control its meaning and intent is instantly destabilized. As Parikka argues, “apocalypses reveal new temporalities, new layers for a media archaeology of the present.”8 The possibility of a catastrophe places the full meaning of programs and networks always in the future but their symptomatic expression in the present. Their complete meaning can only be understood after their looming breakdown. In short, despite the linear and programmatic nature of a program’s execution, the deferral of meaning and the non-­ self-­ sameness opened by its potential insecurity guarantee that the relation between the text of the program and its action in the world is governed by play, différance, and the impending possibility of its deconstruction. This catastrophic threat to the future of databases suggests that they are ultimately shaped by the structure of what Derrida calls arche-­writing (the originary structure of non-­ self-­ presence and externalization that shapes all existence— the ­ violence of our being in the world). When Hägglund explains arche-­ writing, we could easily imagine that he is speaking about a computer rather than a human subject:

#### Cyberwarfare must be understood as fake wars and classified NSA cyberops turning nonwar into war - a conflict over meaning that erases and rewrites the very archives and epistemes that trace its existence

Joque, 18 (Justin Joque, researcher and visualization librarian @ UMich, Master's of Science of Information at the UMich School of Information, PhD in Communications at the European Graduate School. “INTRODUCTION: Root Kit,” Deconstruction machines: Writing in the age of cyberwar. University of Minnesota Press, 2018)

There is no easily agreed-upon definition of cyberwar. Even within closely related literatures, there exists an ongoing debate over what constitutes cyberwar. Some, such as Rid, who has written at length declaring there is no such thing as cyberwar, question whether such a concept is a helpful lens for thinking the present situation at all.1 The term cyberwar, in most invocations, refers to the notion of cyberspace and the possibility of a war carried out in this global networked space, wherein computer systems are taken over to disrupt and surveil an enemy’s communication and networked infrastructure either as part of a “kinetic” war or as a form of low-level conflict aimed at gaining geopolitical advantages. Though it is important to follow authors, strategists, legal scholars, and others wherever they happen to see “cyberwar” occurring, one particular etymological meaning will guide this inquiry. The prefix cyber- refers to the term cybernetics. Cybernetics, originating from the Greek kubernētēs (“steersman” or “governor”), is the science and study of systems, their structures, regulation, emergent properties, and possibilities, spanning disciplines from technology to biology to society. By explicitly thinking the cyber- in cyberwar as referring to systems, it will be fruitful to understand cyberwar as a war against systems: computer systems, state systems, systems of organization, and even systems of meaning. This etymological understanding of cyberwar closely mirrors some of the earliest deployments of this term. One of the first unclassified uses of the term cyberwar comes from a 1992 publication by Arnett.2 For him, the term means the replacement of human operators with machines that decide on targets, trajectories, movement, and so on—essentially the culmination of a long history of the insertion of “intelligent machines” into the arsenal of war fighting. That same year, Der Derian used the term “in the sense of a technologically generated, televisually linked, and strategically gamed form of violence.”3 Arquilla and Ronfeldt subsequently published a paper defining cyberwar as a tactical and strategic movement whereby communication, information, and the visibility of the battlespace become the central concern. They assert that while information technology brings cyberwar to the fore, it is not necessarily a technological phenomenon. In fact, the exemplary case of cyberwar they recount is a thirteenth-century Mongol offensive against Khwarizm, where the Mongols succeeded in defeating a significantly larger army by cutting off communications and disrupting the control of forces. These definitions complement each other. Der Derian and Arnett’s definitions focus on carrying out a kinetic war through the cybernetic organization of humans and technology, while Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s definition stresses disrupting all of the enemy’s cybernetic systems regardless of whether they are human, technological, or a combination. We are faced, then, with something much more expansive than war in cyberspace; rather, what these authors begin to explore in the early 1990s is an understanding of war in which one tries to construct and defend systems of communicating, knowing, controlling, and, ultimately, existing. Simultaneously, one attempts to disrupt, infiltrate, corrupt, and destroy these same systems belonging to the enemy. Arquilla and Ronfeldt state that such a strategy “may aim to confound people’s fundamental beliefs about the nature of their culture, society, and government, partly to foment fear but perhaps mainly to disorient people and unhinge their perceptions.”4 Clearly this is not completely new. Belligerents have always attempted to deceive their opponents and disrupt economies and governments. Furthermore, war has often had as a central objective the destruction of one critical system and the infiltration of another: the body and the territory of the opponent. Despite this, we can outline three critical factors that mark cyberwar as a historical shift. First, proponents of cyberwar, such as Arquilla and Ronfeldt, stress that in cyberwar, information and structures of knowing become central rather than peripheral to conflict. They say that cyberwar “means disrupting if not destroying the information and communications systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to know itself.”5 Second, cyberwar attempts to disrupt not only the enemy’s knowledge but also the entire structure of knowledge. In short, cyberwar invests epistemology itself as a battlespace. Third, cyberwar seeps outside of “war” proper. In calling into question modes of knowing, cyberwar breaks down the limits of the time and space of war. Thus the term cyberwar describes two distinct but related phenomena. On one hand, it is a strategy for fighting war, and we will include whatever is named cyberwar by strategists, legal theorists, authors, and warriors. On the other hand, we will mean a historical shift—in a sense, a global cyberwar that marks a tendency whereby the critical element in war becomes the flow of information and the fortification and disruption of systems. In making this shift, cyberwar has opened an epistemological and cybernetic battlespace wherein notions of war, enmity, and knowing become directly contestable. While these concepts have always been unstable and problematic, cyberwar seizes them as systems of direct military intervention, turning what was once a question for philosophers into a domain of the global battlespace. In its most abstract sense, cyberwar has become an event that calls everything including itself into question at the moment it arrives. It is the historical possibility that all systems may break down—or, in their military occupation, be caused to break down—but it is also possible that cyberwar may undermine itself before anything actually “happens.” Cyberwar as historical event marks a moment of radical militarized unknowability. Many discussions of cyberwar, be they historical, strategic, or legal, begin not with the earliest examples or contemporary attacks but rather with a future catastrophe that demonstrates the danger of our overreliance on vast, connected, yet vulnerable systems. These catastrophes normally start with a nonstate actor or a “rogue” state hacking into key networks, destroying critical infrastructure in the United States or multiple European countries. Airplanes crash into each other, trains derail, communication channels shut down, and electrical systems are disabled. Not only are these systems forced to shut down but they are hijacked and made to spin out of control, sometimes destroying themselves so completely that they would take months to return to normal usage. These imagined scenarios often place the reader at the time immediately following the catastrophe. At this point in time, one can survey the wreckage of our technological hubris before the aftermath begins in earnest. It is the moment when the full scale of a possible collapse is revealed but not yet realized.6 Where a historical account begins in the past, it often starts with a CIA attempt to secretly destroy a Soviet gas pipeline.7 According to Thomas Reed, a National Security Council staffer, in 1982, the CIA was able to insert an intentionally faulty piece of code into a pump that the Soviet Union obtained from a Canadian company. According to Reed’s account, the pump was installed in the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline; varying pump speeds and valve settings produced extreme pressures that caused an explosion large enough to be detected by U.S. satellites. The secret introduction of a so-called logic bomb—a somewhat antiquated term for a malicious piece of code inserted into software—has been touted by a number of commentators as one of the earliest examples of cyberwar. Although Reed, who made this story public for the first time in a 2004 book, never referred to this attack as cyberwar, this story has become something of an origin myth for those who write about cyberwar more generally.8 The event prefigures a number of issues that arise again and again in the myriad discourses surrounding cyberwar. Most important, it becomes clear how vulnerable complex systems of computation have become. These systems aggregate code written across the globe and parts manufactured outside the purview of their owners into complex networks that belie attempts to control them. Computation is exposed to the exterior places in which it is produced. Furthermore, even if unintentionally, the use of this event as the first in a series of international cyberattacks offers an answer to a question that is often asked of theorists of cyberwar: how can such an event lay claim to being “war”? Is this merely sabotage? Placing the origin in the Cold War responds to those critics of cyberwar hype who believe it is nothing more than a collection of high-tech tools in service of the ancient techniques of spying, deception, and sabotage. For the Cold War proved that wars need not be explosive and could consist of decades of low-level conflict. As Virilio says of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, “the weapon’s serious danger is not that it could explode tomorrow. . . but that for thirty years it has been destroying society.”9 The bomb’s destructive power has been felt directly through its threat. Likewise, as can be seen in the futuristic scenarios described earlier, cyberwar seems always to threaten catastrophe. Placing cyberwar’s origins in the Cold War suggests the possibility of a nonwar that is as destructive as a kinetic war. The second half of the twentieth century has demonstrated that even in the absence of a hot war, conflict can destroy governments and societies. Furthermore, at least for those theorists and strategists of cyberwar in the United States, this origin story contextualizes contemporary cyberwar discourses in another way. Several military and political commentators writing about cyberwar as a strategic area of study were the same theorists who worked on nuclear deterrence strategy in the latter part of the Cold War. A number of authors—many of whom work for the RAND Corporation, a think tank that was created in 1948 to provide research and analysis to the U.S. military—even attempt to employ strategies learned from nuclear deterrence research to mitigate military hacking and offensive use of global networks.10 Tying the origin of cyberwar to Cold War global strategic thinking offers an opportunity for those making the transition from strategizing in a bipolar world defined by nuclear weapons to a multipolar, interconnected global economy. While the Siberian pipeline attack’s similarity to contemporary issues surrounding cyberwar is noteworthy, the most striking aspect of the whole affair is that it possibly never happened. Following the release of Reed’s book, an ex-KGB officer with direct knowledge of the region at the time disputes Reed’s account. He acknowledged there was an explosion but claims it was at a different, smaller pipeline and was caused by specific construction mistakes, not by faulty equipment.11 Moreover, no known media reports from the time confirm an explosion, which Reed claims was the size of a small nuclear blast. Other than Reed’s account, no other documentation has been found, and the CIA has never confirmed the event.12 The origins of cyberwar in this event are seemingly impossible to verify. Pipeline explosions were common at the time, and there would have been no way for the CIA to know for certain if it was caused by their purposefully faulty equipment or accidently faulty Soviet equipment. Given our current evidence, the event is completely unknowable. Moreover, even if there was an explosion, it is impossible to verify if it was the logic bomb or a mechanical failure. Depending on one’s perspective, either the fake event or fake refutations seep into the historical record like a computer virus corrupting the system’s memory. Thus, in a largely unrecognized way, this event is archetypal for cyberwar. Cyberwar and cybersecurity weave a complicated relationship between the knowable and the unknowable. Our networked world has become so complex in sheer technical terms that the system as a whole cannot be known from the outside. Mapping even just the public Web has become a scholarly pursuit in its own right. Computers and networks represent information as tiny bits on a magnetic disk or pulses of light across a cable that, owing to their size, speed, and complexity, are on their own essentially meaningless and impenetrable to human observers. One always interacts with abstractions and complex representations of the material reality of computing. Cyberwar, in attacking these systems, is always on the verge of being meaningless itself. Moreover, in attacking systems of knowing that guarantee information, a successful attack impairs even our ability to know if something has happened. Cyberwar is fought precisely in this space between the possible catastrophe and the possibility of nothing happening at all. The event itself is ambiguous and our public historical record is already compromised. It could of course be argued that all history is ambiguous, constructed, and selective. What is unique in the case of cyberwar is that the whole structure of knowing and observing is opened as a site of direct military intervention. It is not only a question of interpretation and selective archives. The entire archive and our ability to comprehend the archive may be attacked at any moment. In a sense, we are dealing with a limit case of historical unknowability—not just ambiguity but a military attack on the data of history itself. Now, even if the victors write history, it may no longer be written from data they control. Thus an effective understanding of cyberwar will only be possible by not prematurely deciding in favor of an event happening or not happening. Cyberwar operates both as a strategy and as a mediatized cultural phenomenon directly in the space between happening and not happening. It succeeds as a military strategy by never succeeding too much. It always seems to be leading us to the verge of catastrophe and at the same time to an interminable boredom where nothing will ever actually happen. Cyberwar could easily be dismissed as not really being war or violent, but what is so virulent and dangerous about cyberwar is its ability to atomize and distribute warfare into everyday life. Cyberwar succeeds so much more effectively for being either overhyped or dismissed. Ultimately, we must resist deciding in favor of catastrophe or boredom, for in doing so, the entirety of cyberwar will certainly escape us. Instead, we must attempt to interrogate the history and discourses of cyberwar by following its vacillations between these two poles as it hides in the theoretical space between war and nonwar.

### Eastern Europe Link

#### Eastern Europe is in its current situation due to decades of lying and breaching agreements by the US – the aff is part and parcel of the US desire to prevent neutralism from taking over its relationship with Europe because it would end open economic exploitation

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**Animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union predated the Cold War, and even Russia’s Bolshevik revolution**.38 For example, the United States and Russia confronted each other in the late nineteenth century over Manchuria, the United States wanting an open door and the Russians seeking political and territorial control. Contrasting strategies for seeking influence beyond their respective borders—informal versus formal empire—were thus evident even before the advent of communism. **These animosities deepened with the coming of communism in Russia**. Wilson sent 10,000 US troops between 1918 and 1920 to destroy the Bolsheviks, an effort that obviously failed but underscored American hostility to Lenin and communism. Again, Stalin wanted American help to limit the Japanese influence over Manchuria but, after coming to power in 1933, President Roosevelt did not respond. Whereas Adolf Hitler forced the Allied powers to work together, even during the war, Roosevelt and Churchill delayed Stalin’s plea to open a second front in France, leaving the Soviet troops to engage 80 percent of the German army.39 **A paranoid man under the best of circumstances, Stalin, then, had his own reasons to distrust the deeper motives of his wartime allies**. Despite this suspicious past, there was a brief moment of hope following the famous meeting at Yalta that the Big Three would be able to work together because the United States and Britain might be willing to concede a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to Stalin. **As we know, this was not to be**. **With Roosevelt’s death and the atomic bomb, the American position hardened**. **Truman recognized clearly that US power was now preponderant and argued that the United States “had to have its way 85 percent of the time.”**40 Stalin was not willing to accept such constraints, especially in his “backyard.” **For both security and economic reasons, he imposed brutal Soviet-style regimes on Eastern European countries**. **Eastern Europe was not of great economic importance to the United States** The reasons Stalin’s control of the region added deeply to American anxieties lay elsewhere. **First, it signaled to American policymakers that Stalin was not willing to “accept a subordinate role in Pax Americana**.”41 **Second, Stalin’s refusal to allow elections in these countries violated deeply cherished preference in the United States for democratic rule**. And finally, prior to World War II, Eastern European countries had been important source of raw materials and markets for Western Europe.42 Soviet control over these economies was now a serious blow to the US design to control the Eurasian landmass, rebuild Western Europe, and keep the economies of the region open as part of an open global economic order. In sum, Soviet efforts to establish a more traditional land empire over its neighboring countries collided with American ambition to establish a global informal empire of open economies, precipitating the Cold War. Following the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, **the United States took the lead in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, a military alliance of Western powers**. In retrospect, **some scholars have wondered why NATO was needed if US power was already preponderant**. **Besides containing any possible future expansionism on the part of the Soviet Union and controlling Germany, one important suggestion has been that a key purpose of NATO was to ensure that Western European countries did not drift toward neutralism**. Senior American policymakers, such as Acheson, considered neutralism “a shortcut to suicide.”43 During the Senate debate over the formation of NATO, one US senator bluntly stated the core American motive: “[T]he Atlantic Pact is but the logical extension of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.”44 **Over time, containing communism and establishing friendly control over Western Europe was, of course, not enough**. **After the Soviets announced that they, too, had an atomic bomb, and after China fell to Mao’s forces, American anxieties about the communist threat deepened**. At home, the debate on who lost China fed the anticommunist hysteria in the form of McCarthyism. **Feeling on the defensive, American foreign policymakers turned more aggressive, which led to the policy changes laid out in NSC-68**. As is well known, these policy changes led Americans to sharply increase military expenditures; pursue the hydrogen bomb; and, if possible, to undermine “totalitarianism” and to roll back communism.45 With the communist revolution in China, the focus of the Cold War shifted to Asia, a set of developments to which I will return after a brief discussion of how the developing world fit into America’s global design during this early phase of the Cold War. Rebuilding the industrial core and containing communism provided the essential context for the emerging American approach to the developing world. Scholars have debated whether the importance of the developing world to the United States during the Cold War was more economic or political.46 This is a false debate. As Truman declared rather early, “[O]ur foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible.”47 **More specifically, in the postwar period, American foreign policymakers understood national power in terms of economic strength, and to them, economic strength included reliable access to raw materials and markets abroad**.48 This is where the developing world fit into America’s global ambitions; it, too, had to be integrated into an open global economy. The importance of different regions of the developing world naturally varied. American decision-makers never doubted that Central America and South America would need to remain within the American orbit.49 Not only was the region important for trade, it also attracted the attention of foreign investors. Both communist and other capitalist European powers would thus have to be kept out of the region. Given America’s global power superiority, this would not be difficult in its own backyard. The policy problem instead would be how to maintain regional influence in an era of assertive nationalism within Latin American countries.

#### The aff/DA misunderstands the root of violence and tensions in the Baltics – Russia’s occupation of Kalingrad was driven by fear of Western consolidation despite the West pulling back because of the aftermath of the violence done

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Shliapentokh and Matveeva write in their book, Strakhi v Rossii [Fears in Russia], that **the Soviet Union was marked by a ‘catastrophe consciousness’, rooted in the trope of Western counter-revolution threatening the future of communism**. **This social imaginary revolved around the themes of famine** (particularly among peasants), **espionage** (predominantly among low-educated urbanites), **nuclear apocalypse, and foreign currency speculation**.7 **Catastrophic consciousness played a particularly destructive role in the state’s programme of repopulation of East Prussia and that** it needed not to be grounded in an actual state of an affairs is beyond the point: fears arise in social organization itself; they have a social basis in the state of uncertainty, which presents a breach in the familiar order of things and daily life.8 Kaliningrad of the second half of the 1940s had such an organization. In the spring of 1946, something unusual, something inconceivable was going on in the newly annexed Western borderland of the Soviet Union that our contemporary thinking fails to grasp. Without official permission, the men of a newly established kolkhoz (collective farm) left for Belarus. When interrogated by a military patrol, they spoke about recent bombings of its capital city, Minsk: ‘Fifteen of our airplanes were shot down over there, while here we sleep tight at night and live in ignorance.’ They resolved to form a guerrilla battalion and marched eastward ‘to defend the Motherland’ (the men were natives of Belarus).9 In another kolkhoz, exactly the opposite had occurred: news had arrived that ‘Turkey, together with England and America, declared a war on the Soviet Union’, but instead of taking up arms, the male villagers fed into the woods in fear of conscription, leaving the fields and livestock to their female co-workers.10 The mood was no calmer in the province’s capital city. Letters were sent to relatives of the volunteer settlers in other provinces, speaking of decapitations committed by Germans, as well as poisoning and arson. **The nightmares of thecollective imagination were echoed in internal memos that circulated between different departments of the local government. These newly crystallizing fears reflected the uneasy circumstances of everyday life that awaited those settlers who arrived in the province in 1946,** misled by the recruiting agents: **the vast majority had to get by in half-destroyed tenement-like buildings, with several families in one room, or in barracks, without electricity or water, and move cautiously between the corroded and mined tram tracks in debris-filled streets**.11 The city’s resources were stretched so thin that the dead were often left in the open for days before being removed.12

### Enlargement Link

#### NATO enlargement represents a deeper relationship between the West and white supremacy that undergirds the entire conflict with Russia – ignoring the role of US imperialism ensures the global spread of fascist violence against revolutionary forces

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The start of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 led to the emergence of over 40 pro-government volunteer battalions fighting on Kyiv’s side. The inability of the Ukrainian armed forces—plagued by corruption, low conscription rates and lack of funding—to halt advances by pro-Russian separatists in some of the initial phases of the conflict were among the key factors behind the rise of these paramilitary battalions. While some of them lacked a distinct political ideology, others were offshoots of far-right and ultranationalist groups, which functioned as skinhead gangs or football hooligan clubs in pre-Maidan Ukraine. My research indicates that almost from the start of armed conflict in the Donbass in spring 2014, some of Ukraine’s volunteer battalions served as magnets for neo-Nazis, white supremacists and other adherents of far-right ideologies who traveled from all over the world to join the fighting. However, this soon became considerably more difficult: Starting as early as in late 2014, Ukraine’s process of disbanding paramilitary groups and integrating them into official forces resulted in an outflow of foreign fighters even as claims that the volunteer battalions remained a magnet for white supremacists persisted into 2019 (see examples here and here). That said, there is evidence that a small number of Western white supremacists are still trying to go to Ukraine to fight—perhaps unaware of the changes on the ground—and that ties between Ukrainian and Western far-right groups persist in the form of direct communication and visits to each other’s countries. Magnet for Foreign White Supremacist Fighters Since the start of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014, some Ukrainian pro-government paramilitary battalions, as well as pro-Russian separatist units, attracted foreign white supremacists and other far-right-wingers to their ranks. The main destinations for these fighters included several Ukrainian pro-government volunteer battalions openly espousing far-right ideologies, such as Azov, Right Sector1 and OUN battalions (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Foreign fighters also joined international battalions such as the Georgian National Legion, which called itself neither far right nor white supremacist but gave foreigners entrée onto the battlefield and a chance for combat experience—which is, in my view, what foreign fighters traveling to Ukraine wanted. (The commander of the Georgian National Legion, which was formed as a volunteer battalion in 2014 and later absorbed into the Ukrainian military, claimed in 2018 that 70 percent of his fighters are Georgian and the rest are from elsewhere—"Germany, U.S.A., U.K., Australia, Greece, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia and Israel,” he told the BBC.) Since volunteer battalions typically did not require their members to sign a contract in the initial phases of the conflict and few (if any) records of members’ citizenship were kept until the battalions’ incorporation into the state security services between late 2014 and 2016, a reliable count of the number of foreign fighters is unavailable—and it is even more difficult to calculate how many of those fighters had neo-Nazi or other far right views. Nonetheless, a 2019 report by the Soufan Center estimated that between 2014 and June 1, 2019, about 880 foreign fighters, not counting some 3,000 Russians,2 traveled to Ukraine to fight on Kyiv’s side. While the report notes, as have others, that the fighters came for a variety of reasons, its authors argue that “many fighters, particularly from Western countries, have taken advantage of the conflict in Ukraine to expand the global white supremacy extremist movement.” Reports of foreign white supremacists and far-right activists fighting among the Ukrainian pro-government paramilitary battalions date back to the summer of 2014, and the volunteer battalions—some of them accused of robbery, torture and other questionable practices—soon emerged on the radar of U.S. policymakers. Members of Congress tried and failed for three years to ban U.S. funding from going to the Azov battalion before finally passing the necessary legislation in 2018, according to reporting by The Hill. More recently, on Oct. 16,2019, a group of 40 Democratic lawmakers led by Rep. Max Rose signed a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanding to know why the Ukrainian National Guard regiment Azov had not yet been designated a terrorist organization. Echoing a 2017 warning from the FBI, the letter claimed that Azov has a history of collaborating with and training white supremacists from the U.S. and other Western states, including the Christchurch, New Zealand, shooter, Brenton Tarrant. (The Christchurch killer did not write about training with Azov in his manifesto; he mentions Ukraine once in the document, claiming to have visited. The flak jacket he wore during his shooting spree, however, included a symbol “commonly used” by the Azov battalion, according to the New York Times.) The congressional letter equated Azov with white supremacist groups in Europe, such as the U.K.’s National Action and the Nordic Resistance Movement, which the signatories also felt should be added to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. While Tarrant’s connections with Azov have been widely publicized, other Western white supremacists and ultranationalists who fought with Ukraine’s far right are less well known. Swedish sniper Mikael Skillt, a self-described “ethnic nationalist” who told the BBC in 2014 that he believes races should not mix, served with the Azov battalion early in the war, as did a handful of other far-right Swedes, including Robin Holmgren. A middle-aged Italian with “a past in the far right,” according to press reports, also fought with the battalion in 2014. Vice magazine reported on two Austrian ex-soldiers, Ben Fischer and Alex Kirschbaum, who fought with the Right Sector and had found “an outlet for [their] nationalism” in Ukraine. Former U.S. army soldier Craig Lang—now wanted in the U.S. for the 2018 murder of a Florida couple—fought in Ukraine in 2015-2016, first with Right Sector, then with the Georgian National Legion; although Lang has described himself as a “strict constitutionalist” and anti-communist, and a recent article claimed that “soldiers who served with Lang in Ukraine said they never heard him express any racist or extremist views,” the FBI accused him last year of providing advice on joining the Azov battalion to Jarrett William Smith, an American white supremacist and U.S. Army soldier who was arrested in September 2019 in connection with plans to bomb a U.S. news network and to assassinate liberal politicians and “antifa” activists. Not Your Typical White Supremacist Groups Notwithstanding multiple alleged and proven connections to white supremacists and far-right groups around the world, the Ukrainian volunteer battalions varied widely, as did the motives of the foreign fighters who joined them, and sometimes even the battalions with strong ultranationalist inclinations differed starkly from Western white supremacist organizations—if only because they attracted fighters whom hard-core racial supremacists would not have allowed in their ranks. Members of Ukraine’s Jewish community, such as Natan Khazin, have reportedly served with Azov, as have ethnic Greeks, while the motley Right Sector incorporated Muslim Chechen and Crimean Tatar fighters into its battalions. That such ultranationalist battalions as Azov and Right Sector reportedly received financing from oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, who is a dual Israeli-Ukrainian citizen and a prominent member of Ukraine’s Jewish community, also undermines the notion that these units adhered to the anti-Semitic tenets of traditional white supremacist ideology. Big Changes While the conflict in eastern Ukraine initially served as a magnet for international fighters of various stripes, the situation began to change around the end of 2014. The initial chaos of the war in Donbass, which had allowed volunteer battalions to operate across the country with limited accountability, was relatively short-lived, as Kyiv’s signing of the Minsk I and Minsk II peace accords was accompanied by efforts to rein in the volunteer battalions and ultimately end their independence. Although my research indicates that some rogue volunteer units persisted until as recently as last summer, most of them had been either disbanded or incorporated into Ukraine’s ministries of Interior or Defense by the end of 2015. The new formalities and discipline introduced during this process, coupled with fewer opportunities for active combat and for those who do not speak Russian or Ukrainian, seem to have motivated many foreign fighters to leave the country. With the onset of reforms, all ex-battalion members were required to sign service contracts and adhere to the military code of conduct. The Ukrainian military tried to enforce rigid discipline across the ex-battalions and most were no longer allowed even to be based in the Donbass region, let alone to participate in armed confrontations with pro-Russian separatists. From November 2014, Azov and many smaller battalions became officially registered regiments within Ukraine’s National Guard. By mid-2015, all ex-battalions were reportedly staffed only by contracted professional military servicemen. This process of institutionalizing the volunteers eventually applied to foreigners as well, and included measures to weed out undesirables. A June 2016 presidential decree laid out the rules under which foreigners could serve in the Ukrainian military and mandated identity checks. While the law explicitly banned foreigners with a criminal record from serving, military recruiters have also been extremely careful about individuals with other reputational risks, according to a Defense Ministry official interviewed in November. In practice, adhering to these standards has sometimes been a challenge, as demonstrated by the tortuous extradition hearings of Lang, the ex-U.S. soldier wanted in the Florida murder case, who is still in Ukraine and regarded by some as a hero. Two other factors that have made the war in Ukraine less appealing to foreign fighters have been the decrease in combat activity and language constraints. With the end of large-scale combat in Donbass beginning in March 2015, foreign fighters could no longer be sure they would be deployed on the frontlines where they could gain sought-after combat experience. Over the past three to four years, the fighting has mostly been reduced to artillery exchanges and occasional small-level skirmishes, while most of the soldiers’ time is spent in garrisons. The above-mentioned Defense Ministry source also said that the Ukrainian military does not provide translators, so all foreigners are expected to understand commands and generally communicate in Ukrainian or Russian. As a result, my research indicates the number of foreigners fighting in Ukraine has fallen and many of those who remain are likely from the former Soviet Union. A journalist reporting from Ukraine in 2016, told DFRLab that, “with the ongoing implementation of the second Minsk agreement, the number of foreign fighters has significantly decreased. There’s definitely been a big change; most of them have left. You used to see foreign fighters around all the time, but the majority moved on in 2015.” In June 2019, Ukraine’s Channel 5 reported that about 500 foreigners were serving on contract with the Ukrainian military (although it attributed the estimate to “volunteers” rather than official sources). For those foreigners who want to stay in the country, whether fighting or not, Ukraine is simplifying procedures for getting residency and citizenship. Fighters Leave, But Contacts—and a Desire to Fight—Remain While the end of the battalions’ free reign may have marked the end of the “Ukraine pilgrimage” for white supremacist fighters from other countries, contacts between Ukrainian volunteer battalions and Western far-right groups persist, with Azov and other ultranationalist Ukrainian ex-battalions continuing to serve as inspiration for Western far-right-wingers, including would-be militants. I believe that as with foreign fighters from jihadist groups, international ultranationalist volunteers pose obvious security risks for their home countries. Some of the Western far-right volunteers in Ukraine were seasoned and experienced soldiers, and Ukraine was hardly more than another stop on their personal crusades. A report on “white supremacist terror” released in April 2020 by the Anti-Defamation League and George Washington University describes the desire to travel to Ukraine, sometimes in order to fight, as “a trend that is becoming more and more common for individuals in both The Base and Atomwaffen [Division],” two white supremacist groups keen to further their international connections. In addition to Smith, the American soldier who sought advice on joining Azov from Lang, the report names William Garfield Bilbrough, a 19-year-old Base member arrested by the FBI early this year who had been “preparing to travel abroad to fight in Ukraine” since late 2019, according to court documents, although it was not clear on which side he’d fight. Others have managed to make the journey: Ethan Tilling—a former Australian soldier who describes himself as an ex-Nazi, “very much right wing,” “anti-immigration” and “definitely anti-Muslim”—fought in Ukraine for a couple of months in 2017, arriving there a year after a fellow Australian ex-soldier with far-right sympathies, Jared Bennett, who had fought with Right Sector. In addition to attracting international fighters, some of Ukraine’s far-right-leaning ex-battalions—most notably, Azov, the largest and most influential of the lot—have also been fostering civilian links with U.S. and European white supremacist groups. "We think globally," Olena Semenyaka, the international secretary for the National Corps party, which includes many Azov veterans, told RFE/RL in November 2018, soon after organizing events in Kyiv with Greg Johnson, a prominent figure in U.S. white supremacist circles. About half a year earlier, Semenyaka had hosted a leader of the California-based white supremacist Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.) and his entourage. While these connections are more defined by ideological solidarity than by military activity, there have also been reports of attempted recruitment for fighting. Bellingcat recently alleged, for instance, that in the fall of 2018 the National Corps “supported an effort by Joachim Furholm, a Norwegian citizen and self-described ‘national socialist revolutionary,’ to bring American right-wingers to Ukraine to fight against Russian aggression. The effort specifically framed participation in Ukraine’s war … as an opportunity for American right-wingers to acquire combat and other practical experience to be deployed later within the United States after returning home.” Furthermore, according to a February 2020 report by British anti-extremism watchdog Hope Not Hate, the Misanthropic Division— “the international recruiting arm of … the Azov battalion,” the report alleges—has been recruiting among British far-right groups, albeit with minimal success thus far.

### Neg State Action/AT:“We are Anti-Expansionist” Link

#### The idea that the aff isn’t imperialist because it isn’t expansionist or doesn’t maintain military superiority misunderstands what imperialism is – the desire to establish stability and credibility for open-market access and the defense of capitalist interests – only our theory of power can explain the violence that coheres the aff

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**It is important to set aside some misleading views about imperialism**. First is the tendency among some observers to deny that imperialism continues in the modern world. Leaving aside apologists and court scholars, **serious proponents of this view hold it because they tend to equate modern imperialism with colonialism**.4 Although I do not share this view, it is a respectable one. I have in this study instead treated the formal control and the informal control of one state over another as variants of imperialism. Understood this way, **imperialism is well and alive in the twenty-first century**. Second, a variety of observers still propose modern-day versions of the white man’s burden to explain what drives contemporary imperialism. **One serious version of this standpoint treats American efforts to promote democracy overseas as a driving force behind American expansionism**.5 This may be true here and there, but it will certainly not do as a general explanation of American interventions in the poor parts of the world. Missionaries notwithstanding, there is very little in the historical record to support a suggestion that the United States, or Britain, expanded overseas primarily to promote the well-being of peripheral countries. A somewhat more serious suggestion that also needs to be set aside is that imperialism in the modern world does not pay, that it is often a mistake. This was the logic behind Joseph Schumpeter’s argument against Lenin, in which he proposed that imperialism was moved, not so much by the profit motive of capitalists, as by the atavistic elements in society who still care about status and militarism.6 Over the subsequent decades, numerous versions of the idea that imperialism is irrational or a mistake have been put forward. For example, a strong criticism of the American war in Vietnam was that it was a giant mistake: it was a product of mistaking nationalists for communists or of the mistaken concerns of ideologues worried about falling dominoes; or it was perpetuated by status-obsessed leaders who could not face defeat at the hands of a “fourth rate power.” 7 **This view allows well-meaning observers to criticize imperialist actions here and there, but it avoids a central question, why are such “mistakes” repeated over and over again, across space and time?** The answer is, imperialism is not a mistake. **There are instances in which imperialists fail to achieve their objectives, such as in Vietnam**. However, a theory of motives ought not to be deduced from the outcomes. Imperialists imperialize because they hope to gain from such actions. **Whether metropolitan states interpret the national economic interest narrowly, equating it with the interests of select capitalists, or more broadly has varied over time and place; what has not varied is that metropolitan states take the lead in imperialism, hoping for gain**. Starting with the East India Company and culminating in the most recent American invasion of Iraq, one aim of the historical analysis in this book has been to identify what imperialists hoped to gain from imperialism. Serious analyses of what drives imperialism need to focus on the selfinterested behavior of imperialists. I have suggested that both Britain and the United States expanded into the global periphery to enhance national economic prosperity. **This proposition competes with two other venerable, interest-oriented hypotheses: realist and Marxist**. Realists often suggest that political interests of national security move imperialism; Marxists, by contrast, argue that imperial expansion really happens at the behest of the capitalists of the hegemonic powers.8 Before revisiting the historical evidence in support of either proposition, it may be useful to focus for a moment on the underlying logic of these competing arguments. My argument that the pursuit of national economic prosperity is the taproot of imperialism begins with the claim that modern states pursue prosperity, both as an end in itself and because state leaders believe that national power is a function of economic buoyancy. **For hegemonic capitalist states, the world is their oyster. Leaders of these states seek opportunities for national capitalists abroad as a means to enhance both prosperity and power**. Hegemonic capitalist states typically seek to open peripheral economies, hoping that such openness will facilitate trade, investment, and financial opportunities for their national firms. When stable openness is not readily achievable in peripheral countries, imperialism becomes likely. **Limiting the sovereignty of peripheral countries is the means by which hegemonic capitalist states ensure economic access in the world. Both formal and informal empire originates from this national logic of dominant capitalist states**. **It will be evident to careful readers that the logic of my argument overlaps with that of both realism and Marxism**, especially at the theoretical edges of these venerable paradigms. This is not surprising, since I draw on both scholarly traditions. But I am also seeking to move beyond. If the realist argument is that states pursue national security and admits that national security depends largely on a growing national economy, then my argument is nearly indistinguishable from some versions of realism. However, a focus on national-level factors as determinants of foreign behavior of dominant states is only a minority strain among realists. Following Kenneth Waltz, the majority view is instead attracted to “system level explanations” in which national behavior is understood mainly as a product of balance-of-power politics in an “anarchic” world.9 Benjamin Cohen thus argues that imperialism results from the urge of nations to maximize their power positions in an insecure world.10 This is the core realist explanation of imperialism. I return below to the discussion of the empirical validity of such arguments and suggest that the real empirical challenge to a number of balance-of-power arguments arises when dominant capitalist states continue imperial expansion even when the global balance of power is not tight.11 Similarly, if the Marxist argument is that capitalist states have enough autonomy from the interests of specific capitalists to pursue the interests of capitalism as a national economic system, then my argument is, again, nearly indistinguishable from some versions of Marxism. However, once Marxist scholars admit that states can pursue what is good for the national economy irrespective of the demands of specific capitalists, then they have very nearly thrown the baby out with the bathwater; the argument is not really a Marxist one anymore.12 The core Marxist argument of imperialism, which is deeply persuasive in some historical instances, instead, is when capitalists actually influence state elites to undertake aggressive actions aimed at opening markets or protecting investments or ensuring that loans are paid off. We have encountered many such cases in this volume. However, we have also encountered numerous other cases of imperial expansion in which the direct pressure of capitalists was missing, in which the state elite took the lead in both diagnosing what ailed the national economy and in suggesting cures, which included aggressive imperialism. The Weberian theoretical assumption that I embrace instead of strained Marxism is that state and class—or authority and association—are autonomous realms of human activity that influence each other.13 This theoretical standpoint enables one to accommodate class analysis of state and imperialism—when needed— but without embracing a Marxist framework. Such a theoretical position is also consistent with a normative preference for social democracy and state sovereignty in the modern world. **If realists underemphasize the importance of economic elites as a force behind imperial expansion, Marxists underestimate the power of nationalism that also drives imperial interventions**. **To overcome these limitations, I have focused on the pursuit of national economic interest overseas as the key motive that propels imperialism. The core intuition is that imperialism is moved by a convenient marriage of the power interests of the state and the profit interests of the economic elite**. How well does this proposition hold up against the empirical evidence analyzed in this book? On balance, the proposition holds up well against much of it, but not all. In what follows I provide a quick summary of this historical evidence.

#### The aff’s “negative state action” is Reaganomics acting at its peak – a simultaneous decrease in governmental accountability and influx of private contracts for militarism proves the aff is just imperial propaganda

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Instead of turning inward, however, Americans elected Ronald Reagan as its president, who became the instrument for the global reassertion of American power. **Reagan was a strong anticommunist.** His foreign affairs focus was mainly on the Soviet Union. Yet, circumstances soon demanded that he focus on other parts of the world, especially the debt crisis in Latin America. (I will return to a fuller discussion of U.S. economic interventions in Latin America during the last decades of the century. For now, some background on the Reagan era that sheds light on the nature of U.S. interventions may be useful.) Reagan’s genius was an effort to beat the usual trade-off between guns and butter. **Early in his presidency, he gave tax breaks to the rich and sharply increased defense spending**. As the budget deficit grew, so did the pressure to cut social spending. **Reagan packaged such cuts in a broader program of releasing market forces by shrinking the state**. **The outlines of a neoliberal revolution were now in place**. **The lower strata and the future generations in the United States would pay for the rapid increase in military spending. Foreigners would also help finance America’s military buildup**. The high interest rates triggered by Volcker’s policies attracted large capital inflows that, in turn, helped both the budgetary and balance-of-payment deficits.14 Further global implications of America’s neoliberal turn included the fact that, supported by a more robust military, the United States was again ready to pressure other states—especially the Soviet Union, but also others—to fall in line with American goals and interests. **Even allies would have to bend to the new American assertiveness**: for example, the Plaza Accord of 1984 pressured Japan and Germany to revalue their currencies to make American exports more competitive; **and, of course, as we will see, the state had to be rolled back in much of the developing world to serve the American interest in a more open global economy**. **During this period, a major economic shift that is relevant for understanding patterns of American interventions in the developing world was the ascendance of finance, both within the American political economy and globally**. Trends within the United States and in the international economy fed each other. The shift toward the dominance of finance began even before the Reagan era, was encouraged by Reagan’s deregulation policies, and matured during the Clinton years. As noted, the economic recovery of Japan and Europe threatened the competitiveness of the American economy, especially in manufacturing. Between 1979 and 1995, for example, some 43 million jobs were lost in the United States. If manufacturing contributed 28 percent, and finance 18 percent of the American GDP in 1975, by 1995 the share of manufacturing had declined to 22 percent and that of finance had increased to 27 percent.15 Measured somewhat differently, the value of assets created by financial institutions within the United States grew from some 55 percent to 95 percent of the GDP between 1980 and 2000.16 Not surprisingly, this shift was also reflected in who within the US economy was making the most profits: between 1980 and 2005, the profits of the financial sector grew by 800 percent, whereas that of nonfinancial sectors grew “only” by 250 percent.17 **The importance of Wall Street**—**that is, of finance**—**in American politics then grew, in part because American politicians were forced to recognize the structural shifts in the American economy, and also because the financial and personnel links adjoining Wall Street and American politics increasingly became denser**. **These developments within the United States were influenced by changes abroad and in turn, pushed the world further toward financial globalization**. The issue of the destruction of the Bretton Woods system is discussed above. And again, the OPEC price increases, along with the agreement of America’s client states in the Middle East to denominate oil sales in dollars, further contributed to a sharp increase in Eurodollars. So, just as American industry was facing stiff competition from Japan and others, US-based banks found new economic opportunities overseas. Overseas branches of American commercial banks, which were not regulated by American banking laws, became a major depository of OPEC dollars. Awash in oil money and believing that “countries do not go bankrupt,” American banks then pushed loans to middle-income, developing countries— especially in Latin America—at relatively low, but variable, interest rates. More than exports and direct investments, financial flows across national boundaries now emerged as the key dimension of globalization: if, in 1979, global financial transactions amounted to a sum twelve times greater than total exports, by 1984, this sum had jumped to nearly twenty times.18 For American banks, domestic business had languished during the 1970s. **In search of new sources of profit, the “international activities” of American banks “exploded” instead, “accounting for 95 percent of the earnings growth of the nation’s ten largest banks” during the 1970s and “probably more than half their total earnings.”**19 As we will see, the approach of the US government to Latin America’s debt crisis in the 1980s was deeply influenced by the need to ensure that major American banks—now heavily exposed beyond the national borders—remained profitable. **Reagan, in sum, increased defense spending sharply, deregulated the domestic economy, and preached the ideology of free-market capitalism**. This militaristic neoliberalism at home had its global counterparts, too: structural adjustment programs in debt-ridden developing countries and military interventions in such small places as Grenada. Reagan’s overseas interventions were relatively limited, though, certainly compared to what followed. Reagan’s morning-in-America notwithstanding, the Vietnam Syndrome had still not been fully defeated within the United States and the Soviet Union was still intact. **It would take the end of the Cold War—and, eventually, 9/11—to overcome these hesitations**. The Cold War started to decline in the mid-1980s with Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev then took unprecedented steps aimed at modernizing the Soviet Union. These actions unleashed forces—probably unanticipated— that led to the reunification of Germany, the toppling of dominoes within the Soviet empire, and the end of the Soviet Union. The Cold War was over. While Americans were more surprised than anything by these developments, they were quick to claim “victory.”20 What followed was first a sense of triumphalism—the “end of history” variety21—and then the hubris to finally remake the world in the American image.

### Russia Link

**1AC fears of Russian exposure of NATO as a “paper tiger” proves they lock Russia in a Cold War Box that dooms solvency and makes miscalc inevitable.**

**Crosston, ’15** [Matthew Crosston, Professor of Political Science, Miller Chair for Industrial and Internaitonal Security and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University. PhD from Brown; “NEMESIS: Keeping Russia an Enemy through Cold War Pathologies”; from Crosston’s academia page, <https://bellevue.academia.edu/MatthewCrosston>]

There have been numerous articles on the authoritarian strengthening of power in Russia and Putin’s backsliding from democracy throughout the 2000s. Russian positions and initiatives in Syria and Ukraine have been portrayed within media venues across the West as evidence of quasi-Soviet revanchism. In the midst of this there has been very little consideration of the impact of American positioning on the Russian perspective. This article examines that influence, whether it is the openly adversarial neoconservative foundation under George Bush or the Republican Party in general, the so-called ‘reset’ interaction under Barack Obama, or American foreign policy analysts and academics meant to be experts on Russia. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that not only fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security interests, but aims to contain Russia within a continued **Cold War box that** not only sours opportunities for collaboration but **guarantees the absence of partnership** **in** important **global security** areas. The idea that Russia’s contemporary positions have not evolved beyond the residue of Cold War mentalities seems to be more a product of scholars and practitioners in the West rather than in the institutions of Russia itself. This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis and whether the West is more responsible for this Cold War pathology than it is willing to admit. Unlike many pundits that have considered Russia a superpower also-ran since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, or even those who simply bristle at the idea of giving Russia a major global platform on international issues today, the fact of the matter is that Russia does indeed still matter: it will remain a key United Nations member; a new entrant into the World Trade Organization; a formidable military power; and a significant player with countries that overall tend to be unfriendly or openly adversarial to the United States.1 America, however, seems either reluctant to accept this reality and thus cuts itself off from creating new dialogues with Russia. There seems to be an element of purposeful disdain in the way Russia is viewed, analyzed, and engaged. Russia most certainly is not blameless and at times only intensifies its bravado, apparently in a fairly petulant display meant to encourage American irritation. Perhaps most disappointing, it will be shown that two of the biggest culprits in this process will be none other than the two respective presidents, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin. This article highlights some fairly intriguing and balanced work being done on Russian national security positions and how American interests endemically conflict with those policies. Unfortunately, these works are not getting near enough attention. Instead there is a public American perspective that seems wholly committed to portraying all Russian initiatives in the harshest light. Whether that portrayal accurately reflects on-the-ground reality sometimes seems recklessly uneven. The raging and disjointed conflict in Eastern Ukraine will be highlighted as a critical case example, where an obvious line of thought has been pushed and trumpeted regardless of ambiguous facts and vetted counter-information. When taken in sum, all of these angles reveal what should be considered **a ‘Cold War pathology’** that **is** actually **emanating** most **vociferously from the American side** rather than the Russian. A final section will elaborate how this pathology, based on historical legacies, may carry stark political consequences far into the future, leaving what could be a major potential partner no choice but to be the enemy. Flaming Punditry and Cold War Triumphalism: Pushing an Adversarial Agenda There are numerous think tanks, both in the United States and Russia, which are deeply concerned about the state of Russian-American relations. Places like the Moscow Carnegie Centre or the Brookings Institute in Washington DC are regular go-to places for the media when seeking expert opinion and analysis. However, these centers have had a decided slant in allocating blame for the poor bilateral relations to the Russians, with the explanations ranging from the fairly simple to the rather mystically esoteric. “If America did not exist, Russia would have to invent it. In a sense it already has: first as a dream, then as a nightmare. No other country looms so large in the Russian psyche. To Kremlin ideologists, the very concept of Russia’s sovereignty depends on being free of America’s influence. Anti-Americanism has long been a staple of Vladimir Putin, but it has undergone an important shift. Gone are the days when the Kremlin craved recognition and lashed out at the West for not recognizing Russia as one of its own. Now it neither pretends nor aspires to be like the West. Instead, it wants to exorcise all traces of American influence.”2 **It is not difficult to find this Freudian popcorn political psychology today when it comes to ‘analyzing’ Russian positions.** It portrays the United States as the **victim of a global oedipal complex** when it comes to Russia: first Putin desperately craves daddy’s attention only to then defiantly and recklessly reject him, petulantly trying to run away from home. It is important to remark how most countries around the world would actually find it dangerously myopic and unhealthy to base its own foreign policy on earning the ‘approval’ of another country. With ease the far more standard approach to foreign policy formulation is to determine a country’s own national interests within its local security dilemma and craft an independent and fierce strategy that can best achieve its optimal goals. That normal process, ironically, is often described in America as a ‘shift’ away from craving attention to exorcising American demons. In reality there is no shift: Russia has always been about Russia, as it expects America to be about America, France to be about France, Nigeria to be about Nigeria, so forth and so on. What Russia usually finds so irksome is that when it does what everyone else does in terms of exercising global power, it is judged as psychologically unstable or deficient. What the American media outlets and think tank personalities fail to recognize is how much of this judgment is coming not from explicitly observable behavior or direct quotes from Russian actors but is placed upon Russia by the so called experts themselves as they push a decidedly one-sided interpretation. Russia is not supposed to aspire to be a copy of the West nor should it be allowing particular American influence over its policies. This is not said as anti-Americanism but rather as simple logic: America would never strive to copy another country and it most certainly would not allow another country to force-influence its foreign policy. So why should Russia? It is this very simple and straightforward question that seems to never be asked by what are otherwise august media institutions and impressive political think tanks in the West. Sometimes this tendency can reach near farcical levels. When Alexei Pushkov, chairman of the Russian parliament’s foreign-relations committee, received so much media attention here when he spoke about ridding Russia of dependence on America and even fining cinemas that showed too many foreign films, Western experts needed to recognize the absurd for absurdity. But they did not. Failure to do so is perplexing given Western analysis always laments the strengthening of Putin’s own presidential power system and decries how little power sits within the legislative or judiciary branches of Russian government. Thus, it is nonsensical to highlight parliamentarians as having real impact. But this happens often in America with no sense of diplomatic irony. There also tends to be a failure to focus Russian analysis through the looking glass of reciprocity. What this means is that current American thinking emphasizes how untrustworthy Moscow decision-makers are while completely ignoring the same Russian criticism lobbed back at Washington. President Putin openly and publicly discusses his lack of trust in American power and in the specific policy decisions emanating from the White House. It is this skepticism that supposedly forces his own lack of desire to engage the United States. There are simply too few voices at present in the West trying to analyze this mindset as a legitimate position. As far as can be determined, the only reason this is not analyzed more seriously is because the competing alternative – that Putin is untrustworthy and Moscow is the cause of all communication breakdown – is simply accepted as a de facto axiom. In short, if the United States does not trust Russia, it is because of how Russia behaves on the global stage and its untrustworthy history. If Russia does not trust the United States, that is simply Russian posturing and a case of political transference, wanting to blame its own selfmade problems on someone else so that it can avoid any accountability. The problem is how readily this is unquestioningly accepted and how few so-called Russian experts are willing to step forward and shine a light on such intellectual superficiality.

### Russia Demonization Link

#### Demonization is wrong, backfires, and ignores that Russia is a check on US aggression

Peter Crowley ’19, is a Boston-area independent writer who recently had his book Those Who Hold Up the Earth published by Kelsay Books., “Thinking About Russia: Pigeonholing Doesn’t Work”, CounterPunch, 4/5/19, https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/05/thinking-about-russia-pigeonholing-doesnt-work/

**Russia has acted as a check on U.S. power**. Unlike in the early 2000s, when the U.S. had free reign to invade countries while Russia was recovering from vulture capitalism, Russia has been back on its feet for well over a decade. Because it acts as a check on American power, Russia is a demonized enemy. **This** **pervades into U.S. pop culture, where Russia and other Eastern Europeans are often depicted as backward and of totalitarian inclination**, such as in the sitcoms Jane the Virgin and New Girl. Russia demonization has long been politicized. The 2017 FBI memo on Russian election interference focused heavily on Russian media influence, such as RT and Sputnik, while failing to add any evidence connecting the DNC hacks by Guccifer 2.0 to Russian intelligence agents. Yet, still Russian interference is a media parade and a Democratic strategy to retake the White House in 2020. Mueller’s recent report may not even have put an end to this. As Russia and the U.S. engage in atavistic great power politics, China is, more quietly, expanding its global reach through the 5G network and the Belt Road Initiative. Whether Chinese infrastructural loans will place host nations in a virtual debt prison remains to be seen. Yet one has to wonder whether this debtor prison will be any worse than IMF loan obligations, often tied to subverting nations’ economic policies to the IMF’s demands. The U.S. attempts to oppose Chinese soft power efforts, such as through having Canada arrest Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. Yet it’s an exercise in futility as the U.S. and Russia, for that matter, have nothing better to offer. Therefore, Italy, despite its membership in the EU and NATO, recently signed on to China’s Belt and Road initiative. So, what of Russia? Russia is no demon. **It is far from the world’s most oppressive nations, such as el-Sisi’s Egypt, Duterte’s Philippines, occupied Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and others**. But Russia is also far from a human rights-protecting nation; it supports national sovereignty largely as a Machiavellian means-to-end to keep American power at bay. **As all nations, Russia acts according to its own perceived interests, which are neither black nor white**. **It sometimes protects the sovereignty of nations, but primarily when they are not within its historic sphere of influence and**, especially, when they U.S. has a mind to invade them.

### Technological Innovation Link

#### The discourse surrounding capitalist innovation and its capacity to “save the world” is rooted in an ahistorical and Orientalist view of the world that ignores the US’s complicity in depriving many countries of resources and then invading them to “save” them with the “Western experience” that justifies further violence out of fear of these nations gaining technological superiority

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

When colonized countries shrugged off the yoke of colonialism after World War II, they found themselves ensnared in neocolonial arrangements that perpetuated their impoverishment and underdevelopment. The Cold War realignment of the world system dominated by the United States and its First World allies on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union and its allies on the other, produced the Third World, that is, countries caught in the crosshairs of the battle between the two camps. Concomitantly, colonial narratives of the inferiority of colonized people, their cultures, and their knowledge systems (i.e., science) evolved into Cold War narratives of modernization and development that presumed the racial and / or cultural deficiency of the Third World. These narratives promoted the ideology that the plight of the Third World was the product of internal deficiencies rather than ongoing colonial exploitation. The solution laid out in these narratives was for Third World scientists to follow a Western path reliant on advanced industrial technologies to prosper (Philip 2015; Bhuiyan 2008; Escobar 1995). Even though the article invoked the notion of “western experience” as the path to Third World advancement, careful attention to what the article denoted by “western experience” in the sentence that followed—Taha knew where the West housed its anthrax—reveals that “western experience” is quite overstated. Such a gloss reflects a deeply entrenched subtext—the assumption of Western superiority. It is a notion so taken for granted that the article need not even explicitly reference it—a vague gesture to “western experience” suffices. The quote also intimates that Iraqi acquisition of “western experience” poses a threat—it is linked to Iraqi superweapons. The end of the Cold War and the advent of U.S.-led global capitalism had produced a severe power asymmetry wherein the United States turned to subduing what were significantly smaller threats globally. Yet, U.S. national circles became concerned with these smaller threats in the backdrop of the vast interconnectedness and mobility wrought by global capitalism, which had made both weaponry and advanced technologies much more accessible to even the most disempowered nations and groups (Cecire 2009). Iraqi scientists like Taha embodied this threat to U.S. hegemony—she had accessed Western technology and could now use it against the United States. One Department of Defense–affiliated study on Taha from 1999 (Taha had been the subject of UK and U.S. surveillance since the mid1990s) quoted Andrew Koch, an analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington: “It is the scientists who are the key to this [weapons capacity].… As long as Iraq maintains the brainpower to do this … over the long term you can’t stop them” (Brian Anderson 1999, 21; emphasis added). As with the news quote above, connections with the West were depicted as a source of intellectual (and technological) power, leading to the image of Western-educated Iraqis who were both advanced and potentially dangerous. In suggesting that “western experience” and technologies can be dangerous in the hands of the non-Western Other, these quotes intimate an ambivalence toward educating and equipping Iraqis. This logic reflected the underlying reality of U.S. empire—that the United States had less of a problem with Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (as the United States had after all helped develop and furnish these weapons to Iraq while it was an ally),27 and more of a problem with Iraqi ability to use them without direction from the United States or, worse, against the United States.

### Technological Transfer/Framework Link

#### Their tech is imperialist – the whole framework of transfer is bankrupt and designed to facilitate extraction

Donald Maclean Wells ’71, B.A. from University of Western Ontario, Master Thesis for Masters of Art in PoliSci, “American Multinational Corporations In Canada: Unchallenged Agents of Empire”, The University of British Colombia, October 1971, https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/stream/pdf/831/1.0302645/1

Just recently a new force in world politics, **the multinational corporation**, has become the focus of widespread interest and concern. **Many students of** the development and spread of **these firms emphasize their actual and potential contribution toward global economic integration**. Contingent upon this process, several observers have optimistically forecast the fundamental breakdown of the nation-state system and its replacement by some form of more stable and peaceful world polity. **The** Canadian **case however, does not sustain this optimism.**

Among all the nations Canada has been the most consistently liberal host of these firms, providing particular attraction for expan-sionist American corporations. As a consequence, the country has experienced a new and profound dependence upon the American economy. Directly resultant upon this experience has been the forfeiture of broad areas of Canadian state sovereignty and national independence. But **unlike the prophecy, this sacrifice has not been part of a more universal transfer of nation-state prerogatives to the claims of supranational authority.** Instead, the forfeiture has been unilateral and horizontal: from the Canadian state to the American state.

**Clearly, American multinational corporations have been successful promoters of continental economic integration**. No other nation in the developed world shares with Canada the same unique degree of economic subordination. **On the other hand, American multinational corporations are demonstrably inadequate institutions for furthering the general erosion of the nation-state system**. They are themselves subordinate to and dependent upon the U.S. state. This relationship is made most explicit through American laws of extraterritoriality whereby the U.S. government has reserved the right to dictate trade, anti-trust, and balance of payments policies to the foreign subsidiaries of American firms. The Canadian government has become acutely aware of this relation-ship on several occasions, most notably over the ‘Time and Reader’s Digest Affair’ and the ‘American Guidelines Issue’. **Of even graver import, these occasions demonstrated the ease with which American economic con-trols in one area could be converted into substantial political leverage in entirely unrelated areas of** Canadian **policy formation**.

**In each instance where the U.S. government has employed its authority over American multinational corporations to sway** Canadian **government policy, the** Canadian **government has eventually acquiesced**. Ironically, Canadian **government elites have proven themselves unwilling to respond to this challenge at its source. Instead of attempting to regulate or discourage American multinational corporations** in Canada, **they have co-operated actively in their promotion**.

#### The state and corporation are symbiotic agents colluding to erode and capture the entire globe for wealth extraction

Donald Maclean Wells ’71, B.A. from University of Western Ontario, Master Thesis for Masters of Art in PoliSci, “American Multinational Corporations In Canada: Unchallenged Agents of Empire”, The University of British Colombia, October 1971, https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/stream/pdf/831/1.0302645/1

But there is a second more critical perspective which is often overlooked or underemphasized by theorists of the great transformation. This outlook centres upon the fact that some **nations use multinational corporations as instruments of national policy to extend their powers and jurisdiction over other nations**. In this sense multinational cor-porations have become a readily “convertible entree”(13) to promote the political, military and economic goals of one state in another state. Instead of being protagonists in a battle with nation states, multi-national corporations are, according to this view, media for this intrusion of one state upon the jurisdiction and sovereignty of another state. Multinational corporations are seen as agents of empire in pursuit of colonies. For this purpose the multinational corporation has provided a somewhat more subtle set of techniques, the consequences of which are, however, comparable to those achieved by earlier cruder instruments of empire.

It is this latter perspective which portrays most accurately the relationship of American multinational corporations to the Canadian state: the American multinational corporation has in the past and does presently act as an economic front line for the intrusion of American political power in Canada. The resultant abridgement of Canadian independence is due less to any autonomous role of the multinational corporation than it is a function of the subordinate position of the American multinational corporation vis a vis the dictates of the American state. Of course this does not mean that the multinational corporation is the only agency of the American empire in Canada, merely that it is a most important agency whose vitality, as will be shown presently, has not diminished through lack of use.

For a variety of reasons, **the American state**, unlike the Canadian government, **has retained ultimate legal authority and actual control over the domestic operations and policies of corporations within its territorial jurisdiction**. **In addition, as will be seen, the American state has sought and exacted an increasing range of discretion over the activities of subsidiaries and affiliates of American-owned corporations outside these boundaries**. This capacity may, it is true, be contingent upon factors which are not necessarily permanent, whose salience may diminish over time. **Included are the great dependence of most U.S. multinational corporations upon the U.S. domestic market rather than upon the markets of other nations**,(14) the high proportion of American nationals in the managerial ranks of American multinational corporations,(15) continuing reliance, critical in some sectors, of the multinational corporation upon U.S. government controls, research and development grants, and other dependencies which signify and favour the American ‘character’ and ‘orientation’ of U.S. multinational corporations. These dependencies may be attenuated in the future as the American multi-national corporation increase the weight of its foreign operations. But this expectation may be naïve. There appear to be other, more permanent and critical features of the U.S. state-U.S. multinational corporation relationship which impel the continuing subordination of corporation to state. These have been aptly summarized by Henry Fowler, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.

“It is impossible to overestimate the extent to which the efforts and opportunities of American firms abroad depend upon the vast presence and influence and prestige that America hold in the world … if we were to contemplate abandoning those frontiers and withholding our assistance … I wonder not whether the opportunities for private American enterprise would wither – I wonder only how long it would take.”(16)

While the American multinational corporation derives considerable benefit from its relationship with the U.S. state and finds the relation-ship necessary to its existence, it should also be understood that the benefits accrue in both directions. **The United States relies heavily upon the continuing presence and growth of American multinational corporations to protect its interests and extend its jurisdiction abroad**. The American multinational corporation has a “highly significant role in the United States foreign policy” for which reason “the United States government has consistently sought … to expand and extend the role of the multinational corporation.”(17)

**So the connection between the U.S. state and the American multi-national corporation is symbiotic**. The rationale is circular: the corporation obeys the state because the state is necessary to the cor-poration, the state requires obedience from the corporation because the corporation is useful to the state. The powers and interest-fulfillment of the one are highly dependent upon those of the other.

### Ukraine Link

#### We have entered the final war against humanity – the 1AC is just fodder in the broader material and ideological skirmish for the boundaries of whiteness – this war for whiteness is inescapable and unsustainable – we must destitute the institutions that come to represent the “west”, whether a broader west that includes Russia or its protracted counterpart that continues inter-family war.

Bifo, 3-10-22

[Franco Berardi, aka “Bifo,” founder of Radio Alice, member of Italian Autonomia movement, writer, media theorist, and social activist: “War and (Senile) Dementia,” e-flux #125 (March 2022). https://www.e-flux.com/journal/125/454088/war-and-senile-dementia/]//AD

War, Agony, Suicide

At the Eastern borders of Europe, two old white men play a game in which neither of them can retreat.

The old white American is on the heels of a humiliating and tragic defeat. Worse than Saigon, Kabul is fresh in the global imaginary as a sign of the cognitive breakdown of the long-dominant, imperialist power.

The old white Russian knows that the base of his power is a nationalist promise: to avenge the honor of “Holy Mother Russia.”

The one who retreats first will lose everything.

The fact that Putin is a Nazi was already clear at the conclusion of the second war in Chechnya. But at the time, he was still lauded by the American president, who looked him in the eyes and praised his sincerity. The Russian also enjoyed the favor of British banks, as they were filled to the brim with rubles robbed by Putin and his friends through the dismantling of public infrastructures after the fall of the Soviet Union. Geriatric Russians and Anglo-Americans were brothers in arms when it came to destroying the social spheres produced by past labor and communist movements all over the world.

But friendship and camaraderie don’t last among assassins. In fact, what use would NATO be if peace was actually brokered? And how would a successful peace have affected the bottom lines of the multinational companies producing weapons of mass destruction and death—today making endless profits.

The expansion of NATO only serves to reignite a hostility that capitalism could not let die, to keep the profitable conflict alive.

There is no rational explanation for the war in Ukraine, especially because it is the climactic movement in a psychotic crisis of the white brain. What rationality is there in the expansion of NATO, which arms Polish, Baltic, and, yes, Ukrainian Nazis against Russian Nazism? In exchange, Biden gets the result most feared by American war strategists: forcing Russia and China into an embrace that fifty years ago Nixon had succeeded in weakening.

Given that the war is inexplicable in strategic terms, to understand the war we don’t need to think geopolitically, but rather psycho-pathologically. Perhaps we need a geopolitics of psychotic outbursts.

At stake here is the political, economic, demographic, and finally psychic defeat of white, Western, (post)colonial civilization, which cannot accept the prospect of exhaustion, which prefers destruction or suicide to the slow extinction of white dominance.

West, Future, Decline

With the war in Ukraine, a hysterical arms race begins, borders are consolidated (along racialized lines), and violence increases exponentially—all demonstrations of the senile marasmus into which the West has fallen.

On February 23, 2022, when Russian troops were already in the Donbass, Trump praised Putin as a peacekeeping “genius,” and suggested that the US follow his lead on the Mexican border.

Let’s see if we can figure out what Trump’s obscenities mean. Is there a kernel of truth in his delusions? At issue is the very concept of the West.

But first, what is the West?

If by “West” we refer to a geographical definition, then Russia is of course excluded. But if we think about the anthropological and historical meanings of that word, then Russia is more Western than any other West.

In short, the West can be defined as the land of decline and of obsession with the future. Those two traits are in fact one, given that for organisms subject to the second law of thermodynamics—as are individual and social bodies—the future can only mean eventual decline.

We—both the “we” of the West and the Westerners of the boundless Russian lands—are therefore united in futurism and decline, that is, in the delirium of omnipotence and in the desperation of impotence.

Trump gets credit for telling it like it is, claiming that our enemies are not Russians, but migrants from the Global South; China, which we have humiliated; Africa, which we have plundered. Those are our enemies, not the very white Russia, which is part of the “Great West.”

This Trumpist logic is based on a white supremacy that sees Russianness as the most extreme form of acceptable whiteness.

Biden’s logic is instead based on the defense of the “free world”: a world born from genocide, from the forced deportation of millions of slaves, and organized around foundational systemic racism. Biden chooses to break the “Great West” apart in favor of a smaller West without Russia, which is in any case destined to tear itself apart and to involve the whole planet in its suicide.

So, let’s define the West as a sphere of racist dominance obsessed with the future. Time stretches out in an expansive pulse: economic growth, accumulation, capitalism. It is exactly this obsession with the future that feeds the machine of dominance: a concrete present (of pleasure, of muscular relaxation) is invested into and exchanged for abstract future value.

Perhaps we could reformulate the classical Marxist analysis of value to say that exchange value is precisely this accumulation of the present (the concrete) in abstract forms (like money) that can be exchanged for something else tomorrow.

The fixation on and fetishization of the future are by no means a natural cognitive modality of the human. Most human cultures have been organized around a cyclical understanding of time, or on the insuperable dilation of the present.

Futurism is a transition to complete self-consciousness (also in aesthetic terms) of cultures of expansion. But there are many futurisms.

The obsession with the future has different implications in the theological-utopian sphere that is central to Russian culture and the techno-economic sphere of Euro-American culture. Federov’s cosmism and Mayakovsky’s futurisms both share an eschatological breath that is lacked by the technocratic fanaticisms of Marinetti and Musk. Maybe that’s why it is Russia’s destiny to end history—and here we are.

Nazism Is Everywhere

The new horizon is war that pits one Nazism against another. In his writings from the 1960s, Gunter Anders predicted that the nihilistic charge of Nazism would not die with the defeat of Hitler. He presaged that it would return onto the world stage when technical power developed to such a degree that it provoked the humiliation of the human.

Nazism is reemerging as a psycho-political form of the demented body of the white race, which ragefully reacts to its own unstoppable decline. Viral chaos has created the conditions for the formation of a global, biopolitical infrastructure, but it has also accentuated the widely experienced perception of matter’s ungovernability as it loses order, disintegrates, and dies.

The West has forsaken death because that concept is not compatible with its obsession with the future. It has rejected senility because it is not compatible with expansion and growth. But now, the (demographic, cultural, and economic) aging of the dominant cultures of the Global North are presented as a specter that white culture cannot even contemplate, let alone accept.

This is where the white brain (that of both Biden and Putin) enters a furious crisis of senile dementia. Then the white brain most lost to senility—that of Donald Trump—utters a truth that no one can stand to hear: Putin is our best friend. Sure, he’s a racist murderer, but we are no less so.

On the other hand, Biden represents the impotent anger that old people express and feel when they notice the decline of their strength, psychic energy, and cognitive efficiency. Now that exhaustion is in its advanced stage, extinction is the only reassuring prospect.

Can humanity save itself from the murderous violence of the demented and agonized Western, Russian, and European brains?

The invasion of Ukraine will continue, whether it becomes a stable occupation (unlikely) or concludes with the withdrawal of Russian troops after the destruction of the military apparatus donated to Kyiv by the West (more likely). Regardless, the conflict will not be resolved by the defeat of either of two patriarchs. Neither one can accept retreat. Therefore, this invasion signals the beginning of a phase of continuous war that will be global (and that may express itself in nuclear terms). The final war against humanity has begun.

In the suicidal war that one West wages against the Other West, the first victims are those who have suffered from the deliriums of both spheres of influence and power—those who want no war but are made miserable by its effects.

The only thing we can do is to desert, to abandon, to collectively transform fear into thought, to resign ourselves to the inevitable. Only in this way can we produce the unpredictable: peace, pleasure, life.

#### The shuffling of official commitments within the colonial infrastructure of NATO is American empire’s anxious response to the rising instability of its global order. Uncertainty over Ukraine’s position within inter-capitalist relations is driving a wedge in the structure of global imperialist accumulation, the impulse to resolve this tension is empire recuperating itself in the face of impending collapse.

**Fouskas and Gökay 19.** VK Fouskas, Professor of International Politics and Economics at the Royal Docks Business School at the University of East London, Bülent Gökay, Professor of international Relations at Keele University, “The Study of Global Politics and Economics Today,” The Disintegration of Euro-Atlanticism and New Authoritarianism, 2019, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-96818-6\_1

Our post-Cold War era is defined by intra-imperialist and inter-imperial contradictions. The former concerns core–core relations (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia) developed during the Cold War under the hub-and-spoke system of American primacy (see below). The latter concerns geo-economic and geopolitical concentrations of capital, especially in South and South-east Asia (e.g. China) and East-central Eurasia (e.g. Russia), whose market operations, accumulation strategies and security are not controlled by the American state but by geopolitically rival imperial states and capitalisms, such as China and Russia. The inter-imperialist contradictions of Lenin’s era have shifted to a different level. Yet, as the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis have clearly shown, regional intra-imperialist caucuses can unravel. This book argues that neoliberal/ordoliberal Europe is held together by what we call here as new (neoliberal) authoritarianism. The more the crisis of the neoliberal/ordoliberal model deepens, the more the authoritarian neoliberalism/ordoliberalism, as crisis management policy, becomes. We have a top-down approach to the phenomenon of authoritarianism. We see it as a direct consequence of the breakdown of the global economic order and the turn of ruling elites in many countries to either authoritarian crisis management techniques or unconstrained economic and political nationalism cum imperialism—even formal imperialism. We see it also as a means aiming at containing the unravelling of intra-imperialist contradictions caused by uneven development and the global fault-lines of capital accumulation on a world scale. In the final analysis, this is the result of what Martin Wolf called “the long and painful journey to world disorder” (Wolf 2017). In this context, we are not only examining the relative weakness of the USA and its Western allies, but also taking into consideration China’s global expansion and its geo-economic imperatives, and increased confidence of Russia imposing its authority in Eurasia with strength as well as the great impact that these have been making on the global distribution of power. Our assessment is that they are driving a wedge among the intra-imperialist assemblages, further undermining the hub-and-spoke system of US neo-imperialism. China’s interaction with US-led globalisation, whether deliberate or not, sets sight on snatching the leadership of globalisation away from the USA and not to succumb to the US-led globalisation, which is clearly in retreat. China, as an imperialist power, is building its global hegemony on the same geography, the very territory and terrain of intra-imperialist contradictions and by way of carefully penetrating them. We show, in this respect, that the Eurozone crisis and the stylised and separable—but not separate—public policies of Anglo-American neoliberalism and German- led ordoliberalism, themselves imperialist and deeply authoritarian public policies, are contributing as much to the coherence of transatlantic relations as to their decomposition. A definition of GF is provided in our previous work (Fouskas and Gökay 2012) in which we also subscribe to some tenets of world systems theory. Suffice to say here in brief that GF conceive of and visualise the social whole as “tectonic plates”, each occupying relatively separate domains: geopolitical-geographical, political, economic, ideological and cultural-civilisational. We do not accept the primacy of economics, or of any domain in particular determining “in the last analysis” all other domains. In other words, we tangle up Marx’s “base/superstructure” metaphor, preferring in its stead another analytical guidance of his to help us untangle the domains of GF, one that goes as follows: “the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” (Marx 1857/1973: 101). A truly global imperial power, an empire, must be in a position to master primacy in every single domain, that is to say, to make all “tectonic plates” converge somewhat harmonically under the single imperial-hegemonic design of a specific state. Some neoliberals reduce this to the economic level alone, arguing that “the world is flat” under the dominance of free market economics centred upon the USA, meaning that global capitalist integration of the entire world has been achieved. Theoretically, this is thinkable, hence (empirically) possible. Historically, and for good reasons, it has never been experienced. For instance, the USA tried first to establish itself in Central and Latin America—the so-called Western Hemisphere of the Monroe Doctrine—and then followed an Open Door imperialist policy in Eurasia and other parts of the globe towards the end of the nineteenth century. However, for nearly 200 years now, the USA has failed to build an informal empire even in its own backyard, Latin America, let alone the globe: many times during the course of the twentieth century, Latin American countries and peoples have not only dropped off the US bandwagon but have even risen to popular revolutions, the best example being socialist Cuba and, later, the Bolivarian strand of socialism which renewed its influence with the powerful anti-neoliberalisation movement of Caracazo in Venezuela in February 1989, followed by the rise of Hugo Chavez in power… We endorse the empirical-descriptive distinction put forth by world systems theorists, namely the distinction between core, semi-periphery and periphery. The imperial order itself is premised upon this division, and no modern imperial order can exist without establishing itself firmly across the uneven chain of this uneven division. This division is not a static or geographical distinction but a descriptive-dynamic categorisation subject to qualitative and quantitative findings resulting from concrete analyses of concrete historical situations and processes. For example, many capitalist countries were deemed as semi-peripheral in the 1960s and 1970s enjoying middle income levels while economically and politically dependent on the USA and NATO (e.g. Argentina, Greece, Portugal); today, they may have been either downgraded to a peripheral status or being entirely dependent on high debt levels and borrowing—a key feature of financialisation—in order to maintain that status. However, as many con- temporary researchers have noted, income inequalities in the post-1970s era of neoliberal financialisation and austerity have substantially increased in both core and peripheral zones and states (Milanovic 2016; Piketty 2014). Many heterodox economists, such as Costas Lapavitsas and Heiner Flassbeck, wrongly in our view, believe that the core-periphery cleavage within the EU/Eurozone is the result of the introduction of the Euro in 1999, underpinning the Eurozone crisis that ensued (Lapavitsas et al. 2010; Lapavitsas 2013; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015). Others are very sceptical in accepting that such a cleavage exists at all at the systemic level (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009a, b); or that it has any meaning at all to dwell on forms of “dependency” of the periphery upon the core, although they accept dependencies and inter-dependencies among members of the core (Panitch and Gindin 2012; Kiely 2010; Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009a, b). GF suggest that a key feature of imperialism is an appropriation of international value, and as such, it is premised upon a systemic and elastic core-periphery–semi-periphery divide, whose key operational function is the transfer of profits and rent from the periphery to metropolitan centres, or from one metropolitan centre to another. In the context of the EU, core-periphery structures have long predated the introduction of the Euro and go as far back as the nineteenth century. Core-periphery cleavages are not conditioned by monetary undertakings but by the level of economic, social and technological development. Relations of dependency, tensions and contradictory/negotiating processes between core and periphery/semi-periphery states and elites, as well as intra-core dependencies/inter-dependencies, are characteristic of a politically divided global capitalist system that needs to be reproduced as such in order to maintain and augment the rate of profit and the appropriation of it by the key economic-imperial configurations of that system, such as MNCs and financial/banking interests. Capitalism rests on a heavily hierarchical—both in terms of class and in terms of administrative/institutional divisions—structure. There can be no capitalism without these hierarchies (states, aggregation of geopolitical blocs, class divisions, separation of state and civil society), which are, essentially, typical hierarchical-theological divisions between rich, poor and those that somewhat stand in the middle, with the important qualification that class divisions cut across states and geopolitical blocs. Core, periphery and semi-periphery are descriptive and flexible divides/categorisations that have to be grounded on qualitative and quantitative findings resulting from concrete analyses of concrete historical situations. In addition to the above, these are not cleavages that apply to the level of the global system alone. Importantly, they apply within regional caucuses and nation states. There is a lot of wealth in London/South-east England, but also a lot of poverty in London itself, and a lot of poverty in the de-industrialised periphery (Wales/East Midland, Cornwall and the de-industrialised North) of the UK. Most mega-cities, London, New York, Shanghai, Berlin, are socially and ethnically segregated. Discourses and educational strategies of “inclusion” and “integration” aiming at “embracing diversity” fail repeatedly to accomplish their mission, not least because neoliberal eco- nomics lacks such integrative capacity. Indeed, a pronounced fault-line of the capitalist system today is, on the one hand, its liberal and goodwill declarations about “inclusivity”, “human rights”, “gender and race equality” and, on the other, imposition of harsh austerity measures and welfare state retrenchment. The illusion is that free markets can accomplish those noble aims… Hub-and-spoke arrangements privilege not just the friend–enemy binary terrain of international and domestic politics, aggregating friends, on the one hand, and defining enemies, whether Communists or Muslim terrorists (after 9/11), on the other. Importantly, America’s hub-and- spoke neo-imperialism celebrated the centrality and utility of US economic and political-military power for each subaltern member of the core, a central relationship that it is of far greater importance than any possible relation or, even worse, alliance built between those subaltern members. Thus, the intention of hub-and-spoke new American imperialism is to prevent its rims from becoming separate, politically organised, forces. Alexander J. Motyl captures that very well, when he notes that hub-and-spoke imperial arrangements are successful only if they operate in the absence of a rim. One could reasonably argue that the USA has managed to deliver on that strategic intent during the so-called Golden Age of capitalism (1950–1970), although this remark is applied to intra- core/intra-imperialist relationships and on the proviso that the erosion of US economic power by Japanese and West German competition is taken into account. As regards Western Eurasia, NATO institutionalised the dependency of Europe upon the USA, whereas American multinationals came to dominate European markets especially from the 1960s onwards. In the Far East, bilateral Treaties with Japan secured American primacy in the Pacific theatre (Fouskas 2003; Fouskas and Gökay 2005). However, The New American Imperialism failed to embed in the periphery, witness the successes of Arab nationalism, the Cuban revolution, the dominance of Communist forces in all anti-colonial movements—the sole exception, perhaps, being Cyprus—and, last but not least, the disastrous American war in Vietnam. Contrary to what Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argue, the US-led making of global capitalism in the periphery during the Golden Age was an utter failure. More to the point, as Robert Brenner has, among many others, argued, the Golden Age nourished West German and Japanese political economies to such a degree as to undermine America’s economic primacy from within. Open Door intra-imperialism began unravelling. This is paramount: whereas the power-shift of the previous imperial order took place by way of competition between externally related geopolitical and currency blocs fighting for supremacy, what Lenin and Bukharin called inter-imperialist contradictions, concession of economic power to the two ends of Eurasia whose post-war reconstruction owed so much to the USA occurred within the US-dominated core proper. This was the result of intrinsic relations of intra-dependency, cooperation, rivalry and combined development built in the very structure of hub-and-spoke international politics and economics under the primacy of the USA: it was an intra-imperialist conflictual power-shift. It does not indicate economic integration and quasi-American primacy, but it does indicate integration cum power-shift.

### Vaccine Link

#### Vaccine development isn’t neutral and the aff can’t just wave their hands and pretend it is – its reliant on extractive neocolonialism whereby the Global North steal the virus resources of the Global South only then to hoard the eventual vaccine which skyrockets deaths

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

As global security scholar Shawn Smallman (2013) notes, the international health system of virus sharing embodies a neocolonial relationship: it perpetuates the dependency of poorer countries impacted by disease on wealthy ones, which secure the needs of their own peoples while “keeping the governments of poorer states as supplicants” (22).33 In practice, the virus-sharing system makes affected nations give up their strains so that they can serve as the substrate for developing treatments primarily accessible to wealthy nations. This system unconscionably leaves nations without the means to purchase them at the mercy of drug donations gifted by wealthy nations and pharmaceutical manufacturers. While pandemic flu preparedness did not birth this skewed system, it exacerbated its inequities. In 2003, the GISN turned its attention to variants that might signal the start of a pandemic, and this move stimulated the demand for samples of potentially pandemic strains as well as the production of vaccines and antivirals against them. As demand intensified, the flu strains of afflicted nations became an increasingly precious commodity sought by nations in the Global North and their pharmaceutical partners. In the United States, where H5N1 did not appear (in birds) until much later in 2014, federal flu plans had nevertheless devoted significant attention to vaccine production as the magic bullet in flu response, and enlisted the vast pharmaceutical infrastructure by offering increased funding and other incentives.34 This infrastructure in turn depended on the acquisition of samples from afflicted nations—China, as already mentioned, and also Indonesia. The H5N1 strains that hit Indonesia were some of the deadliest, with the nation experiencing 58 of the 158 total deaths worldwide, and 75 of the 263 total cases, by the end of 2006 (WHO 2015). Indonesia became a major focus of the international health system and a key site where its inequities materialized. Moreover, like China, Indonesia resisted the inequitable international system. Indonesia had been providing samples to the GISN since finding its first human case in July 2005. But in December 2006, Indonesia stopped. Indonesian health minister Siti Fadilah Supari explained these actions, in her public statements and publications,35 as a refusal to engage in a skewed international system of “virus sharing.” This included issues of credittaking similar to what had befallen China: in April 2006, results of laboratory analyses involving viruses from Indonesia were presented at various international meetings without permission or with last-minute notification, and papers were written that added researchers from Indonesia as co-authors only at the later stages of writing (Sedyaningsih et al. 2008). Supari also highlighted how the international system negatively affected Indonesia’s health, when the Indonesian government could not obtain antiviral oseltamivir (Tamiflu) in late 2005 to treat initial cases of H5N1 because wealthy countries—which had yet to have any cases—had bought up the supply for their preparedness stockpiles (Supari 2008). Indonesia’s inability to access necessary treatment came to a head at the end of 2006, when the Indonesian Ministry of Health discovered an Australian company’s plans to develop a vaccine against H5N1—using a strain Indonesia had provided the WHO system, and without Indonesia’s permission (Fidler 2008; Sedyaningsih et al. 2008). This violated WHO guidelines requiring the donating countries’ permission to develop vaccines.36 The Australian drug company, CSL, later admitted to using Indonesian avian flu strains to develop a trial vaccine, while also insisting that it had no obligation to compensate Indonesia or guarantee the nation access to the vaccine (Lakoff 2010). In an article published in 2008, the Indonesian Ministry indicted the virus-sharing system, stating: “Disease affected countries, which are usually developing countries, provide information and share biological specimens / virus with the WHO system; then pharmaceutical industries of developed countries obtain free access to this information and specimens, produce and patent the products (diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics or other technologies), and sell them back to the developing countries at unaffordable prices” (Sedyaningsih et al. 2008, 486). The ministry showed that the system’s inequity lies beyond the fact that Indonesia lacked the manufacturing capacity and purchasing power of the rich countries to acquire these high-demand treatments. The problem also lies in the way the system demanded viral resources without compensation for afflicted nations. The wealthy countries of the Global North could access viral resources from the Global South for free, produce treatments derived from these resources, and then hoard them. Scholars and activists have used the term “biocolonialism”37 or “extractive biocolonialism”38 (Whitt 2009) to describe how the Global North appropriates biological riches (plants, animals, bodies, tissues, genes, etc.) from indigenous peoples, the poor, the marginal, the weak, the subjugated, and the genetically distinct. Well-known examples include U.S. researchers and corporations patenting medicinal plants from abroad, such as neem and ayahuasca, and the Human Genome Diversity Project’s commodifying the cell lines of indigenous peoples. This biocolonial system is, moreover, the enduring legacy of colonial extraction of land, labor, knowledge, and bodies, which has been updated in the contemporary context of a knowledge-based economy, privatization, and the patent system (Hawthorne 2007; Thacker 2006). An interconnected cast of powerful characters—Global North governments and transnational corporations—are the beneficiaries of biocolonialism; they acquire an array of benefits, from health and scientific advancement to reputation enhancement and profit. Diseases may not seem like they fall under the rubric of “biological riches,” since they are destructive entities that humans generally seek to stamp out.39 Yet, like plants and genetics, disease—the viral samples and other materials from which disease data can be gleaned—do constitute a resource, one procured from the Global South for the advancement of the Global North. Thus, the barriers Indonesia faced to obtaining the medications it urgently needed, despite the fact that these medications originated from its viral resources, were a product of the biocoloniality of the virus-sharing system. In addition to creating tangible vulnerabilities for Global South locales such as China and Indonesia, biocolonial extraction of samples and data imposed the systems and frames of the Global North. North-centric regimes of property and ownership forced afflicted nations to “share” viral data even while they enabled corporations to monopolize vaccines and their distribution. The ability to patent, and thus hold exclusive rights over viruses and the products derived from them, turned pathogenic flu samples into a form of biocapital that pharmaceutical industries based in the Global North sought to acquire to develop lucrative products for sale. A report on patenting trends shows that in 2005 patent applications skyrocketed for H5N1 genetic sequences, vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics—from single digits in prior years to over forty by 2007. The countries in the Global North comprised the vast majority of patent holders. Over half (53 percent) of the patents filed in 2007 originated in the United States (pharmaceutical companies, state-funded labs, government agencies such as the CDC); 27 percent were from Europe; and 4 percent were from Australia (Hammond 2009). Thus, patent holders largely based in the Global North determined who to sell the treatments to. Unbound by the health demands of afflicted nations, government agencies in the Global North could focus on preventative measures for diseases they were not even afflicted by, and private corporations could make decisions based on profitability.

## Links – Other

### Arms Control Link

#### Calls for arms control and fear of dual-use is just imperialist propaganda to continue the unending war against the Other that has characterized US foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

The U.S. push for international biological disarmament in the late 1960s had been the product of both concern about the morality of biological weapons and strategic disinterest given the rise of nuclear weapons (the latter’s proven power versus the former’s questionable efficacy). Both considerations hinged on the notion that some nations and peoples are unfit to possess weapons. In February 1967, leading scientists penned a letter to the White House opposing the use of biological weapons by invoking the notion of good / bad national governments: “CB [Chemical17 and biological] weapons have the potential of inflicting, especially on civilians, enormous devastation and death which may be unpredictable in scope and intensity; they could become far cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons, thereby placing great mass destructive power within reach of nations not now possessing it; they could lend themselves to use by leadership that may be desperate, irresponsible or unscrupulous” (quoted in Robin Clarke’s 1968 The Silent Weapons; emphasis added). The notion that some national governments were unfit to responsibly manage dangerous weapons had been, since the post–World War II period of rising U.S. power, a continuous thread in narratives of U.S. exceptionalism—namely, of the United States as global steward acting with just, altruistic motives. The trope of the ill-intentioned, unfit Other was its counterpoint—a trope the United States has used to demonize entities that threaten U.S. power: during the Cold War, it was applied to the Soviet Union and communism, shifting at the end of the Cold War to “terrorists” and “rogue states” (a history I described in the introduction). In the context of biological weapons, the trope of the unfit Other proved useful not only in the U.S. push for the ban on offensive weapons in the late 1960s, but also in subsequent periods of renewed U.S. interest in biological arms as “defense.” In this vein, the post-9 / 11 national security state mobilized the era’s most well-worn trope of the Other—the Arab / Muslim terrorist—to enhance U.S. biodefense. Section 1013 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which focused specifically on biological warfare, outlined an expanded role for public health (the subject of the next chapter) and the bioscientific research enterprise in bioterrorism preparedness and response, authorizing funding allocations accordingly. 18 The act cited as rationale Osama bin Laden’s statements of his intent to acquire WMDs: “public pronouncements by Osama bin Laden that it is his religious duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons.” The section went on to describe a “callous disregard for innocent human life as demonstrated by the terrorists’ attacks of September 11, 2001,” and “the resources and motivation of known terrorists and their sponsors and supporters to use biological warfare.” The characterization of bin Laden and the September 11 attackers invoked the figure of Arab / Muslim Other I described in the previous chapter—defined by cultural and moral backwardness, and thus uniquely motivated to harm innocents. The law’s invocation of this pervasive characterization thus helped concretize a bio-attack as imminent and made it a basis for U.S. state action (i.e., to build up its biodefense industry). On April 28, 2004, President George Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” calling for renewed attention to biodefense. The nine-page document began by quoting Bush’s earlier (February 11) remarks on the importance of countering international weapons proliferation: “Armed with a single vial of a biological agent, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace. America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose” (Bush 2004b; emphasis added). The passage constructed a divide: malevolent groups in possession of biological agents and ready to wield them, against “great nations” such as the United States who are “civilized” and peaceful. Not only does the latter group’s possession of biological agents go unmentioned, but by implication, their possession is presumed to be for defensive purposes only. The U.S. national security apparatus further couched its biodefense industry in exceptionalist terms by recuperating the notion of “dual use.” Dual use originated as a Cold War term pertaining to a nuclear-focused quandary: that scientific research could be applied toward either civilian or military purposes (Atlas and Dando 2006; Chyba 2002). In post-9 / 11 rhetoric, however, the term’s usage shifted from a distinction of domains to that of intent: “dual use” came to mark certain research materials—those involving biological agents, for instance—as having the potential for both good and evil purposes. In 2004, HHS set up the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to create rules for “dual use” research; the official press release announcing the formation of the board stated: “HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson today announced that HHS will lead a government-wide effort to put in place improved biosecurity measures for classes of legitimate biological research that could be misused to threaten public health or national security—so-called ‘dual use’ research” (“HHS Will Lead” 2004; emphasis added). The distinction being made here was between “legitimate research” (for either health or military / security purposes) by scientists in the United States, and its misuse—by implication the bioterrorist Other. This distinction thus legitimated research according to who was conducting it, the assumption being that U.S. science fields were motivated by good intent.

### Blockchain Link

#### Blockchain just expands capitalism’s environmental destruction to the digital realm

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How It Works: Like Playing Cards Stacked on Wishes

**The first thing to understand is that cryptocurrency, like paper money, has no intrinsic value**. There’s no gold or even a precious substance that we’d need for life on Earth like, say, a gallon of water, backing it, no government guaranteeing it.

Just as countries abandoned the gold standard decades ago and replaced it with a system called “fiat money” (such as the U.S. dollar), it simply represents faith that individuals have when they give and receive that currency. **Its decentralized process, with millions of hosts, was ostensibly created in part to cut down on illegal transactions.** **Furthermore, each different cryptocurrency–Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.–has its own approach, adding to the complexity**.

One important term (among many arcane ones) in understanding cryptocurrency is blockchain, aka distributed ledger technology, DLT. This is a way of keeping track of transactions that’s transparent to anyone who wishes to see them, and allows transactions to occur without the use of a middle-entity such as a bank or credit card company.

The blockchain is essentially a database owned by the network, which itself consists of millions of computers around the world, each with its own key. Whenever a transaction occurs, the details (except for the two parties’ identities) are shared as a cryptographic puzzle with everyone on the network. The computer on the vast network that first guesses the details is the winner. This winner of the verification or validation process collects several newly “minted” bitcoins–each now worth $50,000 or so–as a reward.

**That’s a big payout and tempting even for minor investors, but in truth they can’t compete: Those with the most and the fastest computers reap the most money**.

Digiconomist reports that the carbon footprint of a single Bitcoin block in 2021 is roughly equal to the carbon footprint generated by 1,890,394 Visa transactions. **A single mined Bitcoin has a carbon footprint of 259 tons** (235 tonnes),**in comparison to that of a Bitcoin’s worth of gold, at 24.25 tons** (22 tonnes).

Another term that is perhaps less known, but crucial in discussing the impacts of cryptocurrency on the environment, is “proof-of-work,” a process used by both Bitcoin and Ethereum. This form of cryptocurrency validation uses a method to achieve consensus on the blockchain. Simply put, **proof-of-work cryptocurrency is created as many machines all work to solve the same complex mathematical equation, or puzzle. The first machine to solve the problem wins**.

Thus, the more machines you have working on the same puzzle, the greater your chances of profiting. **As the complexity of the computations increases, it becomes harder for the average person to profit, since one must have thousands of machines to remain competitive**.

And so the system begins to resemble a traditional centralized capitalist system that remains profitable–to the very wealthy.

**Unregulated, Climate-Crazy Profiteering**

This facet of current cryptocurrency mining has drawn criticism from previous enthusiasts, including Jackson Palmer, who cocreated Dogecoin. He now calls it “an inherently right-wing, capitalistic technology built primarily to amplify the wealth of its proponents through a combination of tax avoidance, diminished regulatory oversight, and artificially enforced scarcity.”

And, he adds, “**Cryptocurrency is like taking the worst parts of today’s capitalist system (e.g., corruption, fraud, inequity) and using software do technically limit the use of interventions (e.g., audits, regulation, taxation) which serve as protections or safety nets for the average person. Financial exploitation undoubtedly existed before cryptocurrency, but cryptocurrency is almost purpose built to make the funnel of profiteering more efficient for those at the top and less safeguarded for the vulnerable**.”

**And it’s catastrophically energy-intensive**.

While there are other models for cryptocurrency mining, the proof-of-work model is of particular concern to environmentalists worldwide because of its energy-intensive nature. Proof-of-work mining can use the same amount of energy as an entire country such as Argentina (population 45.2 million).

A 2018 study published in Nature estimated conservatively, based on 2017 transactions, that the number of computers used to mine Bitcoin alone could produce enough greenhouse gases to raise global temperatures above the 2-degree Celsius tipping point before 2048. It’s important to note that cryptocurrency mining energy use has risen 320% in the past five years.

Megatons of Electronic Waste and Attendant Toxins

Emissions from the electrical use are not the only ecological disaster. **The machines generate a lot of heat, so they need to kept cool, requiring more energy. Being used for ever increasingly sophisticated computations, they need to be the speediest and most powerful models available. Computer companies build in fast obsolescence**–underscored in summer 2021 by Apple’s response to the revelation by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab of “ForcedEntry,” as they call the Pegasus spyware that made 1.65 billion Apple iPhones and other devices vulnerable to a complete, almost undetectable takeover by the private Israeli surveillance firm NSO.

**To counter the problem Apple issued a patch, but only for newer devices, thus forcing those with devices six or more years old to remain vulnerable or purchase new ones**.

These electronics contain toxic chemicals and heavy metals, which leach into soil, water, and air–and the bodies of humans and other species.

In September 2021 a Dutch team economics team published a study, “**Bitcoin’s growing e-waste problem**,” in the journal Resources, Conservation and Recycling. **The researchers found that as of May 2021, Bitcoin’s annual e-waste generation had added up to 6.6 million pounds** (30.7 metric kilotons), **with an average per-transaction e-waste of 9.6 ounces** (272 grams).

#### Expansion of blockchain and mining operations destroys the environment

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For advocates of cryptocurrency, **the promise of an economic future that is managed by a blockchain** (a decentralized database that is shared among the nodes of a computer network, as opposed to being held in a single location, such as a central bank) **is compelling**. For anyone paying attention, the rapid expansion of cryptocurrency has been stunning. In 2019, the global cryptocurrency market was approximately $793 million. It’s now expected to reach nearly $5.2 billion by 2026, according to a report by the market research organization Facts and Factors. In just one year—between July 2020 and June 2021—the global adoption of cryptocurrency surged by more than 880 percent.

But the increasing popularity of cryptocurrency has environmentalists on edge, as the digital “mining” of it creates a massive carbon footprint due to the staggering amount of energy it requires. **Based on data from the Bitcoin Energy Consumption Indexfrom Digiconomist, an online tool created by data scientist Alex de Vries, the carbon footprint of Bitcoin, the world’s largest cryptocurrency, is equivalent to that of New Zealand, with both emitting nearly 37 megatons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere every year,** according to a February 2021 CNBC article.

To understand why this is a problem, it’s important to explain what goes into creating a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin. Unlike fiat money, which is regulated through central banks, transactions in Bitcoin are tracked through a public ledger consisting of a network of computers around the world: the blockchain. “**Mining**”—a process in which computational puzzles are solved in order to verify transactions between users, which are then added to the blockchain—**allows this validation to take place, which is an energy-intensive process**.

It’s been a bit of a wild ride for Bitcoin. The market price of a single bitcoin plunged below $30,000 in June 2021 for the first time since January 2021—falling by more than half from its April peak of around $65,000. Nevertheless, some analysts and billionaire investors are still feeling bullish about the crypto coin, as several leading businesses continue to adopt the currency.

**Goldman Sachs started trading Bitcoin futures** (agreeing to transact the coin at a predetermined future date and price). Tesla invested $1.5 billion in Bitcoin. **PayPal announced in March 2021 that it would allow its U.S. customers to use cryptocurrency to pay its millions of online merchants. In September, El Salvador became the first country to make bitcoin legal tender. This, coupled with the fact that big-name brands like AT&T, Home Depot, Microsoft, Starbucks and Whole Foods now accept bitcoin payments, could pave the way for mainstream use**. But if the bulls are right and the price of a single Bitcoin eventually hits $500,000, it would pump more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than what is released by countries like Brazil or Mexico.

Another sector shaken up by digital assets is the art world, as digital artworks have been making headlines for the huge amounts they’ve been selling for on the market through the use of nonfungible tokens, more commonly known as NFTs, a type of guarantee backed by the Ethereum blockchain. In simpler terms, the works are created, or “minted,” through a process called proof-of-work (PoW), which establishes its unique identity, as explained in an article on Hyperallergic.

This is arguably an improvement over the traditional art market when it comes to storing the value of the original work but is terrible for carbon emissions. **The carbon footprint of a single Ethereum transaction as of December 2021 was 102.38 kilograms of CO2, which is “Equivalent to the carbon footprint of 226,910 VISA transactions or 17,063 hours of watching YouTube,**” according to Digiconomist. **Meanwhile, the electrical energy footprint of a single Ethereum transaction is about the same amount as the power that an average U.S. household uses in 8.09 days**, the website further states.

In March 2021, Austrian architect Chris Precht announced that he was “[abandoning] plans to sell digital artworks backed by NFTs due to the environmental impact of mining the digital tokens,” according to Dezeen magazine. He said that he had created three digital artworks and wanted to sell them using blockchain technology. “**I wanted to create 300 tokens because I had three art pieces and I wanted to make each one in an edition of 100**. … I would have used the amount of electricity I usually use in two decades,” Precht explained.

“[**W]e’re largely powering 21st-century technology with 19th-century energy sources**,” Andrew Hatton, head of information technology at Greenpeace United Kingdom, told CNBC. He attributes this energy usage to the “huge amount of data-crunching needed to create and maintain this cyber-currency,” a process that demands a lot of electricity. The problem, according to Hatton, is that “only about a fifth of the electricity used in the world’s data centers comes from renewable sources.”

**Another crucial aspect of cryptocurrency is that there is only a limited supply available. So, over time, as more bitcoin is mined, the complex math problems needed for transactions get harder to solve, demanding more energy in turn**. The system is designed this way so that each digital token that gets issued contains its own unique cryptographic reference to the blockchain, ensuring its security. **The issue of energy usage over time is further exacerbated by incentives attached to mining. In terms of Bitcoin, each time a miner solves the complex hashing algorithm required to produce bitcoin** (the “PoW”), **they receive a small amount of the cryptocurrency itself**.

The inherent problem with this, as Charles Hoskinson, co-founder of Ethereum, toldCNBC, is that “**the more successful bitcoin gets, the higher the price goes; the higher the price goes, the more competition for bitcoin; and thus the more energy is expended to mine [it]**.” As the price continues to rise, so will the incentive to mine the cryptocurrency, creating a feedback loop that spells trouble for the climate.

According to December 2021 figures from the Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index, Bitcoin makes up around 0.52 percent of the total global electricity consumption. That might not sound like much, but Digiconomist calculates Bitcoin’s total annual power consumption to be around 204.50 terawatt-hours, equivalent to the power consumption of Thailand.

#### Decentralization serves capitalist influence by preventing an effective communist bulwark – history proves

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Decentralization vs. Survival

**For a peoples revolution to survive, it must seize state power and use it to (a) break the stranglehold exercised by the owning class over the society's institutions and resources, and (b) withstand the reactionary counterattack that is sure to come**. The internal and external dangers a revolution faces necessitate a centralized state power that is not particularly to anyone's liking, not in Soviet Russia in 1917, nor in Sandinista Nicaragua in 1980.

Engels offers an apposite account of an uprising in Spain in 1872- 73 in which anarchists seized power in municipalities across the country. At first, the situation looked promising. The king had abdicated and the bourgeois government could muster but a few thousand ill-trained troops. Yet this ragtag force prevailed because it faced a thoroughly parochialized rebellion. "Each town proclaimed itself as a sovereign canton and set up a revolutionary committee (junta)," Engels writes. **"[E]ach town acted on its own, declaring that the important thing was not cooperation with other towns but separation from them, thus precluding any possibility of a combined attack [against bourgeois forces] " It was "the fragmentation and isolation of the revolutionary forces which enabled the government troops to smash one revolt after the other**."7

Decentralized parochial autonomy is the graveyard of insurgency—which may be one reason why there has never been a successful anarcho-syndicalist revolution. **Ideally, it would be a fine thing to have only local, self-directed, worker participation, with minimal bureaucracy, police, and military**. This probably would be the development of socialism, were socialism ever allowed to develop unhindered by counterrevolutionary subversion and attack.

One might recall how, in 1918-20, fourteen capitalist nations, including the United States, invaded Soviet Russia in a bloody but unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the revolutionary Bolshevik government. **The years of foreign invasion and civil war did much to intensify the Bolsheviks' siege psychology with its commitment to lockstep party unity and a repressive security apparatus**. Thus, in May 1921, the same Lenin who had encouraged the practice of internal party democracy and struggled against Trotsky in order to give the trade unions a greater measure of autonomy, now called for an end to the Workers' Opposition and other factional groups within the party.8 "The time has come," he told an enthusiastically concurring Tenth Party Congress, "to put an end to opposition, to put a lid on it: we have had enough opposition." Open disputes and conflicting tendencies within and without the party, the communists concluded, created an appearance of division and weakness that invited attack by formidable foes.

Only a month earlier, in April 1921, Lenin had called for more worker representation on the party's Central Committee. In short, he had become not anti-worker but anti-opposition. Here was a social revolution — like every other—that was not allowed to develop its political and material life in an unhindered way.9

**By the late 1920s, the Soviets faced the choice of (a) moving in a still more centralized direction with a command economy and forced agrarian collectivization and full-speed industrialization under a commandist, autocratic party leadership, the road taken by Stalin, or (b) moving in a liberalized direction, allowing more political diversity, more autonomy for labor unions and other organizations, more open debate and criticism, greater autonomy among the various Soviet republics, a sector of privately owned small businesses, independent agricultural development by the peasantry, greater emphasis on consumer goods, and less effort given to the kind of capital accumulation needed to build a strong militaryindustrial base**.

The latter course, I believe, would have produced a more comfortable, more humane and serviceable society. **Siege socialism would have given way to worker-consumer socialism.** The only problem is that the country would have risked being incapable of withstanding the Nazi onslaught. **Instead, the Soviet Union embarked upon a rigorous, forced industrialization. This policy has often been mentioned as one of the wrongs perpetrated by Stalin upon his people**.10 It consisted mostly of building, within a decade, an entirely new, huge industrial base east of the Urals in the middle of the barren steppes, the biggest steel complex in Europe, in anticipation of an invasion from the West. "Money was spent like water, men froze, hungered and suffered but the construction went on with a disregard for individuals and a mass heroism seldom paralleled in history."11

**Stalins prophecy that the Soviet Union had only ten years to do what the British had done in a century proved correct. When the Nazis invaded in 1941, that same industrial base, safely ensconced thousands of miles from the front, produced the weapons of war that eventually turned the tide. The cost of this survival included 22 million Soviet citizens who perished in the war and immeasurable devastation and suffering, the effects of which would distort Soviet society for decades afterward**.

All this is not to say that everything Stalin did was of historical necessity. **The exigencies of revolutionary survival did not "make inevitable" the heartless execution of hundreds of Old Bolshevik leaders, the personality cult of a supreme leader who claimed every revolutionary gain as his own achievement, the suppression of party political life through terror, the eventual silencing of debate regarding the pace of industrialization and collectivization, the ideological regulation of all intellectual and cultural life, and the mass deportations of "suspect" nationalities**.

**The transforming effects of counterrevolutionary attack have been felt in other countries. A Sandinista military officer I met in Vienna in 1986 noted that Nicaraguans were "not a warrior people" but they had to learn to fight because they faced a destructive, U.S.- sponsored mercenary war**. She bemoaned the fact that war and embargo forced her country to postpone much of its socio-economic agenda. As with Nicaragua, so with Mozambique, Angola and numerous other countries in which U.S.-financed mercenary forces destroyed farmlands, villages, health centers, and power stations, while killing or starving hundreds of thousands—the revolutionary baby was strangled in its crib or mercilessly bled beyond recognition. This reality ought to earn at least as much recognition as the suppression of dissidents in this or that revolutionary society.

The overthrow of Eastern European and Soviet communist governments was cheered by many left intellectuals. Now democracy would have its day. The people would be free from the yoke of communism and the U.S. Left would be free from the albatross of existing communism, or as left theorist Richard Lichtman put it, "liberated from the incubus of the Soviet Union and the succubus of Communist China."

**In fact, the capitalist restoration in Eastern Europe seriously weakened the numerous Third World liberation struggles that had received aid from the Soviet Union and brought a whole new crop of right-wing governments into existence, ones that now worked hand-in-glove with U.S. global counterrevolutionaries around the globe**.

In addition, the overthrow of communism gave the green light to the unbridled exploitative impulses of Western corporate interests. **No longer needing to convince workers that they live better than their counterparts in Russia, and no longer restrained by a competing system, the corporate class is rolling back the many gains that working people in the West have won over the years. Now that the free market, in its meanest form, is emerging triumphant in the East, so will it prevail in the West.** "Capitalism with a human face" is being replaced by "capitalism in your face." As Richard Levins put it, "So in the new exuberant aggressiveness of world capitalism we see what communists and their allies had held at bay" (Monthly Review> 9/96).

**Having never understood the role that existing communist powers played in tempering the worst impulses of Western capitalism and imperialism, and having perceived communism as nothing but an unmitigated evil, the left anticommunists did not anticipate the losses that were to come**. Some of them still don't get it.

### China Coop Link

#### US interest in China is rooted in an imperial-capitalist desire to use informal-networks of nations to displace the violent failings of capital onto other while preserving and hoarding the wealth of the system for the Global North

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It may be useful at the outset to preview the general argument that is developed below with reference to historical analysis. The question, first, is what motives drove the United States to expand overseas at the end of the nineteenth century? The pressures to expand overseas had been building in the decades following the Civil War. **During this period, the United States developed a powerful industrial economy**. **The example of Britain was very much on the minds of influential Americans, and arguments emerged that great powers must seek commercial opportunities beyond their borders**, and that they needed to build military power to support those ambitions. Along with an industrial economy, then, the United States developed a powerful navy. The boom-and-bust character of a buoyant capitalist economy added to the argument that ready access to overseas markets could smooth market fluctuations and facilitate steady economic growth and national power. **With much of the global periphery already colonized, however, the United States sought access to the few remaining open economic spaces**. The largest of these was China, and the lure of the Chinese market loomed large in America’s early overseas imagination. **The Philippines was initially deemed a desirable acquisition as a stepping-stone to China; it would be America’s Hong Kong**. Closer to home, Britain was still a major presence in the large economies of Argentina, Brazil, and even Mexico. However, the American economy was becoming more competitive and American naval power was growing. New opportunities were opening up, especially in the Caribbean and Central America. Britain was still a formidable presence, but weaker European powers such as Spain were ready to be expelled from their few remaining colonial outposts. Nationalist revolts against Spanish colonialism in Cuba and the Philippines provided the United States with opportunities to intervene, avowedly in support of those country’s indigenous nationalists. However, quick naval victories over Spain did not lead to independence for Cuba or the Philippines, but to suppression of the indigenous nationalists and the creation of new American colonies. With naval bases in the Philippines, the United States became a Pacific power. **This enabled it to claim a right**—**in a condominium with other major imperial powers**—**to full and open access to the Chinese market,** the big prize all along. Stronger presence in the Caribbean led the United States to appropriate Panama from Colombia and to build the Panama Canal. The canal, in turn, was of great value, not only to the US Navy but also to manufacturing interests on the American East Coast; the canal made access to the Pacific much easier and trade routes more profitable. The rulers of weaker southern neighbors were tamed, to favor either American investors or to ensure payment of debt owed to Americans, or even to Europeans. McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft encouraged these developments, not only because of their close ties to America’s economic elite, but also because they viewed overseas expansion as essential for America’s prosperity and global might. **Next, what were the main mechanisms used by the United States to establish imperial influence overseas?** Unlike Britain, the United States was never comfortable acquiring full-fledged colonies. **The country’s anticolonial history played a role, as did important facts on the ground: at the end of the nineteenth century much of the world was already occupied by Europeans, and by then the United States had already acquired an enormous amount of continental territory of its own**. What the United States now wanted instead was access to overseas markets and, on occasion, control over strategically significant pieces of land. **After some trial and error**—a process that included the full colonization of the Philippines and nearly full colonization of Cuba for more than half a century—the United States settled on a strategy of building an informal empire. Of course, the United States hardly invented this form of imperialism; as we have seen, informal imperialism was part of Britain’s extensive imperial repertoire. And as with Britain, **the essential mechanism that the United States used for building an informal empire was to create stable-but-subservient regimes on the periphery: stability was necessary for protecting property and profits, and subservient regimes were needed to do America’s bidding, including maintaining favorable economic policies**. **Establishing stable-but-subservient regimes in other countries is never easy**. A variety of obstacles that Britain faced in the nineteenth century in Argentina, Egypt, and China have been discussed (chapter 2). By the time the United States arrived on the global scene as a late imperialist, emerging mass politics and nationalism in peripheral countries had added new and additional challenges. **These had to be confronted**. **Even at this early stage, the United States used a range of strategies that eventually came to define America’s way to empire:** hard militarism, in the Philippines (and to an extent in Cuba); multilateral domination, in China; and forced regime change in neighboring countries, such as Nicaragua. We will see that these early strategies represented long-term patterns in the making. **The imperial strategy of hard militarism used to establish a stable-but-subservient regime in the Philippines would be employed by the United States again in Vietnam and Iraq**. Similarly, the multilateral domination of China via the Open Door policy cast the die for future American efforts to establish an open global economy regime in the post–World War II period and, more recently and more relevant to the themes of this volume, to impose the Washington Consensus on developing countries. And last, overt or covert regime change—anywhere from Iran to Chile—has become a permanent part of the repertoire that the United States uses to establish its informal empire. As to the question of why the United States is inclined toward one strategy of domination in one place and another in a different place, early historical evidence points in a number of directions. Regime change may seem the best option when narrow economic interests are at stake (especially those of American-based overseas corporations) or when the United States enjoys overwhelming power superiority over a potential client state. For example, US efforts to change rulers in the mini-states south of the border were often aimed at ensuring the profitability of such American companies as the United Fruit Company. **But when the stakes are higher and the tasks more complex, as they were in the case of maintaining open access to the Chinese economy, the implementation of an imperial agenda requires** moving beyond bilateral interventions to create a system of domination. **Smaller players who get in the way of the pursuit of high-stakes goals are likely to be thrashed**. **This was the fate of the Filipino nationalists at the turn of the century**. **The Open Door notes, in turn, were aimed at creating a coalition of imperialists to prevent the further carving up of China, maintain the subservient regime in power, and keep the Chinese economy open for all to exploit**; the fact that the American economy could increasingly outcompete the economies of other imperial powers only helped to cement American preference for this pathway to informal empire. Last, it is important to take stock of the impact of the costs to and benefits for both the United States and its client states. Unlike Britain, the United States was a giant continental-size economy; it depended less than Britain did on overseas economic interactions for its buoyancy. **It would be hard to make the case**—and I will not make it—**that the United States needed colonies and client states to sustain its economic dynamism**. **Need and want are related but point to different degrees of desirability**. A formal and informal empire was probably essential for Britain to sustain its industrial revolution in the nineteenth century; in this sense, Britain needed an empire. **By contrast**—**there being no limit to human or national wants**—the United States wanted overseas acquisitions to augment its growing wealth and power. As will become clear, **this distinction between need and want has implications for understanding some important contrasts between the British and US modes of building a global empire:** building an empire for the United States—even an informal empire—has always been more a matter of choice than of necessity. **The element of choice, in turn, has added tentativeness to America’s imperial quests and nearly always has provoked disagreements at home.** Although the economic benefits of imperialism for the United States may not appear to have been large, their value has to be assessed in relation to the cost of acquiring and maintaining them. In light of the huge power resources that the United States had begun to build by the end of the nineteenth century, the cost of most of its forays into peripheral states were marginal. **When costs were significant, as, for example, during the first two years in the Philippines, they were borne by US taxpayers and soldiers; the eventual gains were mainly private**. From this standpoint, overseas acquisitions led to significant gains, at least for select Americans. **I document below that the growing empire provided markets for American manufacturers, cheap raw materials for an industrializing economy, and opportunities for investment in mines and commodities**. At times, the benefits of empire transcended private gains, especially when such gains were political; foreign naval bases and fueling stations thus added to the American capacity to project power and so to its status as a new global power. The following assessment of the American impact on its client states discusses both economic and political developments. Forced integration with the American economy often provided client states with opportunities for economic growth, mainly via growth in commodity exports. But such a pattern of growth also created important economic and political distortions. South of the border, for example, American corporations came to own large slices of commodityexporting economies, and the US government often supported friendly dictators to keep protests in those countries at bay. The results included poorly governed societies with sharp inequalities, sustained low levels of living, and long-term political instability, including revolutions, as in Cuba. **The case of the Philippines under American tutelage offers further parallels. The Philippines, too, experienced commodity-led growth in the early twentieth century, but longer-term developments were far from benign: there were limits to commodity-led growth; the dependent pattern of growth gave rise to enormous inequalities; political power came to be concentrated in the hands of large landlords and middle-class politicians willing to do America’s bidding; and a nationalist coalition to lead industrialization failed to emerge, pushing the Philippines down a pathway that resembled the political economies of Latin America more than those of its Asian neighborhood. The impact of US intervention on China was far more diffuse, though again, hardly benign**. China was a giant political economy in which the state was already teetering on the brink of collapse at the turn of the century. As discussed in chapter 2, Britain and Japan were the major imperial powers in China; the importance of the United States was secondary. **But once the United States became a Pacific power, it sided with other imperial powers to keep the Chinese economy open and to preserve the power of an ineffective monarchy**. A variety of modernizing forces were beginning to emerge in China during this period, some aimed at expelling foreigners, others at reforming or abolishing the monarchy, and some at both. More often than not, the United States opposed these forces. For example, the United States joined other imperial powers in defeating the Boxer rebellion, and then supported but undermined the power of the Ch’ing monarchy by imposing huge indemnity—thus contributing to the monarchy’s disintegration—**paving the way to a half-century of political instability that only ended with the victory of communists**.

#### US policy towards China has always been geared towards forcing their markets open for trade, not outright colonization – the aff’s “concession” is no more than a smokescreen to diminish the role of economic warfare

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If the motives (mainly economic) and mechanisms (mainly collaboration with other imperial powers and a weak Chinese monarchy) of American informal empire in China are relatively clear, a few comments on the impact will help bring this discussion to a conclusion. Any discussion of impact, however, must begin with a reiteration of some obvious historical facts; they will help keep the analysis in perspective. **Both the United States and China were giant economies during the time period under consideration; for example, their GDPs around 1900 constituted some 15 percent and 10 percent of the world GDP, respectively**. The United States exported only 7 percent to 8 percent of its total production, and of that, the share of American exports to China was only 1 percent to 2 percent of total American exports. **China, too, was coming apart because of its inability to respond effectively to Western and Japanese incursions**. Britain was the main imperial power in China in the nineteenth century, and Japan’s role grew steadily during the first half of the twentieth century. The US role grew in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, but the United States remained a distant third. In light of such obvious facts, it would be absurd to claim that the United States had gained handsomely from its incursions into China or that China had been hurt precipitously by American interventions. I make no such claims. **What needs to be briefly discussed instead is the direction of change as American influence in China grew**. **We have seen that American policy in China was aimed mainly at trade expansion**. As it turned out, trade indeed did expand following the adoption of Open Door policies. If in 1900 American businessmen had exported $15 million worth of products, by 1905 exports had jumped sharply, to $53 million (Table 4.1). Most of these exports were sold in northern China, especially Manchuria. Nearly half of all American exports to China in 1905 were textiles; more telling is that the Chinese share of total US textile exports had increased from some 12 percent in 1895 to 55 percent in 1905.147 While the share of all US exports that went to China remained miniscule, it did double between 1902 and 1906; for some industries, such as textiles, the gains were decisive. Textile exports declined sharply after Japan gained control of Manchuria. Kerosene and cigarette exports grew instead in the subsequent periods, and they remained America’s main exports well into the 1920s. As noted, the United States’ investments and loans in China were not of great significance; for example, on the eve of World War I, the share of American foreign investment in China was only 3 percent of the total foreign investment in China, while that of Japan was nearly 35 percent. **The Open Door policy was aimed at expanding trade, not investments, and trade did expand**. Though the overall gains were not dramatic, the gains of some specific industries were substantial. Lobbyists from such industries as textiles, kerosene, and cigarette, in turn, continued to press US policymakers to maintain access to the China market. **The real impact of the growing American influence in China was political and, judged from the standpoint of a sovereign and effective state within China, the impact was largely negative**. Like the British in the nineteenth century, **American policymakers desired stability and economic openness in China; they decided that these goals would be best met by supporting a pliable monarchy**. A rule of sorts seems to be in operation here: whenever imperial powers chose not to colonize a peripheral country, a stable-but-subservient government in that country often emerged as a preferred pathway to establishing influence. Be that as it may, the United States’ decision to join other imperial powers in China to prop up the disintegrating rule of the Ch’ing was a mistake, even from the standpoint of America’s own longer-term goal of political stability in China. **The United States was an anticolonial and antimonarchical power. American decision-makers should have known better**. Instead, they were in a hurry to join the club of big imperialist powers. They therefore ignored the powerful emerging forces within China that were demanding modernization. **The Taiping and Boxer Rebellions were early manifestations of this churning; a variety of nationalists and communists would soon join the clamor**. The Empress Dowager’s decision to throw the weight of the Chinese state with the anti-foreigner Boxers, further delegitimized the monarchy. When it was overthrown, there was no ready force in China to establish central authority. It would take few decades of internal Chinese initiatives to re-establish such authority and to expunge imperial powers from China. Conclusion In a comparative study of British and American imperialism published in 1981, Tony Smith argued that prior to World War II the United States was, on balance, a friend of nationalism in the underdeveloped regions of the world. He went on to suggest that the United States only became an “anti-nationalist” or a “counterrevolutionary” power in the post–World War II period, when Third World nationalism joined forces with communism, as exemplified, say, in the Chinese Communist Revolution and the related war in Korea.148 I am afraid that the historical evidence examined above does not support this conclusion. **The evidence suggests instead that well before the advent of communism, the United States consistently fought nationalist forces to establish influence over peripheral political economies**. This is evident in the cases we have examined thus far. In Cuba, Americans were wary of the supporters of José Martí and suppressed the nationalists to establish control; in Nicaragua, the United States orchestrated the overthrow of the nationalist ruler Zelaya in favor of pro-American governments; in the Philippines, the United States ruthlessly defeated the forces of the nationalist Aguinaldo and then systematically discouraged the emergence of any nationalist challenge to American colonial rule; and in the case of China, the United States sided with other imperial powers against the proto-nationalist Boxers and even took a position against the Ch’ing monarch when she decided to ally with antiforeigner forces within China. These American interventions followed a logic. **The American economy had industrialized rapidly toward the end of the nineteenth century. Many in the United States were arguing for economic expansion abroad, especially into regions that could absorb US manufactured products**. It built a powerful navy, in part to support these ambitions. Since much of the underdeveloped world was already colonized, American expansionist efforts focused either on regions that were close to home or on distant islands in the Pacific that would ensure that the United States reached the great China market. **As the United States sought to expand, it often ran into resistance from nationalist forces whose goals were at odds with those of the Americans. The United States systematically eliminated this nationalist resistance**. Rightly or wrongly, policymakers in the United States concluded that American interests in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Far East—mostly economic, but on occasion, strategic—would instead be best served by pliable governments that could ensure order and openness. **As in the case of Britain’s informal empire, then, the creation of stable-but-subservient regimes in the peripheral countries emerged as the means to expand commerce and establish American influence overseas**. The historical evidence we have examined suggests that the United States pursued a variety of approaches to establishing stable-but-subservient regimes abroad. **Three of these approaches are worth underlining in this conclusion because they proved to be of long-run significance. The first was hard militarism, most clearly evident in how the United States established control over the Philippines**. Thousands of American soldiers were employed in a three-year war that led to the death of some 200,000 Filipino civilians. Thus was the American peace established! It will become clear in subsequent chapters that this early instance of hard militarism in the Philippines has more than a passing resemblance to strategy the United States used in subsequent periods as well, in, say, Vietnam and Iraq. Overt or covert regime change was the second strategy that the United States used during this early phase to establish pro-American rulers. This was clearest in the case of Zelaya in Nicaragua. Beyond Nicaragua, the practice of periodic military interventions aimed at either taming governmental behavior or changing rulers outright was also evident in the cases of Cuba and Honduras. Over time, we will notice—especially in cases of Mossadegh in Iran and Allende in Chile—that forced regime change also become a key strategy in the American repertoire for establishing pro-American governments abroad. The third approach, most clearly evident in the case of China, was the collaboration with other imperial powers to ensure a stable-but-open government. **Multilateral collaboration is, then, a strategy that the United States has continued to pursue in recent times, the clearest example being the use of structural adjustment programs via the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that developing countries paid their debts to first world bankers**. **Why did the United States pursue different strategies to establish influence in different parts of the developing world?** A full answer will emerge only in due course, after I have reviewed additional historical evidence. For now, the limited evidence points to some tentative generalizations. **The Philippines was acquired mainly as a stepping-stone to reach a critical goal, namely, access to the China market. American aims in the Philippines itself were thus vague, but resistance to American domination was rather strong. This combination of vague goals on the way to something great, but also strong resistance, then, seems to attract hard militarism as an imperial strategy**. We will have an opportunity to examine this proposition further in the case of American interventions in Vietnam and Iraq. **By contrast, when American goals are specific**—**say, creating economic opportunities for corporations**—**and the relative power advantage of the United States is considerable, then regime change seems to emerge as the appropriate strategy to create pliable rulers**. This logic was clearly at work in the case of Nicaragua, and we will examine it further in the cases of Iran and Chile. **Finally, the case of American expansion into China suggests that multilateral collaboration is needed to establish dominance when the power resources of the United States are not sufficient to accomplish the task at hand**. Again, there will be an opportunity to examine this proposition further against more contemporary evidence, especially the effort to impose the Washington Consensus on development on Latin America. Whether one judges American economic gains from its expansionist efforts as modest or significant depends on the standards one brings to bear on the subject. The American economy was already a giant economy and depended mostly on internal resources and markets. The United States exported less than 10 percent of its products overseas, and most of these went to Europe or Canada. Prior to the Spanish-American War, US direct investments overseas were also trivial. **From this standpoint, one could legitimately conclude that the United States hardly needed to expand into underdeveloped regions to maintain its prosperity or build its national strength**. That is why I began this chapter by making a distinction between need and want—whereas Britain needed an empire, the United States merely wanted one. **Many in the United States, though not everyone, thought that economic expansion abroad would both help smooth out the boom-and-bust quality of rapid capitalist expansion and also provide long-term outlets to solve the problem of glut in the American economy**. The results of the American efforts suggest that such thinking was not wrong, that American gains from its expansionist efforts were far from insignificant. It is clear in Table 4.1 that US trade expanded rapidly in the countries in which it established political sway following the Spanish-American War. The gains in Cuba and the Philippines, especially, were steady and even dramatic. Trade also jumped sharply in China following the Open Door policy, but then declined rapidly when Japan closed off Manchuria to the United States and as a result of the growing political turmoil in China. Over time, however, the United States recovered from these setbacks and re-established a strong trading position. American direct investments overseas also grew sharply after the that war: if before the war total US foreign investments were under USD 1 billion, by 1914 they had grown to USD 5 billion, and then to nearly $8 to $10 billion in the 1920s.149 More telling, nearly half of this investment in 1929 was in Latin America, mostly in the Caribbean; little Cuba alone took $1.4 billion of American foreign investment that year. The evidence, then, supports the contention that perceived economic needs within the United States led to imperial expansion, and both trade and investment followed the flag. **The impact of American expansion on its protectorates was pernicious**. There is no need to deny that commodity exports in places like Cuba and the Philippines helped generate some economic growth, but mainly over the short run. Over the longer term, however, American protectorates became classic colonies that produced commodities and took manufactured goods. **Commodity producers, in turn, became both wealthy and powerful.** While such groups—and their political representatives—were happy to cooperate with the United States, they seldom had enough legitimacy to establish orderly polities. **Economic inequalities and illegitimate rulers gave rise to poorly governed societies**. Creating sovereign and legitimate states might have put these countries on a progressive path. **Unfortunately, the weight of American influence was often in the opposite direction; US influence tended to undermine nationalist leaders who may have commanded the majority support needed to create effective, developmental states**.

#### The desire to cooperate with China is the same imperialist fantasy that we’ve had since the 1890s when we tried to “crack open” the Chinese economy

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As noted, during the 1890s, **the idea that the United States needed to expand overseas to maintain its national prosperity gained currency among influential Americans**. In addition to its own neighborhood of the Americas just discussed— regions that were traditionally delineated as being within the American sphere of influence by the Monroe Doctrine—the China market offered great possibilities in the Far East. Even if self-serving returning missionaries had originally propagated this idea, **many businessmen came to share the view that the giant economy of China**—**one of the largest preindustrial countries that was still not colonized**—**might offer an outlet for America’s rapidly growing industrial production and investment needs**.104 American businessmen, however, could not go it alone in China. Other country governments were already providing systematic support to their own businessmen, including the governments of Great Britain, Japan, Germany, and Russia. **Many policymakers in the United States were then persuaded not only of the importance of the China market, but also of the need of governmental involvement**. **Once the lure of the China market became great, the US made a “conscious, purposeful and integrated effort to open door to China”; from then on, the United States used traditional realpolitik to seek open economic spaces in distant China**.105 Gaining open economic access to China was not going to be easy, however. Not only was China becoming turbulent at the end of the century, but other major powers also were already on the ground there. Access to China would thus require governmental support, and in practical terms, that meant the support of a growing navy. The navy, in turn, would require bases and coaling stations on the way to China. Influential thinkers such as Alfred Mahan and Brooke Adams understood these requirements; they argued not only for building a stronger navy to support America’s overseas commercial ambitions, but also for acquiring colonies—or near colonies—as way stations to China. The economic depression in the United States in 1893 intensified these demands for access to the China market. The Japanese victory over China in 1895 reinforced the concern that China might be partitioned among rival imperial powers. This, it was argued, would be a huge loss for American interests.106 **The need of the China market and the fear that the United States might lose out contributed to the decision to acquire islands on the way to China.** **Viewed from this standpoint, the acquisitions of Hawaii, Wake, Guam, and the Philippines in the Far East were neither accidental nor a product of a policy of large imperialism**; **that is, they were not acquired because of their own economic worth**. **They were acquired in an “eclectic effort to construct a system of coaling, cable, and naval stations for integrated trade route which could help realize America’s overriding ambition in the Pacific**—**the penetration and ultimate domination of the fabled China market**.”107 The Philippines turned out to be America’s most important colonial acquisition after the Spanish-American War. A country of several thousand islands, the Philippines in 1900 was inhabited by some eight million people, a population larger than that of Persia and two-thirds that of Korea at the time. The plan to acquire the Philippines had begun several months before the start of the war. Senator Orville Platt (of Platt Amendment fame), suggested to President McKinley that “Manila had become one of the most important ports of the Orient and that the importance of that station demanded most careful attention.” Shortly thereafter, the assistant secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote a Navy Department memorandum, which President McKinley had examined, arguing that in case of a war with Spain, the Asiatic Squadron “should blockade, and if possible take Manila.”108 As noted, Roosevelt subsequently, in 1897 (well before the war) ensured that a sympathetic naval officer—Dewey—took command of the Asian fleet and instructed him that when “needed,” he should undertake “offensive” actions against the Philippines.109 And then, even before the news of Dewey’s rapid victory over Spain in the Manila Bay had reached Washington, the McKinley Administration had decided to send “an army of occupation” to the Philippines.110 In light of such historical evidence it is hard to understand the claims of some contemporary scholars that the Philippines was “an accidental conquest.”111 While the premeditated approach to acquire the Philippines was meant to provide access to the China market, developments within China intensified the pressures to move in that direction. After their military victory over China, the Japanese in the post-1895 period had started consolidating their gains. This threatened British policy in China to prop up the Ch’ing monarchs. As discussed in chapter 2, the British could have been satisfied either by joining the land grab or creating an open door, enabling all the imperial powers to compete within China; eventually they settled for protecting their own share of the China trade. **Before that, however, Britain invited the United States, in early 1898, to join in an “open door condominium” to ensure that China was not partitioned**.112 **The United States did not respond, in part because it was preoccupied with the coming of the Spanish-American War, but also because it had no real power in the Pacific at that point**. **To join Britain in its major policy proposal over the future of China would have made it a junior partner to that agreement; however, the United States was increasingly unwilling to accept such a secondary status.** This claim is supported by the fact that, after acquiring the Philippines, the United States pursued an identical open door policy in China, but now it was in the lead. **What is important to note is that the growing informal partition of China by Japan, Britain and others underscored a further need for the United States to become a Pacific power that, in turn, would be facilitated by the United States acquiring its own Hong Kong in the Pacific**.

### -- AT: “China is Imperialist Too!”

#### The idea that China is “just as imperialist or worse” than the US is wrong, misunderstands the mechanisms of imperialism, and should be rejected

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China is now an emerging global power with a buoyant economy. **How well do China’s expansionist tendencies fit my arguments about the nature of greatpower imperialism? The short answer is, it’s too early to tell**. China’s expansionism has developed only over the past two decades. The trends I have analyzed in this study unfolded over a much longer time period. Nevertheless, some patterns are already discernable. China’s economic expansion overseas reflects its internal economic needs. This much we should expect based on the British and American experiences. China, too, is pursuing its national economic interest overseas, such as seeking access to raw materials, outlets for capital surplus, and opportunities to export higher value added products. **So far, it has resisted the use of military power to take economic advantage abroad**. This may well change in the near future, especially in the countries in China’s own backyard, but so far, the global military presence of the United States continues to be a major deterrent. This trend has historical parallels in the nineteenth century, when the United States, wary of British power, shied away from the use of military force in Latin America, proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, and focused instead on economic expansion. **In the language of this study, then, China’s economic expansion in the early twenty-first century is exacerbating the economic dependency of numerous developing countries on the emerging manufacturing giant, but there is little evidence—at least so far—that China is building an informal empire**. China’s economic interactions with the developing world are increasingly a focus of scholarly inquiries.22 For my purpose, the details can be set aside. To conclude the book, I draw on this literature only to comment, very briefly, on the motives, mechanisms, and impact of China’s expansionism. After four decades of rapid economic growth, China now produces nearly 25 percent of the world’s manufactured output and holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, it is committed to maintaining a high rate of economic growth in the near future. As with Britain and the United States in the past, China’s commitment to national prosperity has led it to seek markets and profitable outlets for its financial reserves in other developing countries. Considering China’s rapid economic growth, the trends are dramatic. On the trade front, for example, rapid economic growth in manufacturing has led China to ensure a steady supply of raw material imports. By 2015, China was importing more than half of the world’s total imports of iron ore, aluminum, and soya beans.23 China’s exports, by contrast, are mainly manufactured goods. These trends are especially notable in China’s trade with other developing countries. They are also reminiscent of colonial and neocolonial patterns of exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. China’s foreign direct investment in other developing countries has also grown rapidly. Much of this growth is spearheaded by Chinese state-owned firms, especially oil and mining companies searching for natural resources abroad. The driving motive includes the need to promote “China’s national economic development.”24 Last, China’s giant foreign exchange reserves allow it to lend money to developing countries, again mainly to promote its own exports. Chinese sovereign funds and portfolio investments have mostly moved to advanced economies; however, its bank loans and trade credits to the developing world are tied to securing market access. The construction of infrastructure abroad is a focus of Chinese efforts, too, especially via the creation of such policy banks as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (better known as the BRICS bank). China’s most recent initiative, One Belt, One Road, is also focused on loans to promote construction projects in neighboring Asia and Europe.25 In addition to projecting economic power, the hope is, again, to promote the exports of heavy industries that are likely to be underutilized as China shifts to a focus on domestic consumption and as domestic infrastructure needs are saturated. **Much of Chinese global economic expansion is steered by the Chinese state. In this important sense, the driving force behind China’s economic expansion is clearly the country’s national economic needs, as interpreted by its state elite.** Although the state may have competing interests within (as it surely does), there is no denying that state-owned entities are dominant in the buying and selling of goods overseas, managing projects, and in providing loans for specific purposes in the developing world. Political and economic motives are thus closely intertwined in China’s overseas expansion. The Chinese pattern of overseas expansion by state-owned firms is in contrast to the private actors that drove economic expansion in Britain and the United States. **This fact created a problem for interpreting the overseas actions of the British and American states, because it gives rise to the question, were forceful interventions moved by the narrow interests of the economic elite or by some broader understanding of the national economic interest entertained by the political elite?** Although historical evidence can be marshaled to support either proposition, I argue that on balance, one need not treat these as rival propositions. **The pursuit of national economic prosperity by hegemonic powers is the taproot of imperialism. This focus on national economic prosperity as the driver of overseas economic expansion then finds strong support in the case of China**. Private firms still play a secondary role in the Chinese economy. Much of the expansion by state-owned firms reflects the Chinese need to support its own economic growth. More sharply than in the cases of Britain and the United States, the Chinese case underscores the value of the proposition that the search for national economic prosperity generates a tendency toward overseas economic expansion. If the motives driving China’s overseas economic expansion are similar to that of Britain and the United States in the past, the mechanisms are not. **China has rarely needed to use force to access the economies of other developing countries**. The open world economy created by the United States has served China’s economic interests well. Moreover, the timing of China’s economic expansion has been propitious. Just as the Washington Consensus on development was losing steam in the new millennium, China’s rapid economic growth provided seemingly attractive economic opportunities for the developing world. Commodity producers in Africa and Latin America eagerly sought Chinese markets to boost economic growth at home, and they imported cheap Chinese manufactured goods. Chinese finance and expertise helped infrastructure projects in a variety of developing countries, especially in Africa. **When Chinese efforts to seek access to commodities have run into nationalist opposition, bribes, rather than military interventions, have so far sufficed to nip the resistance in bud**.26 **The closest China has come thus far to using force to seek economic advantage overseas is the acquisition of a port from an indebted Sri Lanka**.27 Such use of economic coercion by China to acquire economic assets abroad resembles past patterns of informal empire analyzed in this study. If China continues to use economic or military coercion along these lines to seek economic advantage in, say, other highly indebted countries, such as Pakistan, then China, too, will join the ranks of modern imperial nations. But until now, China’s use of force for profits in the world is a phenomenon of marginal significance. (More significant is China’s use of force to seek strategic goals, especially in its own neighborhood; that, however, is not the focus of the present study.) To the extent that I have emphasized that the use of coercion is central to any understanding of informal imperialism, China does not fit the pattern, at least not yet.

#### China isn’t imperialist – stop it

Minqi Li ’21, is a professor of economics at the University of Utah, “China: Imperialism or Semi-Periphery?”, Monthly Review, 7/1/21, https://monthlyreview.org/2021/07/01/china-imperialism-or-semi-periphery/

Whether China has become an imperialist country is a question of crucial importance for the global class struggle. I argue that although China has developed an exploitative relationship with South Asia, Africa, and other raw material exporters, **on the whole, China continues to transfer a greater amount of surplus value to the core countries in the capitalist world system than it receives from the periphery**. **China is thus best described as a semi-peripheral country in the capitalist world system**.

The real question is not whether China has become imperialistic, but whether China will advance into the core of the capitalist world system in the foreseeable future. **Because of the structural barriers of the capitalist world system, it is unlikely that China will become a member of the core**. **However, if China does manage to become a core country, the extraction of labor and energy resources required will impose an unbearable burden on the rest of the world**. It is doubtful that such a development can be made compatible with either the stability of the existing world system or the stability of the global ecological system.

Is China a New Imperialist Country?

As China becomes the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity) and the largest industrial producer, China’s demand for various energy and raw material commodities has surged. In 2016–17, China consumed 59 percent of the world total supply of cement, 47 percent of aluminum, 56 percent of nickel, 50 percent of coal, 50 percent of copper, 50 percent of steel, 27 percent of gold, 14 percent of oil, 31 percent of rice, 47 percent of pork, 23 percent of corn, and 33 percent of cotton.1

A large portion of China’s demand for commodities is supplied by developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In this context, Western mainstream media has described China as a new imperialist country exploiting developing countries. In June 2013, the New Yorker carried an article criticizing Chinese capitalists in Zambia for exploiting local copper resources and violating labor rights.2

In March 2018, the Week published an opinion article arguing that as China’s overseas investment skyrocketed, Africa had become a key destination of Chinese investment resulting in vicious exploitation of local resources and ecological disasters. The author further argued that, because of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system, Chinese imperialism would prove to be considerably worse than Western imperialism.3

The New York Times asked whether China had become a new colonial power. The writer indicated that China had used its One Belt, One Road Initiative to support corrupt dictators, induce recipients of Chinese investment into debt traps, and promote cultural invasions.4

A Financial Times commentator contended that as China pursued the Belt and Road Initiative and promoted various economic projects, the investment logic would inevitably turn some developing countries (such as Pakistan) into China’s client states. China is therefore “at risk of…embarking on its own colonial adventure.”5

One of the recent articles in the National Interest argues that “China is the imperialist power” in much of Africa today. It contends that what China wants in Africa is not some form of socialism, but control over Africa’s resources, people, and development potential.6

For Marxist scholars and political groups, debates on imperialism have been either directly based on or inspired by V. I. Lenin’s concept of imperialism originally proposed in the early twentieth century. **According to Lenin, by the late nineteenth century, the basic relations of production in the developed capitalist world had evolved from free competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism**. The massive accumulation of capital by monopoly capitalists in combination with a saturation of domestic markets led to surplus capital that could only be profitably invested in colonies and underdeveloped countries by taking advantage of their cheap land, labor, and raw materials. **The competition for capital export destinations in turn led to territorial partitions of the world by the major imperialist powers**.7

In chapter 7 of Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin defined the five “basic features” of imperialism:

(1) the concentration of production and capital developed to such a high stage that it created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of banking capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this “finance capital,” of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed.8

World political and economic conditions have changed dramatically since the publication of Lenin’s Imperialism. While some of the “basic features” of imperialism proposed by Lenin remain relevant, the “territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers” can no longer be understood in its original sense due to the victory of national liberation movements and decolonization of Asia and Africa in the mid–twentieth century. Marxist theories of imperialism (or concepts of imperialism inspired by the Marxist tradition) that evolved after the mid–twentieth century typically defined imperialism as a relationship of economic exploitation leading to unequal distribution of wealth and power on a global scale.9

**In the contemporary debate on “Chinese imperialism,” Marxist theorists who contend that China has become a “capitalist imperialist country” usually argue that China has become imperialist in the Leninist sense**—**that is, internally, China has become a monopoly capitalist country; externally, the monopoly Chinese capital has manifested itself through massive exports of capital**. For example, N. B. Turner has argued that both state and private monopoly capital had been established in China and the four largest state-owned banks controlled the “commanding heights” of the Chinese economy, demonstrating the dominance of finance capital. Turner further noted that China had accumulated enormous overseas assets and become one of the largest capital exporters in the world, exploiting workers and raiding resources in various parts of the world.10

David Harvey, one of the world’s best-known Marxist intellectuals, has recently contended that China’s holding of large chunks of U.S. government debt and the Chinese capitalist land grabs in Africa and Latin America have made the issue of whether “China is the new imperialist power” worthy of serious consideration.11

There have also been lively debates on whether China has become imperialist among Chinese leftist activists within China. Interestingly, a leading advocate of the proposition that China has become imperialist is Fred Engst (Yang Heping), the son of Erwin Engst and Joan Hinton, two U.S. revolutionaries who participated in China’s Maoist socialist revolution. In “Imperialism, Ultra-Imperialism, and the Rise of China,” Yang Heping (using the pen name Hua Shi) argued that the Chinese state-owned capital group had become the world’s single largest combination of industrial and financial capital and the world’s most powerful monopoly capitalist group. According to Yang, China’s demand for resources has already led to intensified imperial rivalry with the United States in Africa and Southeast Asia.12

Imperialism and Superprofits

Lenin considered imperialism to be a stage of capitalist development based on monopoly capital. **For Lenin, monopoly capital did not simply mean the formation of large capitalist groups but large capitalist enterprises that had sufficient monopoly power to make superprofits**—**profits far above the “normal” rates of return under free competitive conditions**.

Using available business information at the time, Lenin cited several examples of superprofits of monopolist capitalist businesses. The Standard Oil Company paid dividends between 36 and 48 percent on its capital between 1900 and 1907. The American Sugar Trust paid a 70 percent dividend on its original investment. French banks were able to sell bonds at 150 percent of their face value. The average annual profits on German industrial stocks were between 36 to 68 percent between 1895 and 1900.13

After elaborating the five basic features of imperialism, Lenin immediately said that “we shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if consideration is to be given, not only to the basic, purely economic concepts…but also the historical phase of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general.” In chapter 8 of Imperialism, Lenin further argued that export of capital was “one of the most essential bases of imperialism” because it allowed the imperialist countries to “live by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.” The superprofits exploited from the colonies in turn could be used to buy off the “upper stratum” of the working class who would become the social base of opportunism in the working-class movement: “Imperialism means the partition of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, creating the economic possibility of corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat.”14

In the preface to the French and German editions, Lenin further elaborated:

[It] is precisely the parasitism and decay of capitalism, which are the characteristic features of its highest historical stage of development, i.e., imperialism.… Capitalism has now singled out a handful (less than one-tenth of the inhabitants of the globe; less than one-fifth at a most “generous” and liberal calculation) of exceptionally rich and powerful states which plunder the whole world simply by “clipping coupons.”… Obviously, out of such superprofits (since they are obtained over and above the profits which capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their “own” country) it is possible to bribe the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour aristocracy.15

Lenin considered this to be a “world-historical phenomenon.”

Thus, for Lenin, capitalist imperialism is not simply associated with the formation of large capitals and export of capital. It inevitably leads to and has to be characterized by “high monopoly profits” or “superprofits” through the plunder of the whole world. It is also interesting to note that, for Lenin, imperialism as a “world-historical phenomenon” has to be based on the exploitation of the great majority of the world population by a “handful of exceptionally rich and powerful states,” which Lenin estimated to include a population between one-tenth and one-fifth of the world total. Thus, imperialism must be a system where a small minority of the world population exploits the great majority. It cannot possibly be a system in which the majority exploits the minority.

**If we apply Lenin’s concept of imperialist superprofits to the Chinese context, what do we find? Has China already become an imperialist country that is plundering the whole world simply by “clipping coupons”?**

Using conventional international balance of payment accounting, China has indeed become a large capital exporter and accumulated enormous overseas assets. But these “assets” need to be analyzed.

From 2004 to 2018, China’s total foreign assets increased from $929 billion to $7.32 trillion. During the same period, China’s total foreign liabilities (that is, total foreign investment in China) increased from $693 billion to $5.19 trillion.16 This means China had a net investment position of $2.13 trillion at the end of 2018. That is, China has not only accumulated trillions of dollars of overseas assets but also become a large net creditor in the global capital market. This seems to support the argument that China is now exporting massive amounts of capital and therefore qualifies as an imperialist country.

However, **the structure of China’s overseas assets is very different from the structure of foreign assets in China**. Out of China’s total overseas assets in 2018, 43 percent consists of reserve assets, 26 percent is direct investment abroad, 7 percent is portfolio investment abroad, and 24 percent is other investment (currency and deposits, loans, trade credits, and so on). By comparison, out of total foreign investment in China in 2018, 53 percent is foreign direct investment, 21 percent is foreign portfolio investment, and 26 percent is other investment.

**Thus, while foreign investment in China is dominated by direct investment, an investment form consistent with the foreign capitalist attempt to exploit China’s cheap labor and natural resources, reserve assets account for the largest component of China’s overseas assets**.

**China’s reserve assets reflect largely the accumulation of China’s historical trade surpluses and are mostly invested on low-return but “liquid” instruments such as U.S. government bonds. These assets theoretically represent China’s claims on future supplies of goods and services from the United States and other developed capitalist countries**. **But these claims may never be realized because the United States and other developed capitalist countries simply do not have the production capacity to produce within a reasonable period of time the extra goods and services that may correspond to the more than three trillion dollars of foreign exchange reserves held by China**. If China uses a large portion of its reserves to buy raw material commodities or exchange the reserves into other assets, it would dramatically drive up the prices of these commodities or other assets and China would suffer a massive capital loss (a large reduction of the purchasing power of China’s reserves). In addition, China needs to hold several trillion dollars as reserves to insure against possible capital flight or financial crisis.

From the U.S. point of view, China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (mostly in dollar-denominated assets) has essentially allowed it to “purchase” trillions of dollars’ worth of Chinese goods largely by printing money without providing any material goods in return. China’s reserve assets, rather than being a part of China’s imperialist wealth, essentially constitute China’s informal tribute to U.S. imperialism by paying for the latter’s “seigniorage privilege.”

While China’s total overseas assets are greater than its liabilities by $2.13 trillion, China’s investment income received in 2018 was actually smaller than the investment income paid by $61 billion.17 Chart 1 compares the rates of return on China’s total investment overseas with those on foreign investment in China from 2010 to 2018.

Chart 1. Rates of Return on Investment (2010-2018)

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Sources: Rates of return are calculated as ratios of investment income to the stock of total investment. China’s overseas investment, foreign investment in China, investment income received and paid are from “The Time-Series Data of International Investment Position of China,” State Administration of Foreign Exchange, People’s Republic of China, March 26, 2021; “The Time-Series Data of Balance of Payments of China,” State Administration of Foreign Exchange, People’s Republic of China, March 26, 2021.

From 2010 to 2018, the rates of return on China’s overseas assets averaged about 3 percent and the rates of return on total foreign investment in China varied mostly in the range of 5 to 6 percent. **An average rate of return of about 3 percent on China’s overseas investment obviously does not constitute “superprofits.”** Moreover, foreign capitalists in China are able to make about twice as much profit as Chinese capital can make in the rest of the world on a given amount of investment.

On the eve of the First World War, net property income from abroad accounted for 8.6 percent of the British gross national product and total property income accounted for 9.6 percent. It was by observing such massive superprofits that Lenin considered exports of capital to be of “exceptional importance” in the era of imperialism. By comparison, China’s total investment income received in 2018 was $215 billion or 1.6 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) and China’s net investment income from abroad is negative.18

The general pattern of China’s investment abroad can be further revealed by examining where the Chinese investment takes place. China’s total stock of direct investment abroad in 2017 was $1.81 trillion, including $1.14 trillion invested in Asia (**63 percent**), $43 billion invested in Africa (**2.4 percent**), $111 billion invested in Europe (**6.1 percent**), $387 billion invested in Latin America and the Caribbean (**21 percent**), $87 billion invested in North America (4.8 percent), and $42 billion invested in Australia and New Zealand (2.3 percent).

Within Asia, about $1.04 trillion was invested in Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore. Hong Kong and Macao are China’s special administrative regions and Singapore is an ethnic-Chinese city-state. About $9 billion was invested in Japan and South Korea. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, $372 billion was invested in the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands.19

**China’s massive investments in Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Cayman Islands, and British Virgin Islands** (altogether $1.41 trillion **or 78 percent of China’s direct investment abroad**) **are obviously not intended to exploit abundant natural resources or labor in these cities or islands**. Some of China’s investment in Hong Kong is the so-called “round trip investment” to be recycled back to China in order to be registered as “foreign investment” and receive preferential treatments.20 Much of the Chinese investment in these places may simply have to do with money laundering and capital flight. In 2012, Bloomberg reported that Xi Jinping’s family had several real estate properties in Hong Kong with a combined value of £35 million. In 2014, a report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists further revealed that Xi’s brother-in-law once owned two shell companies based in the British Virgin Islands. China’s investment in these tax havens has more similarities with wealth transfers by corrupt governments in the third world than projects of imperialist plunder. **Much of China’s investment in Europe, North America, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand is likely to be of a similar character. Rather than “exploiting” the developed capitalist countries, such capital flight in fact transfers resources from China to the core of the capitalist world system**.21

**This leaves about** $158 billion (**8.7 percent of China’s total stock of direct investment abroad or 2.2 percent of China’s total overseas assets**) **invested in Africa, Latin America, and the rest of Asia. This part of Chinese investment no doubt exploits the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America of their labor and natural resources. But it is a small fraction of China’s total overseas investment and an almost negligible part of the enormous total wealth that Chinese capitalists have accumulated** (China’s domestic capital stock is about five times as large as China’s overseas assets). Some Chinese capitalists may be blamed for their imperialist-like behaviors in developing countries, but, on the whole, Chinese capitalism remains nonimperialist.

### COVID Link

#### Don’t buy their calls about how COVID proves how vulnerable we are to disease – it’s the same propaganda the DOD uses to justify mass militarization of the entire health system

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

The backstory of the NSVP’s formation reveals a history of tension over smallpox since the end of the Cold War. Public health typically prioritizes the management of existing disease, and therefore the field viewed smallpox as a lesser priority once it was eradicated. The national security field, on the other hand, viewed smallpox as a military threat whose successful eradication only increased the vulnerability of the national population—lack of exposure to smallpox meant that the nation’s immunity to the disease had declined (although the degree of loss was unclear, since the data on smallpox was outdated and biomedical circles could not reach consensus on the length of immunity the vaccine conferred). Concerns about susceptibility to smallpox had escalated under Clintonera civilian biodefense, culminating in the highly influential Dark Winter exercise in the summer of 2001, which comprised one of several mock terrorist scenarios policy makers conducted at the turn of the twenty-first century. 5 Dark Winter simulated a smallpox attack, based on relatively high transmission rates and susceptibility of the population to smallpox—the scenario used an immunity value of no more than five years, at which point immunity waned significantly. 6 The scenario presented a stark picture of devastation: within ten weeks of exposure to smallpox, three million would be infected and about one million dead (O’Toole, Michael, and Inglesby 2002).7 Many health researchers contested this “worst-case scenario” and discouraged basing policy on these numbers.8 Nevertheless, it greatly influenced ideas of smallpox preparedness, particularly in national security circles, and created momentum for vaccine production and vaccination in anticipation of an outbreak. The post-9 / 11 push for precautionary smallpox vaccination—embodied by the NSVP—was the culmination of this militarized approach to smallpox. The NSVP’s target vaccination numbers reflected the influence of the alarmist worst-case scenarios pushed by defense pundits (namely, Vice President Dick Cheney and several Department of Defense officials); these numbers were much higher than those proposed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), despite the fact that the latter was in charge of carrying out the actual vaccinations (CDC 2002; Cohen and Enserink 2002). The military had not only triumphed over the smallpox agenda but enlisted public health to implement its vision. When Bush announced the program on December 13, 2002, he emphasized its health dimension as much as its security one: “We will continue taking every essential step to guard against the threats to our nation and I deeply appreciate the good efforts of state and local health officials who are facing difficult challenges with great skill. The actions we are taking together will help safeguard the health of our people in a measured and responsible way” (Bush 2002b; emphasis added). In articulating this effort as having a positive outcome for the health field—that is, the promotion of the “health of our people,” Bush turned the national security apparatus’s mobilization of the health field into a dual benefit—for the nation’s health as well as security. Legal scholars David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin (2007) call this placement of disease alongside national security the “synergy thesis”;9 it yielded new surveillance initiatives oriented toward improving early detection of both bioterrorist attacks and infectious disease outbreaks (for example, the National Biosurveillance Initiative of 2004). This synergy orientation would eventually integrate health and security among a variety of diverse hazards —an “all-hazards” approach. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 exemplified this dramatic convergence of domains. Its stated purpose was “to improve the Nation’s public health and medical preparedness and response capabilities for emergencies, whether deliberate, accidental, or natural”—with “deliberate” signifying bioterrorism, “accidental” referring to lab mistakes, and “natural” meaning naturally arising outbreaks. The NSVP represented an important early site where the Bush administration attempted to merge these disparate domains.10 A week into the NSVP’s start date, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, articulated the thesis that public health and biodefense could join forces in his 2003 testimony during the Smallpox Vaccination Plan: Challenges and Next Steps hearing: “At the end of the day we believe this [research on biological agents such as smallpox to produce vaccines and other countermeasures] will have two major accomplishments. One will be that it would effectively defend us against the microbes of bioterror. But also, since bioterror agents are really emerging and reemerging diseases that resemble very much the naturally occurring diseases, so that what we learn for biodefense will have important implications for decades and decades to come in our approach toward emerging and reemerging diseases.” Fauci’s statement, echoing the Bush administration’s rhetoric of converging biodefense and disease management interests, belied the reality —the de facto subsumption of public health by the national security apparatus.

### Credibility Link

#### Geopolitics across the globe exists in its current state because of the US lack of restraint for economic coercion – even if the aff rolls back the alliance, corporations just fill in the vacuum re-establishing the informal Western block – turns the aff

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More than Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the midtwentieth century conceived of its global interests as deeply interconnected. As I analyze American interventions in the developing world, it is important to keep in mind this interconnected nature of America’s understanding of its own interests. **With global ambitions, American leaders believed that challenges to its domination over any one part of the world could be contagious, leading to losses elsewhere; credibility was the currency with which the United States hoped to maintain its informal empire**. **Although the American approach to establishing influence was more coercive in some parts of the world than in others, what also connected these efforts was the belief that the hegemonic project was indivisible**. In the early postwar years, America’s top priorities were mainly in Europe. The economic recovery of declining powers like Britain and France was not only deemed to be central for continuing American prosperity, but also necessary to forestall the emergence of nationalist and redistributive politics in Western Europe; latter trends were deemed to favor the Soviet Union. To help avoid the mistakes made at Versailles, Americans also decided to reindustrialize West Germany and Japan while ensuring that they will never again pose a military threat. Americans then used a proverbial stick and carrot—anything from the well-known Marshall Plan to lesser-known efforts to help these declining European powers maintain their colonial economic links—to incorporate Western Europe (and Japan) within the American orbit.2 **When Stalin refused to accept a subordinate position in the American-led order, the Cold War erupted**.3 A brutal dictator in a war-devastated country, Stalin had a very Russian understanding of what was good for the motherland: control over neighboring territories so to avoid future wars. When Western powers refused to let Stalin have regional influence, Stalin imposed harsh control over Eastern Europe, lowering what Winston Churchill famously described as the Iron Curtain. **These closed economies of Europe posed a serious challenge to the American postwar hopes for an open global economy**. **From then on the United States fought the Cold War from a position of considerable strength, aiming first to contain communism and then to roll it back**. **Because communism offered an alternative to capitalism, the Cold War also went well beyond a classic realpolitik struggle; it became a struggle over how best to organize national states and markets**, on the one hand, **and**, on the other hand, **it took on the proportion of a crusade in which might was needed to protect what was right**. Mao Zedong’s victory in China, war in Korea, and growing nationalist demands in European colonies quickly exacerbated American anxieties, giving the struggle against communism a global dimension. Communism then had to be fought everywhere, because it threatened what Americans perceived as their core interests and values. During the Cold War era, the United States intervened in numerous developing countries, especially ones in East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.4 American efforts to revive war-devastated capitalist powers and to confront communist ones provided the context for these developing-country interventions. An **incomplete list of major American interventions**—either to support or to oppose emerging political trends—**might include the following: China, Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia in East Asia; Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt in the Middle East; Congo in Africa; Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua and other small countries in Central America; and Brazil and Chile in Latin America**. The United States sought indirect influence over yet other developing countries via regional treaties or through such grand schemes as the Alliance for Progress. I have chosen three cases of direct American interventions in the developing world for detailed analysis: Iran, Vietnam, and Chile. These three cases capture a range of America’s regional and global interests and the covert and overt methods that American leaders used to achieve their goals. American efforts were also more or less successful across these cases. Although the discussion that follows is surely less than comprehensive, it does shed light on the issue at hand, namely, America’s efforts to build an informal empire in the developing world.5 In Iran, Americans helped Britain to covertly overthrow the elected Iranian nationalist leader, Muhammad Mossadegh, in 1953.6 Mossadegh had earlier nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. When the negotiations over the compensation for nationalization bogged down, the CIA helped to orchestrate a coup that led to Mossadegh’s overthrow. In the aftermath, the power of a proWestern and pliable Shah was restored and the rights to Iranian oil came to be shared equally between British and American corporations. Beyond the historical details (some well-known, others less so), the discussion of the Iranian case will help highlight several relevant themes: the importance of oil (and thus, of the Middle East in the American postwar global calculations); **the growing significance of multinational corporations in global affairs**; the willingness of the United States to support declining colonial powers (but at a price); how a shortterm American victory turned pyrrhic over a longer time frame; and, of course, America’s early inclination to thwart developing-country nationalists who sought to use state power to benefit their own country. A similar but much more violent and prolonged confrontation between imperial ambitions and nationalism unfolded in Vietnam, the second case I discuss. The details of the American War in Vietnam—what the Vietnamese call the Vietnam War—are relatively well known, although new research keeps deepening our understanding of the conflict. When the Vietnamese sought to get rid of the French, in the early postwar period the United States helped France to restore colonial rule. Following the French military defeat in 1954, the United States took on the imperial mantle to limit the gains of revolutionary nationalists like Ho Chi Minh, both because of America’s global campaign to contain communism but also because open economic access to Southeast Asia—a central part of the old co-prosperity sphere—was deemed important for Japanese economic recovery. Over time, the reasons for the United States to be in Vietnam became more and more muddled; even American leaders admitted that they could not win the war, but that they also could not withdraw. **Maintaining American credibility became a reason to stay in the war because credibility was deemed to be central to the exercise of influence elsewhere in the world. In the name of credibility, the United States dropped more bombs on a sliver of a country than were dropped during all of World War II**. To resist, hardline communists in Vietnam won out; they were willing to make enormous sacrifices of their own people in the name of the nation, such as during the Tet Offensive in 1968. The United States eventually lost the battle of wills. Some three million Vietnamese died during the conflict, that is, half the number of Jews killed during the Holocaust. Nearly 58,000 Americans also died. **The tragic costs of American imperial ambitions in Vietnam were enormous**. While the United States was losing the war in Vietnam, it also, in 1973, undertook a much more successful intervention in Chile to overthrow a democratically elected president; it was as if a victory was needed in the backyard to compensate for the defeat in distant jungles. The overthrow and murder of Salvador Allende is the third case of US intervention I discuss here. Allende was a leader of the left who sought wealth redistribution and the nationalization of the American corporations that dominated Chile’s commodity-dependent economy. American antipathy to nationalist and socialist leaders south of the border was hardly new; Jacobo Arbenz, Fidel Castro, and others had already experienced American wrath. American intervention in Chile fits the recurring pattern of American efforts to undermine nationalists and socialists who seek to limit external dependency. But the Chilean case is also distinctive because it is in a region that has long been dominated by the United States. Compared to the other cases discussed here, US economic influence in Chile was more significant, as were American contacts with Chilean military leaders. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger could realistically ask the CIA to make the “Chilean economy scream” and undercover operatives to encourage Chilean military leaders to depose a democratically elected president. The results included prolonged repressive and authoritarian rule, on the one hand, and a failure to diversify a commodity-dependent economy, on the other hand. Here, as in the other chapters of the volume, **historical materials help to build an analytical argument about the motives, mechanisms, and consequences of imperialism**. A brief preview of these themes at the outset may be helpful to the reader. It would be easy to conclude from these three cases that US interventions were aimed mainly at fighting communism; after all, this was the era of the Cold War. **While not wrong, such a conclusion would be both superficial, and ultimately, misleading**. The **evidence below will make clear that fighting communism was but an excuse for American interventions in Iran and Chile**. **By contrast, the United States indeed confronted a revolutionary communist force in Vietnam but what the United States was fighting was national, and not global, communism**. More important, as we notice in chapter 4, US interventions in the developing world began well before the emergence of the Cold War and as will become clear in the next chapter, have continued well after the end of the Cold War. Clearly, a fight against communism cannot be held as the main factor that drove interventions during the Cold War era. In such cases as the US involvement in the Korean War and then in South Korea, as well as in protecting Taiwan, Cold War politics was clearly of primary significance. In most other cases of US intervention during this period, however, a fight against communism was one factor, but not the dominant consideration. So, either we believe that American interventions in different eras (or places) had different motives—an epistemological position I do not share—or we search for deeper patterns that help make sense of a variety of American interventions in poor countries of the world. One such deeper pattern is revealed if we focus on the American effort to establish a global hegemony—**more accurately, an informal empire**—during this period, with an open global economy as a centerpiece. **This urge to open the economies of other nations, by force if necessary, runs through the long American twentieth century**. Of course, American economic needs evolved over this time. While early efforts were aimed at free trade, as the century wore on, securing overseas corporate investments and ensuring that foreign debt was paid back also became important. **America’s century-long efforts are thus bookended by demanding an open door in turn-of-the-century China and by implementing the Washington Consensus on development toward the end of the centur**y. This is not to deny that some American interventions did not fit this pattern. Since history is seldom neat, the evidence reveals that ideology and security concerns complicated the pursuit of national economic interests overseas; the case of Vietnam is especially salient from this standpoint. Nevertheless, seeking open doors was a central motive in many of the more important cases of US interventions in the developing world. **During the Cold War period, then, American efforts to establish a global hegemony led it to confront communists and nationalists alike, because both sought to create closed or semiclosed economies.** What we notice in all three cases is a pattern of confrontation between the imperial ambitions of the United States, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Third World nationalists, who sought to chart independent paths for their respective countries. It is not the case that American leaders were not sympathetic to nationalism in the developing world. Over and over again, the historical record reveals that policymakers in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations noticed the emerging trends and sought to accommodate them. **American leaders thus rightly concluded that the era of colonialism was over; they also did not shy away from conveying this message to their British and French counterparts**. However, American leaders also wanted to limit the autonomy of the emerging developing countries, especially if their leaders were perceived to be opposed to American designs. **Such limits were essential if the United States hoped to establish a global order in its own image.** The puzzle for American foreign policymakers was how to do this without asserting formal control over the emerging sovereign countries. **The Americans believed that they were perfecting a model of informal control in the Philippines, Cuba and elsewhere, that combined nominal independence and substantial control over key policies**. The hope was that this model of informal empire would enable American leaders to incorporate other developing countries within the orbit of the free world. **The key mechanism of extending American influence was thus to encourage and support pro-American governments within the developing world. Covert or overt interventions were often aimed at putting friendly regimes in power**. A variety of carrots, for example, foreign aid, and sticks, for example, military bases, were then used to keep these regimes pliable. Since the overt use of force to bend the will of nationalist rulers was both costly and too Old World for the new era, it was also important that the American word—of support or threat—was taken seriously. That is why credibility of American commitments took on such enormous significance within the scope of the American order. In the best of worlds, America’s informal empire was to operate via friendly regimes that complied with American desires because they took American wishes seriously, backed as they were by enormous economic and military resources.

#### The aff is a form of covert imperialism – the sacrificing of overt commitments to militarism in favor of creating sub-servient governments to secure open access for corporate extraction

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After World War II, the United States emerged as the world’s most powerful state. **The United States then used its power superiority to mold a world order that fit its values and interests**. **The centerpiece of this world order was to be an open global economy**. **While capitalist Europe and Japan joined this global order, many others did not. In addition to the Soviet Union and the states within its land empire, a variety of communist and nationalist regimes in the poor countries**—in the so-called Third World—**also sought to pursue state-led development, with closed or semiclosed economies**. The United States tolerated some of these, either because they did not challenge significant American interests (e.g., some postcolonial countries in Africa) or because, as, for example, in the case of India—the costs of imposing a Pax Americana on them would have been very high, especially in relation to the perceived potential gains. **In much of the developing world, however, the United States did confront communists and nationalists who stood in the way of America’s desire to establish an open global economic order**. To repeat, a list of clear US interventions in the developing world during the Cold War era, in support or in opposition to emerging trends, might include China, Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia in East Asia; Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt in the Middle East; Congo in Africa; Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua and other small countries in Central America; and Brazil and Chile in Latin America. Of these, I have in this chapter analyzed three specific interventions—Iran, Vietnam, and Chile—with the aim of understanding the causes and consequences of America’s imperial actions. The motives behind, mechanisms, and impact of American interventions during the Cold War have been traced throughout this chapter via historical materials. My understanding of these key themes was also summarized above in the introduction to this chapter. Only a brief restatement is thus necessary at this point. **What really moved the Americans to intervene in the developing world was not so much the threat of communism but the danger assertive nationalists posed to America’s hegemonic ambitions**: Iran’s Mossadegh not only threatened key economic interests of an already weakened ally, Britain, but also posed a broader danger of creating an unacceptable norm for who controls the production, supply, and profits of an important commodity, oil; the revolutionary nationalism of Ho Chi Minh similarly threatened important interests of another weakened ally, France, but then the more the United States got involved, the more America’s global credibility became an issue, prolonging a costly and tragic war; and Chile’s Allende posed a direct threat to American corporations, as well as the broader danger of encouraging a nationalist and a democratic socialist pathway to development in America’s backyard. **Since overt colonialism was not on the United States’ Cold War agenda, the main mechanism of control was the creation of stable but subservient governments in power**. **The covert support for coups against Mossadegh and Allende had led to the installation of the Shah and Pinochet, respectively, who both did America’s bidding**. Similar cases that are not discussed in this chapter might include the US-supported overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo. **The case of Vietnam was more overt but the American hope there, too, was to create a stable-but-subservient regime in South Vietnam; the covert overthrow and death of Diem also followed a pattern similar to those in Iran and Chile**. Once client regimes were installed, the United States sought to maintain them using a variety of carrots and sticks. The most common tools were foreign aid (especially military aid) but also establishing American military bases, which limited national autonomy. **The hope was that given America’s enormous power and economic resources, most client states would simply take America’s preferences seriously; after all, it is an old axiom of politics that the truly powerful need not use their power to secure preferred outcomes**. That is why maintaining credibility became so important for the United States. The failure in Vietnam was thus a turning point in American efforts to create and sustain an informal empire.

### Demilitarization Link

#### The aff’s stance is a recovering of imperial power that ignores “withdrawal of pre-emption” only smooths the relations between imperial nations while leaving decolonized nations at the risk of violence – zero chance of a link turn

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So we see that, when implementing the same independent, internationalist working class line, in different situations one will reach very different conclusions due to objective factors and class interests. Or in other words, **the same, consistent strategy of permanent revolution leads, for different types of wars, to different tactics**. Only a mechanistic bonehead should be surprised by this. **Where the working class and the oppressed are not engaged in a direct struggle for power, i.e., outside of a revolutionary situation, the task of overthrowing a given regime is subordinate to the task of the defending a semi-colonial country** (or a degenerated workers state) **against an imperialist attack**. **On the other hand, when we have the mobilization of the working class and the oppressed in a direct struggle for power, as is the case in a revolutionary situation, a civil war, etc., Bolshevik-Communists fight for the victorious outcome of this class struggle**. At the same time, we combine this support with uncompromising opposition to any imperialist attacks against the regime to be toppled. The Second World War is a model for such a contradictory situation which illustrates well the application of a combined, dialectical approach to military tactics. During this war, the revolutionary Marxists of the Fourth International defended the Soviet Union against German imperialism – despite the former’s alliance with Western imperialism. At the same time, they sided with the colonial peoples against their imperialist occupiers – despite the Stalinists’ support for the British and French occupiers, and despite the Allied imperialists’ support for the Chinese resistance against Japanese imperialism. The Fourth International also sided with the national liberations partisan armies against German imperialism in Europe and took a defeatist position against both imperialist camps in their conflict with each other. So we see that, **in such contradictory situations, in which several wars are actually taking place in the context of supposedly single war, it would be both wrong and disastrous to pursue the same tactic for all the various wars or “sub-wars.”** Quite the contrary – in such cases, Marxists must call for diverse military tactics. **Only when imperialist forces threaten to conquer a given semi-colonial country** (or a degenerated workers state) **and when, at the same time, the working class is not strong enough to take power, only then does it becomes necessary to subordinate the struggle against the regime in defense of the semi-colonial country** (or a degenerated workers state) **in question**. This is why we supported the national liberation struggle of the Bosnian people against the Serbian restorationist bureaucracy in 1992-95 while opposing any NATO attacks. This is why we supported the uprising of the Kosova-Albanians in 1997-99 while at the same time opposing NATO’s war against Serbia. **This is why during the Gulf wars of both in 1991 and 2003 we said “Defend Iraq! Defeat Imperialism!”** When the imperialist assault against Afghanistan started on 7th of October 2001 we called for the military victory of the Afghan resistance despite the Taliban leadership. And we called for the Hezbollah-led resistance in Lebanon 2006 and the Hamas-led resistance in Gaza 2008/09, both against the Israeli Apartheid state. **Such complications, amalgamations of different and contradictory interests in a given military conflict are likely to increase in the future**. Why? **Because of the increasing rivalry between imperialist powers**. Due to this rivalry, **all imperialist powers are more and more motivated to interfere in local conflicts and civil wars and to exploit them so as to advance their influence and increase their profits**. Unfortunately, **this trend is completely ignored by many sectarians who fail to recognize that in addition to the old imperialist powers** – **in North America, Western Europe, and Japan** – **there are also new, emerging imperialist powers, in particular Russia and China**. [6] In our study of Chinese imperialism, we explained various possible consequences of this increasing rivalry between imperialist powers like the US and China using the example of possible future wars in the South China (or East) Sea region. “Which position should the working class take in a military conflict between China (or the USA) with one of the smaller East Asian countries? **Here we have to take into account the fact that countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan etc. are not imperialist powers**. **They are rather semi-colonial capitalist countries**. (…) As we said in our program it is the Marxist principle to defend such semi-colonial countries against imperialist powers. **However it is not sufficient to state the Marxist principles on wars**. **In real life all forms of combinations, alliances, amalgamations of different interests etc. are possible and indeed are an important aspect of the class struggle**. In formulating the correct revolutionary tactic Marxists have to combine the application of the Marxist principles of the class approach to wars with a concrete analysis of every war in its peculiarity and totality. **Concerning the South China (or East) Sea this means the following: Countries like the Philippines or Taiwan have had close alliances with US imperialism for many decades** – or more concretely they are semi-colonies of the USA. Given these facts it is quite possible that there can be a war for example between the Philippines and China as it nearly happened in the summer of 2012. Concretely in this case the Philippine military forces acted in closest accordance with the US armed forces. **In such a war we would have formally an imperialist power (China) on one side and a semi-colonial country (Philippine) on the other side**. However in fact it would be a proxy war in the case of the Philippines, i.e. they would act as an extension of US imperialism. Thus the working class should not rally to defend the Philippines but should take a position of revolutionary defeatism as they would do in an inner-imperialist war. **However not all wars in the region are necessarily proxy-war**. **Vietnam for example** – **whose people heroically defeated first Japanese, then French and finally US imperialism** in its liberation wars in the 20th century – **has a history of being bullied by China**. One just needs to remember the reactionary assault of the Chinese Stalinist bureaucracy on Vietnam in co-ordination with US imperialism in 1979. In principle Vietnam has a right to use the East Sea for fishing no less than China. **Its resistance against being expelled from the Sea so that imperialist China can exploit it alone is justified**. **Hence Bolshevik-Communists could take in such a war a revolutionary defensist position on the side of Vietnam and a defeatist position concerning China**.” [7] The Marxist classics on contradictory factors in wars It is true that imperialist powers have historically tried to utilize democratic struggles for their own ends and interfere in them. Such interference must be opposed by Marxist forces. But as Lenin said, in the epoch of imperialism the big powers will always try to interfere and utilize national and democratic conflicts. **However, this fact should not lead Marxists to automatically adopt a defeatist instead of a revolutionary-defensist position in such conflicts**. Rather, the position taken by Marxists should depends on which factor becomes dominant – the national, democratic liberation struggle or the imperialist war of conquest. „Britain and France fought the Seven Years’ War for the possession of colonies. In other words, they waged an imperialist war (which is possible on the basis of slavery and primitive capitalism as well as on the basis of modern highly developed capitalism). France suffered defeat and lost some of her colonies. Several years later there began the national liberation war of the North American States against Britain alone. France and Spain, then in possession of some parts of the present United States, concluded a friendship treaty with the States in rebellion against Britain. This they did out of hostility to Britain, i.e., in their own imperialist interests. French troops fought the British on the side of the American forces. What we have here is a national liberation war in which imperialist rivalry is an auxiliary element, one that has no serious importance. This is the very opposite to what we see in the war of 1914-16 (the national element in the Austro-Serbian War is of no serious importance compared with the all-determining element of imperialist rivalry). It would be absurd, therefore, to apply the concept imperialism indiscriminately and conclude that national wars are “impossible”. A national liberation war, waged, for example, by an alliance of Persia, India and China against one or more of the imperialist powers, is both possible and probable, for it would follow from the national liberation movements in these countries. The transformation of such a war into an imperialist war between the present-day imperialist powers would depend upon very many concrete factors, the emergence of which it would be ridiculous to guarantee.“ [8] In another article, Lenin compared imperialist interference in national liberation struggles for their own ends with the interference of sections of monopoly capital in democratic struggles within imperialist countries. In both cases, Lenin argued, it would be wrong to refuse support for theses struggles because of this interference: „On the other hand, the socialists of the oppressed nations must, in particular, defend and implement the full and unconditional unity, including organisational unity, of the workers of the oppressed nation and those of the oppressor nation. Without this it is impossible to defend the independent policy of the proletariat and their class solidarity with the proletariat of other countries in face of all manner of intrigues, treachery and trickery on the part of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations persistently utilise the slogans of national liberation to deceive the workers; in their internal policy they use these slogans for reactionary agreements with the bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (for example, the Poles in Austria and Russia who come to terms with reactionaries for the oppression of the Jews and Ukrainians); in their foreign policy they strive to come to terms with one of the rival imperialist powers for the sake of implementing their predatory plans (the policy of the small Balkan states, etc.). The fact that the struggle for national liberation against one imperialist power may, under certain conditions, be utilised by another “great” power for its own, equally imperialist, aims, is just as unlikely to make the Social-Democrats refuse to recognise the right of nations to self-determination as the numerous cases of bourgeois utilisation of republican slogans for the purpose of political deception and financial plunder (as in the Romance countries, for example) are unlikely to make the Social-Democrats reject their republicanism.” [9] This methodological approach was later defended and developed by the Trotskyists. In our journal Revolutionary Communism we have re-published an excellent article from Rudolf Klement, a secretary of Trotsky and a leading member of the Fourth International, on “Principles and Tactics in War”. In this article Klement elaborated the position of the Trotskyists and defended it against their sectarian critics: “**Class struggle and war are international phenomena, which are decided internationally. But since every struggle permits of but two camps (bloc against bloc) and since imperialistic fights intertwine with the class war (world imperialism—world proletariat), there arise manifold and complex cases**. The bourgeoisie of the semi-colonial countries or the liberal bourgeoisie menaced by its “own” fascism, appeal for aid to the “friendly” imperialisms; **the Soviet Union attempts**, for example, **to utilise the antagonisms between the imperialisms by concluding alliances with one group against another, etc**. The proletariat of all countries, the only internationally solidarity—and not least of all because of that, the only progressive—class, thereby finds itself in the complicated situation in wartime, especially in the new world war, of combining revolutionary defeatism towards his own bourgeoisie with support of progressive wars.” Klement defends a dialectical approach, arguing that “the proletariat, especially in the imperialist countries, requires, in this seemingly contradictory situation, a particularly clear understanding of these combined tasks and of the methods for fulfilling them.” Later, at the end of his article, he goes on to emphasize: “Thus we see how different war situations require from the revolutionary proletariat of the various imperialist countries, if it wishes to remain true to itself and to its goal, different fighting forms, which may appear to schematic spirits to be “deviations” from the basic principle of revolutionary defeatism, but which result in reality only from the combination of revolutionary defeatism with the defence of certain progressive camps.” [10] **It is this concrete, dialectical method which the Marxist classics developed and which we apply today to the different types of wars which occur in a world situation characterized by increasing contradictions and rivalry**.

### “Dirty” Bomb Link

#### The idea of a “dirty bomb” or “attack” is rooted is racist and imperial imagery to mock the Middle East

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

The cartoon depicted the actual act of bioterrorism in exceedingly simple terms—the dropping of a licked, sealed envelope in the mail. This impression of an easy delivery mechanism was further conveyed by the cave-like dwelling—a small, dingy apartment with sheets for curtains connoted simplicity as well as primitivity. The omission of both scientific expertise and a scientific setting from the picture belied the processing and cultivation entailed in weaponizing germs—which typically require highsecurity, well-equipped labs, and in the specific case of the anthrax mailings was in fact traced to a U.S. laboratory. As mentioned, the West has mobilized Orientalist logics since the colonial period to mark itself as possessing rationality, scientific thinking, and advanced technology, and as superior because of these attributes. In turn, the West marks the East as irrational and backward, and as constitutionally unable to produce the tools and products of an advanced civilization—that is, science / technology (as well as other features of Western cultures such as industrialization and capitalist development). The West has used this narrative to couch colonial exploitation as a charitable attempt to help inferior cultures develop and progress toward civilizational advancement (Adas 1989, 205, 220; Macleod 1993, 123). As Stuart Hall (1992) describes: “The West was the model, the prototype and the measure of social progress.… And yet, all this depended on the discursive figures of the ‘noble vs ignoble savage,’ and of ‘rude and refined nations’ which had been formulated in the discourse of ‘the West and the Rest.’ … Without the Rest (or its own internal ‘others’), the West would not have been able to recognize and represent itself as the summit of human history” (221). Thus, Western historians of science have constructed a genealogy of science in a linear fashion from within Europe that excludes not only traditions emanating from other locales, but also the incorporation of nonEuropean sources into modern science in Europe. Specifically, the West has ignored and dismissed rich histories of science originating from Arab and Islamic thinkers. Mamdani (2004b) has described how Western historians have dismissed Arabic-writing scientists during the classical age of Islam (from the eighth to the thirteenth century) and constructed them as merely preserving classical Greek science and passing it on—without any significant contribution—to Renaissance Europe (from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century). The Ramirez cartoon reflected this Orientalist view: its picture of mundane primitivity (in the terrorist’s ease of waging biological warfare) combines features of Western narratives of science and progress with the savagery attributed to the Arab / Muslim male that I have already outlined. Thus, Ramirez’s caricatured Arab /Muslim man lacks scientific expertise and its associated trappings—reason, rationality, and objectivity. Such a figure feeds into anti-Arab / anti-Muslim discourse, insinuating that Arabs and Muslims are of lesser intellect and scientific capacity, producing yet another terrain of their dehumanization. The Unstoppable Germ A second type of figuring of the bioterrorist emerged in U.S. national security debates on bioterrorism response scenarios. Pundits from national security and public health officials to bioethicists and journalists contemplated a new, entirely imagined, threat: the “suicide infector.” Also called “suicide disease carrier,” “suicide disease bomber,” and “smallpox martyr,” among other names, the figure denotes someone who infects themselves with disease, sneaks into the country (the United States) before showing symptoms of the disease, and consequently starts an epidemic.19 The self-infected terrorist became a subject of U.S. security discussions on possible Iraqi biological weapons—namely, smallpox—possession from late 2001 to early 2003. In these discussions, the suicide infector signified the degree of potential Iraqi threat, helping bolster the U.S. rationale for preemptive action—both the invasion of Iraq and the vaccination of members of the military and public health sector against smallpox.20 The hypothetical nature of the figure made it possible for pundits to experiment with ideas about bioterrorism and bioterrorists. A RAND Corporation report described a study conducted by its Center for Domestic and International Health Security that focused on “suicide attackers who ride mass transit spreading the virus” as one of several “feasible smallpox attack scenarios” (2003). A New York Times journalist described the possibility that “a smallpox epidemic could begin with a single infected person—a ‘smallpox martyr,’ in the terminology of bioterrorism experts—simply walking through a crowd” (Stolberg 2001). Such scenarios made a suicide infector attack appear probable and, moreover, as something that could occur in the most mundane of public settings. The suicide infector derives its genealogy from the suicide bomber, 21 drawing on the latter’s potency in demarcating the Orientalist binary. Sociologist of race and terror Gargi Bhattacharyya (2008) describes suicide bombing as representing, in Western discourse, “an indication of the absolute difference between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and the instance of the boundary is seen to stem from the dysfunctional subject formation of socalled enemies of the West” (54). The suicide bomber is seen as Other because of a willingness to not only create mass, indiscriminate destruction, but also perform a monstrous act of human sacrifice. The suicide bomber’s mode of warfare is, thus, designated illegitimate and uncivilized—it is not the willingness to give one’s body over to a military cause, but the nature of the sacrifice that marks the terrorist as Other (as opposed to, say, the exaltation that meets the patriotic soldier). In this way, Western discourses on suicide bombing have racialized Arab and Muslim cultures as engaging in warfare that lacks a proper sense of morality and outlook on death (Amireh 2011; Asad 2007; Brunner 2007; C. Lee 2009). The suicide infector figure builds on this notion of Arab and Muslim cultures as backward, violent, and morally questionable. To weaponize one’s body with germs—thereby weathering grave illness—epitomizes the type of monstrous self-sacrifice that marks Arab and Muslim cultures as depraved in Orientalist discourse. The germ dimension, moreover, imbues the suicide infector with an element of metaphor: the suicide infector mirrors the ability of germs to contaminate everyday spaces. The figure made its way through the mass media, often through vivid description. It even appeared in relatively obscure newspapers such as the Naperville Sun; 22 in late November 2001, the paper published an article covering bioterrorism response plans being explored in local health departments and other agencies, opening with a worrying scenario: “Bioterrorists in New York City, Washington, D.C, and Chicago have deliberately infected themselves with smallpox virus and are contaminating public, highly visible places, like subways, government buildings and shopping malls” (Pazola 2001; emphasis added). As in the previous examples, the theme of contamination invited a slippage between germ carrier and germ, but further invited the reader to dwell upon a variety of horror scenes. The characterization of the suicide infector as contaminant built on wider post-9 / 11 discourse likening terrorism to a vicious disease, and terrorists to despicable vermin (C. Lee 2009; Sarasin 2006). An August 2004 article in the Wall Street Journal described terrorism as spreading “like a virus.” Historian Philipp Sarasin (2006) notes the many explicit references to the September 11 World Trade Center attackers as uncivilized vermin by a diverse array of sources from journalists to survivors. This rhetoric echoes long-standing narratives of the Other that analogize them as germs, vermin, and parasites infecting the national body (Steuter and Wills 2009). Decolonial theorist Linda Tuhiwai Smith, in discussing the subjugation of indigenous peoples, highlights how such rhetoric serves to dehumanize—and this dehumanization has been pivotal to subjugation attempts: “To consider indigenous peoples as not fully human, or not human at all, enabled distance to be maintained and justified various policies of either extermination or domestication. Some indigenous peoples (‘not human’), were hunted and killed like vermin, others (‘partially human’), were rounded up and put in reserves like creatures to be broken in, branded and put to work” (Smith 2002, 26). The germ contaminant dimension of the suicide infector trades on this discourse of “humanity,” suggesting an enemy so vile and wholly destructive that only the most extreme measures will be able to stamp it out. But the suicide infector scenario mobilizes the germ analogy to further dire effect: it turns the metaphor of terrorism as contagious disease into a material reality. The suicide infector is not like a contaminant, he23 is the contaminant. Like the suicide bomber, the suicide infector connotes an enemy who can sneak into highly public spaces without detection to perpetrate deadly acts. But the actual body of the suicide infector symbolizes more than just a dangerous, insidious presence—he is literally a bundle of living, regenerating germs that can proliferate indefinitely. The infectivity of the suicide infector, I suggest, hooks onto the notion of infiltration in post-9 / 11 discourses of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans as the enemy within (i.e., as loyal to their fundamentally suspect, culturally different countries of origin). The Arab / Muslim Other as germ body, in this view, represents both a cultural and a biological threat.

### East Asia Link

#### The desire to harmonize alliances in Eastern Asia is the US’s mechanism for establishing economic control

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Toward the end of World War II, US foreign policymakers were clearly aware of the political difficulties that lay ahead in facilitating neocolonial links in Asia, or, for that matter, elsewhere in the periphery. According to the US Department of the State, Asian and Pacific countries contained “a substantial part of the world’s supply of many critically important primary commodities.”54 The access to these resources in the last couple of centuries had been controlled, first by Western powers, and more recently by Japan. But toward the end of the war, “rising nationalism in Asia has led to a demand for freedom from this political and economic subjection.” **The challenge faced by US policymakers at the end of the war was to “harmonize” the goal of bringing an “increased measure of selfgovernment” to colonized people, but without alienating key industrial allies**. **How might this be done?** **US officials thought that American control over the Philippines** and Cuba **offered a model for how to reconcile nominal sovereignty with substantial control in Asia.** They hoped to persuade their European allies to follow in the American footsteps of forsaking formal colonial control, but **settling for something more suited to the new era, informal control**. What would this informal control look like in practice? Again, with reference to the Philippines, a few years later, US foreign policymakers clarified the stakes and how the United States was putting the model of informal control into practice. Dean Rusk, the future secretary of state, argued, “[I]t is vital we hold the Philippines whatever the cost—unless we are prepared to write off Asia.”55 **Since the Philippines was now an independent country, how did the United States plan to hold on to it? The thinking of American foreign policy officials is worth quoting** in full: It is recognized that the United States must continue for an indefinite period to assume responsibility for the external defense of the islands, to provide military and economic assistance, to take appropriate measures to assure the institution of necessary political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms, and in general to participate in the defense and administration of the country. Such continued participation in the affairs of an independent country has its undesirable aspects but **in the context of the present world situation there is no acceptable alternative**.56 **Maintaining substantial control over key policy areas in formally sovereign countries was the key to maintaining influence in the new postcolonial era**. There was nothing new in such imperial strategies; as I discuss in earlier chapters, Britain during the nineteenth century had built a far-flung informal empire, such as in Argentina and Egypt, where it achieved substantial policy influence without full colonization. With rising nationalism in the post-World War II period, **the United States now offered its Philippine model of decolonization to its European allies, especially to the French in Indochina, as a way of maintaining the vital links between the industrial core and the agrarian periphery**. **As the United States would soon learn, the Philippine model of establishing informal control worked mainly when the ruling elite of a client state**—often dependent on commodity exports—**could be readily coopted**. **This, in turn, was more likely in situations where the elite-mass gap in the targeted country was substantial and the ruling elite could control the masses via some combination of clientelism and repression**. **Both Latin America and the Middle East were populated by such political economies. It is not surprising that American efforts at establishing stable-but-subservient regimes in the post–World War II period were concentrated in these regions**. The American interventions in Iran and Chile also exemplify this trend. By contrast, the nationalist elite in many Asian countries mobilized their respective masses against both colonialism and other forms of external interventions. **Mass nationalism would prove much more difficult for the United States to accommodate within its global hegemonic project**. The British learned this lesson in India and bowed out. Americans, too, decided not to confront Mao—certainly not with a sustained military effort. However, the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indochina learned this lesson the hard way. The French actually faced military defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese in 1954; the United States then entered this fray at considerable expense and eventual failure.

### Emerging Diseases Link

#### Calls for cooperation to respond to “emerging diseases” is a colonialist gesture used by the United States to justify further expansion of bioimperialist surveillance architectures – past initiatives with China prove

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By the 1990s, the “emerging diseases worldview” came to dominate infectious disease control approaches in the United States, as well as at the World Health Organization—elevating the urgency of global health, that is, health problems that transcend national boundaries and necessitate global cooperation.12 In the decade that followed, “global health security” framed the cross-border spread of infectious diseases as a type of security threat, and further prioritized global health over national interests and sovereign authority (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; Weir 2014). Global health security and its predecessor, the emerging diseases worldview, both mobilized a fundamentally Eurocentric framework that assumed that the Global South was to blame for the rise of new and resurgent infectious diseases.13 This premise was the legacy of colonial health paradigms originating in western Europe in the late nineteenth century (e.g., tropical medicine) that primarily focused on the colonies as the cauldron of exotic diseases threatening the colonial enterprise (the health of the colonizers and the colonized labor force) (N. King 2002, 772– 773; Levich 2015, 714–715). Accordingly, the global health security regime focused on the diseases and health concerns of interest to the West and other Global North nations. When SARS emerged in late 2002, an “Asian” pathogen, it provided the perfect opportunity for the global health security regime to test one of its key mechanisms: an enhanced international system of disease surveillance and response. This system, spearheaded by the WHO, monitored the disease’s spread within and beyond nations, analyzing data gathered from health information systems and laboratory testing. The global research network took approximately three months to contain the disease.14 Its swift suppression seemed to represent the unmitigated success of global cooperation. Amid the lauding of global cooperation and scientific advancement, U.S. public health seized the opportunity to applaud and exaggerate its contributions to SARS containment, while only briefly acknowledging the efforts of its allies. The U.S. CDC took credit for the discovery of the coronavirus, announcing in a March 24 article that “CDC Lab analysis suggests new coronavirus may cause SARS” (CDC 2003a). In reality, the discovery had been the result of the WHO’s collaborative Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), which linked together individual disease surveillance and response systems.15 Moreover, the discovery of the SARS agent (SARS-CoV) had been made in several laboratories in the network simultaneously (Brookes and Khan 2005; Fidler 2005).16 The CDC article gave the role of the WHO collaborative network only brief mention: “Collaboration among scientists led by the World Health Organization (WHO) is unprecedented.” Unnamed were the other major contributing laboratories in Europe, Hong Kong, and mainland China. The United States repeated its self-congratulatory narrative with respect to the subsequent effort to sequence the virus and learn its genetic characteristics. Canada first sequenced SARS-CoV on April 13, 2003, with the United States following shortly after on the next day. Jerome Hauer, acting assistant secretary for the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, portrayed the United States as leading the sequencing effort in his 2003 testimony during the SARS: Assessment, Outlook, and Lessons Learned hearing: “CDC identified the coronavirus within a few short weeks of receiving the first specimens from Asia,” followed a few sentences later by “It [SARS-CoV] was successfully sequenced by an international team of laboratories including CDC and Health Canada.” The Canadian role was rendered equivalent to the U.S. role. Further, the United States constructed its leadership role by framing other key players as passive recipients of aid: “We have deployed teams of experts and support staff to each of the impacted countries, including Canada, mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.” In fact, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other locations had also completed sequencing and discovered important regional variations (Brookes and Khan 2005). The paternalistic statements of the United States illustrate its attempts to overshadow a sequencing effort that was in fact collaborative and to erase the scientific and medical contributions of other countries. Thus, the United States ultimately exploited global cooperation to amplify exceptionalist narratives and boost its international clout. Such conceptual practices reflect and uphold U.S. global dominance in an uneven international health system, and bolster U.S. ability to determine health outcomes worldwide. Before elaborating this claim, I outline the history of this uneven system. The WHO, Neocolonialism, and the Pandemic Turn Humanitarian medical practitioner-scholar Philippe Calain (2007a, 2007b) and global health politics scholar Sara Davies (2008) have both highlighted the way that the United States and other dominant nations have built global networks that facilitate an unequal system that benefits their parochial interests.17 Through the WHO, the United States and other wealthy neocolonial powers of the Global North have dominated global health governance, despite the international body’s composition of member nations that fall on different ends of the global divide. U.S. public health has played a particularly prominent role in the WHO, where many key U.S. figures hold leadership roles. D. A. Henderson, a U.S. epidemiologist, directed the WHO’s smallpox eradication program in the 1960s and 1970s. David Heymann, another U.S. epidemiologist, worked on both the WHO’s smallpox eradication program and the U.S. CDC’s outbreak containment program in Africa in the 1970s (Lakoff 2015). Since the end of the Cold War, the CDC has wielded even greater influence over WHO priorities. U.S. public health leaders pushed the WHO to prioritize “emerging infectious diseases,” focused on deterring spread from the Global South to the Global North. U.S. health leaders also helped establish the WHO’s global network of surveillance centers and reference laboratories (typically private commercial laboratories for pathogen testing and identification) to provide early warning of outbreaks; this data garnered the CDC and other large health institutions information about disease outbreaks abroad before they spread globally and affected, for instance, the United States. The war on terror afforded the United States and other global powers further opportunity to push the WHO to adopt additional North-centric priorities, namely, WMD event monitoring. This was a notable shift in the international body’s purview, and to an issue of much lesser concern for the Global South.18 The turn to pandemic flu followed soon after, which diverted much-needed resources from the pressing health issues facing most nations in the Global South—that is, diseases linked to poverty and gaps in local health infrastructure (e.g., HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria) (Abraham 2011; Calain 2007a, 2007b). As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the focus on pandemics revolved around H5N1, which symbolized for the United States the unpredictable threat of influenza strains as well as the specter of “emerging disease” from Asia. The United States responded to H5N1 by creating new global networks to bolster its international pandemic response capacity. In September 2005 at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Bush announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (IPAPI), designed to create “a global network of surveillance and preparedness that will help us to detect and respond quickly to any outbreaks of disease” (Bush 2005). About eighty countries signed on to this international body, which convened a series of meetings beginning January 2006. In the name of “transparency,” all who signed on were required to immediately share information and provide flu samples to the WHO should they face an outbreak. The United States further supported global pandemic preparedness by offering both financial and technical assistance for countries to develop capacities for rapid response, lab diagnosis, and surveillance, pledging $434 million to the effort (Bureau of Public Affairs 2007; Crook 2006). In this way, U.S. approaches to disease control shifted toward global efforts that served U.S. interests by generating information— and thus early warning—about diseases before they reached U.S. shores. The United States also supported the greater authority of the WHO to intervene in the infectious disease response of nations and compel their compliance. This greater authority was encoded in the second of two documents the WHO issued on pandemic preparedness, namely, the revised 2005 International Health Regulations.19 The culmination of decade-long work to prioritize emerging diseases containment, the regulations built on WHO success in spearheading the global efforts against SARS. Member nations were required to develop the capacity to monitor infectious diseases. In addition, the WHO now possessed greater and broader authority to require member nations to provide “information” about “events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern” (WHO 2005c). The rubric “events” indicated disease threats and outbreaks that have the potential for serious public health impact and international spread (i.e., pandemics). “Information” included outbreak distribution and trends, morbidity / mortality numbers, but also, potentially, viral samples and genetic sequences—the substrates for making vaccines and other medical treatments.20 This effectively gave the WHO wider authority to force countries to furnish the international body with data and resources for flu response. As with SARS, the international surveillance system and its research networks made possible global collaboration, and many nations primarily affected by H5N1 (like China) were contributors and beneficiaries of these efforts. At the same time, the dominance of the United States and other Global North nations positioned them to capitalize on the enhanced control of the WHO over disease resources globally, perpetuating, as I show in the next section, tangible disparities in the international system. Uneven Surveillance: Discourse and Compliance China, as one of the main countries H5N1 affected, by the end of 2006 had 14 of the 158 total deaths worldwide, and 22 of the 263 total cases— making it the fourth hardest country hit (WHO 2015). Accordingly, China had great stake in developing adequate flu response and participating in the research networks of the international health system. As poultry outbreaks spread in early 2004, China sent reports to the WHO as part of H5N1 monitoring. China also sent samples collected from infected poultry. In mid-2005, a senior official in China’s Ministry of Agriculture, Jia Youling, stopped sending samples from new H5N1 outbreaks in birds to the WHO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. He had discovered that a U.S. team had used samples China shared with the WHO to develop results published in a February 2005 article in the Journal of Virology without giving credit to China’s Ministry of Agriculture, which had identified the virus. China’s grievance was met with a half-hearted apology from the U.S. team—they described it as a mix-up, the lead author calling it an “honest mistake,” while also accusing China of hoarding its samples as a rule. The WHO representative to China, Dr. Henk Bekedam, issued a less conditional apology, confirming that the U.S. research team, in failing to acknowledge that China’s Ministry of Agriculture had identified the virus they used for their research, was in breach of scientific protocol (Beck 2006; Johnson 2006; Zamiska 2006). Despite this issue of credit-taking, many U.S. media sources, along with other Western-dominated media sources and the international health community, echoed the U.S. research team’s accusation that China in general hoarded information. In reference to China’s dispute with the WHO, a July 2005 Washington Post article described China as refusing to hand over any information other than the most basic outbreak data (other information includes, for example, specifics about the extent of infection or genetic analyses of the strain). The article characterized China as withholding: “The [Chinese] government has yet to respond to a … request by international health experts,” and “Chinese officials did not respond to written requests for comment by the Washington Post.” The article gave no context for China’s actions other than cageyness: “U.N. officials and independent scientists said they were reluctant to publicly discuss their frustrations with China for fear the government would shut them out of the country. But officials and researchers said they were dismayed with the government’s secrecy, especially after China ran afoul of international agencies for its response to the SARS epidemic that began in 2002” (Sipress 2005). In invoking a secretive, obfuscating Chinese central government, the article implied that the Chinese government could not be trusted in health endeavors. The characterization of China’s H5N1 response in the static terms of a caricatured SARS response—namely, a cover-up21—is problematic in that China responded vigorously to the H5N1 outbreak, swiftly sealing off, vaccinating, and later culling infected birds to mitigate the pathogen’s ability to infect humans, as well as ramping up medical supplies, training, and funds once it had. In fact, China had boosted spending on health after SARS, including on infectious disease and especially on HIV / AIDS. China has continued to address important health issues, implementing in 2008 the first of several policies for universal medical insurance, as well as pensions, medical leave, and other health systems reforms. Even so, Western scholars often disparage China’s increased attention to disease response as a desire to boost its international image—a “saving face” trope, rather than a desire to improve the country’s health (Wishnick 2010). This image of China is rooted in longstanding Western portrayals of China as backward and diseased,22 as well as more recent portrayals of China’s government as secretive, stemming from the Cold War, when China aligned with the Soviet Union (Kim 2010). The resurgence of denigrating tropes of China at the turn of the twenty-first century occurred in the context of China’s rising military and economic influence in the world, and U.S. desire to limit that influence. Although China’s power was nowhere near on par with that of the United States—especially its military power— the United States has maintained what historian Vijay Prashad calls “Western fantasies of Chinese domination” (Prashad 2017, 2541).23 It was in this geopolitical milieu that SARS emerged, and the Chinese government’s handling of SARS met with enormous U.S. scrutiny. U.S. public health and news media portrayed Chinese public health practice as in shambles and Chinese culture as possessing, in the words of one journalist, a “casual attitude toward health” where “men and women enthusiastically spit in public” (Lynch 2003). They attributed the emergence of SARS in China to exotic and savage food preparation and consumption practices (D’Arcangelis 2008)—a place where humans live “cheek-by-jowl” with a variety of animals that “walk in and out of their houses” (Pearson et al. 2003). Few stories remarked on China’s relatively low reported mortality rate from SARS—at approximately 6.5 percent—much lower than that reported worldwide (9.6 percent) and significantly lower than, for example, U.S. neighbor Canada (17 percent) (WHO 2003c).24 Nor did U.S. coverage of China mention the extreme range of scholarly viewpoints on how China dealt with SARS and on the state of Chinese public health at the time: while some criticized China for withholding information about the outbreak for too long and putting economic considerations ahead of public health, others praised Chinese public health response as relatively quick in the face of a new disease.25 In effect, SARS afforded the United States the opportunity to reinvigorate the specter of a diseased Orient26—a story that only intensified with the advent of H5N1.27 CDC director Julie Gerberding described Asia as “the perfect incubator” for pandemic flu (Manning 2005). Similarly, Senate staff director David Dorman opened the China’s Response to Avian Flu hearing by referring to China as “one of the prime incubators for a potential human influenza pandemic.” The reduction of China to solely a disease generator went hand in hand with U.S. reliance on national barriers as a means of disease control, despite their inefficacy. 28 Representative Tom Lantos reflected this approach in his 2005 testimony during the National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan hearing: “This pandemic, if it comes, is most likely to come from Asia, it is most likely to come via San Francisco, Los Angeles or other ports of entry.” Such a focus failed to promote a much more efficacious approach, namely, cooperation with Asia’s disease control efforts—overlooking the region’s demonstrated capability at collaborative health management.29 A New York Times article titled “Scientists Hope Vigilance Stymies Avian Flu Mutations,” which described U.S. scientific and health efforts in flu response, contrasted the United States and China in a pair of photos (McNeil 2007). The top photo in figure 7 depicts two U.S. professionals—CDC Director Gerberding along with another doctor; the bottom photo in figure 7 depicts a Chinese man surrounded by a flock of poultry in a dark, dank-looking room. The choice of juxtaposing a Chinese farmer with U.S. doctors reproduced a view of China as a generator of disease. In contrast, the United States was portrayed as the epitome of science and health—we see only experts, far removed from the source of disease. These depictions, of China as disease producer and the United States as model of flu readiness, were the denouement of the Orientalist imaginary that had gained traction since SARS. Chandra Mohanty (1984) describes how knowledge production can function as “discursive colonization,” a “mode of appropriation and codification of ‘scholarship’ and ‘knowledge’ about [a non-Western subject] by particular analytic categories employed in specific writings on the subject,” serving to enact “a relation of structural domination, and a suppression—often violent—of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question” (333). Because U.S. discourse about China during the H5N1 response flattened China into an impediment to global health, it ignored a much more complex picture. China was submerged into the category of “non-West” and by association reduced to the downtrodden and technologically backward. The recognition that many non-Western nations have been colonized and exploited by the West (which has contributed in large part to their ailing public health infrastructures) should not preclude a more nuanced discussion of each nation’s actual public health capacity. These flattened portrayals, moreover, diminished China’s governance capacity. To return to the controversy over China’s sample sharing stoppage in response to U.S. credit stealing, the ensuing negative press effectively acted as compliance enforcement. Press coverage produces strong incentive for countries to comply with the international system; as Briggs and Nichter (2009) state: “If countries are likely to be ‘outed’ by such [international surveillance] networks, it behooves them to report incidents in a timely manner and to be seen as good global citizens instead of selfish agents trying to protect their self-interests in trade, tourism, institutional politics, political alliances, and national images”; consequently, “[some] countries are rewarded in the press for being ‘good global health citizens,’ ” while others are “blamed as bastions of unhygienic subjects” (197). Discursive mechanisms can, in fact, force compliance as strongly, if not more so, than formal compliance mechanisms (especially since the revised 2005 International Health Regulations guidelines lacked any formal compliance mechanism to require member nations to provide information and samples).30 Moreover, in a neocolonial international system, global pressure is not evenly applied. While the international press and health communities met China with charges of obfuscation and narratives of unhygiene, they largely left the United States alone. In fact, the WHO repeatedly accused China of delaying reports of H5N1 outbreaks, even though China reported regularly to the WHO during and after avian flu outbreaks (Davies 2012, 603).31 Thus, the international system and its Global North leaders can browbeat less powerful, Global South nations to comply with the North-centered international system, regardless of how this might diminish their ability to implement disease control in ways that best protect their populations. Indeed, this pressure seems to have worked in China’s case—China’s Ministry of Agriculture resumed sending samples a year later.

### Heg Link

#### The idea that “there is no alternative to hegemony” or that “transition wars” would prevent the revolution are self-serving and self-defeating readings of history designed to serve the imperial narrative

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Imperialism is an age-old phenomenon. **In one form or another, it is likely to continue**. There is insight in Thucydides’s suggestion that the “weak” will always be “subject to the strong,” and that the powerful seldom turn down “the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength.”**20 But one problem with such venerable claims is that they tend to absolve the strong for exploiting the weak**. **Another problem is the danger of near banality passing for ancient wisdom: if there will always be rich and poor, then should we not worry about inequality? If some citizens will always commit crimes, then should we not try to find ways to mitigate the harm of such behavior?** A commitment to a better world suggests that we seek to right the wrongs of the past. In a world of states, then, it is important to strengthen arrangements that discourage powerful states from imposing their will on weaker ones. **It may well be the case that institutions cannot readily restrain the powerful in an “anarchic world.”**21 If so, it is at least important to dissect the self-serving claims of the powerful; at minimum, the mighty should not to be allowed to define what is right. Throughout this volume I have interrogated several interrelated claims made by hegemonic states of the modern era: we really do not run an empire; if we do, it is only because it was offered to us; even when it was not offered to us, we had to take it, not for greed, but for the sake of our own security; and, in any case, the impact of our empire was, on balance, benign. My analysis has underscored the ways in which each of these claims is deeply misleading. With this core analysis in mind, I have a few final, speculative thoughts on the future of imperialism. Extrapolating from the recent past, two sets of comments are especially pertinent. First, what is the likely trajectory of American interventions in the developing world in the near future? Second, will emerging powers like China follow the expansionist patterns analyzed in this book? Is China also moving toward building an informal empire? As I turn to discuss these questions, an obvious but important caveat ought to be borne in mind: peering into the future is hazardous. Nevertheless, if the analysis of the past is correct, it ought to have some bearing on future projections. **The United States has never really needed an empire**. The analysis in this volume has suggested instead that unlike Britain, which really needed an empire to sustain prosperity in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth century had merely wanted one. **The tentativeness in the American imperial project is a function of this difference between need and want. American gains from imperial interventions in the global periphery have also been uneven**. A case can be made that during the post–World War II period, the United States has been more successful in achieving its goals—at least short- to medium-term goals—via covert (or indirect) rather than overt, military interventions. For example, the former suggestion is supported by American interventions in Iran and Chile and by the most recent imposition of the Washington Consensus on Latin American countries. By contrast, US intervention in Vietnam was a heroic failure. The most recent military intervention in Iraq is still unfolding. But it is unlikely that the partial success in Iraq in deposing a despot and opening the oil wells of that country to foreign capital will ever be judged worth the cost in treasure, loss of life, and the unstable polity that the United States has left behind. **The relative failures of US military interventions in the developing world are also comprehensible**. **Of course, the United States is a military giant and, if it so chose, it could readily defeat and occupy any (or most) developing countries**. But that is not the American goal. The United States does not want colonies. What it wants instead are stable-but-subservient regimes in the global periphery. And these are increasingly hard to construct via military interventions. As I argue throughout this book, **the building blocks of old-fashioned nineteenth century imperialism**—**ready collaborators in the periphery who benefited from maintaining commodity-exporting economies and clientelistic polities**—**have dissolved in the global periphery**. **Mass politics has replaced clientelism nearly everywhere. Plebiscitarian politics, in turn, encourages a variety of nationalists to the fore.** Imperial efforts to overtly shape and control the politics of a developing country then readily run up against developing-country nationalism. Diem and others in South Vietnam, for example, could thus never be considered legitimate rulers of a sovereign South Vietnam; they were in fact puppets and were seen as such by the Vietnamese, no match for a Ho Chi Minh. The same is true elsewhere, such as in contemporary Iraq. **This does not mean that modern-day imperialists cannot find ready collaborators in the developing world, or that commodity-producing elites and their political representatives do not have much to gain from quiet collaboration with industrialized countries, especially the United States**. But as democracy spreads in peripheral countries, subservient rulers face power challenges from a variety of nationalists. **The American preference for democracy, on the one hand, but for promotion of stable-but-subservient regimes in the developing world, on the other, are thus inherently in tension**. When economic stakes are high, as in the case of oil-rich Saudi Arabia, the United States quietly sets aside the goal of democracy in favor of supporting the power of a stable-but-subservient regime. **What is the likely shape of US interventions in the developing world in the near future?** **Enormous power disparities and the prospect of economic gain will tempt the United States to intervene in one developing country or another**. Global norms of noninterference in the affairs of sovereign nations may put some brakes on imperial ambitions. American citizens’ awareness that US interventions in the developing world often bring misery to the lives of those who are already destitute may also retard the imperial urge. **However, neither global norms nor public opinion is likely to make imperialism a relic of the past**. The post–World War II record examined here sharply supports this projection. The more pertinent issue is what form American imperialism will take in the near future. Again, the record examined here suggests that the United States does economic imperialism better than military imperialism. To the extent that imperialism is rational, one should expect the United States to eschew military interventions but continue to seek economic advantage in the global periphery via the use of covert and indirect interventions. As this book goes to press, Iran and Venezuela, which both possess enormous oil resources, are the focus of American angst. Will the United States intervene militarily in these countries? A cost-benefit analysis of the past suggests that the United States ought not to pursue a military option in these countries. **But what complicates this rational suggestion is the enormous power surplus that the United States enjoys in the world**. **This power surplus, in turn, enables American leaders to periodically ignore the costs of interventions, which, in any case, are borne largely by American taxpayers and soldiers, and to indulge their whims and hubris**.

#### The move to make “better” hegemonic intervention IS the move to economic intervention

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The debt crisis in Latin America threatened the solvency of major American banks. The United States intervened, both directly and via multilateral organizations in which the United States was a dominant force, to ensure that Latin American countries paid back their debts to US banks. **The crisis also provided an occasion to further open up Latin American economies to US goods and capital**. While the avowed goal of structural reform in Latin America was to promote development, it is more likely that US decision-makers understood, or at least had an inkling, that policies associated with the Washington Consensus would hurt economic growth in Latin America but still pushed them because they served American economic interests. **As we have seen, the US intervention in Latin America during the 1980s was part of a long pattern of soft economic imperialism** (discussed in earlier chapters under the rubric of informal empire) **to forcibly open doors the world over to sustain and enhance American prosperity**. **Economic motives were also behind the US military intervention in Iraq, but in less obvious ways than in Latin America**. Among the factors that make the Middle East of great strategic importance to the United States is the concentration of world’s oil resources in the region. **Whether friends or foes control the production, distribution, and pricing of oil is, then, a matter of considerable US concern**. As noted in chapter 5, the US was party to the overthrow of Muhammed Mossadegh in the 1950s in order to deny Iran national control over its own oil. The client status of the Saudi monarchy serves American regional interests well. Ever since the overthrow of the pro-American Shah, the US has sought to deny Iran a significant regional role. It even supported Saddam Hussein against Iran during the prolonged Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. No one doubts that the US intervened to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1991 because Kuwait swims in oil. The motives behind the Second Iraq War—the focus of the present chapter—need to be understood within this historical and regional context. I argue that the United States went to war in Iraq the second time as a first step in a grander design to further incorporate the oil-rich Middle East within the American orbit. The fact that it may not work out that way does not take anything away from the original motives. **Intervention in Iraq also fits a century-long pattern of hard military imperialism: the pattern began with the United States’ smashing Filipino nationalists at the turn of the twentieth century to control the Philippines as a stepping-stone to the giant China market; it continued in Vietnam as a way to stop the spread of communism and to maintain open economies in the region; and is now playing itself out in the oil-rich Middle East that the United States hopes to dominate**. Judged from the standpoint of whether America’s imperial interventions bring it benefits, the evidence from the most recent period again suggests that the United States does economic imperialism better than military imperialism. The US efforts to deal with the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s supports the first part of this conclusion. As we have seen, the United States used economic coercion to ensure cooperation by Latin American elites, who were willing to pass on the costs of policy reform to both the lower strata and the future generations of Latin America. **The costs of American intervention to Americans were minimal, except for the loss of some international goodwill. In turn, the US government and US-dominated multilateral institutions helped to maintain the profits and solvency of major American banks. Latin American markets were opened up further to American goods and capital. By contrast, US-military intervention in Iraq has cost the Americans dearly and the rewards remain uncertain**. **Since the goals of US intervention were murky to begin with, it is difficult to assess whether any of them have been met or are likely to be met**. If the goals had been minimal—namely, to get rid of a thuggish, possibly anti-American dictator with access to oil wealth—that much the Iraq War certainly achieved. However, much of this goal was already accomplished after the first Gulf War, after which Saddam was still in power but well contained, and even willing to allow foreign oil companies to invest in Iraqi oil. The grander goal of remaking Iraq in America’s image, and then going beyond to impose an American peace on the entire region, remains, at best, illusive, and more likely, with growing anti-Americanism and the spread of militancy, even more distant than before the second war. The impact of American interventions on developing countries—both economic and military—has been negative. **As to economic imperialism, I document below that American efforts to ensure that banks were repaid their debts contributed to a lost decade of growth in Latin America**. **Beyond the lost decade, moreover, forced economic openness reinforced economic dependency of Latin American countries on their northern giant. The consequences are evident if one juxtaposes the experience of Asian countries during the same period** (say, from 1980 to 2005), with that of Latin America. Asian countries pursued a more autonomous development path in which national states directed their respective economies. This pattern of development—the Asian financial crisis notwithstanding—produced high growth rates, modest inequalities, industrial development, and high value-added exports. By contrast, economic growth in Latin American countries remained sluggish, with sharp income inequalities. Most Latin American countries also continued to export commodities in exchange for manufactured goods. **The negative impact of America’s war in Iraq is there for anyone to see**. What makes a moral judgment a little complicated is the fact that Saddam Hussein was a despotic, ruthless dictator who killed many of his own citizens, probably close to a quarter million over a period of twenty-five years.2 **By contrast, as noted, nearly a half million Iraqis died under American occupation between 2003 and 2011, the year most American troops left Iraq. Since then, US troops have had to return to deal with militancy. The Iraqi state remains weak and corruption and poverty remain endemic, even as oil extraction continues to grow**.

### Liberalism Link

#### The [aff/neg’s] form of liberalism is a retreat to the citadel in the face of the shatterzone of empires because it theoretically cannot account for the unending violence

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More recently, intellectual historians have begun to identify the reasons for this estrangement from witnessed history as a Cold War pattern of thought, and while the reification of such notions as a Cold War ‘mentality’‚ or even ‘liberalism’‚ can not always be avoided‚ some have persuasively recovered the biographical and theoretical basis for such forms of estrangement.11 What remains to be clarified, however, is when historical disenchantment had first emerged as an element of liberal political thought, and to what extent this development was causally linked to the Cold War. There was a peculiar pattern of speaking as well as being silent about some historical conflicts, especially the presence of anti-semitism, which had a much longer prehistory, reaching back as far as Jacob Burckhardt’s work on Europe, as Lionel Gossman has argued.12 **Another, more recent history of liberalism suggested dating this moment to the Second World War and the Holocaust as the apotheosis of ‘damaged ideals and broken dreams’**.13 **In what follows, I want to propose dating the beginning of the kind of historical alienation that is typically associated with ‘Cold War liberalism’ to a moment** between the nineteenth century and the 1950s, particularly‚ to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, a treaty that the aforementioned John Wheeler-Bennett had **appropriately called the ‘forgotten peace’**. As a separate process of peace-making, the treaty excluded a number of key belligerent powers, notably, Britain, France, and the United States. Its principal object was to seal Russia’s defeat, and to divide its lost territories between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. As Richard Bourke has identified, it was this quality of the treaty which gave rise to the term ‘Balkanization’ as a derogatory concept in political thought and public policy.14 (Fig. 8.1). If we are to understand at which point modern political liberalism retreated from its earlier confidence in historical progress, the international reception of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (1917–1918) between Russia and the Central Powers is a good place. **Its history draws attention to the ‘shatterzones of empires’ and the point at which liberalism became disorientated vis-à-vis its own past ideals and future commitments**.15 Looking at the reactions of contemporaries and witnesses to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (1918), we can also develop a better understanding of the fraught relationship between Enlightenment ideals and twentieth-century political practice. The form of the peace had shaken up a number of received principles of European political culture, which themselves dated back to Enlightenment ideals of the political**. It was a treaty signed between states which soon after ceased to exist in this form**—a particular problem for those traditions of liberal political thought which concentrate on the state as their main object. As this chapter will make apparent, a fresh.16 This chapter begins by identifying the metaphor of the ‘citadel’ as a central concept through which Isaiah Berlin’s abstraction from historical experience can be explored look at Isaiah Berlin’s ideas of history could return our awareness to this important moment through biographical and situational contexts in reading his discussion of ‘negative’ liberty, before discussing the implications of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk for ideas of liberty in the contexts of German liberal and historical thought of the same period. ‘Negative’ Liberty and the Retreat from Cosmopolitanism **The negative conception of liberty which** Isaiah **Berlin developed in his Two Concepts of Liberty, drawn from his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1958‚ provides the most influential account of the reasons why modern liberalism had to abstract from particular historical experience**. Criticizing positive conceptions of liberty, which, in his view, risked becoming dogmatic and totalitarian, Berlin insisted that under his conception, the subject had to maintain the capacity to ‘retreat into the inner citadel’, a space which he associated with the Stoic and Epicurean roots of the Enlightenment idea of reason.17 **In speaking of a ‘retreat’, Berlin described it as a space where the subject has freed himself**—and it is nearly always a he—**not just from pain, but from the source of pain; where power in the kingdom whose ‘frontiers are long and insecure’ is ensured by eliminating the ‘vulnerable area’, a process he likened to a wounded leg that is being amputated in order to save the living core**. He called this metaphorical citadel ‘my own sect, my own planned economy’. In other writings, **Berlin also argued that people wanted to be free from ‘dictation or coercion from teachers, masters, bullies and persuaders and dominators of various kinds’.** What was needed, in his view, were ‘natural units of human size’, not cosmopolitanism or other dogmatic doctrines of history.18 **The purpose of his moderate vision of liberty was to create a model which would safeguard individuals from manipulation by political ideologies which claimed to emancipate them on their behalf**. Berlin’s anti-radical world picture also involved a very conscious turning away from eighteenth-century languages of cosmopolitanism, which Berlin associated with the figure of Immanuel Kant as a moral dogmatist whose ideals, despite potentially good intentions, could evidently lead to totalitarianism. In his place, he favoured Kant’s former disciple and outspoken critic, Johann Gottfried Herder, whom Berlin construed as a theorist of cultural pluralism‚ having rescued him from a more völkisch reading by Nazi ideologues. A further characteristic of Berlin’s relationship to history was an interest in figures from the history of ideas who could be clearly mapped as either ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-Enlightenment’. Berlin’s interpreters have discussed this passage to emphasize the importance of a positive notion of freedom within Berlin’s demand for its negative conceptualization.19 In these interpretations, however, his choice of metaphor—the citadel—remained out of focus. It was a type of space bridging military and civilian, exceptional and regular experiences of citizenship. **The citadel, which we might also translate as fortress**, or krepost in Russian, acropolis in Greek, zion in Hebrew or Kasbah in Arabic, **is an element of defence architecture within which a certain form of life continues in war as well as in peacetime alike, with some, but ideally, only minimal restrictions in wartime**. The Russian word for serf— krepostnoi—is derived from this concept. Max **Weber has emphasized the hybrid nature of this structure,** combining elements of a market with elements of a city**, but without quite being identical with cities**.20 Although often discussed by the same authors of classical antiquity who left us an account of **cities as sites of political representation,** citadels **are not conspicuous by this function;** they serve the purpose of protection in a state of emergency in which notions of internal political organization, justice, and political representation are pushed to the side.21

#### Particularly, their conception of liberal realism is an incredibly selective reading of history that ahistoricizes vast portions of the past to justify its myopic worldview and aid imperial expansion

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Berlin’s separation between political philosophy and witnessed history had a profound influence on liberal attitudes to the historical past‚ yet they were formed in response to historical circumstances which preceded the Cold War. **Though they are not typically classed as ‘Cold War liberals’, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, for instance, have also been visibly agnostic vis-à-vis the historical experience of the twentieth century in terms of conceptualising norms of justice and publicity**.50 The abstraction from history acquired normative connotations in a way that was particularly salient in the philosophy of John **Rawls**, as he sought to re-establish the foundations of ideal theory in a way which would be unfettered by historical experience.51 His **very influential contractual model of justice probably gave the clearest justification for a divorce of political thought from history. It required readers to imagine a ‘veil of ignorance’ concerning their true historical and economic position, which frees up participants in a social contract to abstract from any particular passions or experiences and tunes them to seek out universally valid terms of justice**. Realism in international relations was also characterized by a highly selective curation of historical evidence, as expressed in the doctrine of Hans Morgenthau, who argued that ‘[h]istory shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy’.52 On this model, the idea of a national interest, the modern variant of the imperial reason of state, was a safer guide to political behaviour than the ideological or legal framework within which these were legitimated.53 In the last section of the paper, I want to propose how a different, more historically grounded engagement with past ‘crooked paths’ might actually provide less conclusive insights about the relationship between historical experience and future commitments. As will be seen, this emerged from German engagements and responses to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, particularly, in the work of Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, and later, Reinhart Koselleck.

### Military Nationalization Link

#### The aff’s naïve hope in the idea that “nationalizing” the military will remove the “bad private actors” ignores the government’s active and purposeful role in waging war – “nationalization” only makes the state more efficient in achieving violence because it doesn’t have to negotiate with private interests

James M. Cypher ’08, Professor-Researcher (Economics), Doctoral Program in Development Studies, Universidad Autonoma de Zacatecas, Mexico., “Economic Consequences of Armaments Production: Institutional Perspectives of J. K. Galbraith and T. B. Veblen”, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 37-47, March 2008, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25511285.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0759c5b913e324d684a9344556aa5de8

**In Galbraith's second version of the military-industrial complex a unique public private bureaucracy dominates**. An identical wage-receiving cadre of professionals (engineers, scientists, cost analysts, intelligence experts, communications specialists, economists, etc.) dominates both the private military contracting corporations (their boards of directors, their shareholders and their top management) and the public sector where the Pentagon technicians and their defense intellectuals hold sway over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the heads of the branches of the Services, the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate and the U.S. President. This curious inversion ? **particularly within the military itself where hierarchy is the sine qua non of professional order** ? is not backed up with any real empirical support. The professional cadres, in possession of knowledge, are assumed to be the motor force of the vast corporate and public sector entities. A case could probably be made that within these vast organizations those who possess knowledge of a professional nature are crucial to the functioning of the organizations and that they exercise some relative autonomy. But, they do so within some very strict parameters.

Galbraith attempted to describe the micro aspects of a stable Keynesian Social Structure of Accumulation that articulated the public and private sectors in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. From 1975 through 2007, the U.S. economy has metamorphosed under the twin forces of "globalization" and "financialization" (Cypher 2003). Since Galbraith offered his interpretation, much has changed: first and foremost, the trend of military expenditures has been strongly downward, with dramatic ups and downs as a result of the United States' defeat in Vietnam, the Reagan arms buildup, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, and the onset of "war on terrorism." Professionally trained "technostructure" cadres have been mustered out by the hundreds of thousands in both the public and private sector. **In the corporate world, mergers and acquisitions, downsizing and off shoring have scrambled careers and demonstrated that the technostructure is hardly in control of the dynamics of the giant corporations**. In the fourth edition of the New Industrial State, Galbraith acknowledged that his formulation of the "planning system" had not anticipated the rise of globalization, the instability of the macroeconomy, the decline of military expenditures and other mega-trends. Yet, he tended to minimize most of the processes and dynamics his model had not anticipated (Galbraith [1967] 1985, xi-xxxv). **Galbraith claimed** (in 1971) "**that the principal seat of government is the Commonwealth of Virginia, not Washington, D.C. where both the Pentagon and CIA are located**". **While he claimed that causality ran from the symbiotically aligned private-public technostructure regarding the creation of weapons systems or an "initial decision in favor of invasion" up through the Congress and to the President, it is difficult to square this perception with a careful reading of recent history regarding foreign affairs and military policy** (Galbraith [1971] 1986, 223). The Star Wars missile defense system was the result of a neoconservative shift in the matter of military grand strategy ? not a result of some faceless, bland, "planning" technostructure. The top Pentagon brass did not initiate either Gulf War I (1991) or II (2003-2008?). Both were wars to maintain/expand United States suzerainty in the Middle East, the first driven by a "realist" version of grand strategy, the second by a neoconservative vision. In short, from the end of the Vietnam War onwards, one could easily cite event after event relating to military affairs wherein a pivotal role could be assigned to the Congress, the executive office or to other forces and factors that seemed to have nothing to do with a symbiotically aligned public-private sector. Finally, although Galbraith was quick to heap ridicule on the idea that the private sector contracting firms had the upper hand in the relationship between the buyer and the seller of armaments, it is difficult to understand the actual workings of the military-industrial complex without concluding that Galbraith was simply wrong on this point. Nowhere in his writings can an empirical defense of his position be found.

It is a relatively simple manner, however, to cite case after case wherein the military has bought overpriced products at a quantity level below that specified in their original contract and at a quality level that is woefully below that promised by the contractor. Consider what is but the latest case: In 2002, the Coast Guard was allocated $17 billion for the Deepwater project which was to revolutionize the Guard, rebuilding virtually all old ships and helicopters, while providing (1) new state-of-the art ships; (2) patrol aircraft with biological, nuclear and chemical capabilities; and (3) two types of ultra high-tech unmanned aerial surveillance planes**. By 2005, the cost overruns of the contracted items to be provided by the Northrup Grumman and Lockheed corporations had soared by 41% (to $24 billion), while by 2006, none of the 459 aircraft and ship items had been delivered as specified** ? the Coast Guard was less able to fulfill its functions than it was in 2001 (Lipton 2006, Al, A12-13). **To get the initial funding, the Coast Guard relied upon the lobbying capacities, talent and experience of both Northrup and Lockheed** ? **a far cry from Galbraith's formulation whereby the military bureaucracy adroitly maneuvers its way around the Congress and the executive.** In Galbraith's interpretation, the private corporations provide the equipment, and the highly skilled military technostructures work cooperatively with the private sector to ensure that technologically advanced weapons systems are delivered to the satisfaction of the military bureaucracy. In the case of Deepwater, the Coast Guard technostructure was not, apparently, to be found (Lipton2006,A12).

Nor was the Congress a passive recipient of the decision handed down, as in Galbraith's interpretation, by the symbiotically aligned Northrup/Lockheed-Coast Guard duality. **Three Congress members** (**all with strong vested interests in having the project funded due to an inordinate amount of work that would be profitably undertaken by corporations in their districts**) **were instrumental in steering the unprecedented contract to approval in 2002**. Deepwater is not exceptional as The Wastrels of Defense and Grand Theft Pentagon show (Wheeler 2004; St. Clair 2005). If both the public and the private sector were symbiotically aligned, why would there be an incessant history of contractor abuse, wherein enduring the bad end of the exchange is always the fate of the military services unless the whole objective of the exercise is simply to "make money"? **The answer, of course, is that Galbraith's interpretation simply does not coincide with the empirical record regarding contracting relationships**.

#### Plan fails to recognize the government’s monopoly on sanctioned violence – a nationalized military is just as likely to abuse its power

Thomas K. Duncan and Christopher J. Coyne ‘13, \*is Mercatus Dissertation Fellow at the Mercatus Center, George Mason University, \*\*is F. A. Harper Professor of Economics at George Mason University., “The Origins of the Permanent War Economy”, The Independent Review, v. 18, n. 2, ISSN 1086–1653, pp. 219–240, Fall 2013, https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_18\_02\_03\_duncan.pdf

In the context of foreign military interventions, this flaw implies that, given the chance, self-interested capitalists will gladly engage in a mutually beneficial exchange with the state-monopoly provider of military services. Private companies offer campaign contributions and political support, and politicians and state bureaucrats offer rents in return. Although both parties are privately made better off, the significant negative externality of allowing this exchange is that the permanent war economy diverts productive resources away from other uses that would improve the general standard of living (see Duncan and Coyne forthcoming).

**How is this dilemma to be resolved?** **One solution is to adopt a completely planned economic system for military and defense production that removes capitalists from the process altogether**. The flaw in this alternative, however, is that it assumes that government, absent crony capitalists, will have less of an incentive to build and use weapons for imperialistic purposes. The field of public choice, which demands the symmetry of assumptions between private and public actors, calls this assumption into question. Further, **historical evidence also provides countless instances of government abuse of its monopoly on military force**.

Yet another alternative is to establish a constitutionally limited system that constrains government while allowing productive capitalism to flourish within a limited domain of action. In principle, this solution would limit the type of cronyism that gave rise to the permanent war economy. The main problem with this alternative is that binding constraints have historically been fleeting in the face of constant pressures by politicians, bureaucrats, and capitalists pursuing their own narrow, self-interested agendas. Further intensifying these pressures are real and perceived crises that create openings for expansions in government, resulting in increased rents available to well-positioned special interests (see Higgs 1987, 2004, 2005b, 2006, 2012).

A third solution is to reconsider the state’s role as a monopoly provider of defense services. **Recognizing the monopoly rents associated with the state as the sole provider of military services, this alternative entails engaging in comparative institutional analysis to explore the feasibility of different means of providing protection and defense** in the absence of a state monopoly (see, for example, D. Friedman 1989; Stringham 2007; Powell and Stringham 2009). **Although this alternative may at first appear radical, it is no more so than the first two solutions, which ultimately rely on centralizing control of the military with the hope that it will not be abused by those in power**. History, however, shows that avoiding such abuse is the exception rather than the norm.

### MIC Link

#### The idea that there is a “separate” military power that exists outside of economic organization that could be solved by “removing corporate influences” is the exact play the corporate elite makes during periods of economic crisis to reconsolidate the means of destruction in their hands – PMCs are just scapegoats for violent US interventions

Paul M. Sweezy ’56, was a Marxist economist, political activist, publisher, and founding editor of the long-running magazine Monthly Review. He is best remembered for his contributions to economic theory as one of the leading Marxian economists of the second half of the 20th century, “Power Elite or Ruling Class?”, Review of *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills, Monthly Review, Vol. 8, No. 5: September 1956, <https://monthlyreviewarchives.org/index.php/mr/article/view/MR-008-05-1956-09_2>, accessed via MR on 11.11.21

Mills starts off with a concept of the power elite which is dis-armingly simple. Those who occupy the “command posts” of our major economic, military, and political institutions constitute the power elite—the big shareholders and executives of the corporate system, the generals and admirals of the Pentagon, and the elected and appointed officials who occupy political positions of national sig- nificance. But this of course tells us nothing about the men who stand at these posts—how they got there, their attitudes and values, their relations with each other and with the rest of society, and so on—nor does it provide any but an admittedly misleading clue to these questions: **Mills himself repeatedly rejects the notion that the power elite in his sense constitutes some sort of natural aristocracy of ability and intelligence, in spite of the common connotation of the term “elite.”**

Having in effect defined the power elite as composed of the big shots of industry and government, Mills’ next task is to devise a theoretical scheme within which to locate them and to guide his empirical investigations into their characteristics and habits. Two general approaches readily suggest themselves, and Mills follows them both without ever clearly distinguishing them, without asking how far and in what respects they may be in conflict, and without any systematic attempt to reconcile their divergent results. The first ap- proach is via social class: the hypothesis can be put forward and tested that those who occupy the command posts do so as repre- sentatives or agents of a national ruling class which trains them, shapes their thought patterns, and selects them for their positions of high responsibility. **The second approach is via what Mills vari- ously calls the “major institutional orders”** (eg., on p. 269), the “major hierarchies” (p. 287), the “big three domains” (p. 288), **and other more or less synonymous terms, This assumes that there are distinct spheres of social life**—**the economic, the military, and the political**—**each with its own institutional structure, that each of these spheres throws up its own leading cadres, and that the top men of all three come together to form the power elite.**

**Now there may be societies, past or present, in which this idea of more or less autonomous orders, hierarchies, or domains has enough relevance to make it a fruitful approach to problems of social struc- ture and power**. But it seems perfectly clear to me that the United States is not and never has been such a society. Moreover, **the cumulative effect of the empirical data presented by Mills is de- cisively against any such interpretation of the American system**. He adduces a wealth of material on our class system, showing how the local units of the upper class are made up of propertied families and how these local units are welded together into a wholly self-conscious national class. He shows how the “power elite” is overwhelmingly (and increasingly) recruited from the upper levels of the class system, how the same families contribute indifferently to the economic, mili- tary, and political “elites,” and how the same individuals move easily and almost imperceptibly back and forth from one to another of these “elites.” When it comes to “The Political Directorate” (Chap- ter 10), **he demonstrates that the notion of a specifically political elite is in reality a myth, that the crucial positions in government and politics are increasingly held by what he calls “political out- siders,” and that these outsiders are in fact members or errand boys of the corporate rich**.

**This demonstration in effect reduces “the big three” to “the big two”** —**the corporate and the military domains**. There is no doubt at all about the decisive importance of the former, and Mills makes some of his most useful and interesting contributions in discussing the wealth, power, and other characteristics of the corporate rich.\* But the evidence for an autonomous, or even semi-autonomous, mili- tary domain of comparable importance is so weak that it can be said to be almost nonexistent. **Historically, to be sure, the military has normally been somewhat separated from the main stream of American life, and in this sense one could perhaps speak of a military domain**. **But it has been small and completely subject to civilian control, quite impotent in terms of the national decision-making which is the special function of Mills’ power elite**. **In wartime, of course, the mili- tary has swelled enormously in size and power, but it is precisely then that it has ceased to be a separate domain**, The civilian higher circles have moved into commanding military positions, and the top brass has been accepted into the higher circles. What happens in such times is that the “power elite” becomes militarized in the sense that it has to concern itself with military problems, it requires military skills, and it must inculcate in the underlying population greater re- spect for military virtues and personnel.

**All this has nothing in common with the rise to power of a military order headed by an elite of “warlords,” though it is in these terms that Mills describes what has been happening in the United States since the beginning of World War II, and indeed must describe it or else abandon the whole theory of a composite power elite made up of separate “domanial” elites;** **for on his own showing the “‘political directorate” is merely an emanation of the corporate rich**. **To sup- port the theory of “The Warlords’** (Chapter 8) and “The Military Ascendancy” (Chapter 9), **Mills brings forth little evidence beyond the well-known facts that the military trade has traditionally re- quired a specialized training and code of conduct, and that the Pentagon is an important center of power in American life**. **But these facts require no such fancy interpretation and are perfectly compatible with a more prosaic theory of the locus of power in mid- twentieth-century United States**.

But Mills really relies much less on facts than on a sort of un- stated syllogism to back up his warlord-military ascendancy theory. The syllogism might be formulated as follows: the major outlines of American policy, both foreign and domestic, are drawn in terms of a “military definition of world reality” which has been accepted by the power elite as a whole; this military definition of reality (also referred to as “military metaphysics”) must be the product of the professional military mind (“the warlords”) ; ergo the warlords now occupy a decisive position within the power elite (“the military as- cendancy”). **This may look impressive and convincing at a first glance, but a moment’s reflection will show that it explains nothing and constitutes no support whatever for Mills’ theory**. **Professional military people naturally think in military terms and have doubtless always tried to persuade others to see things their way. Throughout most of United States history, they have succeeded, if at all, only in wartime**. The real problem is to understand why it is that since World War II the whole “power elite” has come to think in- creasingly in military terms and hence to accord a place of greater honor and power to the military. Without an answer to this, all the facts that seem to Mills to add up to the “military ascendancy” of the “warlords” remain quite unexplained.

**Now Mills himself never faces up to this question, and the only relevant answer I can find is that the United States now, unlike in the past, lives in a “military neighborhood”** (the phrase is used on a number of occasions), **which presumably means that the country is under constant threat (or potential threat) of attack and military defeat**. This is more sophisticated than saying that we live in mortal danger of red aggression, but its explanatory value is exactly the same: in either case the increasing militarization of American life is the result of external forces. The rise of the warlords, then, is seen as the outcome of a world historical process for which the United States has no responsibility and over which it has no control, and not, as Mills clearly wants to prove, as the outcome of internal forces operating in the military domain.

**Thus, while Mills appears to have little in common with the cold-war liberals, and in fact rather generally holds them in contempt, his theory of the role of the military leads to very much the same conclusions**. I believe that this is no accident. “Elitist” thinking inevitably diverts attention from problems of social structure and process and leads to a search for external causes of social phenomena. Simon-pure elitists like Pareto and his followers frankly adopt this method and find what they are looking for in the alleged natural qualities of their elites. Semi-elitists like Mills—people who think they can adopt the terminology without any of the basic ideas of elitist theory—tend to get bogged down in confusion from which the only escape is to borrow the most banal ideas of their opponents.

**It is too bad that Mills gets into this kind of a mess, because, as I indicated above, his work is strongly influenced by a straight- forward class theory which, if he had stuck to it and consistently explored its implications, would have enabled him to avoid com- pletely the superficialities and pitfalls of elitist thinking**. The upper- most class in the United States is, and long has been, made up of the corporate rich who directly pull the economic levers. **Prior to the Clutch Plague and World War II, the corporate rich left political and military matters largely** (though by no means ex- clusively) **in the control of hired hands and trusted agents**; but since the highly dangerous economic breakdown of the 30s, the Big Boys have increasingly taken over the key positions themselves. **Their unwillingness to solve the economic problems of capitalism through a really massive welfare state program meant that they welcomed the war as the salvation of their system**. **Since the end of World War II, they have accepted, nay created and sold through all the media of mass communications, a “military definition of reality” as the ideological-political underpinning of the war-preparations economy, which remains crucial to the whole profit-making mechanism on which their wealth and power rests**. For this purpose**, they have lavishly subsidized and encouraged the military, which in turn has not only grown vastly in size but also has been enormously flattered and has become the most loyal defender and promoter of the “free enterprise” system**. The picture of “warlords” exercising a “military ascendancy” is fanciful: our warlords have no fundamental values or purposes different from those of their corporate colleagues; many of them perform virtually indistinguishable jobs; and the crowning achievement of a military career today is the board chairmanship of a billion-dollar corporation.\* At the same time, we have nothing even approaching a unified military order or caste seeking to impose its “military metaphysics” on the nation. The most famous of our “warlords,” President Eisenhower, is now the most peaceful of our influential politicians; while our most strident “militarists” are civilian Senators Symington and Jackson whose closest affiliations would seem to be with the multi-billion-dollar aircraft industry.

**No, the facts simply won't fit Mills’ theory of three (or two) sectional elites coming together to form an overall power elite**. What we have in the United States is a ruling class with its roots deeply sunk in the “apparatus of appropriation” which is the corporate system. To understand this ruling class—its metaphysics, its purposes, and its morals- -we need to study, not certain “domains” of American life, however defined, but the whole system of monopoly capitalism.

#### The aff is antithetical to a Marxist approach on militarism – their theory relies on anti-Marxist thought that blames military violence on general “bureaucracy” rather than seeing it as a stage of capitalist, imperialist development necessary for the existence of the nationstate – proves the K turns the entire aff, but not the other way around

Charles Constantine Moskos, Jr. ’74, was a sociologist of the United States military and a professor at Northwestern University, “The Concept of the Military-Industrial Complex: Radical Critique or Liberal Bogey?”, Social Problems, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 498-512, April 1974, accessed via WFU-JSTOR on 11.05.21

Contemporary with the publication of The Power Elite was Dahrendorf's Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1956). Restating the mana- gerial revolution concept he described the ruling group of the post-industrial state as composed "of the administra- tive staff of the state, governmental elites at its head, and those interested parties which are represented by the governmental elite" (1956:303). **More recent variations on the same theme are found in** Keller's Beyond the Ruling Class (1963), Galbraith's The New Industrial State (1967), and Bell's The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973). **In all of these studies, despite varying political positions, there was a common conceptual ancestry in the ideas of the neo-Machiavellians and Weber**. Contrary to Marxist thought, these theorists portrayed post-indus- trialized societies-whether capitalist or socialist-as converging in their basic forms of authority; **top leaders emerging out of large-scale public and private enterprises comprised the new ruling groups; educated state function- aries and technical specialists trans- cended the property basis of power**; and even class conflict was to be superseded by the bureaucratization of elite struc- tures.5

**The point here is simply that the basic theoretical premises underlying Mills' The Power Elite were not in themselves departures from prevailing sociological thought**. Quite the con- trary, the central conceptual thrust of The Power Elite was essentially in ac- cord with the basic formulations of earlier and contemporary non- if not anti-Marxist social scientists.6 In par- ticular, **the invocation of notions such as mass society and elite groups served to undercut explanatory concepts based on economic relations of classes to the means of production**. Moreover, this aversion to use a class analysis has been the hallmark in the subsequent develop- ment of the concept of the military- industrial complex.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL DETERMINANTS

It is not surprising that interpreta- tions of the causal factors in the op- eration and makeup of the military- industrial complex are many. At first glance it would appear that the litera- ture on the military-industrial complex is too variable to categorize easily. From among the diverse accounts, however, we can distinguish-with some overlap to be sure-three recurring and analyt- ically exclusive themes as to the root quality of the military-industrial com- plex. For purposes of exposition, we can refer to these three determinants as **deriving from (1) the military hier- archy, or (2) the administrative bu- reaucracy, or (3) corporate wealth**. In terms of ideological referents, **it ap- pears that the different theoretical emphases given principal determinants are correlated-albeit loosely-with rather distinct positions on the political spectrum**. **The dominant thrust in the literature, which stresses the baleful role of the military hierarchy, tends to find its proponents among liberal spokesmen**; **emphasis on the autonomy of administrative bureaucrats seems to be chiefly a characteristic of those ad- hering to a kind of New Left persua- sion**; **while attributing prime deter- minancy to corporate wealth finds its adherents principally-although not ex- clusively-among Marxist writers**. The Military Hierarchy. The truly novel feature of The Power Elite was Mills' introduction of the military "warlords" as constituent members of the ruling elite of the United States. Never before had uniformed officers been so characterized in American so- ciety.7 It also appears more than coi cidental that Mills resorted to a mili- tary metaphor to define the power elite as those who "occupy the strategic com- mand posts of the social structure" (1956:4). This portrayal of the mili- tary found an echo in Cook's The Warfare State (1962), and Swomley's The Military Establishment (1964) which squarely placed the blame for the militarization of American society on the "permanent officer group." But it was not until the contemporary pe- riod, when the war in Indochina engen- dered an endemic anti-militarism within America's intellectual and academic circles, that the nefarious role of the uniformed military became a leitmotiv in much of the military-industrial com- plex literature.

Barnet (1969:81) thus states: "By the end of the Johnson Administration, the uniformed military had acquired considerable independent political power." Lens, whose The Military- Industrial Complex (1970) includes a panoply of vested interests, neverthe- less, points to the Pentagon as "the fountainhead" of American imperial- ism. Heilbroner (1970:6) concludes: ". .. that the military establishment constitutes itself as a self-contained en- tity, capable of impressing its views and imposing its will not only on the civil establishment to which it pays ritual obeisance, but over a section of the economy in which the language of private enterprise is merely a fiction to hide its absolute authority." Galbraith (1969:10) holds: "In my view the Services, not their industrial suppliers, are the prime wielders of this power." Indeed, Galbraith explicitly reverses Marxist causality and refers to military suppliers as "captive contractors" (1969:33).

Specifying the military as the main culprits in the military-industrial com- plex is not by any means confined to academics. **Thus former Marine Com- mandant Shoup** (1969) **argues that inter-service rivalry plays a determining role in weapons acquisitions and Amer- ican interventions abroad**.8 **Senator Fullbright** (1970) **castigates senior officers and Defense Department offi- cials for brainwashing the American public into acceptance of Cold War and militaristic values**. **Similarly focus- ing on the armed forces as the major agents of the military-industrial com- plex are those accounts dealing with the military's dominance in setting na- tional priorities** (Rodberg and Shearer, 1970; Gottlieb, 1971), and revelations of military waste and collusion between high-ranking officers and armaments manufacturers (Proxmire, 1970; Tyrell, 1970; York, 1970; Kaufman, 1972).9

**Running through the arguments of the military determinists is the belief that the senior command structure of the armed forces has been slipping out from under civilian control**. **The em- phasis from this perspective on the military-industrial complex is definitely on the military**.10 Advocates of this viewpoint usually reflect the sentiment that once the armed forces are returned to their proper-and much reduced-- role the American system will right itself. In their own fashion, then, the military determinists have turned Marxian analysis inside out---control of the means of destruction has come to determine the nature of the means of production in American society.

**The Administrative Bureaucracy**.

Deriving almost directly from neo- Machiavellian and Weberian anteced- ents via the "garrison state," the "man- agerial revolution," and the "power elite" is that literature on the military- industrial complex which sees the causal factor vested in an autonomous bureaucracy of non-elected adminis- trators and advisors. As in all elitist analysis, there is the crucial notion that real power resides in other than the formal decision-making processes and is even independent of property rela- tionships.

One of the most closely detailed and persuasive articulations of this view- point is found in Pentagon Capitalism by Melman (1970). **Briefly, Melman's thesis is that the military-industrial complex of the Eisenhower era has been supplanted by a "state-manage- ment" decision system introduced by Secretary of Defense McNamara in the early 1960s**. **He argues that the mili- tary-industrial firm is no longer a pri- vate firm, in that corporate decisions are now in the hands of government managers**. "**The state management has also become the most powerful deci- sion-making unit in the United States government. Thereby, the federal gov- ernment does not 'serve' business or 'regulate' business. For the new man- agement is the largest of them all. Government is business. That is state capitalism**" (Melman, 1970:22). Sig- nificantly, defense strategy has become a means to an end, the end being greater domestic power and influence. For Melman, then, the primary goals of the Defense Department are the expansion of its own power within American society.11

**A common corollary of administra- tive bureaucratic determinism is to por- tray governmental elites as propelled by an "institutionalized power lust"** (Melman, 1970:4), **or "executive ego- ism"** (Horowitz, 1971:38), **or "bu- reaucratic machismo"** (Barnet, 1971: 55). The sense of this interpretation is captured in the title of Chomsky's American Power and the New Man- darins (1967). The absence of class analysis in this train of thought is mani- fest when Horowitz (1971:38) reviews The Pentagon Papers, not in terms of a military-industrial complex dominated by economic oligarchs, nor even in terms of a triadic power elite, but by specifying a ruling group in American society as a "non-elected political elite."12 Adopting virtually the same non-class interpretation of how the United States entered the Vietnam War is Halberstram's The Best and the Brightest (1972). Carrying this mode of analysis one step further, Tucker (1971) describes the compulsion for imperialist America as the quest for power itself and not because of any internal capitalist dynamic.

Somewhat more involved is the pro- vocative thesis presented by Pilisuk and Hayden (1971) that the value premises of American elites are in fact not that much different from the mass of the population. "**Our concept is not that American society contains a ruling mili- tary-industrial complex. Our concept is more nearly that American society is a military-industrial complex**" (Pilusuk and Hayden, 1971:99). All strata of the population, that is, share to some degree a common set of cold-war-coun- ter-revolutionary "core beliefs." For Pilisuk and Hayden, then, precisely be- cause of the general acceptance of these core beliefs, it is not necessary to in- voke either a class analysis or notions of domestic repression to understand the dominance of the military-industrial complex. Likewise, Hoffman (1972), presenting an anarchist viewpoint, con- cludes that the prevalence of militaris- tic values results not so much because of elite manipulation, but more im- portantly, because of a genuine belief on the part of the American public in the naturalness and necessity of a huge military establishment.13 **Or put in another way, the militaristic administra- tive bureaucracy has come to be co- terminous with American society**.

Corporate Wealth. **Contrasting with both those who emphasize military dominance or administrative bureau- crats is the Marxian perspective, which interprets American society in terms of class structure and capital ownership**. In Marxian analysis (e.g., DuBoff, 1969; Balbus, 1971; Ross, 1971), therefore, military determinism is only a misguided scapegoating of a super- structural entity; while administrative determinism erroneously reverses the independent-dependent nexus between government officials and corporate wealth. **Indeed, the whole concept of a military-industrial complex without fundamental revision is incompatible with a Marxian framework**, as was also the earlier case with Mills' thesis of a power elite.14

**Baran and Sweezy, in their influen- tial Monopoly Capital** (1966), **make the central point that** the huge Ameri- can military machine serves the capital- ist purposes of maintaining prosperity at home while fighting socialism abroad.15 **More directly, Horowitz** (1970:11) **eschews notions of adminis- trative or military determinancies and states**: "The locus of power and interest [of the ruling class] is the giant cor- porations and financial institutions which dominate the American econ- omy, and moreover, the economy of the entire Western world." **Kolko** (1969; 1970) **likewise has presented an inter- pretation of American domestic and foreign policies being clearly dominated by a corporate economic elite**. In fact, Kolko (1971:43) benignly describes the American military as "docile" and "unquestionably among the most re- strained of those in power."16

One of the striking features of recent American historiography has been the emergence of a "revisionist" interpre- tation of America's global role since the Second World War. **Generally operating within a Marxian paradigm, revisionist writers have placed prime culpability on the United States for the origins of the Cold War and, later, counter-revolutionary interventionism with regard to Third World countries** (Horowitz, 1965, LaFeber, 1967; Kolko, 1969; Alperovitz, 1970; Wil- liams, 1970). Despite some differences between the various revisionist ac- counts, they all seek to demonstrate how the corporate economic elite con- trols those aspects of the governmental and military machinery essential to capital interests. **There is a consistent theme among the revisionists which sees the military-industrial complex as epiphenomenal; and which regards the bureaucracy of the armed forces and government as playing a minor part in American Cold War and imperialist decision making**. Thus, the dean of revisionist historians, **Williams** (1970), **sees the Cold War greatly antedating the military-industrial complex and traces its origins to the nature of the integral expansion of capitalist society in America**.'7 Indeed, Williams (1971:3) has written in a related con- text that ". . . **the cold war actually be- gan with the triumph of laissez-faire capitalism over the more organic po- litical economy of mercantilism, and can be dated by the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776**."[!]

However, emphasis on the determin- ing role of the corporate rich in shaping basic cold-war-defense expenditures is not exclusively a Marxist perog- ative.18 Adopting an essentially non- Marxist but critical framework are several studies which also conclude that an aristocratic economic elite sets the fundamental politics of America's defense establishment. Thus, Domhoff (1967) surveys the American power structure and shows how the upper class controls the executive branch of the federal government.19 Lundberg (1968) holds that the military hier- archy, governmental leaders, and cor- porate managers are little more than handmaidens of the "super-rich." In fact, Lundberg (1968:543-553, 950- 954) frontally attacks Mills' concept of a power elite-and by implication, the concept of a military-industrial com- plex-which is scathingly dismissed as a restatement of the managerial revo- lution thesis. For Lundberg the signifi- cant units of power in the United States have always been-and still firmly re- main-wealthy families.20

CONCLUSION

**The purpose of this article has not been to offer an evaluation of the ex- planatory veracity or empirical mani- festations of the concept of the mili- tary-industrial complex**. As reflected in the attendant bibliography, this task has already engaged numerous writers. Our task here has been a quite different one-namely to demonstrate the com- monalities between the military-indus- trial complex literature and the devel- opment of Western bourgeois social science.21

The relevant literature, moreover, could be readily appraised in terms of categories derived from the prime de- terminants imputed to diverse national decision-making sectors. Thus, **those who stress the primacy of the adminis- trative bureaucracy in its various forms continue a long tradition of channeling causal analysis of society-wide power away from class and stratification con- siderations**. **In this perspective, the con- cept of the military-industrial complex becomes in effect another reformula- tion of the managerial revolution hy- pothesis**. **Coming at the issue from a different vantage point, but with paral- lel consequences, are the arguments of those who stress the paramountcy of the military hierarchy. Indeed, in their own fashion, the military determinists have turned Marxian analysis inside out; control of the means of destruction has come to determine the nature of the means of production**. It follows there- fore that those researchers who give prime determinancy to corporate wealth in the national power structure have consistently found themselves uneasy-- if not at odds-with the contemporary concept of the military-industrial com- plex as well as its theoretical antece- dents.

### Precision Ag Link

#### Precision agriculture that utilizes [AI/biotechnology] is a form of digital dispossession and increasing militarization in the face of climate change

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Anthropogenic climate change is altering and disrupting food production systems globally (Arnell et al, 2019). With high confidence, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) asserts: “Observed climate change is already affecting food security through increasing temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, and greater frequency of some extreme events” (Mbow et al., 2019: 439). **Climate change presents numerous challenges to achieving equity within food production systems**—**smallholder farmers, historically marginalized** **populations, and those regarded as vulnerable by climate intelligentsia bear a disproportionate burden of impacts** (Mbow et al., 2019: 439; IPCC, 2014).

Increasingly, climate crisis discourses are being framed through the lens of securitization (Grove, 2010, King and Goodman, 2011, Parenti, 2012), wherein the vulnerability of the vulnerable is used to justify further surveillance and militaristic interventions (Thomas and Warner, 2019). **Food insecurity and disruptions in food production related to climate change are also being framed through similar securitization discourses** (Karlsson et al., 2018, McDonagh, 2014). Climate-food discourses frequently fuse with neo-Malthusian discourses that scapegoat the growing human population in the global South as threatening future food supplies for a planetary population of 9 billion in 2050 (Fouilleux et al., 2017, Ojeda et al., 2020, Shaw and Wilson, 2020). From this grounding, climate-related food security discourses establish the imperative of increasing agricultural productivity for securing human well-being (McDonagh, 2014, Fouilleux et al., 2017, Nally, 2011).

**Under the aegis of population vulnerability, securitization provides a useful pretext for the vast dissemination of new capital-intensive technologies that seek to ‘modernize’ agrarian production systems** (Stock, 2020, Dryzek, 2013). Undoubtedly the world’s foremost authority on global ecological change, the IPCC has become a vocal advocate for climate-responsive technological innovations in agriculture: “Many [agricultural] practices can be optimised and scaled up to advance adaptation throughout the food system (high confidence)” (Mbow et al., 2019: 439). **Ranging from** biotechnology **to** artificial intelligence**, numerous innovations in agriculture are currently being developed and implemented under the broad umbrella of ‘climate-smart agriculture’ that seek to facilitate a ‘triple-win’ of establishing food security, mitigating greenhouse gases and enhancing the adaptive capacity of farming communities** (Suckall et al, 2014). However, many observers contend that ‘smart’ interventions promoted by authoritative institutions (e.g. UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture) are inadequate ‘techno-managerial fixes’ to the political causes of food insecurity that may exacerbate social inequalities (Nightingale et al., 2019, Karlsson et al., 2018, Taylor, 2018, Cavanagh et al., 2017).

1.1. Precision agriculture

Improving agricultural yields as a response to the looming climate crisis is a matter of global human welfare of great geopolitical importance. People and their production systems have become central objects for political management. For example, John Deere fits new tractors with sensors that passively mine field-level data about soil and crop conditions and then invites farmers (through subscription fees) to benefit from decision support systems (DSS) that can help inform their decisions about when to plant, spray and harvest (Bronson and Knezevic 2019). **Within these logics, paramount to the practice of agricultural optimization for food security is collecting and processing data from all aspects of the food production system to ensure precision in the targeting of interventions, the application of inputs, tracking the outputs, and recording patterns of human, plant, and animal behavior. Such technologies, broadly referred to as precision agriculture** (**PA**), **are data-driven agricultural technologies that use localized farm data at the appropriate time and location to make ‘precise’ farming management decisions** (Rossel and Bouma, 2016, Driessen and Heutinck, 2015, Bongiovanni and Lowenberg-Deboer, 2004, Cox, 2002). PA or “farming by the foot” is largely made possible through the processing of big data or high-volume, high-velocity, multisource agriculture data (e.g. crop yields, digital soil information, reflectance information, elevation data) (Shannon et al., 2018, Clay et al., 2017, Vallentin et al., 2019**). Technologies associated with PA are quite diverse, including but not limited to: yield monitors** (Fig. 1), **soil and water sensors, GPS units for self-driving tractors, robotic milking machines, drones** (Fig. 2) **and blockchain technologies**. **PA is also being integrated with technologies of artificial intelligence under the auspices of ‘smart’ agriculture**. Artificial intelligence (AI) can be defined as present wherever machines can exhibit some level of intelligence (Russell and Norvig 2016; Smith, 2020). Through AI, PA is envisioned to be “delivering real value” to farmers (Smith, 2020) and steering society toward the “fourth industrial revolution” or agriculture 4.0 (Lele and Goswami, 2017). With help from satellites, drones, sensors and machine learning algorithms, PA technologies are helping farmers make various decisions by integrating information technology into farm machinery and management (Rossel and Bouma, 2016, Driessen and Heutinck, 2015, Bongiovanni and Lowenberg-Deboer, 2004, Cox, 2002). For example, the adoption of Microsoft’s Cortana Intelligence Suite is helping farmers find optimal planting dates for crops in India and Colombia (López and Corrales 2018), drones are being used by farm managers to scout and remove weeds from fields (Lottes et al., 2017, Fennimore, 2017), and automated systems are milking cows in the dairy industry (Dreissen and Heutinck, 2015). Agritech firms increasingly position themselves as purveyors of technologies that respond to the climate crisis, yet market their products to farmers as solutions to challenges of falling profitability and biosecurity (John Deere, 2020). PA systems may increase farm profitability while ostensibly reducing negative impacts on the environment (Rossel and Bouma, 2016, Bongiovanni and Lowenberg-Deboer, 2004, Banerjee et al., 2013; Smith, 2020). At the same time, **the mechanisms of PA** (e.g. data collection, infrastructures, data sharing, algorithms) **present social and ethical issues such as potential privacy breaches or access and trust issues among farmers and other actors in the food system** (Jakku et al. 2019). Recent social science research provides relief to uncertainties surrounding the social dimensions of PA, and specifically to big data applications for agriculture (Gardezi and Stock, 2021, Klerkx et al., 2019, Rotz et al., 2019a, Bronson and Knezevic, 2019). For example, Gardezi and Bronson (2019) explore the social determinants of farmers adopting PA technologies and their perceptions of biophysical risk associated with the new food production system. We build on this extant literature by situating the power relations between food system actors and institutions within a larger political economy of industrial agriculture and ask the following research question: What are the sociopolitical effects of big data gathered from ‘smart’ agriculture interventions of farmers in South Dakota and Vermont? In the next section, we provide texture to this question by examining the uses and effects of PA, a new paradigm of capital-intensive industrial agriculture that integrates digital technologies to improve crop yields and manage populations.

1.2. **Capital accumulation by data dispossession**

“…computing and the rise of big data are not only implicated in new ways of living and being in the world, but also generate new ‘industrial’ landscapes of computing where flows of resources (energy and water), the presence (or absence) of connective infrastructure, and economic growth and livelihood provisioning are entangled in highly uneven development processes that collapse urban/rural and social/natural dichotomies” (Pickren, 2018: 238).

**Producing a windfall of highly-valued big data, PA is an ecological modernization and accumulation strategy par excellence**. Users of agricultural tech providers’ technologies and software are generating torrential volumes of data on the food production system and their own consumer preferences and behaviors. Farmers sign user agreements, consenting for their data to be utilized by agritech firms. **Tech providers harvest this data to “inform innovations and direct strategic investment,” accumulating capital and information in the process** (Fraser, 2019: 895). **The data generated is privatized by the agricultural tech providers, protected through intellectual property rights law and users do not own nor are able to control this data** (Rotz et al., 2019a, Carolan, 2017). Like architects of digital infrastructures in other industries, such as social media and online retail, agritech’s “formal indifference and distance from ‘users,’ combined with its current freedom from meaningful regulation, sanction, or law, buffer it and other surveillance capitalists from the consequences of mistrust…the coup des gens introduces substantial new asymmetries of knowledge and power” (Zuboff, 2015: 83).

PA presents an unparalleled opportunity for agritech firms to engage in what some observers have called data grabbing, the dispossession of producers’ quantified and monetized digital information generated in stealth through their use of the technologies (Fraser, 2019). **Discursively framed as a ‘smart’ securitization of food systems affected by anthropogenic climate change, data grabbing for PA can be thought of as an iteration of green grabbing, dispossession in the name of sustainable development** (Fairhead et al, 2012; Stock and Birkenholtz, 2019). **Users of these agricultural technologies lose control of their data by way of agreeing to Byzantine user agreements that legally represent their abdication of privacy** (Thatcher et al., 2016, Rotz et al., 2019a). Firms then construct digital profiles of each user—subjected to algorithmic entanglement and analysis by computational models—and then aggregate user profiles as commodity bundles for sale, grist for the advertising mill (Fraser, 2019). “**In PA, acting, thinking, and doing are themselves subject to commodification via datafication**” (Miles, 2019: 7). Advertisements for new products, related digital content, or upgrades to existing digital software produce yet more data from the original data generated (Fraser, 2020), a lucrative simulacrum of agrarian ‘reality’ (Beaudrillard, 1994).

**New digital technologies are becoming ubiquitous interfaces of social participation within food production systems** (Klerkx et al, 2019). PA is an experiment in corporate social engineering (Bronson and Knezevic, 2019), insofar as the preferences, habits and actions of users are digitally monitored and utilized to influence their behaviors within a food production system (Gardezi and Stock, 2021, Miles, 2019, Carolan, 2019). The repeated use of these technologies engenders a social dependency of users who “get something in return” for their generation of data (Fraser, 2019). These users are influenced by the technologies through targeted advertisements, services and prompts within the platform. Users become subjects of a powerful algorithmic rationality of agriculture (Miles, 2019)—part of an “emergence of social identities that are shaped by the adoption of PA itself” (Gardezi and Bronson, 2019: 16-17)—many of whom internalize the new logics of accumulation and modify their actions to fulfill the policies and ambitions of the agricultural tech providers (Gardezi and Stock, 2021, Fraser, 2019, Carolan, 2019; see Pickren, 2018), a process Foucault calls governmentality (Foucault, 1991). Recent studies in political ecology and cognate disciplines have extended the concept of governmentality to analyze subjectivities within the politics of the environment (see Cavanagh, 2018, Moulton and Popke, 2017, Birkenholtz, 2009). This study reveals that many PA users can exhibit a range of agri-algorithmic subjectivities. The subjectification of users to PA infrastructures (devices and digitalia) is part of a longer genealogy of capital-intensive technological interventions that transform the political economy of food production systems and the livelihoods of producers.

1.3. Back to the future of food: Precision agriculture in the longue durée

“By the year 2050, U.S. growers will need to reach an impressive level of food production to help feed a growing world population. Fewer in number, they will operate multifaceted businesses with stunning new technology to increase efficiency on farms” (Syngenta, 2017a).

Agritech corporations temporally position their technologies as ‘smart’ and ‘innovative’ solutions to future crises of food security (Syngenta, 2017b). Discourses of ecological modernization are reproduced by development agencies that regard PA as “the future of food” (World Bank, 2019). **Yet PA’s future can be situated within a genealogy of capital-intensive accumulation strategies in agriculture**. Miles (2019: 6) provides this useful historicization: “**PA represents to the present what farm management, mechanization, hybridization and artificial inputs represented to the past: a movement to further transform objects (and now activities) into discrete commodities, to extend the reach of capital, and to accumulate entire new geographies of possibility to the market’s logic**.” Industrial agriculture’s ‘digital turn’ claims to provide a nimble socioecological fix to internal contradictions within capitalism that produce distinct crises of ecological degradation through production processes (e.g. climate change), while availing new investment opportunities for overaccumulated capital in the present and far into the future (Ekers and Prudham, 2015, Harvey, 1982). The data harvested now by PA will inform agritech’s research and development efforts for years and decades to come, extending horizons of profitability by enclosing data, software and hardware as intellectual property.

Yet situating PA within a punctuated historicization of agrarian crises is disingenuous, insofar as these historically specific and contingent crises are sustained and temporarily resolved by firms. **Capitalism adapts to long periods of crisis through restructuring the relations of production** (Braudel, 1982). **From this vantage point, it becomes necessary to jettison the misleading ‘agriculture 4.0′ moniker** (Lele and Goswami, 2017). **Accumulation cycles within capitalism’s longue durée transform agrarian spaces** (Arrighi, 1994), **often through technological innovation that seeks to ‘modernize’ production**. Hence, agritech’s assemblage of digital infrastructures must be situated within the ‘long’ Green Revolution (Patel, 2013)—characterized by agricultural innovations (e.g. mechanization, high-yield varieties, chemical inputs, biotechnology, financialization). Within the Green Revolution’s present accumulation cycle in the longue durée of capitalism, PA effectively resuscitates the dominant Borlaugian telos of securing production through securing profit. Further, PA presents a novel problematique of the classic agrarian question, concerned with capitalism’s transformation of the countryside and the role of agriculture in capitalism’s development (Kautsky, 1988, Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010a). **Through PA, agritech can establish new cyberspace frontiers to ensure the further penetration of capital into rural spaces unfettered by temporal limitations, reconfiguring labor arrangements in the process**. “Farm consolidation will drive the need for more outside labor. **Expect high-tech solutions like robotics to come to the rescue**” (Syngenta, 2017a). The circuits of PA capital are rewiring farm work. Although agritech’s future ambitions of labor displacement have been disclosed, the impacts upon and affectations of producers in the present remain unclear. **PA systems add urgency to examinations of the agrarian question of labor, centering the survival strategies and politics of producers in capitalism’s sustained crises and agrarian transformations** (Bernstein, 2004, Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010b, Levien et al., 2018, Stock and Birkenholtz, 2019). This study will explore how the power of agritech capital is operationalized through the surveillance of data grabbed from producers who are threatened with proletarianization by PA.

1.4. Precision agriculture as biopolitics of surveillance capitalism

PA can be situated within a new logic of accumulation based in the commodification of personal data through digital interfaces (Fraser, 2019). **PA is able to penetrate deeper into the personalization of agricultural management by accumulating, surveilling and curating data harvested from farm and farmer at little cost ad infinitum** (Fraser, 2020, Miles, 2019). As opposed to earlier technological interventions within food production systems led mainly by the public sector or philanthropic institutions (Hetherington, 2020, Nally, 2011, McMichael, 2009), **PA is driven by agribusiness corporations** (e.g. John Deere, Monsanto) **assisted by state actors and institutions** (e.g. USDA) **that serve as development brokers of agribusiness capital** (Fraser, 2019, Carolan, 2017; see Levien, 2018). Surveillance of data by agritech enables the sustained regularization of agriculture to corporate interests far into the future. Zuboff (2015: 75) defines surveillance capitalism as a “new form of information capitalism [which] aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control” (see also Zuboff, 2019). **By wielding the ability to commodify the personal data-points** (isolated and aggregated) **from farmers as a means to accumulate capital and influence their behaviors, PA opens a new agrarian frontier for surveillance capitalism**.

**Profitable surveillance through PA en masse represents a seismic shift in the power to manage life itself**. In the context of global environmental change, neoliberal states can exercise biopower on entire populations through agritech firms, “a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations” (Foucault, 1978: 137). Prior to liberal capitalism, a sovereign state wielded the ability to take life and let live for the ostensible vitality of the polity (Machiavelli, 2013). Alternatively, **biopower marks liberal capitalism’s shift to a “make live and let die” calculation that asserts itself to manage population wellbeing through various mechanisms, such as** (inter alia) **statistics, demography, public health infrastructures and development schemes** (Foucault, 2003). Against the backdrop of agrarian transformation in rural Indonesia, Tania Li (2010: 67) argues: “Make live interventions become urgent when people can no longer sustain their own lives through direct access to the means of production, or access to a living wage.”

**PA, an assemblage discursively articulated as a clever gambit against climate-induced future food insecurity, can be seen as a mechanism through which the regulation of life and the management of** (**more-than-human**) **populations is exercised by agritech firms**. Specifically, the neoliberal state erects the statutory architecture necessary for agritech’s capital accumulation by data dispossession. **Regulatory frameworks are congealing but remain out of step with the rapidly advancing PA technologies, much to the chagrin of agritech**: “Many new machines are currently equipped with the electronics to control operations with very little human interaction. However, the legal and regulatory issues surrounding robots must be bridged first” (Syngenta, 2017a). PA is a form of biopolitics through which the neoliberal state enables agritech firms to scientifically manage populations in a food production system—including human producers, companion crops, pests and weeds—as objects to study, improve and protect (Carolan, 2017, Nally, 2011). For an example of biopolitics in agriculture, Hetherington (2020) explores the biopolitical techniques of managing plant health to expand monocrop agriculture in the US and Europe and later exported to the global South during the period of the second Green Revolution (see Jasanoff, 2019).

We assert that the generation and capture of agricultural big data becomes a biopolitical calculation of “make bloom and let wither.” More-than-human populations are entangled with capital-intensive devices of digital agriculture, deployed to “make bloom” certain monoculture crops and “let wither” other plant species (see Bronson 2020**). Further, the biopolitical management of agricultural production systems is unevenly deployed throughout the planet’s agrarian spaces** (Hetherington, 2020, Fraser, 2019). **Research shows that the high cost of many AI-based PA technologies is a known barrier to adoption among farmers** (Gardezi and Bronson, 2019, Reichardt and Jürgens, 2009), **which disproportionately affects smaller operations that are already more vulnerable to financial risk**. Agricultural tech companies develop the software and devices with data selection methods that establish algorithmic biases for largeholding farmers with a ‘productivist’ strategy growing cash crops across vast acreage, enabling novel opportunities for elite capture (Bronson and Knezevic, 2019). The reverse outcome of a biopolitical mechanism designed to “make live by making bloom” unfolds for users disadvantaged by algorithmic biases or intellectual property rights (Carolan, 2017, Bronson and Knezevic, 2019**). Through blocked access or bias, a fate of “let die by letting wither” may transpire because “their [agrarian] labour is surplus in relation to its utility for capital”** (Li, 2010: 68). Ironically, such widespread withering would exacerbate the world’s marginal producers’ vulnerabilities to climate-related food insecurities (Turhan et al, 2015). Controlling our interactions with nature through the uneven subjectification and commodification of life through digital abstraction and valuation becomes an existential imperative to secure the food supply against the crisis of climate change; **PA can maximize capital accumulation and sustain geopolitical power relations in perpetuity through food production systems. Hence, biopower for the biosphere**.

### Supply Chain Solutions Link

#### (AI specific) The plan helps corporations consolidate more power and become less governable – turns the entire aff

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The nature of world production has changed as a result of the widespread adoption of global supply chain solutions. **It has helped corporations to position themselves as constructive citizens; as CSR has increased their authority and legitimacy as governance actors, companies have increasingly been embraced as the solution to problems like modern slavery and ecosystem depletion, rather than the cause of these problems**. **Alongside the explosion of supply chain solutions, multinational corporations have vastly increased their size, market share, and control over the global economy** (Khan, 2017; Petry et al., 2021). Corporations are using this power to shape solutions in their own financial interests – ultimately, becoming richer and even more difficult to govern.

At the same time, **global supply chain solutions are distracting from other key shifts; for instance, fair labour initiatives can distract from changes in the union density of a workforce, commercial dynamics that all but ensure suppliers cannot pay minimum wage, or from outsourcing practices well-documented to introduce forced labour into supply chains**. Thus, notwithstanding the gains that could be made through individual supply chain solutions, there is cause for concern that the ascendance of global supply chain solutions comes with hidden costs relevant to a whole range of issues in IPE, from market volatility and economic instability of financialization and changing patterns of corporate ownership, investment and market speculation (Clapp, 2018, 2019) to the rise of artificial intelligence (Dauvergne, 2020).

By demonstrating that global supply chain solutions come with hidden costs that are often missed, we aim in this special issue to contribute to theoretical and empirical understandings of the limits of dominant forms of supply chain governance. Specifically, **the issue sheds light into where and how the perverse outcome effects of global supply chain solutions occur and why**. **It consolidates evidence that while supply chain solutions may make gains in some issue areas, the net effectiveness of private governance as a solution to resolving the environmental and social risks and problems introduced by a self-regulatory, efficiency-driven model of global production appears to be limited** (Dauvergne, 2020; Le Billon & Spiegel 2021; Ponte, 2020).

**We also highlight the broader changes being spurred in the global production system and across various supply chains through the rise and proliferation of global supply chain solutions**. As mentioned, our literature review finds little cause for optimism that the rise and proliferation of global supply chain solutions is making meaningful progress towards solving problems like global biodiversity loss and labour abuse (Observation 1). **Yet, we see ample evidence that global supply chain solutions are not passively ineffective. Rather**, as the articles by Ponte, Cutler & Lark, Fridell, and Dauvergne all illustrate in different ways, **global production has entered a qualitatively different era as a result of the widespread adoption of private governance. Corporations have gained favour with governments and many NGOs as ‘champion’ citizens leading innovative, voluntary problem-solving CSR projects and initiatives**. Yet, they are ultimately using this new reputational capital and authority to strategically shape rules and solutions in their own favour to guard the business status quo and expand their profitability and control.

Several articles within this special issue underscore and analyse these dynamics. Le Billon & Spiegel provide a rich comparative case analysis of the benefits and micro- and meso-level hidden costs of three types of solutions to eliminate conflict minerals, showing that the benefits legitimate corporate extractive communities while hiding the local costs to poor and marginalised workers. Through an analysis of corporate power and captured value in the global wine and coffee sectors, Ponte shows how the global supply chain ‘solution’ of environmental upgrading results in beneficial profits to large downstream lead firms while pushing the risk and compliance costs onto small upstream producers causing hidden environmental consequences. And Cutler and Lark demonstrate the privatised legal regime that has accompanied and facilitated the rise of global supply chain solutions has given corporations a new arena to exert power and evade public knowledge or scrutiny, through the rise of private arbitration solutions. **In all of these cases, global supply chain solutions are clearly advantageous for business** – advancing corporate power and financial goals. **Yet, their benefits to environment and labour interests are uncertain and in many cases they are compromising**.

The special issue highlights that the rise and proliferation of supply chain solutions is playing an important, yet under-discussed, role in stabilizing, legitimating, and reproducing contemporary capitalism (Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014). In this sense, **it is unsurprising that the actors working to conceal their hidden costs like corporations and consultants are doing so; indeed, many actors doing the ‘hiding’ have vested normative interests in assuaging societal and policymaker concerns while continuing to profit from exploitative business models**. As mentioned, while many global supply chain solutions have done little to nothing to transform labour or environmental practices (see Supplementary Material), they allow consumers, activists, and policymakers to believe they are doing good and that it is possible to live ethically and resolve social and environmental problems through market behaviour and consumerism. While the proliferation of supply chain solutions hasn’t necessarily transformed the dynamics of production premised upon patterns such as poverty wages, gender-based violence, and environmental destruction, it has diverted energy and desires for a better world that in earlier eras of capitalism were targeted into contesting markets and capitalism, and incorporated these into markets themselves.

**Such initiatives have also helped corporations to obtain social and political license to grow and take on a key role as central organizers of global economic activity.** As such, **supply chain solutions have contributed to pioneering new models of value and wealth creation and distribution, which are concentrating wealth in the hands of fewer and more powerful firms and individuals**. **As NGOs and civil society actors have endorsed and legitimized CSR, they have increasingly sought to transform the world with and alongside corporations, instead of by opposing corporations or calling for restrictions on their activities**. The articles within this SI document the role of CSR and supply chain solutions in stabilizing and reproducing particular features of the contemporary global capitalist order, and the complicated role of civil society and NGOs within this.

For instance, **Diprose et al. (2020) provide a strong in-depth empirical account of how multi-stakeholder sustainable mineral solutions in the tin sector play out on the ground in two major tin-producing Indonesian islands**. The article highlights how local conditions shape and explain the benefits and hidden costs of transnational solutions, and the role of stakeholder groups in delivering or undermining global supply chain solutions. In particular, the authors argue the importance of understanding resistance and the hidden costs associated with failure to align solutions with local political economies.

**Dauvergne’s article provides early warning of the hidden costs of a major emerging technological force** – **artificial intelligence (AI)** – **shaping supply chains and sustainability solutions towards business interests within the global political economy**. Drawing on the SI typologies, **the article highlights the importance of understanding the role and interaction of corporate power and the state in the complex relationship of micro firm-level benefits of AI solutions** (e.g. clean energy and material efficiencies) **to larger systemic macro-level hidden costs of AI to unsustainable outcomes** (e.g. increased resource extraction and consumption).

Finally, in addition to describing and analyzing the hidden costs of global supply chain solutions, the contributions provide important analysis about the inequalities hard-wired into supply chains themselves, contributing to longstanding debates within RIPE (cf. Anner, 2020; Selwyn et al., 2020). Fridell’s contribution to this volume documents the dynamics of wealth and value creation associated with the banana supply chain and associated supply chain solutions. Through the compelling case of the astonishingly rapid total collapse of the local banana economy in St. Vincent & the Grenadines, he presents a critical challenge to dominant theoretical lenses used to understand supply chains (Fridell, 2020). **He argues that these systematically overlook some of the same power dynamics that global supply chain solutions and studies of them tend to omit**. The theory, he notes, is overly static and consequently, has an inherent bias towards viewing economic integration as a beneficial solution. The reality, he argues is that there is a dynamic on-the-ground interplay of hidden costs over time that includes exclusion and re-integration and that are borne by local communities and governments not global companies.

#### Supply chain “solutions” are false, rely on creating new forms of modern and child slavery, displace labor globally, and re-entrench legacies of colonialism and racism – don’t buy their “we solve those!” framing, it’s the same logic (multinational corporations) MNC’s use to gather profits while divesting the Global South in the name of “ethics”

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In this article, and indeed, in the special issue of Review of International Political Economy (RIPE) that we introduce within it, **we contend that the prevailing optimism surrounding global supply chain solutions is demonstrably unwarranted**. First, there is sparse and highly uneven evidence confirming the effectiveness of such solutions in tackling social and environmental problems. **But even more importantly, the dissection of the governance of the global economy into disjointed, privately run, largely unenforceable supply chain-based solutions in fact, generates deeper costs: namely, the hidden cost that ‘solutions’ are entrenching rather than transforming the underlying drivers of labour and environmental problems and skewing perceptions of those problems and the progress being made (or not) towards solving them**. **The consequence is assured governance failure as the very dynamics worsening labour and environmental problems over the past several decades deepen, not only unhindered by the explosion of supply chain solutions, but actually enabled through them**.

**The hidden costs of global supply chain solutions to workers, communities and the planet** (and to achieving truly effective governance mechanisms for their protection and welfare) **are a** ~~blind~~ **spot [of ignorance] for large swathes of scholarship on supply chain governance**. Often, these lie beyond the scope conditions of individual studies, or are obscured by the metrics used to assess progress, which tend to mirror measures of effectiveness defined within the solutions themselves. While no doubt, not every study can be about everything at the same time, the consistent neglect of hidden costs within the literature dedicated to global supply chain solutions is important for both analytic and normative reasons. The contributions to this RIPE special issue highlight the need to integrate investigations of hidden costs and to widen the lens to so as to bring into view the dark sides of the rise and reliance on supply chain solutions more broadly as the key tool for governing the global production system.

We argue that **the rise of global supply chain solutions has been accompanied by three key types of hidden cost. First, individual supply chain solutions come with hidden costs that play out from the micro-level of individual companies and CSR initiatives. High-paid consultants and NGOs develop solutions to address problems like child labour or chemical waste in supply chains** – usually of one company, region or sector – **and then enforce them using private tools like ethical audits** (Auld, 2014; Fransen, 2012; Fransen & Burgoon, 2012). Social auditors and NGOs commissioned by companies write reports extoling the progress and benefits of projects and programs, citing improvement across key performance indicators and metrics. But these activities can serve to distract from the root cause drivers, such as the high volume-low-cost business model, and can displace problems beyond the scope of individual solutions. **For instance, ethical auditing can have the unintended consequence of reinforcing status quo commercial dynamics, while driving new problems, such as pushing child or forced labour deeper into the subtiers of global supply chains or prompting suppliers to lay off workers as they seek to recover the costs of expensive environmental certification** (LeBaron et al., 2017; LeBaron & Lister, 2015). Indeed, **supply chain solutions can lead to improvements across one set of indicators but spur new problems beyond the bounds of that initiative or set of metrics; for instance, an initiative to eliminate child labour from cocoa production can inadvertently increase it in artisanal mining, and environmental initiatives can carry adverse social consequences and vice versa**.

Second, **global supply chain solutions come with underlying hidden costs at the institutional meso-level**. As multi-national corporations (MNCs) – and the NGOs, consultants, development finance institutions, international organisation bodies, and others paid to help them as implementation partners – come together to tackle challenges, these efforts may come with unacknowledged costs and unintended consequences for certain stakeholders, municipalities and states, and populations, reinforcing problems and crowding out potentially stronger direct regulatory enforcement. **For instance, with the support of the World Bank, a large corporation might divest itself of plantations where labour abuse is a known problem, championing the creation of a new sustainable ‘worker-shareholder’ model, as Tata Group did through the International Finance Corporation’s equity investment of $7.8 million in Assam’s tea sector a decade ago. Yet, while the World Bank and tea companies at the top of supply chains extoll the benefits, opportunities, and better lives enjoyed by tea communities as a result of this project, workers and unions contend this ‘solution’ has inadvertently stabilised and enabled business models configured around forced labour, coerced vulnerable and impoverished workers into buying shares without proper information about the risks of investment, and reinforced a highly unequal development model grounded in colonialism and racism** (LeBaron, 2018, 2020; see also Ponte, 2008). **Other examples of meso-level hidden costs include that industry-wide CSR programs may: facilitate the erosion of state-based labour or environmental inspection or support for state action** (Bartley, 2018; Amengual & Bartley, forthcoming); **chip away at state sovereignty** (Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Vandergeest & Unno, 2012); **diminish public pressure for regulating firm behaviour abroad** (Kolcava et al., 2021); **hollow out support for public assistance and welfare provisioning** (Burgoon & Fransen, 2017); **and ‘managerialize’ law enforcement such that ineffective symbolic structures become associated with legal compliance** (Monciardini et al., 2021). This regulatory ‘crowding out’ is often fuelled by governments, who enable and at times even directly fund supply chain solutions, as they’ve whittled away their own environmental and social standards regulation and enforcement capacities and channel resources into voluntary market-based forms of regulation.

Finally, and most importantly, **global supply chain solutions generate macrolevel hidden costs. Namely, that global supply chain solutions fuel the systemic problems they purport to correct by stabilizing, distracting from, and leaving unchallenged dynamics that are driving environmental and social damage in the first place**. For instance, they charge corporate power and growth, reinforce a regulatory paradigm that privileges the interests of business and the wealthy, and stabilize the offshoring and outsourcing business models of contemporary capitalism (Milberg & Winkler, 2013; Peck, 2017; Soederberg, 2010; Urry, 2014). As corporations, NGOs and IOs proliferate solutions at the micro and meso-levels that are carefully designed not to disrupt the status quo of business models and supply chains (whose commercial dynamics are hard-wired to take advantage of social and environmental ‘externalities’), supply chain solutions are actually entrenching and enabling systemic drivers. For instance, eco- solutions enhance the rising power of big business and its capacity to destroy the planet (Dauvergne, 2016, 2018) while MSIs to address food security fuel perceptions that brand companies control conditions within agricultural supply chains, while distracting from the power actually accruing to financial actors to pry open new arenas for accumulation (Clapp & Isakson, 2018). Although the proliferation of supply chain solutions gives consumers, the public, and policymakers the impression that social and environmental problems are being addressed, more often than not, supply chain solutions reinforce and legitimise rather than challenge corporations. As such, they are empowering the very actors perpetrating large swathes of social and environmental damage.

As we discuss further below **in relation to our review of 290 studies of the effectiveness of global supply chain solutions, these solutions often fall short even on their own terms because they almost never press upon the features of supply chains that are well-documented to trigger adverse consequences for environments, workers, and local communities**. For instance, they do little to challenge low retail prices made possible by MNCs sourcing below the costs of production, which make it impossible for suppliers to pay their workers minimum wage (Anner, 2020; Vaughan-Whitehead & Caro, 2017). **Nor, do these ‘solutions’ address power imbalances between MNCs and their suppliers, which leave producers little scope to negotiate the commercial conditions they need to meet social and environmental standards** (Bartley, 2018; Fridell, 2007; LeBaron, 2020). They certainly do not disrupt the trend of corporate consolidation and monopolisation that continually lowers the floor for labour and environmental standards across entire sectors (Clapp, 2019; Khan, 2017). And only rarely do they meaningfully challenge the forms of gender oppression and gender-based violence that are used to subsidize profits (Barrientos, 2019; Dunaway, 2014) or ongoing colonial-era power relations of extractivism that bolster bottom lines across several industries (Banerjee, 2008; Bhambra, 2021). Indeed, **global supply chain solutions almost never tackle the root causes of social and environmental problems, such as: the mass production, consumption, and disposal of cheap and low-quality goods; the shareholder primacy model** (which puts pressure on businesses to produce short-term gains for shareholders); **or even basic commercial dynamics like discount pricing and outsourcing** (Murcia et al., 2021).

**Our argument is not that supply chain solutions are completely ineffective**. Indeed, as our literature review below makes clear, **some supply chain solutions have yielded incremental successes and positive improvements. Rather, our point is that these small successes can conceal and distract from the much larger costs and trade-offs taking place at different scales, which in turn become harder to analyse and measure amidst the proliferation of solutions**. For instance, the ethical audit regime is facilitating corporate obfuscation of bad practices (LeBaron & Lister, 2015), fair trade certification is misleading consumers about the prevalence and nature of forced labour (LeBaron, 2020), and corporate worker feedback technologies are facilitating corporate obfuscation of worker abuse and exploitation, while creating the impression amongst policymakers and consumers that illegal practices are being addressed (Rende Taylor & Shih, 2019). Indeed, **while some supply chain solutions are yielding incremental successes, these do not cancel out the costs; however, this fragmented mode and flurry of governance efforts makes it challenging for scholars, consumers, and policymakers to see the full picture**.

By discussing hidden costs, we do not mean to suggest that global environmental impacts and labour abuses – or the forms of global production, corporate and market regulation, and inequality that give rise to them – are completely invisible or unanticipated. Critical and international political economy (IPE) scholarship has a well-developed literature probing the harms and dangers of corporate-led governance (Clapp, 1998; Cutler et al., 1999; Hatanaka & Busch, 2008; Mayer et al., 2017; Soederberg, 2010), much of which has been published in previous issues of RIPE. **However, the insights of this literature have been largely overlooked within the vast body of scholarship focused on studying global value chains and the effectiveness of global supply chain solutions; these literatures often overlook costs and focus narrowly on technical questions, including evaluations of effectiveness that measure against the stated aims and objectives of supply chain solutions and take these at face value**. Indeed, there is an entire interdisciplinary literature (anchored in business and management studies and also encompassing research within the disciplines of political science, management and business studies, geography, sociology, anthropology, development studies, amongst others) dedicated to understanding the effectiveness of global supply chain solutions, which has been largely siloed from scholarship in IPE. The literature on global value, commodity, and supply chains (cf. Bair, 2008; Gereffi et al., 2005; Selwyn, 2019) that sits loosely within IPE is often insular, focused on dynamics within firms and intrinsic to supply chains and overlooking the broader structural and big-picture political economy dynamics, including IPE debates about capitalism, corporate power and the governance of these, and the role of supply chain solutions within such dynamics.

In this article and special issue, we provide a bridge between supply chain scholarship and broader IPE literatures, such as on: wealth creation, corporate ownership, and power (Babic et al., 2017; Clapp, 2018, 2019; Heemskerk & Takes, 2016; Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017; Strange, 1996); financialization and the failure of corporate governance (Admati, 2017); NGOs and their role in either propping up or disrupting neoliberal economic policies and capitalism (Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014; Kamat, 2004); legitimacy and authority in non-state governance (Bernstein, 2011; Brassett & Tsingou, 2011; Cutler, 2003; Keohane, 2011; Strange, 1996); and expertise, and its impact on processes of policy change (Hay, 2008; Hearson, 2018). Our intuition is that global supply chain solutions are playing a far more significant and constitutive role in shaping the corporate-led global economy than is typically realised, and that it is therefore an area that could benefit from research by IPE scholars who haven’t researched CSR or supply chain solutions in the past.

Drawing on the critical and international political economy insights, we analyse scholarship on the effectiveness of global supply chain solutions and explain how the contributions to this SI take both forward. As we describe in greater detail below, to this end, **we conducted a literature review in which we analysed and coded 290 academic journal articles that provide evidence about the effectiveness of supply chain solutions in relation to social and environmental problems. We found that across this literature, scholarship tends to approach supply chain solutions at face value, rarely analysing the broader dynamics or consequences associated with their rise**. Yet, as this special issue and introduction point out, when global supply chain solutions are studied in technocratic ways with narrow measures of effectiveness, the full costs of supply chain solutions – to the public good, to workers and to the planet – tend to be hidden and obscured.

## Framework

### 2NC – Framework

#### Capitalism’s chief weapon is constraint on political imagination---you should invert your standard for alternative solvency and prioritize anti-capitalist struggle even if it seems inconceivable.

McCarraher '19 [Eugene; 11/12/19; Associate Professor of Humanities at Villanova University, PhD in US Cultural and Intellectual History from Rutgers University; The Enchantments of Mammon: How Capitalism Became the Religion of Modernity, p. 15-18]

Words such as “paradise” or “love” or “communion” are certainly absent from our political vernacular, excluded on account of their “utopian” connotations or their lack of steely-eyed “realism.” Although this is a book about the past, I have always kept before me its larger contemporary religious, philosophical, and political implications. The book should make these clear enough; I will only say here that one of my broader intentions is to challenge the canons of “realism,” especially as defined in the “science” of economics. As the master science of desire in advanced capitalist nations, economics and its acolytes define the parameters of our moral and political imaginations, patrolling the boundaries of possibility and censoring any more generous conception of human affairs. Under the regime of neoliberalism, it has been the chief weapon in the arsenal of what David Graeber has characterized as “a war on the imagination,” a relentless assault on our capacity to envision an end to the despotism of money.24 Insistent, in Margaret Thatcher’s ominous ukase, that “there is no alternative” to capitalism, our corporate plutocracy has been busy imposing its own beatific vision on the world: the empire of capital, with an imperial aristocracy enriched by the labor of a fearful, overburdened, and cheerfully servile population of human resources. Every avenue of escape from accumulation and wage servitude must be closed, or better yet, rendered inconceivable; any map of the world that includes utopia must be burned before it can be glanced at. Better to follow Miller’s wisdom: we already inhabit paradise, and we can never make ourselves fit to live in it if we obey the avaricious and punitive sophistry professed in the dismal pseudoscience.

The grotesque ontology of scarcity and money, the tawdry humanism of acquisitiveness and conflict, the reduction of rationality to the mercenary principles of pecuniary reason—this ensemble of falsehoods that comprise the foundation of economics must be resisted and supplanted. Economics must be challenged, not only as a sanction for injustice but also as a specious portrayal of human beings and a fictional account of their history. As a legion of anthropologists and historians have repeatedly demonstrated, economics, in Graeber’s forthright dismissal, has “little to do with anything we observe when we examine how economic life is actually conducted.” From its historically illiterate “myth of barter” to its shabby and degrading claims about human nature, economics is not just a dismal but a fundamentally fraudulent science as well, akin, as Ruskin wrote in Unto This Last, to “alchemy, astrology, witchcraft, and other such popular creeds.”25

Ruskin’s courageous and bracing indictment of economics arose from his Romantic imagination, and this book partakes unashamedly of his sacramental Romanticism. “Imagination” was, to the Romantics, primarily a form of vision, a mode of realism, an insight into the nature of reality that was irreducible to, but not contradictory of, the knowledge provided by scientific investigation. Romantic social criticism did not claim the imprimatur of science as did Marxism and other modern social theories, yet the Romantic lineage of opposition to “disenchantment” and capitalism has proved to be more resilient and humane than Marxism, “progressivism,” or social democracy. Indeed, it is more urgently relevant to a world hurtling ever faster to barbarism and ecological calamity. I wrote this book in part out of a belief that many on the “left” continue to share far too much with their antagonists: an ideology of “progress” defined as unlimited economic growth and technological development, as well as an acceptance of the myth of disenchantment that underwrites the pursuit of such expansion. The Romantic antipathy to capitalism, mechanization, and disenchantment stemmed not from a facile and nostalgic desire to return to the past, but from a view that much of what passed for “progress” was in fact inimical to human flourishing: a specious productivity that required the acceptance of venality, injustice, and despoliation; a technological and organizational efficiency that entailed the industrialization of human beings; and the primacy of the production of goods over the cultivation and nurturance of men and women. This train of iniquities followed inevitably from the chauvinism of what William Blake called “single vision,” a blindness to the enormity of reality that led to a “Babylon builded in the waste.”26

Romantics redefined rather than rejected “realism” and “progress,” drawing on the premodern customs and traditions of peasants, artisans, and artists: craftsmanship, mutual aid, and a conception of property that harkened back to the medieval practices of “the commons.” Whether they believed in some traditional form of religion or translated it into secular idioms of enchantment, such as “art” or “beauty” or “organism,” Romantic anticapitalists tended to favor direct workers’ control of production; the restoration of a human scale in technics and social relations; a sensitivity to the natural world that precluded its reduction to mere instrumental value; and an apotheosis of pleasure in making sometimes referred to as poesis, a union of reason, imagination, and creativity, an ideal of labor as a poetry of everyday life, and a form of human divinity. In work free of alienation and toil, we receive “the reward of creation,” as William Morris described it through a character in News from Nowhere (1890), “the wages that God gets, as people might have said time agone.”27

Rendered gaudy and impoverished by the tyranny of economics and the enchantment of neoliberal capitalism, our sensibilities need replenishment from the sacramental imagination. As Americans begin to experience the initial stages of imperial sclerosis and decline, and as the advanced capitalist world in general discovers the reality of ecological limits, we may find in what Marx called the “prehistory” of our species a perennial and redemptive wisdom. We will not be saved by our money, our weapons, or our technological virtuosity; we might be rescued by the joyful and unprofitable pursuits of love, beauty, and contemplation. No doubt this will all seem foolish to the shamans and magicians of pecuniary enchantment. But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of on Wall Street or in Silicon Valley.

### 2NC – Ethics First

#### Their argument begins from an ideological bias that brackets out capitalism’s exploitation of the periphery – traditional impact calculus can’t take this into account, ethics must come first

Slavoj **Zizek and** Glyn **Daly**, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, 200**4**, Conversations With Zizek, p. 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture — with all its pieties con¬cerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette — Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor¬bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibi¬tion conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is mag¬nified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differ¬ential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sus¬tained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par¬ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

## Impacts

### 2NC – Impact – Extinction

#### Global capitalism is unsustainable, militating towards extinction.

Martin '18 [Glen; 9/8/18; President of the World Constitution and Parliament Association, founder of the Radford University program in Peace Studies, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Radford University in Virginia, PhD in Philosophy from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York; "Human Beings Face Extinction: We Need to Act Now," <https://dwfed.org/2018/09/human-beings-face-extinction-we-need-to-act-now>]

The global climate is unraveling at rates far beyond the predictions of scientists. The studies are so common by this date, and the scientific evidence so pervasive going back at least half a century, that there is no need to cite sources about this fact. The oceans are dying, the fisheries are becoming exhausted. The forests are dying. They are devastated through human overuse, logging, wildfires, acid rain, and rapidly changing climate conditions.

Agricultural lands are drying up and losing productivity, the land, water, and air are polluted. Artificial human-made chemical compounds are found in the tissues of every living creature on Earth, with unknown synergistic effects. The oceans are rising, displacing millions of coastal dwellers and submerging prime agricultural lands.

The habitats for animals and life in general are disappearing, and many species go extinct daily. The polar caps are melting, irrevocably altering the planet’s climate. Rainfall is irregular, with periodic droughts alternating with devastating floods. ….

At the same time, the global human population unsustainability continues to increase. … …Noam Chomsky declares: “Survival of Organized Human Life Is at Risk Due to Climate Change and Nuclear Weapons.”

UN CHARTER’S UNTOUCHABLE SACRED COW PREVENTS GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

Meanwhile, the nations of the world focus on “sovereignty,” militarism, national independence, trade wars, and unsustainable capitalist development. “Sovereign independence” is written into the UN charter in multiple ways and continues to function as an untouchable sacred cow, preventing the development of global citizenship everywhere on Earth. Each nation inculcates loyalty into its citizens and criminalizes any non-government sponsored relationships with foreign officials, which they label “disloyalty” and “treason.” Trillions of dollars are poured down the toilet of militarism that are needed to protect and restore the planetary environment.

FEW PEOPLE SEEM TO CARE

Nuclear weapons are refined and made “combat ready,” and countries like North Korea correctly understand that without the nuclear deterrent, they would suffer the same destruction as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. For the imperial system led by the U.S. and its NATO allies continues to work for a global hegemony to counter the growing influence of Russia and China, politically and economically, without concern for human rights, dignity, or the welfare and livelihood of many millions who appear of less worthiness to live because they are “not us.” Books such as Nuclear Madness by Helen Caldicott or The Doomsday Machine by Daniel Ellsberg regularly appear detailing the many times that the near use of these weapons has brought humanity close to extinction, but few seem to care. Our fragmentation, hate, fear, and need for “enemies” is so much greater than our desire for a future for our children or the planet.

SHOCK ALERT: IT’S A WAR SYSTEM, STUPID!

Our planetary system is inherently a war system requiring enemies and producing vast profits for the industries that supply and encourage this system. As climate and military disasters around the world increase so do the profits of the system of “disaster capitalism” described by Naomi Klein in her 2007 book The Shock Doctrine the Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Meanwhile the big banks and masters of the global monetary systems continue to dominate unsustainable global economics, running the world as a debt system from which they derive not only vast profits but vast political power, as Ellen Brown showed in detail in her 2007 book The Web of Debt.

IS THE RULING CLASS “INSANE” OR SIMPLY CRIMINAL?

A Google search reveals a number of articles by different authors who have declared that the ruling class is “insane.” Indeed, if bringing the entire planet to ruin in the service of ones personal greed for wealth and power is insane, then this label is appropriate, although I prefer the term “criminal,” since the majority of the ruling class of the world are simply criminals who control the mass media, the politicians, and the UN in the service of their criminal enterprises that are bringing humankind to extinction.

In the US, the majority of both Democrats and Republicans in the Washington, DC, government are criminals in this sense, serving both themselves and the ruling class. Many so-called liberals in the US are working to remove Trump as President, and to “take back our country.” But the truth is they never had “their country.” The ruling class has always had it, and human extinction advanced perhaps just as rapidly under Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, or Barack Obama. The mass media, the war system, and the “sovereign nation” propaganda keep the people of the US asleep no matter who is president. Whomever fills that office can do little because the system itself defeats rationality, recognition of our common planetary humanity, and the changes necessary for survival.

REFUSING TO BECOME WORLD CITIZENS IS A DEATH SENTENCE

Trump is a symptom and not a cause. People refuse to actualize what Karl Marx called our species-being. They refuse to become world citizens in any real sense of this word. They cling to their sovereign borders and delude themselves that somehow extinction can be avoided if the peoples of some 193 different, militarized sovereign nations all care about the environment, recycle, and “dispose” of the trash properly. Rather than living in what I call a “boundary-less world,” they insist on their puerile boundaries and identities, even as this exacerbates the rush to total climate collapse and human extinction. To cling to a tiny, exclusive identity that divides one from others who are “not me” becomes more important than the survival of the human race.

MASS MEDIA A MAIN SOURCE FOR IMMATURE IDEOLOGIES

It has often been pointed out that the mass media keep ordinary people distracted, immature, and unable to think clearly. The mass media are designed for this purpose. For more sophisticated ordinary people, there are sources like the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, which frame the immature ideologies in a more erudite manner to satisfy the egoism of the “educated” middle classes. But the entire world system is immature and structurally inculcates immaturity into the peoples of Earth.

MISGUIDED LOYALTIES TO OUTDATED SYSTEMS

The system of sovereign nation-states is nearly four centuries old, often said to have begun formally at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, developed at a time when people were riding horses and fighting with swords. The system of capitalism is just as old, developed at a time when the Earth seemed to have inexhaustible resources, was able to receive unlimited wastes from human industries, and the population of the world was a fraction of what it is today. These systems structurally condition people into loyalty to their puerile national identities and into a capitalism that has no concern for the environment or human dignity, but only for egoistically pursued private profit. “Freedom” becomes promoting egoistic self-interest regardless of the social or environmental consequences.

### 2NC – Impact – War (General)

#### Global reach of West has resulted in the appearance of interimperial and total warfare which defines the modern era

Dina Gusejnova ’18, is Lecturer in Modern History at the University of Sheffeld, “1 Introduction”, Cosmopolitanism in Conflict, Palgrave McMillian, 2018, accessed via PDF – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

The first type of context within which we place the rise of global consciousness and a cosmopolitan agenda is that of war. The ideas of Emer de Vattel and even of Carl von Clausewitz may not seem as far removed from those of Immanuel Kant as the twenty-first century theorists of cosmopolitanism would have it, especially considering, as Reinhart Koselleck had once remarked, that Kant’s Perpetual Peace was in fact an echo of the Treaty of Basel (1795), one of several separate peace treaties signed during the French Revolutionary Wars.24 From the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years’ War and the War of American Independence in the eighteenth century, to the Napoleonic and later the extraEuropean colonial wars in the nineteenth, followed by the two World Wars and the Cold War in the twentieth century, each moment in the intellectual development of cosmopolitan thought can be linked to a series of increasingly global conflicts which also had profound repercussions for the political imagination. **The Seven Years’ War marks the conceptual start of the volume because this conflict had made clear that European interimperial conflicts could no longer be viewed from one or two sides, as confrontations between national realms, but demanded a global perspective both from their participants, and from subsequent interpreters**. What initially was a conflict between Britain and France escalated into a war of global proportions in which previous loyalties were caught in the vortex of two international coalitions involving most of the great powers, with Prussia on the British and Austria, Russia and Spain on the French side, and reaching colonies and dominions from Bengal to Quebec. **The new realities of interimperial conflict were a product of global colonial interests, along with a rise in regional aspirations to sovereignty**. In the twentieth century, concepts of warfare took the form of ‘total war’ in the age of Goebbels. **While new forms of warfare made the separation between military and civilian combatants and targets less significant, the Cold War challenged the very distinction between wartime and peacetime through a growing expansion of conflict into the sphere of culture, or** what Joseph Nye has termed ‘**soft power**’.25 ‘The connection between cosmopolitanism and war, we may be tempted to think, is merely sequential,’ Stephen Conway (Chap. 1) points out in his contribution on transnational aspects of eighteenthcentury European warfare. But looking at the practices of conducting war and peace in the War of the Spanish (1702–1713), Polish (1733–1738), Austrian (1740–1748) and Bavarian (1778–1779) succession, and the Napoleonic wars, his chapter shows how cosmopolitan ideas not only could, but did arise from within these incidents in the form of social practices, changes in etiquette and reflections on solidarity. The **increasingly global deployment of military officers and mercenaries, which became prominent in eighteenth-century European wars, changed the relationship of people to places, as well as stretching the boundaries between ‘reason of state’ arguments and imperialist expansion.**26 At the same time, growing commercial connections and information networks increasingly invited societies to think of global aspirations as a social reality rather than as a utopian aspiration, even though these connections remained unevenly spread across the globe.27 Four areas are examined: first, the alliance systems that brought different governments and armed forces into cooperation; second, the supply and finance of armies and navies, which often relied on complex transnational networks; third, the composition of supposedly national armies; and finally the legal framework that sought to define the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in war and the values that underpinned its conduct. In this new light, the cosmopolitan dimensions of war can be uncovered, focusing on sympathy for the sufferings of others—outside one’s own local, national or ethnic community—among those engaged in the fighting.

#### Capitalism is the root cause of war.

Hathaway '15 [William; 3/4/15; adjunct professor of American studies at the University of Oldenburg in Germany; "The root cause of war is oligarchic capitalism," https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/root-cause-war-oligarchic-capitalism/]

Capitalism is always at war. The violence, though, is often abstract: forcing us either to accept low-paying, exhausting jobs or starve; denying us adequate healthcare, education and economic security; convincing us that human beings are basically isolated, autonomous units seeking self gratification. But when this doesn't suffice to keep their profits growing, the violence becomes physical, the cannons roar, and the elite rallies us to war to defend "our" country and destroy the fiendish enemy. Motivating us to kill and die for them requires a massive propaganda campaign - America is under attack! - which we confront whenever we turn on their media.

Why do they do this? Are they monsters?

No, they're not. They're just human beings serving an inhuman system. Capitalism is inherently predatory. It demands aggressive growth. It either dominates or goes under. This drive for domination is the root cause of war, and until we eliminate it, we're going to continue killing one another. Eliminating it requires a global struggle to bring down oligarchic capitalism and replace it with democratic socialism. Political democracy must be expanded and extended into the economic sphere. We, the people of the world, have to take control of the forces that shape our lives. This is the basis for building a society in which we can all fully develop as human beings. Once we achieve this, we'll have a real chance at lasting peace.

#### Global conditions from disintegrating capitalism make global war inevitable.

Ahmed '19 [Nafeez; 2/22/19; Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, MA in Contemporary War & Peace Studies and PhD in International Relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University; "The “Disintegration” of Global Capitalism Could Unleash World War 3, Warns Top EU Economist," https://www.resilience.org/stories/2019-02-22/the-disintegration-of-global-capitalism-could-unleash-world-war-3-warns-top-eu-economist//]

In his new paper, Hanappi concludes that global conditions bear unnerving parallels with trends before the outbreak of the first and second world wars.

Key red flags that the world is on a slippery slope to a global war, he finds, include:

the inexorable growth of military spending;

democracies transitioning into increasingly authoritarian police states;

heightening geopolitical tensions between great powers;

the resurgence of populism across the left and right;

the breakdown and weakening of established global institutions that govern transnational capitalism;

and the relentless widening of global inequalities.

These trends, some of which were visible before the previous world wars, are reappearing in new forms. Hanappi argues that the defining feature of the current period is a transition from an older form of “integrating capitalism” to a new form of “disintegrating capitalism”, whose features most clearly emerged after the 2008 financial crisis.

For most of the twentieth century, he says, global capitalism was on an “integrating” pathway toward higher concentrations of transnational wealth. This was interrupted by the outbreaks of violent nationalism involving the two world wars. After that, a new form of “integrated capitalism” emerged based on an institutional framework that has allowed industrialised countries to avoid a world war for 70 years.

This system is now entering a period of disintegration. Previously, fractures within the system between rich and poor were overcome “by distributing a bit of the gains of the tremendous increase of the fruits of the global division of labour to the richer working classes in these nations.” Similarly, international tensions were diffused through transnational governance frameworks and agreements for the regulation of capitalism.

But since the 2008 financial crisis, wealth distribution has worsened, with purchasing power for the middle and working classes declining as wealth becomes even more greatly concentrated.

Growth in the Western centres of transnational capital has slowed, while formerly sacrosanct international trade agreements are being torn to shreds. This has fuelled a reversion to nationalism in which global and transnational structures have been rejected, and ‘foreigners’ have been demonised. As global capital thus continues to disintegrate, these pressures escalate, particularly as its internal justification depends increasingly on intensifying competition with external rivals.

While integrated capitalism depended on a transnational institutional framework that permitted “stable exploitation on a national level”, Hanappi argues that “disintegrating capitalism” sees this framework become disaggregated between the USA, Europe, Russia and China, each of which pursues new forms of hierarchical subordination of workers.

Disintegrating capitalism, he explains, will resort increasingly to “direct coercive powers supplemented by new information technologies” to suppress internal tensions, as well as a greater propensity for international hostilities: “The new authoritarian empires need confrontation with each other to justify their own internal, inflexible command structure.”

Great power conflict

Hanappi explores three potential scenarios for how a new global conflict could unfold. In his first scenario, he explores the prospect of a war between the three most prominent military powers: the US, Russia and China.

All three have experienced large increases in military spending since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite a dip for the US since 2011, President Trump has ushered in a new spike, while Russian spending has plateaued and Chinese expenditures are rapidly increasing. All three countries have also experienced an authoritarian turn.

Drawing on game theory, Hanappi argues that the calculus that none of these countries would be capable of ‘winning’ a world war may be changing in the perceptions of the leaderships of these countries. By one estimate, China has the highest probability of survival at 52 per cent, followed by the US at 30 per cent, and Russia at 18 per cent. This calculus suggests that of all the three powers, China might be the most inclined to escalate direct hostile military activities that challenge its rivals if it perceives a direct threat to what it sees as its legitimate interests.

The US and Russia in contrast might transfer the focus of their military activities on more covert, indirect and proxy mechanisms. In the US case, Hanappi points out:

“… the military strategy of Trump seems to include the possibility to delegate part of local operational responsibility to close vassals, which receive massive weapon support from the US, e.g. Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Middle East. Turkey, one of the strongest NATO branches in the area is a special case. It seems to have been allowed to destroy an emergent state of the Kurdish population, which would have been closer to the European style of governance.”

There are growing signs of heightened great power tensions which could erupt entirely by accident or unanticipated provocation into a global conflict that nobody wants.

The US-China trade war is escalating, while both powers tussle over technology secrets and argue over China’s growing military footprint in the South China Sea. Meanwhile Trump’s massive expansion of the US Navy and Air Force point to preparations for a major potential conflict with either China or Russsia.

Both the US and Russia have jettisoned a critical nuclear treaty established since the Cold War opening the way to a nuclear arms race. North Korea remains unrepentant about its ongoing nuclear weapons programme while Trump’s tearing up of the nuclear agreement with Iran disincentivises that country from complying with disarmament and reporting terms.

Early last year, a statistical study of the frequency of major wars in human history found that the so-called 70 years of ‘long peace’ is simply not an unusual phenomenon indicating an unprecedented period of peace. The study concluded that there was no reason to believe that the 70 year period so far would not give way to another major war.

Small wars, global contagion

Hanappi’s second scenario explores the prospect of a series of “small civil wars in many countries”. The ingredients for such a scenario are rooted in the resurgence of both right-wing and left-wing populism. “Both variants — sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly — refer to a past historical national state form that they propose to return to,” explains Hanappi.

While right-wing populism harks back to the authoritarian, racist regimes established in Germany and Italy in the 1930s, left-wing populism yearns to return to the model of “integrated capitalism” that was in place during the first three decades after the Second World War, and which reacted to the unequalising effects of capitalism through the ‘social net’ of the so-called ‘welfare state’ as well as various forms of state intervention in the economy alongside private industry.

But the challenge is that “integrated capitalism” is already engulfed with its own internal contradictions, propelling the shift toward disintegration.

This puts left-wing populism in a systematically weaker position, as right-wing populism can point to the multiple failures of “integrated capitalism”: the failure to “overcome class antagonisms”, and the failure to “fulfil the promise of a substantially better life for the majority of people.” According to Hanappi:

“The representatives of Integrated Capitalism are discredited and cannot act as leaders, the movement therefore is forced to experiment with new forms of national organization. More participatory forms of democratic organization take more time, and with multiple social groups involved this weakens this movements strength vis-à-vis right-wing populism. Furthermore, its vision of an improved national Integrated Capitalism is handicapped by the fact that many people still remember its failures, while the song of national glory that right-wing populism sings refers to an imagined far-away past that no one ever had seen.”

In this context, he argues, the potential exists for outbreaks of national civil war between emerging paramilitary branches of right-wing and left-wing populist movements, in the context of either movement adopting state power and coming into conflict with the opposition.

Hanappi warns of the possibility of a regional or global “contagion” effect, if these breakdowns occur within a similar time-scale. In that scenario:

“The fluid mobility of national ideological political entrepreneurs, the creators of populist movements, meets the rigidity of dire global economic constraints. This is the crash that provokes local wars.”

This scenario is also backed by statistical data. In 2016, a study by Lloyds Insurers found that since 1960 there has been an increasing frequency in “pandemics” of “political violence contagion” involving regional and transnational outbreaks of civil unrest within and among states.

The report said that social protest and dissent against government policies of militarism abroad and neoliberal austerity at home could act as potential precursors to “contagions” of violence, along with other risk factors, including “an increase in the share of internet users”, greater urban concentration, increases in infant mortality, and a growing young population.

Global insurgency of the poor

Hanappi’s third scenario parallels the Lloyds study’s finding that in coming years, the world is likely to face a series of “super strain pandemics” in the form of “anti-imperialist” and “independence movements”, “mass pro-reform protests against national government”, and “armed insurrection” or “insurgency” associated with two particular ideologies, “Marxism” and “Islamism.”

According to Hanappi, the plausibility of this scenario can be found in the “profoundly divergent trajectories of welfare of poor parts and rich parts of the world economy.”

While GDP has continued to grow overall, in the last three decades income and wealth inequalities within almost every country have widened, and look set to sharpen further. If this cycle continues, a coalescence of grievances among the poorest three billion, spurred on by the interconnectivity of communications in the smartphone era, is plausible.

Hanappi argues that in reality, global conditions make a combination of these three scenarios more likely than just one of them.

#### Capitalism is literally the root cause of all warfare – multiple empirical developments prove – only embracing the alt is able to create a party strong enough to push out capitalist organizing

Adams ’02 – is the coordinator of the Culture of Peace News Network. He retired in 2001 from UNESCO where he was the Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, proclaimed for the Year 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly (Dr. David, “THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENTS CHAPTER 8: THE ROOT CAUSES OF WAR”, pgs 23-25, http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-23.html)

American intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression. In 1914 and 1915, as war between the European imperialist powers broke out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. **One industrial market was expanding**, however, **the market for weapons in Europe**. The historian Charles **Tansill concludes that "it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation."** And since the sales went to Britain and France, it committed the U.S. to their side in the war. **Finance capital was equally involved: "the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits."** When bank loans to Britain and France of half a billion dollars went through in 1915, "the business depression, that had so worried the Administration in the spring of 1915, suddenly vanished, and 'boom times' prevailed." Of course, German imperialism did not stand idly by while the U.S. profited from arms shipments and loans to their enemies in the war. German submarine warfare against these shipments finally provoked American involvement in the War. The rise of fascism in Europe was the direct result of still another cyclical depression, the Great Depression that gripped the entire capitalist world in the Thirties. In his recent book on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism, David **Abraham has documented how major capitalists turned to Hitler to** fill the vacuum of political leadership **when the economy collapsed**. In part, the absence of political leadership "with the collapse of the export economy at the end of 1931...drove German industry to foster or accept a Bonapartist solution to the political crisis and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis. The "Bonapartist solution", as Abraham calls it, was found in Hitler's Nazi Party. As he says, "By mid-1932, the vast majority of industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation in the government." **For these industrialists, "an** anti-Marxist, imperialist program **was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base for such a program."** The appeasement of Hitler's promise to smash the communists and socialists at home and to destroy the Soviet Union abroad expressed a new cause of capitalist war. Up until that time, inter-imperialist wars were simply the response to economic contradictions at home and capitalist competition abroad. In part, World War II was yet another inter-imperialist war. But now a new cause of war was emerging alongside of the old. The rise of socialism was a direct threat to the entire capitalist world. **In addition to glutted domestic markets and competition for foreign markets, the capitalists now had to face the additional problem that the overall foreign market itself was shrinking**. Thus, they tended to support each other in the face of a common enemy. After World War II, there was a particularly sharp shrinkage in the "free world" for capitalist exploitation as socialism and national liberation triumphed through much of the world. **The U.S. and its allies responded by demanding that the socialist countries open their doors to investment by capitalism**. According to historian William Appleman Williams, "It **was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war**." As Williams explains, "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition." D**iplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic**. As pointed out by historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "**The question of foreign economic policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the extension and expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power and needs."** In addition to the new problem of shrinking world markets, there remained the problem of cyclical depressions. Although unemployment was not bad in 1946 because industry was producing to meet the accumulated needs of the war-deprived American people, the specter of another depression was very much a factor in the Cold War. As the Kolkos point out, "The deeply etched memory of the decade-long depression of 1929 hung over all American plans for the postwar era....In extending its power throughout the globe the United States hoped to save itself as well from a return of the misery of prewar experience." **The Vietnam War was a continuation of the Cold War, as the United States tried to prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system**. **The U.S. had already fought a similar war in Korea**. In his chapter, "The U.S. in Vietnam, 1944-66: Origins and Objectives," Gabriel Kolko calls the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, "the most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War." Elsewhere in his book, Kolko goes into detail about the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital. The Vietnam War, he explains, was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. **It was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world."** Finally we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup under Presidents Carter and Reagan (and more recently under Bush, father and son). To some extent, it is a response to the old problem of cyclical depressions. Since World War II, each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits for the first time since the Thirties. Government spending was needed to put people back to work. **Would the government spend the money for military weapons or for civilian needs?** A long line of Presidential candidates, standing for the military solution, have been supported in their campaigns by the military-industrial complex against other candidates who were unable to wage a serious campaign for civilian spending instead of military spending. **The growing power of the military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition to the economic causes of war**. It reflects an economic crisis that goes even deeper than those of the past. **In addition to the cyclical depressions and the shrinkage of foreign markets, there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes**. The military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector of the American economy because through the aid of state subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits. Never mind if the U.S. government goes into debt to banks and other financial institutions in order to pay for military spending. The world of financial speculation does not worry about tomorrow. Not only does this "military spending solution" endanger the security of the planet, but it also increases the risk of a major financial collapse and subsequent depression.

### 2NC – Impact – Environment

#### State-sanctioned environmental destruction is intrinsic to capitalism---culminates in extinction.

Plested '20 [James; 2/17/20; editor of Red Flag; "Capitalist roots of the environment crisis," https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/02/18/capitalist-roots-environment-crisis/]

Climate change is only one aspect of the problem. Everywhere we look, the natural systems that maintain our planet in its habitable state are rapidly deteriorating. Can we survive the destruction of the tropical rain forests of the Amazon – the lungs of Earth? Can we survive the spread of dead zones – areas too low in oxygen to sustain life – across our oceans? Can we make do without the bees and other insects we currently depend on to pollinate our crops?

Perhaps the scariest thing about the situation isn’t the vast scale of breakdown in natural systems but the fact that those entrusted with the leadership of our society appear determined to hasten us to our doom. Instead of listening to the advice of the scientists, firefighters, land managers and others who’ve been sounding the alarm about climate change for decades, Scott Morrison and Co. parrot propaganda points from the Murdoch press. Instead of agreeing, finally, to contribute more to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, they double down on the expansion of Australia’s booming coal and gas industries, attempting all the while to distract the public with fairy tales about greenies preventing back-burning and the fires just being part of Australia’s natural cycle.

Elsewhere in the world, the picture is the same. Decades of global climate negotiations have gone nowhere. Despite the increasingly urgent warnings of scientists, emissions continue to rise. And with the likes of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Jair Bolsonaro in charge of some of the world’s biggest economies, the prospects for a major shift occurring soon appear terrifyingly dim.

Where did it all go wrong? The answer is suggested by the increasingly popular slogan System change, not climate change. Morrison, Trump and their fellow fossil fuel enthusiasts act not simply in accordance with their personal whims and desires but as the conscious servants of a system: capitalism. Proponents of capitalism talk as if it’s the natural form of human society – something that has existed since the dawn of time. The reality, however, is that the age of capitalism spans only the past two to three centuries. For the vast majority of our 200-300,000 year history, humans lived in societies, like those of the Indigenous inhabitants of Australia prior to invasion, characterized by collective decision making and sharing of resources, not the system of private property and the endless competitive scramble for individual gain that define the world today.

If the capitalist system was most befitting of our human nature, you would expect its emergence to have been embraced by all whose lives were transformed by it. But the birth of capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries was an extremely violent process that was strongly resisted from the start. As Karl Marx put it in Capital: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.” Capital came into the world, he wrote, “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”

Since the earliest days of human existence, we have had a significant impact on the environment. Scientists believe, for instance, that hunting, along with the use of fire and other land management techniques employed by Australia’s Indigenous population, contributed to the extinction of the continent’s megafauna. Deforestation was a major problem in ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Air pollution from the burning of wood and coal was an issue in London as early as the 12th and 13th centuries. All this, however, was on a minuscule scale compared to the devastation of the past 200 years, and particularly in the period after World War Two – the era in which capitalism came to dominate every corner of the globe.

In 1950, global carbon emissions totaled 5.28 billion tonnes. By 2017, they were 36.15 billion tonnes. According to the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report 2018, the total population of mammals, birds, fish and reptiles has declined by 60 percent since 1970. Every year, the rate of extinctions rises, and scientists estimate that a million animal and plant species may go extinct over the coming decades. According to a 2016 report by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the production of plastic has risen 20-fold since 1964 and is expected to double again in the next 20 years and quadruple by 2050. Only around 5 percent of plastic ends up being recycled. If current trends continue, the report predicts, by 2050 there will, by weight, be more plastic in the world’s oceans than fish.

No one of these gloomy metrics, considered alone, can capture the depths of the crisis we face. In only 200 years of existence, capitalism has brought us to the brink of such a calamitous breakdown in the world’s natural systems that our entire civilization is now under threat.

Among Marx’s most evocative metaphors for the operation of capital is his description of it as “dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks”. It’s not only “living labor,” however, that sustains the vampire of capital, but also the natural inputs of the productive process – the raw materials that labor works up into the products that capitalists sell on the market for their coveted profits.

What makes capitalism uniquely destructive in comparison to previous systems is the rupture of the connection between the main drivers of economic life and the natural world that sustains us. A capitalist may own a significant amount of land. But unlike the feudal lords of the Middle Ages, their wealth isn’t tied to the piece of land that they own. If a capitalist destroys their land – say by digging up all the coal or oil it contains, poisoning it with chemicals or exhausting the fertility of the soil through over-farming – they can simply take the profits they’ve generated from it and buy more land elsewhere.

The vampire metaphor is powerful precisely because it speaks to this fundamental rift between the lifeblood of capitalism – profit – and society’s underlying life systems, including labor and the natural environment, that are the ultimate source of all wealth. Rolling Stone contributor Matt Taibbi’s description of investment bank Goldman Sachs as “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money”, can be extended to the whole capitalist class. The environmental (or other) consequences of their activities don’t give them much pause for concern as long as they’re making money.

The wealth of the capitalist ruling class of today is so immense that even the existential threat posed by climate change won’t shake them into action. According to Oxfam, the combined wealth of the world’s 2,153 billionaires exceeds that of the poorest 4.6 billion people, who make up 60 percent of the global population. Catastrophic events like the Australian bush fires are unlikely to faze them – in contrast to the mass of ordinary people impacted by the fires, they can easily buy their way to safety.

The ruling class’s lack of concern for the environment is reinforced by the competitive nature of the system. Each individual capitalist must keep their costs low and their profits high to stay ahead of their rivals. The main way they do this is by keeping workers’ wages down. But if they can save money by not dealing with the environmental costs of their operations, they’ll do that too.

The capitalist class gains immense savings from treating environmental destruction as an “externality” that they can pass on to society. The International Monetary Fund calculated that global subsidies to fossil fuel companies amount to US$5.2 trillion a year, approximately 6.4 percent of world GDP. Most subsidies relate to the cost of dealing with the destructive consequences of all the carbon emissions produced by burning fossil fuels. This includes the impacts of climate change, along with the costs of health care associated with air pollution and so on.

You might wonder why governments are willing to let fossil fuel companies and other destructive industries get away with this. The answer lies in the role of the capitalist state. We’re taught that it is a neutral body that mediates between the conflicting interests of different social layers and guides society in the collective interest. The state, however, has never been neutral. Modern capitalist states emerged in conjunction with the rise of the capitalist class as the dominant economic power in society, and they’ve always, as Marx put it, been “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”

The role of the capitalist state, in other words, is to protect and advance the interests of big business and the rich, rather than the mass of the population who suffer the consequences of their environmentally destructive practices. And again, this dynamic is reinforced by competition on an international scale. Each national state defends the interests of its capitalist class against those of their foreign rivals. This involves both maintaining good business conditions (e.g. low wages and a lack of environmental and other regulations) at home and projecting power externally, through diplomatic and military means, to ensure access to resources and markets around the world.

The destructive consequences of these dynamics can be seen in capitalism’s almost uninterrupted history of war. And they also help explain the continuing failure of global efforts to secure agreement on any serious action to reduce carbon emissions or address other major environmental issues. Sacrificing short term profits in the name of long term sustainability goes against the DNA of the capitalist nation state. This is particularly clear in the case of Australia, one of the world’s most fossil fuel-dependent nations. Neither the Liberals nor Labor are prepared to forgo the tens of billions in profits that flow from coal and gas exports. The strength of the fossil fuel industry is just too important to Australia’s status as a major regional power.

We’re in a battle for our lives. The entire future of the human experiment – so utterly miraculous and so terrifyingly fragile – depends on what we do in the coming years and decades. As Russian Marxist Nikolai Bukharin, writing a few years after the revolution of 1917, put it: “No system, including that of human society, can exist in empty space; it is surrounded by an ‘environment,’ on which all its conditions ultimately depend. If human society is not adapted to its environment, it is not meant for this world; all its culture will inevitably pass away; society itself will be reduced to dust.”

### 2NC – Turns Case (Biotechnology)

#### K turns and outweighs the entire aff

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

U.S. intensification of its bio-imperial capacity harms not only its intended targets. All bioscientific research entails risks such as laboratory accidents, unintentional leakages, and transport mistakes. Research on dangerous pathogens, also subject to these mishaps, thus yields significant biohazards to laboratory workers and those in the geographic vicinity of the labs. In 2004, three laboratory workers in a Boston University biosafety level 2 lab, working with what they mistakenly thought was a benign strain of tularemia, became ill with a virulent and potentially fatal strain. That same year, seven researchers at a biosafety level 2 lab in Oakland Children’s Hospital were exposed to live—instead of dead—anthrax, sent by mistake by a vendor in Fort Detrick, Maryland (Hecht and MacKenzie 2005). Other notable accidental releases and exposures that took place in the early twenty-first century have been catalogued by the Sunshine Project. In 2006, the organization updated the map (figure 3) to not only include the new labs built in the meantime, but also show the releases that had occurred from 2001 to 2005.20 These lab accidents and leakages are not historically anomalous. During the height of the active U.S. program in the 1950s and 1960s, at Camp Detrick, the former hub of military research on biological weapons, there were 3,330 accidents between 1954 and 1962; half involved lab personnel, of whom 77 percent were infected (Hersh 1968).21 The dire consequences of these accidents have best been demonstrated by the Sverdlosk disaster in 1979, when weaponized anthrax leaked from the Soviet bioweapons laboratory, killing an estimated one hundred people (Guillemin 1999; Inglesby et al. 2002). The revamped post-9 / 11 biodefense industry continued this trend. The CDC has recorded about twenty accident reports of infectious pathogens a year since 2004—a number researchers think is probably underreported, and which increased to thirty-two in 2007 (Kaiser 2007). The growing research on putative biological agents likely increased the potential for these mishaps—the number of people gaining clearance to work reached about 20,000 at 400 sites around the United States by 2007, ten times more than before 9 / 11 (MacKenzie 2007). I have discussed how the specter of the mal-intentioned Other has enabled the U.S. state to justify domestic buildup. Here I also argue that it helped the state to mask the risky research and laboratory hazards the biodefense industry generates. Focus on the bioterrorist figure pushes aside the ongoing need to assess the prudence of conducting such research. This discursive move has been well described in other arenas of U.S. national security, suggesting a broader pattern. Anthropologist Joseph Masco (1999) has highlighted how, in U.S. nuclear research culture, the post–World War II national security state turned its focus to “national security” threats in ways that both produced and concealed “national sacrifices” (204). Masco describes the building of Los Alamos National Laboratory (a U.S. nuclear weapons complex in Los Alamos, New Mexico) as exploiting Native American lands, producing nuclear waste and environmental contamination, and exacerbating the exploitation of Nuevomexicano labor. The U.S. national security apparatus frames the harms it produces as the justifiable cost of achieving national defense. Post-9 / 11 institutionalization of “biosecurity” further enshrouded the “sacrifices” of biodefense research. The biosecurity regime focused on guarding and restricting access to research on dangerous pathogens.22 This meant tightened security at facilities, increased screening of lab workers, and restrictions on publication of research findings and collaboration. Operationalizing biosecurity focused attention on outsiders obtaining the dangerous research materials, rather than on concerns about internally generated lab hazards. The new access restrictions, moreover, aimed at specific categories of people. The USA PATRIOT Act had extended post–Cold War era discourse on terrorism to mark both communist countries and countries in the Middle East—whether individuals, groups, or nation-states—as severe threats to U.S. national security. The act also contained a section regulating bioscience, aiming to more tightly restrict access to and transfer of biological materials deemed hazardous (so-called select agents) from categories of “restricted persons.”23 To section 817, “Expansion of the Biological Weapons Statute,” it added subsection 175b, “Possession by Restricted Persons.” This subsection restricted access to select agents by anyone who was an “alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States” or “an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who is a national of a country as to which the Secretary of State … has made a determination (that remains in effect) that such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” The latter category denoted foreign nationals from countries designated by the State Department as “state sponsors of terrorism,” which at the time included Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.24 The restriction’s basis in national origin—specifically, to countries identified as hostile to the United States—racialized them via the discourse of terrorism.25 In addition to these racialized restrictions based on citizenship status and national origin, the act marked other categories of persons as national security threats: anyone who has been convicted of a crime for a term exceeding one year, fugitives from justice, users of controlled substances, anyone who has been discharged dishonorably from the U.S. Armed Services, and anyone deemed a “mental defective.” The delineation of this wider array of Others deemed unfit to access biological agents demonstrates the logics of state targeting. The state marginalizes various abject groups, at different times and places, and to different degrees depending on the dictates of biopower. 26 The discursive gesturing to those the state abandons —the Arab / Muslim Other, the convict, the drug user, the defector, and the disabled—in the name of protecting “life” served to bolster the logics of the biosecurity regime and its aim to keep pathogen research only in the hands of the state and its proxies—in this case high-level biodefense insiders. The U.S. state did not limit itself to these categories. Steve Kurtz was not part of any of the listed exclusions—he was a white male and had no connections to incarceration, drug use, wartime defection, or disability. He was, however, a lab outsider—a bio-art activist doing critical work about the politics of science27—who got caught up in the post-9 / 11 counterterror regime through an unfortunate series of events surrounding a heartbreaking personal tragedy.

### 2NC – Turns Case (Disease)

#### The aff’s logic is rooted in a white scientific masculinity that presumes it is above the consequences of its actions and actively prevents the eradication of disease out of fear of “future attacks” – turns the entirety of case

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Post-9 / 11 acceleration of such risky research reveals the logic of state protectionism in U.S. biological warfare research. Like other militarized sciences, the industry embodies a protectionism infused with white masculinity and technoscientific authority. 33 I have in my previous work on U.S. biodefense argued that it is a form of institutionalized “white scientific masculinity”: institutions of science and security associated with white males (e.g., defense sciences) get construed as infallible founts of knowledge and expertise.34 The post-9 / 11 regime of biosecurity thus garnered the U.S. biodefense industry, a trusted institution of “white scientific masculinity,” an even greater ability to conduct risky research without significant scrutiny. But no case better illustrates U.S. impudence in pursuing new avenues of risky research than that conducted with smallpox. Smallpox is known for its historical devastation—it has an approximately one-third mortality rate and was responsible for almost half a billion deaths worldwide in the twentieth century. It wreaked havoc in Native America centuries ago when European settler-colonists—in an early example of biological warfare— intentionally infected native populations who, without prior exposure, were decimated by the disease (Christopher et al. 1997; Duffy 2002; USAMRIID 2004). In 1979, smallpox became the first disease to be successfully eradicated from the world.35 Neither the warfare genealogy of smallpox—as a deplorable tool Europeans had used to commit Native American genocide—nor its status as an internationally eradicated disease and thus a minimal threat—seemed to influence the resurgence of attention the United States gave smallpox at the end of the Cold War. In the context of the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. national security circles feared its deployment by so-called terrorist networks and rogue states. The triumph of eradication, moreover, had birthed a new dilemma: whether stocks of variola (the virus that causes smallpox disease) existed outside of World Health Organization (WHO) knowledge, and thus whether it should retain a few guarded stocks for prophylactic, research purposes.36 The WHO would allow the United States and the former Soviet Union to hold onto stocks of variola—for research purposes—in their high-containment labs (the CDC and the Russian Research Institute for Viral Preparations, respectively).37 Thus, the public health triumph of smallpox eradication contorted, within the U.S. national security community, into a problem of U.S. vulnerability—a population with little immunity to smallpox and thus highly susceptible to a smallpox bioweapons attack. The post-9 / 11 era drastically escalated this post-eradication specter, painting Iraq in particular as a looming threat.38 This was extraordinarily ironic since the only military deployment of smallpox has been by Europeans against Native Americans (not to mention the false victimhood the United States adopted to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq). This incongruity notwithstanding, the United States embarked on hazardous research on the variola virus—namely, genetic engineering of novel strains. These are strains to which—by virtue of their novelty—humans would have little or no immunity. As with other instances of pathogen proliferation in the name of biodefense, the strategy was to prepare for and pre-empt others who may be doing the same thing. In 2004, the United States put forward a request to the WHO, in charge of overseeing smallpox studies, for approval to conduct genetic engineering experiments with variola, including creating cross-species hybrids by splicing variola genes into the genomes of other orthopoxviruses; if approved, it would change the 1994 WHO guideline banning such work (WHO 2004). This request was considered at the World Health Assembly meeting in May 2005. It met with substantial opposition from many countries expressing concern about this escalation of research and potential accidental escapes. Nevertheless, the WHO approved all but the most extreme genetic engineering activities (i.e., the splicing of variola genes into other orthopoxviruses) (Enserink 2005). In 2007, the WHO finally banned all research involving genetic engineering of the variola virus, after pushback by many member countries and NGOs, particularly from the Global South, including the Sunshine Project and the Third World Network, a transnational development and environmental policy NGO based in Malaysia (Third World Network 2007b). The U.S. push for genetic engineering highlighted once again a faith in technoscience—as long as it remained under the purview of U.S. state biosecurity. The United States, moreover, relaxed its overall restraints on smallpox research in the post-9 / 11 climate—by continuing to postpone destroying variola stocks. Soon after the WHO agreed to allow the United States and the former USSR to hold onto stocks of the variola virus for research purposes in 1984, it had recommended their destruction once sufficient information had been garnered. In 1990, the WHO assessed that enough research had been conducted (e.g., genome sequencing and clone fragment libraries39) and set a date for the destruction of the remaining stocks—1993. Yet, when that time came, the WHO postponed destruction to 1995 due primarily to pressure from the United States and Russia, both of which argued that they still needed the stocks for further research and to develop new countermeasures. Proponents of postponement even cited the achievement of full genome sequencing—intended to obviate the need for preserving viral samples—as presenting a new danger: scientists could use this to re-create the variola virus (Mahy et al. 1993; Hammond 2007). Technoscientific advancement had generated more risk, yet remained the mainstay of U.S. decision making in its pursuit to control variola. Over the years many nations and independent organizations internationally as well as within the United States have argued for the destruction of these remaining stocks to stem potential proliferation of variola. But in the post-9 / 11 climate, the U.S. biodefense community has only further entrenched its position to retain the stocks in the name of national security. In 2002, after two subsequent postponements, destruction of the stocks was postponed indefinitely (Third World Network 2007b; WHO 1999). The biosecurity regime has been successful in shifting attention away from the dangers that the research industry internally generates—in the form of lab accidents, leaks, and other mistakes, as well as mal-intended deployment by industry insiders like Bruce Ivins, the white male biodefense scientist who was the FBI’s final suspect in the anthrax mailings of 2001. It is precisely the buildup of domestic U.S. biological warfare capacity that poses a tangible, grave danger, domestically and internationally, to those intentionally targeted by the U.S. national security regime—Arabs, Muslims, and other negatively racialized groups and nations—as well as those affected by the biohazards of the research process itself—lab workers and others in physical proximity of dangerous biological agents. That the buildup continues despite these severe costs attests to the power exerted by U.S. bio-imperialism and the national security state and industry interests that drive it.

## AT: Impact Turns

### 2NC – Jevon’s Paradox

#### Tech can’t solve environmental problems -- Jevons paradox

Alexander, 15- lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs at the University of Melbourne who wrote his PhD thesis on degrowth (Samuel Alexander, 2015, “Prosperous Descent: Crisis as Opportunity in an Age of Limits,” published by The Simplicity Institute, pg. 68-69)

This mainstream vision of how to achieve a sustainable world is coherent in theory, at best, but demonstrably it does not reflect empirical reality (see Alexander, 2014). Although many economies around the world are indeed getting better at producing commodities more cleanly and efficiently (a process known as ‘relative decoupling’), overall ecological impact is nevertheless still increasing, because every year increasing numbers of commodities are being produced, exchanged, and consumed as a result of growing economies (Jackson, 2009, Ch. 5). We might have more fuel-efficient cars, for example, but the rebound effect is that we are also driving more and buying more cars. This is but one example of the ‘Jevons paradox’ that permeates market societies and beyond (Polimeni et al., 2009) – a paradox, so-called, because a per unit reduction in the throughput of commodities does not always lead to reduced ecological impact, since those efficiency improvements are often outweighed by the increasing amounts of commodities that are consumed (Holm and Englund, 2009). The implication of this is that technology and efficiency improvements are not going to solve the ecological crisis, as their most optimistic advocates and popular consciousness seem to assume they can (Lovins, 1998) – at least, not unless the highly developed nations also transition away from growth economics. Efficiency without sufficiency is lost.

### 2NC – Ontology

#### Neoliberalism ontologically encloses us into capital worship – be suspect of all of their defenses

Joronen ’13 – University of Tampere, School of Management, Post-Doc (Mikko, “Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism”, 3/21/13, Special Issue: Geopolitics of Changing State Spaces, Geopolitics, Volume 18, Issue 2, 2013, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2012.723289)

The latter mechanism of ontological violence, in turn, refers to the inner logic of neoliberal enframing. **Neoliberalisation operates**, first, by **reducing political capabilities of individuals to the internalised rule of the maximum economy, but also by moulding all things into reserves of profits**. **First of all, neoliberalisation violently enframes human existence into bare reserves of human capital, which are increasingly used by states in their tactics to succeed in global competition**. The neoliberal state, governing its population by the means of encouraging economically calculating subjectivity, is not established out of the violent act of territorial inclusion and order, but above all, out of the violent fact of reducing human existence into usable capital. Second, as a drive to reveal things as profitable reserves, neoliberalisation violently divests natural entities from their abrupt happening and phenomenological richness of revealing. Altogether, such reductions constitute the post-political situation of neoliberal governmentality: they create a world of technical solutions and politics-free zones abrogating the politics of ontological revealing. The depoliticising conduct of the neoliberal state is an ultimate political act, which paradoxically establishes an anti-political abrogation of all political acts through the concealment of the politics of ontological possibility. Such ‘ontological mono-politics’ thus intertwines with the first mechanism of ontological violence: by fabricating the real, including human existence, for the use of economic calculations and profits, neoliberal governmentality monopolises a particular mode of revealing, and thus, fades the ontological openness of being and its finite Event (Ereignis) to the background.

What remains excluded in the process of neoliberal enframing, what remains “outside” of its framework, is evidently no-thing ontic, but the ontological openness of being. As the critical explorations of neoliberalism in recent geographical literature have emphasised, mainly by leaning on Marx, Harvey and a set of interpretations of Foucault, **neoliberalism should be conceptualised as an open and unpredictable process of ‘enclosure’, as “a complex set of logics of inclusion and exclusion operating through a variety of spatial territories and networks**”. 54 Instead of a fixed set of doctrines and practices, neoliberalisation is conceptualised as a contingent process that works by enclosing a variety of subjects, practices, technologies and materialities through different, even conflicting, rationalities and spatialities. Nevertheless, even as delegate contributions as these seem to fall short on scrutinising the ontological characteristics involved in the process of neoliberalisation, not to mention the evident absence of Heidegger's work, which also Foucault, though with cryptic and non-explicated manner, admitted as being a central influence on his own thinking. 55 Although neoliberalism is conceptualised as a flexible and contingent process emerging through the unlimited number of unpredictable enclosures, from the Heideggerian perspective, neoliberalism is not so much a dialectical process of inclusion and exclusion, 56 but a process of ontological mono-politics enframing the real as such in terms of available, usable, orderable, and makeable reserve. Instead of exclusion, neoliberal enframing works through total inclusion, where every-thing is revealed as having the potential to become utilised. Things escaping the measures of neoliberal enframing are revealed, not as excluded, but as not-yet-enframed-and-utilised reserves. **Neoliberal enframing is hence a process of ontological inclusion – an ontological drive towards the complete economic usability of things, where this drive in itself is never under suspect.**2

#### The aff destroys the radical potentiality of the alternative by foreclosing life outside the political

Joronen ’13 – University of Tampere, School of Management, Post-Doc (Mikko, “Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism”, 3/21/13, Special Issue: Geopolitics of Changing State Spaces, Geopolitics, Volume 18, Issue 2, 2013, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2012.723289)

Accordingly, the process of neoliberalisation has not lead to the degradation of state power, but has taken place particularly through the reforms of state government. Although in a world of global flows the state has become inextricably tied to the changes that cannot be replied through the traditional forms of state sovereignty, it is precisely the state that has become a locus between the neoliberal subjectification and the networks created by the global movements of capital. As Foucault claims, 40 inasmuch as the neoliberal homo economicus refers to a mode of government that needs to be maintained through the institutions, **administrative practices and the internalisation of market rationalities, also the (global) space of neoliberal markets, free of monopolies and interventions of the state, can only exist through the active government and legal support of the state**. Neither globalisation of neoliberal markets nor the government of the everyday life of individuals erodes the state or turns it into what Thrift calls the ‘phantom state’ – a state based on communicative power of electronic networks and few selected glocalities, such as the world cities, driven by the money power. 41 **Neoliberalisation is rather in need of the state, not so much of the sovereign power of the state, but of the state institutions and practices de-politicising the population through the survival strategies, which encourage conducts where people are treated as ‘reserves of human capital’ essential for the survival of the state in the turmoil of global competition.**

The rationality of neoliberal governmentality consists of a new human anthropology and the support of the space of the competition, which both need to be maintained and kept viable at all levels of society through different techniques, practices, identities, and forms of visibility. The neoliberalisation of the state thus consists of a change in the way states increasingly justify their existence: through the protection of the space of the markets, by valuing the non-human entities as reserves of profits (either as a natural resource or by framing the ‘ecological’ through ‘economical’), and through the process of subjectification grounded on the human anthropology of homo economicus. **Neoliberalisation of the state**, then, **denotes an increasing use of the strategies of government constituted through the particular mode of power: the strategic programming of individual conducts on a basis of economic rationality**. This however, as Foucault warns us in Security, Territory, Population, 42 does not mean that the sovereign and disciplinary modes of power are now somehow eliminated from the world. We should not think that the disciplinary society has replaced the society of sovereignty, or that the disciplinary society is now being entirely eliminated by the rise of the society of governmental management, but instead to explore the complex ways of their “demonic combination”. 43

The violence intrinsic to the neoliberal state, to its ways of economising nature and the everyday life of individuals, is fundamentally based on the ontological enframing of human and non-human life through the actualisation of different (demonic) combinations of practices, materialities, rationalities, power relations, and spatial formations. As Giorgio Agamben has argued, by being self-consciously Heideggerian, Foucault's understanding of the historical regimes of power is grounded on a more original relation between the constituted (or actualised) forms of power and the constituting power of potentiality. **While the constituting power works as a condition of possibility for the constituted modes of power to emerge, all historical actualisations of power intrinsically depend on the suspension of the potentialities of constituting power, on their** concealment**.** 44 In this sense, constituting power has a similar ontological structure with Aristotle's notion of potentiality: it maintains itself without ever fully passing into actuality, without being exhausted into actualisations. 45

It is not my intention here to go into details of Agamben's complex and nuanced argument in Homo Sacer, but instead to emphasise, as Agamben's re-reading of the distinction between potentiality and actuality indicates, how the coalescence of state power with neoliberal governmentality constitutes politics at the domain of ontology. The constituting power does not merely refer to the ontological possibility for the constituted modes of constituted power, but also to the fundamental possibility for the political action as such. Accordingly, also the question of resistance needs to be explored and confronted at this proper level of ontology: as a question of existential resistance.

In order to scrutinise the ontological implications Agamben's distinction has for the question of existential resistance, it is essential to pay attention to what Agamben calls in Homo Sacer the ‘life of possibility’. **It is life that opposes the operations of constituted power: it constitutes an inexhaustible possibility, which can be never entirely corralled into constituted forms of political power.** **The power of potentiality in life**, thus, denotes **a power to constitute, a possibility to ground new modes of life, to be otherwise**. **Governmentalities of neoliberal enframing evidently** close this possibility, or **to** use Rancière's words in Disagreement, 46 **follow the “logic of the police”, the logic of designating ontological positions and divisions of power rather than opening them up for the power of potential life.** **The ontological resistance**, hence, **does not only liberate life from sthe grasp of ontological monopolisations, such as neoliberal enframing, but from all coded and corralled forms of belonging, including the state.**

### 2NC – Red Innovation

#### Communism spurs more and better innovation than capitalism – all “innovation” under capital has been due to restricting corporate decision-making, not the free market

Tony Smith ’15, is a professor of philosophy at Iowa State University and the author of Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production., “Red Innovation”, Jacobin, 3/31/15, https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/socialism-innovation-capitalism-smith

The technological dynamism of capitalism has always been a powerful argument in its defense. **But one of its secrets is that at the heart of this change we find neither bold entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, nor established firms.**

**Investments pushing the frontiers of scientific knowledge are just too risky**. The advances sought may not be forthcoming. Those that do occur may not ever be commercially viable. **Any potentially profitable results that do arise may take decades to make any money. And when they finally do, there are no guarantees initial investors will appropriate most of the resulting windfall**.

There is, accordingly, a powerful tendency for private capital to systematically underinvest in long-term research and development. **Despite popular perceptions that private entrepreneurs drive technological innovation, the leading regions of the global economy do not leave the most important stages of technological change to private investors**. These costs are socialized.

In the quarter-century after World War II, the high profits garnered by American corporations due to their exceptional place in the world market allowed corporate labs to engage in “blue-skies research” projects. But even then**, public funding accounted for roughly two-thirds of all research and development expenditures in the United States, creating the foundations for the high-tech sectors of today.**

With the rise of competition from Japanese and European capital in the 1970s, private-sector funding of research and development increased. However, long-term projects were almost entirely abandoned in favor of product development and applied-research projects promising commercial advantages in the short-to-medium term.

**Basic research continued to be funded by the government, like the work in molecular biology that supported the move of agribusiness companies into biotechnology.** The same was true for projects of special interest to the Pentagon — the developments associated with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, for instance, which paved the way for modern global positioning systems — and other government agencies.

**But medium-to-long-term R&D in general was in great danger of falling into a “valley of death” between basic research and immediate development, with neither the government nor private capital providing significant funding for it**.

For all their rhetoric touting the “magic of the marketplace,” those in the Reagan administration recognized market failure when they saw it. They began to offer federal and publicly funded university laboratories various carrots and sticks to undertake long-term R&D for US capital.

New programs were created to provide start-ups with resources to develop innovations prior to the “proof of concept” required by venture capitalists. Under Reagan, the Small Business Innovation Development Act even mandated that federal agencies set aside a percentage of their R&D budget to fund research by small firms. These and other forms of public-private partnership have granted US capital enormous competitive advantages in the world market.

It’s no surprise that Apple’s tremendously successful line of products — iPads, iPhones, and iPods — incorporate twelve key innovations. All twelve (central processing units, dynamic random-access memory, hard-drive disks, liquid-crystal displays, batteries, digital single processing, the Internet, the HTTP and HTML languages, cellular networks, GPS system, and voice-user AI programs) were developed by publicly funded research and development projects.

**It hasn’t been the dynamics of the market so much as active state intervention that has fueled technological change.**

The Promised Golden Age

**Technology is more than just a weapon for inter-capitalist competition; it is a weapon in struggles between capital and labor**. **Technological changes that create unemployment, de-skill the workforce, and enable one sector of the workforce to be played against another shift the balance of power in capital’s favor**. Given this asymmetry, advances in productivity that could reduce work time while expanding real wages lead instead to forced layoffs, increasing stress for those still employed and eroding real wages.

Two ongoing technological developments further strengthen the power of capital. Advances in transportation and communication now enable production and distribution chains to be extended across the globe, allowing capital to implement “divide and conquer” strategies against labor to an unprecedented extent.

Astounding new labor-saving machines are also becoming more and more inexpensive. A recent exhaustive study of over seven hundred occupations concluded that no less than 47 percent of employment in the United States is at high risk of being automated within two decades. Anything approaching this level of labor displacement will yield more misery, not progress, for ordinary workers.

But the lower cost and higher capacities of machines have also led to change of a better sort. As the prices of computer hardware, software, and Internet connections have declined, many people can now create new “knowledge products” without working for big capitalists.

**Multitudes across the globe now freely choose to contribute to collective innovation projects of interest to them, outside the relationship of capital and wage labor**. The resulting products can now be distributed as unlimited free goods to anyone who wishes to use them, rather than being scarce commodities sold for profit.

It is beyond dispute that this new form of social labor has generated innovations superior in quality and scale to the output of capitalist firms. These innovations also tend to be qualitatively different.

**While technological developments in capitalism primarily address the wants and needs of those with disposable income, open-source projects can mobilize creative energies to address areas capital systematically neglects, such as developing seeds for poor farmers or medicines for those without the money to buy existing medications**. **The potential of this new form of collective social labor to address pressing social needs across the globe is historically unprecedented.**

In order to flourish, however, open-source innovation requires free access to existing knowledge goods. Leading capital firms, hoping to extend their ability to privately profit from publicly supported research, have used their immense political power to extend the intellectual property rights regime in scope and enforcement, severely restricting the access open-source projects require. Copyright, after all, was extended for twenty years at the turn of the century, just as Internet access was starting to balloon.

**Despite these barriers, the success of open-source projects shows that intellectual-property rights are not required for innovation**. Further evidence is provided by the fact that most scientific and technological workers engaged in innovation are forced to sign away intellectual property rights as a condition of employment. **These rights actually hamper advancement by raising the cost of engaging in the production of new knowledge, and by diverting funds to unproductive legal costs**.

The World is Flat?

Capitalism also hampers the ability of much of the world to contribute to technological advancement. **Whole regions of the global economy lack the wealth to support meaningful innovation**. Today, **only four countries spend over 3 percent of their GDP on research and development**; a mere six others devote 2 percent or more.

Capital in these advantaged regions has the opportunity to establish a virtuous circle, free-riding on the extensive public investment discussed above. Privileged access to advanced R&D enables capitalists to appropriate high returns on successful innovations; these returns allow those companies to make effective use of technological advances in the next cycle, setting the stage for future profits.

**At the same time, enterprises in poorer regions, lacking access to high-level R&D, find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle**. Their present inability to make significant innovations that would enable them to compete successfully in world markets undercuts their future prospects. Only a handful of countries — such as South Korea and Taiwan — have ever been able to move forward from this starting disadvantage.

Global disparities in technological change alone do not explain why 1 percent of people in the world now own 48 percent of global wealth. But they are a major part of the story; technological change is a weapon that enables the privileged to maintain and extend their global advantages over time.

Creative Non-Destruction

**The destructive effects examined above are not necessary features of technological change; they are necessary features of technological change in capitalism. Overcoming them requires overcoming capitalism**, even if we only have a provisional sense of what that might mean.

The pernicious tendencies associated with technological change in capitalist workplaces are rooted in a structure where managers are agents of the owners of the firm’s assets, with a fiduciary duty to further their private interests.

But a society’s means of production are not goods for personal consumption, like a toothbrush. The material reproduction of society is an inherently public matter, as the technological development of capitalism itself, resting on public funds, confirms. **Capital markets, where private claims to productive resources are bought and sold, treat public power as if it were just another item for personal use. They can, and should, be totally done away with**.

### 2NC – Sustainability

#### Capitalism is terminally unsustainable and guarantees global extinction from climate change – its try or die to develop a new socioeconomic system

Asher Moses ’20, is the editor Voice of Action, the newspaper for the working classes., “‘Collapse of Civilisation is the Most Likely Outcome’: Top Climate Scientists”, Resilience, 6/8/20, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-08/collapse-of-civilisation-is-the-most-likely-outcome-top-climate-scientists/

**Professor Hans Joachim Schellnhuber**, director emeritus and founder of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, **believes if we go much above 2°C we will quickly get to 4°C anyway because of the tipping points and feedbacks, which would spell the end of human civilisation**.

“There is a very big risk that we will just end our civilisation”: Professor Schellnhuber

Johan Rockström, the head of one of Europe’s leading research institutes, warned in 2019 that in a 4°C-warmer world it would be “difficult to see how we could accommodate a billion people or even half of that … There will be a rich minority of people who survive with modern lifestyles, no doubt, but it will be a turbulent, conflict-ridden world”.

Schellnhuber, one of the world’s leading authorities on climate change, said that if we continue down the present path “there is a very big risk that we will just end our civilisation. The human species will survive somehow but we will destroy almost everything we have built up over the last two thousand years.”

**Schellnhuber said in a recent interview that the IPCC report stating we could stay below 1.5°C of warming was “slightly dishonest” because it relies on immense negative emissions** (**pulling CO2 out of the air**) **which was not viable at global scale**. He said 1.5°C was no longer achievable but it was still possible to stay under 2°C with massive changes to society.

If we don’t bend the emissions curve down substantially before 2030 then keeping temperatures under 2°C becomes unavoidable. The “carbon law” published in the journal Science in 2017 found that, to hold warming below 2°C, emissions would need to be cut in half between 2020 and 2030.

Steffen told Voice of Action that the three main challenges to humanity – climate change, the degradation of the biosphere and the growing inequalities between and among countries – were “just different facets of the same fundamental problem”.

This problem was the “neoliberal economic system” that spread across the world through globalisation, underpinning “high production high consumption lifestyles” and a “religion built not around eternal life but around eternal growth”.

“**It is becoming abundantly clear that (i) this system is incompatible with a well-functioning Earth System at the planetary level; (ii) this system is eroding human- and societal-well being, even in the wealthiest countries, and (iii)** collapse is the most likely outcome of the present trajectory of the current system, as prophetically modelled in 1972 in the Limits to Growth work,” Steffen told Voice of Action.

Eternal growth is not possible

The Limits to Growth model released by the Club of Rome in 1972 looked at the interplay between food production, industry, population, non-renewable resources and pollution.

The basic findings were that you can’t grow the system indefinitely as you will cause environmental and resource issues that will ultimately cause the whole global system to collapse (ABC’s This Day Tonight program covered it here). At the time of the model’s release it accurately reproduced the historical data from 1900 to 1970.

A 2008 study by Graham Turner, then a senior CSIRO research scientist, used three decades of real-world historical data to conclude that the Limits to Growth model’s predictions were coming to pass: “30 years of historical data compare favourably with key features of a business-as-usual [BAU] scenario called the ‘standard run’ scenario, which results in collapse of the global system midway through the 21st century.”

Former CSIRO scientist Graham Turner has been warning about collapse for decades

Turner ran updated figures through the model again in 2012 for another peer-reviewed paper, and again in 2014 when he had joined the University of Melbourne’s Sustainable Society Institute.

“Data from the forty years or so since the LTG study was completed indicates that the world is closely tracking the BAU scenario,” Turner concluded in the 2014 paper.

“It is notable that there does not appear to be other economy-environment models that have demonstrated such comprehensive and long-term data agreement.”

Turner semi-retired in 2015 but runs a small organic market garden on a rural property in the NSW south coast’s Bega Valley.

He and his wife grow most of their own food and live off grid powered by a solar energy system. Turner said this saved him during last summer’s catastrophic bushfires as his power stayed online but most people in the area lost power for weeks.

Turner has continued tracking the data as best as possible since his last official report in 2014, and last year he helped a Harvard masters student update the data for their thesis.

Turner told Voice of Action that **under his modelling the business as usual scenario “ends up resulting in a global collapse from about now through the next decade or so”.**

It was difficult to predict a timeline but Turner said he believed “there’s an extremely strong case that we may be in the early stages of a collapse right at the moment”.

“Vested interests and corrupt politicians combined with a population happy to deny problems overwhelm those that are trying to promulgate truth and facts,” said Turner.

Fossil fuel emissions continue to rise

‘By 2030 we’ll know what path we’ve taken’

Steffen told Voice of Action that it’s “highly likely that by 2030 we’ll know what pathway we’ve taken”, “the pathway towards sustainability or the current pathway towards likely collapse”.

“**I think the ‘fork in the road’ will come in this decade, probably not a single point in time but as a series of events**,” said Steffen.

Steffen told Voice of Action he believes collapse “will likely not come as a dramatic global collapse, but rather as overall deterioration in many features of life, with regional collapses occurring here and there”.

“For example, **it appears that the USA is entering a long period of decline in many aspect of its society, with a potential for a more rapid collapse in the coming decade**,” said Steffen.

Samuel Alexander, a lecturer with the University of Melbourne and research fellow at the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, told Voice of Action that the coming collapse would not be a single black or white event.

“With respect to civilisations, what is more likely is that we have entered a stage of what JM Greer calls ‘catabolic collapse’ – where we face decades of ongoing crises, as the existing mode of civilisation deteriorates, but then recovers as governments and civil society tries to respond, and fix things, and keep things going for a bit longer,” said Alexander.

“**Capitalism is quite good at dodging bullets and escaping temporary challenges to its legitimacy and viability. But its condition, I feel is terminal**.”

Alexander, who studies the economic, political and cultural challenges of living on a full planet in an age of limits, believes the future will be “post-growth / post capitalist / post-industrial in some form”.

“The future will like arrive in part by design and in part by disaster. Our challenge is to try to constitute the future through planning and community action, not have the future constitute us,” said Alexander.

Alexander said that it would never be “too late” to act sensibly as whether we’re trying to avoid or manage collapse there is lots of work to be done (“a 3 degree future is better than a 4 degree future”).

Steffen believes **the current US mass uprisings are not a sign of collapse but one of “growing instability**”.

Alexander said **it was a sign of “steam building up within a closed system”. Without bold grassroots and political action we were “likely to see explosions of civil unrest increasingly as things continue to deteriorate”**.

### 2NC – AT: Green Growth/Decoupling

**Absolute decoupling is necessary but impossible---efficiency limitations, input substitution, and financialization export environmental impacts.**

Ward '16 [James; //; Associate Professor at the School of Natural and Built Environments at University of South Australia, Ph.D. in environmental science from the Flinders University, et al.; "Is Decoupling GDP Growth from Environmental Impact Possible?" https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164733/]

The perpetually growing economy is generally regarded as a viable and desirable societal objective [1–4]. Whilst ‘**infinite growth’** may not be the words used to characterize and exhort a perpetually growing economy, they are nonetheless an accurate characterization of the objective. The words in current fashion for defending the viability of a perpetually growing economy are phrases such as ‘**green growth**’, ‘**dematerialization**’, and ‘**decoupling**’ [5–9]. The decades old question ‘Is economic growth environmentally sustainable?’ remains contested despite its apparent simplicity. The Limits to Growth [10] was a seminal work that warned of the consequences of exponential growth with finite resources. The World3 models underpinning the Limits to Growth analysis were validated using actual data after twenty and thirty years [11,12]. A further independent evaluation of the projections of the World3 models showed that our actual trajectory since 1972 has closely matched the ‘Business as Usual’ scenario [13]. Increasing recognition of the causes and consequences of climate change have generated a great deal of doubt regarding the feasibility of simultaneously pursing economic growth and preventing and/or mitigating climate change [14–18]. Contemporary work in this broad area of assessing **anthropogenic impact** on the planet suggests that several ‘Planetary Boundaries’ have been crossed [19].

The question as to whether human society can decouple economic growth–defined as growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)–from environmental impacts has not been settled. The decoupling debate itself is polarized with a preponderance of neo-classical economists on one side (decoupling is viable) and ecological economists on the other (decoupling is not viable) [20]. The divide over the compatibility of economic growth and environms sental limits extends into the general public [2] with substantial polarization in ideas of decoupling, dematerialization, and limits to growth.

Settling the debate has far reaching policy implications. Decoupling is increasingly being described in popular press as a viable policy objective [21,22]. Decoupling has been incorporated into international indicators of sustainable development [23] and policy objectives such as the United Nations’ ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ [24]. If decoupling is possible, then these policies are valid sustainable goals; however, if decoupling is shown to be **nonviable** then society will need to shift away from the current ‘infinite growth’ model.

Decoupling is defined as either ‘relative’ (aka ‘weak’) or ‘absolute’ (aka ‘strong’). Relative decoupling refers to higher rates of economic growth than rates of growth in material and energy consumption and environmental impact. As a result, relative decoupling implies a gain in efficiency rather than removal of the link between impact and GDP. Recent trends (1990 to 2012) for GDP [25], material use [26] and energy use [27] in different countries and regions exhibit different behavior (Fig 1). In China, relative decoupling has occurred as GDP (market prices, in current US$) increased by a factor of more than 20 over the 22-year period, while energy use rose by a factor of slightly more than four and material use by almost five. Germany, meanwhile, exhibited slower GDP growth than China, but at the same time reduced energy use by 10% and total material use by 40%. The OECD follows a similar story to Germany, albeit with flat rather than falling energy and material consumption. Although Germany and the OECD give hope that absolute decoupling may be achievable, at the global level we see only relative decoupling with energy and material use increasing by 54% and 66% over the 22 years, respectively.

Similar evidence to that in Fig 1, showing apparent decoupling of GDP from specific resources, has been shown throughout much of the OECD [28]. However, there are several limitations to the inference of decoupling from national or regional data. There are three distinct mechanisms by which the illusion of decoupling may be presented as a reality when in fact it is not actually taking place at all: 1) **substitution of one resource for another**; 2) the **financialization** of one or more components of GDP that involves increasing monetary flows without a concomitant rise in material and/or energy throughput, and 3) the **exporting of environmental impact** to another nation or region of the world (i.e. the separation of production and consumption). These illusory forms of decoupling are described with respect to energy by our colleague [29].

An additional mechanism of decoupling is associated with growing inequality of income and wealth, which can allow GDP to grow overall while the majority of workers do not see a real gain in income [30]. This growth in inequality can manifest as higher GDP without a proportional increase in material and energy flow (i.e. relative decoupling) when a wealthy minority of the population derives the largest fraction of GDP growth but does not necessarily increase their level of consumption with as much demand for energy and materials [31]. In such cases, at the aggregate level decoupling would be observed, but it is doubtful that such unequal sharing of growth in GDP represents an improvement in wellbeing.

At the World aggregate level, Fig 1 shows relative decoupling with a growing gap between GDP and resource consumption. In the context of reaching **planetary boundaries** and **global environmental limits**, however, relative decoupling will be **insufficient to maintain a GDP growth-oriented human civilization**. The only way to achieve truly sustainable growth would be via permanent absolute decoupling. Absolute decoupling theoretically occurs when environmental impacts are reduced while economic growth continues. While relative decoupling has been observed in multiple countries, **absolute decoupling remains elusive** [32–34]. According to one study [35] no country has achieved absolute decoupling during the past 50 years. Another study [36] reports that population growth and increases in affluence are overwhelming efficiency improvements at the global scale. They find no evidence for absolute reductions in environmental impacts, and little evidence to date even for significant relative decoupling.

It should be noted that technological advances can lead to absolute decoupling for specific types of impact [37]. It is possible, for instance, to substitute a polluting activity with a non-polluting activity, and notable examples have included the removal of tetraethyl lead from automotive fuel and CFCs from refrigerants and propellants. It is also possible to envisage a scenario in which GDP growth is decoupled from the use of fossil fuels and related CO2 emissions by switching to 100% renewable energy, but this is not the same as decoupling GDP growth from energy use. In the context of this study, we are primarily interested in fundamental resources (matter and energy) as the foundations of economic activity.

In the current paper, we show that decoupling scenarios can be interpreted using an easily understood model of economic growth and environmental impact. The simple model was calibrated against published data derived from sophisticated predictive studies of decoupling, and used to develop a long-term prognosis of environmental impact under continued GDP growth. The results are then used to draw conclusions about the long-term viability of GDP growth as a societal goal.

Model Derivation

We use a simple mathematical model to develop insights into decoupling behavior. We start with the IPAT equation [38–40], which is a basic formulation of environmental impact I as a function of economic activity:

(1)

where P is population, A is affluence (GDP per capita in $/person/year) and T, as originally formulated, represents “technology”. More precisely, however, T should be viewed as the economic intensity of a particular resource or pollutant, and therefore both T and I will have different units depending on which resource or pollutant is considered. For energy, appropriate units for T may be joules per $ of GDP; for material use T may be kilograms per $ of GDP. The terms T and I can–and should–thus be evaluated separately, with appropriate units, for individual resources such as farming land, fresh water and energy resources, and/or pollutant emissions such as sulphur dioxide, lead, or carbon dioxide.

To test the hypothesis that continual GDP growth can be sustained, we only require a scenario in which GDP increases exponentially. The economy (as GDP) can thus be simplified to G = PA, leading to Ij = GTj where Ij and Tj are the impact and economic intensity, respectively, of resource or pollutant j. A simple case is one in which both population (P) and affluence (A) are increasing exponentially, but other combinations (e.g. stationary population with rising affluence) could achieve the same result of rising GDP. There are, of course, scenarios that could lead to falling GDP (e.g. declining population with constant affluence, or both falling) but our investigation is directed explicitly at testing the sustainability of continual economic growth as a societal goal. As such, we assume G at time t is given by:

(2)

where G0 is the initial GDP at time t = 0, and k is the growth rate per year. Hence, impact (for resource or pollutant j) over time is given as:

(3)

If there is no technological change to reduce a particular impact (i.e. Tj = constant; no decoupling), the use of resources or pollutant emissions will rise exponentially, in keeping with GDP growth. For absolute decoupling from resource or pollutant j, Tj must decrease exponentially at the same rate as GDP growth such that Ij remains constant in time, i.e.:

(4)

where Tj,0 is the initial level of economic intensity of resource or pollutant j.

Put simply, absolute decoupling from resource or pollutant j requires Tj to decrease by at least the same annual percentage as the economy is growing. For example, if k = 0.03 (steady 3% p.a. economic growth), Tj must reduce 20-fold over 100 years, 100-fold over 150 years, and 500-fold over 200 years, and continue this trend of exponential reduction as long as the economy is growing. If Tj were to decrease at a faster rate than GDP growth, the impact Ij would decline.

For non-substitutable resources such as land, water, raw materials and energy, we argue that whilst efficiency gains may be possible, there are minimum requirements for these resources that are ultimately governed by physical realities: for instance the photosynthetic limit to plant productivity and maximum trophic conversion efficiencies for animal production govern the minimum land required for agricultural output; physiological limits to crop water use efficiency govern minimum agricultural water use, and the upper limits to energy and material efficiencies govern minimum resource throughput required for economic production. Therefore a more appropriate formulation of Eq (4) is to allow Tj to decrease to an ultimate value, Tult ≥ 0, as follows:

(5)

where Tj,ult is the ultimate resource use intensity, and rj is the rate of exponential decline, for resource or pollutant j. In cases where decoupling is occurring, Tj,ult < Tj,0. However, cases where resource use intensity is increasing towards an upper limit can be accommodated with Tj,ult > Tj,0.

The nature of decoupling behavior for different types of resource can be readily predicted from the relationships between rj, k, Tj,ult and Tj,0 as summarized in Table 1. It is only those resources or pollutants for which rj > k and Tj,ult < Tj,0 (i.e. efficiency gains are possible and can be achieved faster than the economy is growing) that a period of decoupling can be expected.

Model Application

A recent predictive study [41] concluded that Australia could–through adoption of specific policies–“achieve strong economic growth to 2050 … in scenarios where environmental pressures fall or are stable” (this study is referred to as “H-D” hereafter). That paper summarized the results of a significant project, the 2015 Australian National Outlook [42] published by the Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and represents a high-profile, contemporary study in decoupling. In all of their modelled scenarios, both population and gross national income per capita increased. In their strong abatement scenario (called “Stretch”), various forms of decoupling behavior were predicted. We will use the Stretch scenario from H-D as a case study in decoupling, and will use Eq (5) to further explore the behavior of energy and material use and implications for longer-term impact. The data used in H-D’s historical and projected scenarios are all available in their Supplementary Information files that accompanied their original publication. Likewise, the data and model results for the following analysis can all be found in the S1 File accompanying this paper.

We begin by calibrating the decline rate rj from Eq (5) against H-D’s historical energy use (j = 1) and material extraction (j = 2). The term Tj for each resource is found by dividing GDP (G) by resource use (Ij) on a yearly timestep. For energy, units are MJ per thousand $AUD (2010). T1,0 = 3.783, equal to the value of T1 in the year 1980. The ultimate resource use intensity T1,ult is unknown, and depends on future technological advances. To account for this uncertainty, three scenarios are adopted: high decoupling (T1,ult = 0.25 T1(2010) = 0.704), medium decoupling (Tult = 0.5T1(2010) = 1.408) and low decoupling (Tult = 0.75 T1(2010) = 2.113). Under each of the three T1,ult scenarios, Eq (5) is used to predict T1, and is calibrated by varying the single unknown parameter (the decline rate, r1) to give the best fit between our T1 (predicted) and T1 (historical) derived from H-D’s data. The calibration was performed using the free statistical package “R” (https://www.r-project.org) with the in-built Non-Linear Least Squares function.

All three scenarios reproduce the observed downward trend in T1. Calibrated declines rates with standard error (in brackets) were 1.24% (± 0.05%), 1.70% (± 0.07%) and 2.66% (± 0.13%) for high, medium and low respectively. The result is a simple calibrated model that can be used to project forward based on recent trends, for the purpose of comparing against the more complex modelling scenarios from H-D. The results are shown in Fig 2(A), with the modelled T1 values projected to 2050. The decoupling predicted by H-D is also shown (taking T1 as their predicted impact divided by their predicted GDP). Clearly H-D predict stronger decoupling than our strongest case. In terms of the simplified IPAT model, even for our most optimistic T1,ult scenario, this implies a change to a greater decline rate than can be obtained merely by calibrating against historical trends.

In the case of material extraction, T2 has been increasing over recent years; in other words, according to H-D’s historical data, material use has not been on a decoupling trajectory in Australia. This is not unexpected, reflecting Australia’s strong dependence on its extractive industries. However, it means that in order to obtain a good fit to historical data, T2,ult must be greater than T2,0. The units of T2 are tonnes of material extracted per thousand $AUD (2010), and T2,0 = 1.091 in the year 1980. Three scenarios are adopted as an upper bound to future material intensity: low (T2,ult = 1.25T2(2010) = 1.513), medium (T2,ult = 1.50T2(2010) = 1.815) and high (T2,ult = 2.00T2(2010) = 2.420). As before, the model is calibrated by finding the decline rate r2 for each T2,ult scenario. The scenarios calibrate well in all three scenarios with r2 = 2.75% (± 0.47%), 1.36% (± 0.22%) and 0.68% (± 0.11%) for low, medium and high T2,ult scenarios respectively. Fig 2(B) shows the historical and modelled T2 values, plus H-D’s projection to 2050. The profound deviation from long-term trends reflects the assumptions embedded within H-D’s Stretch scenario, which anticipates major policy changes and a shift toward very different forms of production.

The results of calibrating Eq (5) to historical data are inconclusive; uncertainty in T1,ult and T2,ult makes long-term projections unreliable. In any case, historical observations of decoupling at national levels are fraught, for the reasons articulated earlier. We conclude that simplistically extrapolating historical trends is not a reliable technique for projecting future decoupling behavior. Moreover, the sophisticated analysis of H-D suggests that deviations from historical trends in Tj may be plausible, as shown in Figs 2 and 3. Hence from here onward we will focus on the Stretch scenario from H-D and assume it is a plausible future of rapid technological development and proactive policy settings, which could lead to rapid decoupling from energy and material use.

In order to re-calibrate Eq (5) to create a more useful long-term projection, we use the period 2015–2050 in H-D’s Stretch scenario. The scenario already contains embedded assumptions regarding strong efficiency gains (30% drop in energy intensity and almost 70% drop in material intensity by 2050). As with the historical calibration, T1 and T2 are taken as H-D’s predicted energy and material use, I1 and I2 respectively, divided by their predicted GDP. We adopt a single Tj,ult scenario for each resource, and arbitrarily assume resource use intensity can be reduced to 50% of the Tj attained by H-D’s model in 2050, giving values of T1,ult = 0.881 MJ per thousand $AUD and T2,ult = 0.139 tonnes per thousand $AUD. The decline rates rj are calibrated in the same manner as above.

Fig 3 shows the calibrated model runs, with a projection to 2100. Calibrated decline rates are r1 = 2.06% (± 0.12%) and r2 = 5.59% (± 0.11%) for final energy demand and material extraction, respectively. A 95% confidence interval on each Tj prediction is obtained by performing additional model runs using upper and lower values for rj (mean ± 1.96 × SE); this is included as a coloured band around each solid coloured line in Fig 3, but is only clearly visible on T1, being too narrow to see on T2. Finally, to check the appropriateness of our Tj,ult scenarios, a further calibration is performed by varying both rj and Tj,ult. This allows us to estimate the ultimate resource intensity if technology followed the trend projected by H-D, giving calibrated values T1,ult = 1.64 (± 0.05) and T2,ult = 0.19 (± 0.01). From this we can see that our projection is more optimistic than the Stretch scenario of H-D (which was their most optimistic scenario), and we proceed on the basis that our modelled conditions must be considered extremely favorable to decoupling.

Fig 4 shows values of Tj inferred for current energy and total material use across a range of countries, in order to provide some context to the future decoupling scenarios being modelled. It is clear that by this measure, Australia is already one of the most energy-efficient economies in the world. H-D project that by 2050 Australia will improve further, to be on par with Denmark and Sweden today, and our chosen T1,ult value assumes Australia can ultimately become more energy-efficient (per unit GDP) than any country on the planet today. With respect to material use, H-D project that by 2050 Australia will have completely transformed from being one of the most materially intensive economies today, to being one of mid-range material intensity (by current measures). Our assumption of a 50% further reduction in T2,ult would place Australia's ultimate material efficiency at a level equivalent to high-income countries today that have relatively low dependence on extractive industries, such as New Zealand. These assumptions can indeed be viewed as an extremely optimistic scenario of future technological improvement.

The calibrated model can now be used to explore the potential future evolution of resource use under continued economic growth. For this projection, the growth rate k = 2.41%, which is the average GDP growth rate from 2015 to 2050 in H-D’s Stretch scenario. Fig 5 shows the modelled projection of impact Ij to 2100. Projected GDP at the end of the century is 7.7 times its 2015 level. Material extractions and final energy demand in 2100 are up 29% (95% confidence interval 28.4–30.7%) and 256% (95% confidence interval 241–273%) respectively, relative to 2015 levels. Considering the embedded optimistic assumptions for Tj,ult, this result is a robust rebuttal to the claim of absolute decoupling. Fig 5 also includes the projections for Ij using the model in which both rj and Tult were calibrated (i.e. most closely reproducing the trends in H-D’s projections). Using that model, energy demand in 2100 would be five times higher than in 2015, and material extraction would rise by 71%.

Importantly, as Tj moves towards a constant value (Tj,ult), the growth rate of Ij approaches the economic growth rate k. Thus, whilst in 2015 the growth rates for material extraction and final energy demand (-1.87% and +1.47% respectively) are all less than the 2.41% economic growth rate, by 2100 these have changed to +2.16% and +1.89% and by 2150, both I1 and I2 exhibit growth rates close to the economic growth rate (2.42% and 2.21% respectively).

On the basis of this simple modeling, we conclude that decoupling of GDP growth from resource use, whether relative or absolute, is **at best only temporary**. Permanent decoupling (absolute or relative) is **impossible** for essential, non-substitutable resources because the efficiency gains are ultimately governed by physical limits.

Discussion & Conclusions

Our model demonstrates that growth in GDP ultimately cannot plausibly be decoupled from growth in material and energy use, demonstrating categorically that GDP **growth cannot be sustained indefinitely**. It is therefore misleading to develop growth-oriented policy around the expectation that decoupling is possible. However, we also note that GDP has been shown to be a poor proxy for societal wellbeing, something it was never designed to measure, and GDP growth is therefore a questionable long-term societal goal in any case. The mounting costs of “uneconomic growth” [43] suggest that the pursuit of decoupling–if it were possible–in order to sustain GDP growth would be a misguided effort.

Society can sustainably improve wellbeing, including the wellbeing of its natural assets, but only by discarding the goal of GDP growth in favor of more comprehensive measures of societal wellbeing [44]. The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recently agreed to by all UN countries, represent a much broader conception of the goals of society. These goals include eliminating poverty and hunger, reducing inequality, protecting and restoring the climate, and terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Only one of the 17 goals mentions GDP growth, but it is qualified as “inclusive and sustainable growth”. Certainly, GDP growth over the last several decades has not been inclusive–inequality is getting worse in most countries. For GDP growth to be sustainable it would have to be decoupled from energy and material use and environmental impacts. We have shown that there is little evidence that GDP growth can be decoupled in the long-term (i.e. it is not sustainable).

If GDP growth as a societal goal is unsustainable, then it is ultimately necessary for nations and the world to transition to a steady or declining GDP scenario. We contend that it will be easier to start this **transition now** while there is still capacity for technological gains, rather than go down the path of decoupling and be forced to make a transition post 2050 when we are closer to the theoretical limits to technological efficiency gains. We argue that **now is the time to recognize the biophysical limits**, and to begin the overdue task of re-orienting society around a more achievable and satisfying set of goals than simply growing forever [44,45].

### 2NC – AT: Inequality

#### Global inequality is increasing---their theory lacks statistical proof.

Ravallion '17 [Martin; 2017; PhD in economics from the London School of Economics, Professor of Economics at Georgetown; "Inequality and globalization: A review essay Martin Ravallion," www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2017-435.pdf/]

As normally measured, “global inequality” is the relative inequality of incomes found among all people in the world no matter where they live. Francois Bourguignon and Branko Milanovic have written insightful and timely books on global inequality, emphasizing the role of globalization. The books are complementary; Milanovic provides an ambitious broad-brush picture, with some intriguing hypotheses on the processes at work; Bourguignon provides a deep and suitably qualified, economic analysis. The paper questions the thesis of both books that globalization has been a major driving force of inequality between or within countries. The paper also questions the robustness of the evidence for declining global inequality, and notes some conceptual limitations of standard measures in capturing the concerns of many observers in the ongoing debates about globalization and the policy responses.

1. Introduction

Income inequality is in the news, and a policy concern in many countries. Two new volumes by two leading scholars on inequality, Francois Bourguignon (2016) and Branko Milanovic (2016), are thus welcome. While both authors are economists who have contributed at the frontiers of knowledge, each has written for a broad audience. Non-economists will have little trouble following the arguments. Economists will also appreciate the many subtleties of the subject that the authors manage to convey in accessible terms. The books are timely—even more so now than when they were written.

The Bourguignon volume provides a concise introduction to the economics of inequality. The book’s strengths are its clear exposition of the economic forces impacting the global distribution of income and its policy analysis. The strengths of the Milanovic volume are its descriptions of how distribution has changed and its thought-provoking interpretations of the political and economic forces at work.

The books provide measures of global income inequality (hereafter “global inequality”), often drawing on the authors’ own data work. But the bulk of their effort is in trying to explain what they see in the data. They bring perspectives from both macroeconomics (notably on sources of growth within countries) and microeconomics (why some households are better able to participate in that growth), as well as from history and the history of thought. Both knowledgably span the world, from poor to rich countries—as is appropriate for books on global inequality. Bourguignon draws more completely on the theories and evidence found in modern economic writings on the subject. Milanovic takes a somewhat more idiosyncratic approach, grounded in his own interpretations of the evidence he assembles. (I expect that Milanovic’s style sells more copies.) They broadly agree on the evidence. Bourguignon probes more deeply in trying to understand that evidence as an economist. Both authors sprinkle their text with their own opinions, though Bourguignon provides a clearer idea of what they are based on. The essay begins with an overview of what these books tell us about the trends in global inequality. It then critically examines what they say about the causative factors and policy responses. Finally, comments are offered on some broader concerns, applicable to much of the literature on global inequality.

The evidence on global inequality

The historical patterns identified in both books can be summarized as follows. Looking back over 200 years, one finds that global inequality—defined as the relative inequality of incomes among all peoples of the world ignoring where they live—was on a rising trend from 1820 to about 1990.2 This long period of rising inequality was driven in the main by the divergent growth processes, with today’s rich world taking off economically from the early C 19th (though with some late starters such as Japan). Average inequality within countries was stagnant or even falling over much of this period, most notably over the middle half century of the C20th—known as the Great Levelling in the rich world.

This pattern changed dramatically toward the end of the C 20th with an overall pattern of falling inequality between countries alongside rising average inequality within countries. This new pattern in the evolution of global inequality is the main focus of both books. Figure 1 shows the series of global inequality measures provided by Bourguignon, using a Theil index. 3 We see the fall in global inequality, markedly so in the new Millennium. This has been driven by a decline in inequality between countries, which accounts for the bulk of total inequality. Average inequality within countries (population-weighted) has edged upwards since 2000. 4

There are numerous data issues underlying Figure 1, related to household surveys, price indices, census data and the role played by national accounts. Neither book goes into much detail on these issues, though Chapter 1 of each book provides a brief summary of how their estimates for global inequality were derived.5 Nor will this essay focus on data issues. But I flag only one issue that should be kept in mind. Along with both authors, I suspect that the within-country component in Figure 1 is being underestimated. There are a number of reasons. Selective compliance in surveys is a concern almost everywhere; in particular, it is plausible that the rich are less likely to participate in household surveys. The bias could well be large: Korinek et al. (2006) estimate that correcting for such selective compliance adds about five percentage points to the Gini index for the U.S. There are also concerns about under-reporting of incomes, especially income from capital. Estimates using income tax records have indicated larger “highend” incomes than found in surveys (Atkinson et al., 2011). It is likely that the true level of within-country inequality is higher than currently measured. It is less clear how much these measurement errors matter to the trend, but my own expectation is that inequality within countries is rising more than the data in Figure 1 suggest, on the presumption that many newly affluent respondents are reticent to fully reveal their gains or even to participate in surveys.

The aggregate summary statistics in Figure 1 do not reveal much about how income changes were distributed across the population. Milanovic starts out with a more informative tool for describing the evolution of income distribution in the world, using a graph from Lakner and Milanovic (2016a) which plots the proportionate gain in income over 1988-2008 against fractiles of the income distribution, as reproduced in Figure 2. This is a version of a “growth incidence curve” (GIC), as defined in formal terms for continuous distributions by Ravallion and Chen (2003) who discuss the curve’s properties. 6 The methodology used to construct the GIC in Figure 2 is explained in Lakner and Milanovic (2016a).

The Lakner-Milanovic graph has been dubbed the “elephant chart” since it traces the shape of an elephant’s head with its trunk held high. Readers who are used to hearing about rising inequality in the rich world will see that feature in the graph; strikingly, between the 80th percentile (from the bottom) and the top 1% globally we see a steeply positive curve (the elephant’s raised trunk), rising from near zero growth to over a 60% gain for the top percentile. But readers also see something as striking—the marked proportionate rise in incomes for those near the middle of the global distribution (the elephant’s massive and expanding head). This came with considerably slower growth for the poorest.

As Lakner and Milanovic note, the Lorenz curves intersect internally, as can be seen in Figure 3.While the overall Gini index fell (from 72% to 71%) this came with a marked inward shift of the Lorenz curve between the 30th and 80th percentiles but an outward shift among the top decile and a declining share for the poorest 5%. The Lakner-Milanovic estimates imply that the share of the world’s top 1% rose from 12% to 15% between 1988 and 2008.

So rather than suggesting a decline in global inequality, this is actually quite an ambiguous picture of distributional change. Given that there is not Lorenz dominance, the claim that global inequality is falling is not robust to the choice of index; some valid inequality measures (such as the Gini index and the Theil index, as in Figure 1) can show a decrease while other equally valid measures do not. 7 With sufficiently strong aversion to inequality one would declare that global inequality has in fact risen. Consider for example the Atkinson (1970) index, which has a parameter  reflecting the aversion to inequality; a higher value of  implies that one is willing to incur a greater loss when transferring money from the rich to the poor (i.e., a lower share actually reaching the poor) and yet still judge that social welfare has increased.8 I calculate that the Atkinson index of global inequality has fallen over 1988-2008 for   4 but that inequality has risen for   5 or 6. 9 The upshot of these observations is that with sufficiently strong aversion to inequality, one will judge that global inequality has risen over this period.

### 2NC – AT: Reform Solves

#### Reform fails---accumulation intrinsic to capitalism is unsustainable---the magnitude of collapse is underestimated and outweighs all other impacts which are recoverable shocks.

Monbiot '19 [George; 4/25/19; columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science); "Dare to declare capitalism dead – before it takes us all down with it," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/25/capitalism-economic-system-survival-earth/]

But as I’ve grown older, I’ve come to recognise two things. First, that it is the system, rather than any variant of the system, that drives us inexorably towards disaster. Second, that you do not have to produce a definitive alternative to say that capitalism is failing. The statement stands in its own right. But it also demands another, and different, effort to develop a new system.

Capitalism’s failures arise from two of its defining elements. The first is perpetual growth. Economic growth is the aggregate effect of the quest to accumulate capital and extract profit. Capitalism collapses without growth, yet perpetual growth on a finite planet leads inexorably to environmental calamity.

Those who defend capitalism argue that, as consumption switches from goods to services, economic growth can be decoupled from the use of material resources. Last week a paper in the journal New Political Economy, by Jason Hickel and Giorgos Kallis, examined this premise. They found that while some relative decoupling took place in the 20th century (material resource consumption grew, but not as quickly as economic growth), in the 21st century there has been a recoupling: rising resource consumption has so far matched or exceeded the rate of economic growth. The absolute decoupling needed to avert environmental catastrophe (a reduction in material resource use) has never been achieved, and appears impossible while economic growth continues. Green growth is an illusion.

A system based on perpetual growth cannot function without peripheries and externalities. There must always be an extraction zone – from which materials are taken without full payment – and a disposal zone, where costs are dumped in the form of waste and pollution. As the scale of economic activity increases until capitalism affects everything, from the atmosphere to the deep ocean floor, the entire planet becomes a sacrifice zone: we all inhabit the periphery of the profit-making machine.

This drives us towards cataclysm on such a scale that most people have no means of imagining it. The threatened collapse of our life-support systems is bigger by far than war, famine, pestilence or economic crisis, though it is likely to incorporate all four. Societies can recover from these apocalyptic events, but not from the loss of soil, an abundant biosphere and a habitable climate.

The second defining element is the bizarre assumption that a person is entitled to as great a share of the world’s natural wealth as their money can buy. This seizure of common goods causes three further dislocations. First, the scramble for exclusive control of non-reproducible assets, which implies either violence or legislative truncations of other people’s rights. Second, the immiseration of other people by an economy based on looting across both space and time. Third, the translation of economic power into political power, as control over essential resources leads to control over the social relations that surround them.

In the New York Times on Sunday, the Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz sought to distinguish between good capitalism, which he called “wealth creation”, and bad capitalism, which he called “wealth grabbing” (extracting rent). I understand his distinction. But from the environmental point of view, wealth creation is wealth grabbing. Economic growth, intrinsically linked to the increasing use of material resources, means seizing natural wealth from both living systems and future generations.

To point to such problems is to invite a barrage of accusations, many of which are based on this premise: capitalism has rescued hundreds of millions of people from poverty – now you want to impoverish them again. It is true that capitalism, and the economic growth it drives, has radically improved the prosperity of vast numbers of people, while simultaneously destroying the prosperity of many others: those whose land, labour and resources were seized to fuel growth elsewhere. Much of the wealth of the rich nations was – and is – built on slavery and colonial expropriation.

Like coal, capitalism has brought many benefits. But, like coal, it now causes more harm than good. Just as we have found means of generating useful energy that are better and less damaging than coal, so we need to find means of generating human wellbeing that are better and less damaging than capitalism.

### 2NC – AT: Tech Solves

#### Tech fixes are a short-term delaying tactic to ensure fossil-fuel profits for as long as possible---only anti-capitalist transformation of society can avoid business as usual.

Black ‘21 [Emma; 5/23/21; writer for Red Flag; "Capitalism’s fake solutions to the climate crisis," <https://redflag.org.au/article/capitalisms-fake-solutions-climate-crisis/>]

“Net zero by 2050” (or 2060 in China’s case) has become the new mainstream political mantra on climate change. However, this ambitious-sounding, yet still far from adequate, goal is premised on a series of new technologies that remain untested at best and completely hypothetical at worst.

The name dropping of an array of these high-tech “solutions” to the climate crisis was a feature of US President Joe Biden’s Earth Day summit in April. Among those in which Biden has promised to invest US$35 billion as part of his proposed American Jobs Plan are carbon capture and storage, hydrogen, nuclear, floating offshore wind, biofuels and electric vehicles.

While the disappearance of the outright climate denialism of the Trump era might seem cause for celebration, the new trend for spruiking the magical power of technology to solve the climate crisis is cause for serious concern. When you look beyond the headline-grabbing announcements of increased long-term ambition, the Earth Day summit amounted to little more than another case of government greenwashing of the business as usual of fossil-fuelled capitalism.

Instead of detailing the changes to be made in the here and now to reduce emissions, Biden and other world leaders instead promoted faith in the capacity of science and technology to come to the rescue at an indeterminate point in the future.

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison was among them. While the media highlighted the supposed gulf between a progressive, “green” Biden and the conservative, fossil-fuel-loving Morrison, they both promoted the same faith in the powers of technology. Like Biden, Morrison has vowed to invest tens of billions of dollars in developing carbon capture and storage technologies, “clean” hydrogen, “blue” carbon and “green” steel—among other colourful innovations.

In May’s federal budget, the Coalition allocated more than half a billion dollars to developing the first two of these technologies—$263.7 million for carbon capture and storage (CCS) and $275.5 million for “clean” hydrogen.

CCS mostly involves capturing C02 emissions at their source—in mines, power stations and so on—and pumping them deep underground (so the theory goes) to be permanently stored in appropriately porous and stable rock formations. But despite politicians and business leaders spruiking CCS as an easy fix for the climate crisis for decades, it has never been shown to work on anything near the scale required.

Australia already boasts the world’s largest, supposedly functional, CCS facility at Chevron’s Gorgon gas project in Western Australia. However, according to the Climate Council, “the Gorgon CCS trial has been a big, expensive failure ... capturing less than half the emissions needed to make CCS viable”. In what is only the latest in a series of problems since it became operational in 2019, Michael Mazengarb reported in Renew Economy earlier this year that pumping equipment required to clear water from the undersea formation into which the C02 is to be injected had become clogged with sand.

However, while CCS may be useless for addressing climate change, it remains an extremely useful political tool for the government—providing it with green cover while it continues to funnel money to Coalition supporters in the coal and gas industries. And of course, it’s also useful for those companies on the receiving end of the government’s “green” largesse.

Bernard Keane was right in his assessment of it as a scam in Crikey. “Fossil fuel interests”, he wrote in 2019, “sense the opportunity to extract some taxpayer funding from a government worried it might have to pretend it believes in climate change”. With this year’s budget, they hit the jackpot.

But if CCS is a scam, what about “clean” hydrogen? In his speech to the Earth Day summit, Morrison vowed to rival US innovation by investing billions in high-tech “hydrogen valleys”. “In the United States you have the Silicon Valley”, he said. “Here in Australia we are creating our own ‘Hydrogen Valleys’, where we will transform our transport industries, our mining and resource sectors, our manufacturing, our fuel and energy production.”

Hydrogen is potentially a clean energy source, but only if it’s produced using renewable energy. And to be produced at the scale required to transform the economy in the way Morrison is implying would require a lot of electricity.

In his recent contribution to the Quarterly Essay, Australia’s former chief scientist, Alan Finkel, calculates that to produce the equivalent volume of hydrogen to what Australia currently exports in liquefied natural gas would require “approximately 2,200 terawatt-hours” of electricity. This, Finkel notes, “is about eight times Australia’s total electricity generation in 2019”.

If Morrison genuinely believes the “hydrogen boom” he envisages will be based on production of renewable energy on that kind of scale, the government would have provided increased funding for renewables in the budget. None was forthcoming.

The reality is that Morrison sees the talk of “hydrogen valleys” as a way of greenwashing the same old “gas-fired recovery” he was promoting last year. The government doesn’t envisage producing hydrogen with electricity from renewables, but rather from gas. The focus on CCS gives the game away. The “hydrogen valleys” of the future will be criss-crossed with pipelines and peppered with gas-fired power stations with (we’re supposed to believe) the magic of CCS ensuring that the whole operation can nevertheless be run green and guilt-free.

“Clean” hydrogen then, just like CCS, turns out to be just another technological chimera designed to greenwash capitalism’s continuing addiction to fossil fuels.

What then of the other technological solutions being touted? Perhaps the most headline grabbing of them has been Biden’s proposed US$174 billion investment in the infrastructure for electric vehicles and their production. On the surface, again, this might sound like a good idea. Who wouldn’t want to live in a world in which we can all drive around in sleek, silent, powerful and “green” electric vehicles like Teslas?

Again, however, this is just another fake technological “fix” to the climate crisis that will help perpetuate the environmentally destructive status quo. A genuinely sustainable society won’t be built around the kind of car culture that exists today. What’s needed, among other things, is a massive investment in public transport and the transformation of cities to reduce the need for long commutes.

The promotion of electric vehicles as part of a technological “green” utopia is designed to forestall this kind of change, to protect as much as possible the car makers and other big business interests that profit from the status quo.

Elon Musk personifies this. In his authorised biography, Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future, Ashlee Vance revealed that Musk’s California “hyperloop” proposal was aimed at quashing plans for a high-speed rail link between Los Angeles and San Francisco. “Musk had dished out the Hyperloop proposal just to make the public and legislators rethink the high-speed train”, wrote Vance. “He didn’t intend to build the thing ... With any luck, the high-speed rail would be cancelled. Musk said as much to me during a series of emails and phone calls leading up to the announcement.”

For those who can afford it (a base-level Tesla will set you back an eye-watering $73,900 in Australia today), driving an electric car might make you feel like you’re doing something to help save the planet. This is an illusion.

Even if your car is charged from electricity produced by renewable energy, you also have to consider all the emissions produced in the construction and maintenance of the roads and freeways on which you drive. Then there’s the material of the car itself, and the lithium needed for the battery. Already, the skyrocketing demand is causing major environmental problems for major lithium producers like China, Chile and Bolivia. Tellingly, Musk has already devised the ultimate escape plan for himself—moving to Mars. This is not an option for most people.

The long list of fake technological fixes to the climate crisis is nothing more than a delaying tactic, designed to create the impression of change to ensure the profits bonanza of the fossil fuel economy can continue for as long as possible. Only a total transformation of society, in which technological production is rationally designed and democratically organised and controlled, can ensure that we are able, in Marx’s words, “to bequeath the Earth in an improved state to succeeding generations”.

### 2NC – AT: World Better

#### Capitalism has failed---the world is unambiguously not getting better.

Foster '19 [John Bellamy; 2/1/19; Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, PhD in Political Science from York University, President and Board Member of the Monthly Review; "Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?" https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/]

Less than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialization, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war.

To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3

Indications of this failure of capitalism are everywhere. Stagnation of investment punctuated by bubbles of financial expansion, which then inevitably burst, now characterizes the so-called free market.4 Soaring inequality in income and wealth has its counterpart in the declining material circumstances of a majority of the population. Real wages for most workers in the United States have barely budged in forty years despite steadily rising productivity.5 Work intensity has increased, while work and safety protections on the job have been systematically jettisoned. Unemployment data has become more and more meaningless due to a new institutionalized underemployment in the form of contract labor in the gig economy.6 Unions have been reduced to mere shadows of their former glory as capitalism has asserted totalitarian control over workplaces. With the demise of Soviet-type societies, social democracy in Europe has perished in the new atmosphere of “liberated capitalism.”7

The capture of the surplus value produced by overexploited populations in the poorest regions of the world, via the global labor arbitrage instituted by multinational corporations, is leading to an unprecedented amassing of financial wealth at the center of the world economy and relative poverty in the periphery.8 Around $21 trillion of offshore funds are currently lodged in tax havens on islands mostly in the Caribbean, constituting “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”9 Technologically driven monopolies resulting from the global-communications revolution, together with the rise to dominance of Wall Street-based financial capital geared to speculative asset creation, have further contributed to the riches of today’s “1 percent.” Forty-two billionaires now enjoy as much wealth as half the world’s population, while the three richest men in the United States—Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett—have more wealth than half the U.S. population.10 In every region of the world, inequality has increased sharply in recent decades.11 The gap in per capita income and wealth between the richest and poorest nations, which has been the dominant trend for centuries, is rapidly widening once again.12 More than 60 percent of the world’s employed population, some two billion people, now work in the impoverished informal sector, forming a massive global proletariat. The global reserve army of labor is some 70 percent larger than the active labor army of formally employed workers.13

#### Their notion of “progress” required massive human and ecological harm---don’t ignore material change, but recenter your conception of what type of progress is desirable.

McCarraher '19 [Eugene; 11/12/19; Associate Professor of Humanities at Villanova University, PhD in US Cultural and Intellectual History from Rutgers University; The Enchantments of Mammon: How Capitalism Became the Religion of Modernity, p. 13-14]

Because I emphasize this enchanting carceral quality, some readers may complain that I overlook the real advances in human flourishing made possible by capitalism. Although I consider this objection a red herring, I want to make clear that I am not one of those churlish reactionary radicals who see nothing in capitalist modernity but one long, unrelieved nightmare of greed, brutality, and desiccating rationalization. The technological achievements of capitalism have surely improved the social and material conditions of billions of people; as none other than Marx asked in the Communist Manifesto, what earlier time “had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?” Still—and this needs to be reiterated at a time of wavering but nonetheless ascendant capitalist triumphalism—these improvements would also not have been possible without labor unions, radical movements, welfare states, and political parties that mobilized unremitting popular struggle against the imperatives and institutions of capital. Moreover, it is essential to remember that, as Benjamin observed, every document of civilization is also a document of barbarism; during the tragically dialectical epoch of class struggle, all human achievement is tainted by oppression. It’s a ruefully ironic observation with which Augustine would, I suspect, have concurred. Marveling in the City of God at “all the arts discovered and developed by human genius,” Augustine still insisted that the aims and means of these arts could nonetheless be “dangerous and harmful” on account of our corruption.20

Thus, in the spirit of Augustine and Benjamin, I don’t deny the reality of “progress,” but I contend that the problem of “progress” is not as Christopher Lasch posed it in The True and Only Heaven (1991)—“ progress and its critics”—but rather the meaning of “progress.” 21 Despite caricatures of Luddism or technophobia, almost none of my anticapitalist protagonists desired a reversion to premodern technology and social relations. It is more accurate to say that the moral and ontological primacy of money in capitalist civilization has valorized a particular conception of “progress” that was, in their view, humanly and ecologically destructive despite all the material benefits it has conferred. (Even Marx succumbed to it.) Yet they did not call for the restoration of earlier social orders, nor did they believe that hammers and hoes would exhaust the technical possibilities of a world after capitalism. Their example suggests not that we should resurrect the past, but that we need to revisit what we mean by “progress,” and not change the subject by invoking cyberspace or holding up the newest version of the iPhone.

#### Economics under capitalism is a straight line from colonialism---cultural progress isn’t because of capitalism and doesn’t prove its desirability.

Norberg-Hodge '19 [Helena; June 2019; founder and director of Local Futures and The International Alliance for Localization; This Civilization is Finished: Conversations on the end of Empire—and what lies beyond, Post-Script, no page #]

It’s of vital importance to distinguish between two very different forms of progress. The past century has seen cultural trends that can generally be termed ‘progressive’; we are moving away from the outright barbarism of the days of colonialism, and lessening the stronghold of white supremacy and patriarchy. The economic trajectory, however, has remained out of touch with those changing values, and has continued on a straight line from colonialism. Wealth inequality has expanded to record extremes, and slavery, cultural destruction, and domination over nature have only become more insidious. From its very inception in 17th-century Britain, the global economy set out to invade and undermine local economies, extract their wealth, and amalgamate them into a monocultural, centralised system. This was originally achieved through conquest, genocide, and slavery. In the modern era, with ever greater specialisation within large-scale technological systems, it has become increasingly difficult for individuals to recognise the overall impact of their actions. Whether worker, consumer, politician, or CEO, it’s virtually impossible to be sure that you are not harming ecosystems or people on the other side of the world. It’s as though our arms have grown so long we can’t see what our hands are doing.

## Alt

### 2NC – Alt Solvency

#### **International organization and revolution is possible – now is time to capitalize on energy**

Tavan '21 [Luca; 3/7/21; writer for Red Flag; "Worldwide revolution is possible and necessary," <https://redflag.org.au/article/worldwide-revolution-possible-and-necessary/>]

From the moment Marx and Engels urged workers of the world to unite at the climax of the Communist Manifesto, the goal of international revolution has been at the core of Marxist politics.

International revolution isn’t just a romantic dream, but an urgent necessity. It’s the only means by which capitalism can be permanently uprooted and replaced with socialism. This is because capitalism, unlike previous class societies, is a globally integrated system. “For the first time in history”, wrote British Marxist Colin Barker of this phenomenon, “capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate”.

Capitalism has linked every nation in a global chain of production. Take your mobile phone for example. It was likely assembled in China, using computer chips manufactured in Taiwan, powered by coal exported from Australia and produced with minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo according to specifications developed in Europe or the United States. No single country produces all the things necessary to satisfy its population’s needs, unlike the various forms of society that came before capitalism, which were mostly self-sufficient and organised around small local economies.

Capitalism was established as a world system through immense robbery and violence—from the international slave trade, which fuelled the Industrial Revolution, to the murderous colonisation of what is now Australia. That same violence is today used by states to defend their imperialist interests, and discipline any movements that get in their way. Movements that aspire to national independence or that back left-wing reformist governments have been demolished with the aid of the great capitalist powers countless times in the past century, from the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 1973 to the 2019 Bolivian coup.

Revolutionary movements that attempt to overturn the entire capitalist system face a much more severe response. This was confirmed by the defeat of the Russian Revolution. In 1917 workers, radicalised by years of war and economic crisis, overthrew the tsarist regime and eventually took power into their own hands. In response, the capitalist powers of the world united to crush the workers’ state, in alliance with reactionaries who wanted to restore the tsarist regime. Unless revolutions can spread internationally and challenge the imperialist powers that have an interest in destroying them, they will be crushed.

A heroic effort by Russian workers and peasants fought off 16 foreign invading armies, but at a great cost. The working class was decimated, the factories were depopulated, and the radical working-class democracy that had been built withered. The isolation and poverty imposed on Russia made building socialism an impossibility, and a new Stalinist regime emerged that reversed most of the gains of the revolution.

Because Russian revolutionary socialists who pinned their hopes on spreading revolution across the globe were ultimately defeated, their example is used by defenders of capitalism as a cautionary tale today: that a worldwide revolution against the system is an impossible dream.

But capitalism’s global nature means that revolts tend to spread across national borders. Workers today share increasingly similar experiences: conditions of work, forms of consumption, lifestyles and political cultures. And the global integration of production serves to transmit struggle from one country to another. In 1974, for instance, resistance to the brutal military dictatorship in Chile spread to East Kilbride, Scotland, of all places. Workers at the Rolls Royce factory there learned that the engines they were repairing were being used by the Chilean air force to drop bombs on workers resisting the coup. They downed tools and refused to work on the engines, keeping them out of the hands of the military junta for four years.

While nationalism still has a powerful hold on the consciousness of many, it’s increasingly clear that the real line of polarisation across the globe is between the minority ruling class and the majority working class. And when revolts break out in one part of the world, people can identify with the causes and motivations of their struggles, and draw comparisons with their own situation. “Languages remain different,” observed UK Marxist Chris Harman in 1992, “but what they say is increasingly the same”. Harman’s words ring true in every wave of political radicalisation.

1968 is remembered as a year of global revolt, when millions of workers, students and oppressed people drew inspiration from each other’s movements. Activists in the US were radicalised by the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people to American imperialism. Irish civil rights activists emulated the militant politics of the Black Panthers. When students and workers united to launch a massive general strike in France in May, it taught student radicals in Australia that they needed to link up with the power of the organised working class in order to win.

The movements of 1968 united people across superficially very different societies. For decades, Cold War common sense had dictated that the greatest divide on the planet was between Western liberal capitalism and Stalinist “Communism”. But in 1968, both sides of the iron curtain exploded in revolt. The triggers for the struggles may have been different, but they were all responses to similar issues: inequality, exploitation and war, imposed by monstrous bureaucratic states.

In 2011, a poor Tunisian street vendor set himself alight to protest against police harassment. Within days, his act had inspired anti-government protests across the country. Within weeks, the protests escalated into a regional revolt that challenged regimes across the Arab world. One small act tapped into resentment against inequality, unemployment and state violence that engulfed an entire region. The radical wave spread even further: at a massive demonstration against an anti-union bill in the US city of Madison, Wisconsin, a man held up a poster with a picture of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak beside Republican Governor Scott Walker. The caption read: “One dictator down. One to go”. The Arab revolutions went on to inspire the Occupy movement, which spread to more than 80 countries.

Today, more than ever, insurgent social movements and working-class uprisings are spurring action in other parts of the world—from Hong Kong to Chile, from Lebanon to France. One placard at a memorial for protesters murdered while resisting the military coup in Myanmar took up Marx’s incitement: “Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains”.

While the Russian Revolution is cynically held up by capitalist ideologists as the ultimate argument against international revolution, it actually proves the opposite. It shows that the goal is not only necessary, but also that it’s possible. The news of workers seizing power in Russia, overthrowing their capitalist government and declaring their withdrawal from WWI, created shock waves across the planet. Workers in Germany rose in revolt a year later, ending the war for good and building soviets, a form of radical working-class democracy inspired by the Russian example. This was followed by uprisings in France, Italy and Hungary.

The revolutionary wave spread further. A classified British government report from 1919 noted a “very widespread feeling among workers that thrones have become anachronisms, and that the Soviet may be the best form of Government for a democracy”.

The rising tide of radicalism had an impact in Australia too. Meatworkers in the Queensland city of Townsville donned red jumpers, stormed the local police station to free jailed unionists, and placed the city under workers’ control. The editor of the conservative Townsville Daily Bulletin lamented: “Townsville for the last year or so has been developing Bolshevism ... the mob management of affairs in this city, differs very little, from the Petrograd and Moscow brand”.

The Russian Bolsheviks, the revolutionary working-class party that led the revolution to victory in 1917, didn’t just passively wait for revolutions elsewhere. They actively organised to spread the revolt. In 1919, they established the Communist International, an organisation for debate, discussion and coordination between different revolutionary workers’ parties. Revolutionaries in Russia, Italy, France, Germany, the US, Australia and elsewhere attempted to clarify and develop a strategy for overthrowing capitalism everywhere. In none of these countries was there a party like the Bolsheviks, steeled in years of organising working-class struggle to overthrow the state, and capable of leading a revolution. But for a number of years, workers came close to overthrowing capitalism in several countries.

In periods of stability, when social conservatism dominates, international revolution can seem like a pipe dream. Defenders of the status quo actively work to reinforce this illusion. But history proves that the crises that the system generates are international, and that they will inevitably provoke international resistance.

Capitalism is a global system. It requires a global movement to tear it up, root and branch. But it also makes global revolution more possible, and more likely. The most important thing that socialists can do, whether you live in Hong Kong or France, Myanmar or Australia, is to get stuck into organising for it today.

#### Worldwide movement is possible---latent discontent is mounting but unifying under collective struggle is a historical necessity to preserve humanity.

Foster '19 [John Bellamy; 2/1/19; Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, PhD in Political Science from York University, President and Board Member of the Monthly Review; "Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?" https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/]

Indeed, history has been unkind to all such attempts to provide detailed forecasts of the future, particularly if they simply extend current trends and leave the bulk of humanity and their struggles out of the picture. It is for this reason that a dialectical view is so important. The actual course of history can never be predicted. The only thing certain about historical change is the existence of the struggles that drive it forward and that guarantee its discontinuous character. Both implosions and explosions inevitably materialize, rendering the world for new generations different than that of the old. History points to numerous social systems that have reached the limits of their ability to adapt their social relations to allow for the rational and sustainable use of developing productive forces. Hence, the human past is dotted by periods of regression, followed by revolutionary accelerations that sweep all before them. As the conservative historian Jacob Burckhardt declared in the nineteenth century, “a historical crisis” occurs when “a crisis in the whole state of things is produced, involving whole epochs and all or many peoples of the same civilization.… The historical process is suddenly accelerated in terrifying fashion. Developments which otherwise take centuries seem to flit by like phantoms in months or weeks, and are fulfilled.” He called this the “acceleration of historical processes.”91

Burckhardt principally had in mind social revolutions, like the French Revolution of 1789. This was an acceleration of history that, as the modern French historian Georges Lefebvre explained, commenced as a series of widening revolutions, mutating with terrifying speed, from an aristocratic revolution to a bourgeois revolution to a popular revolution and then a peasant revolution—finally taking on the character of a historic “bloc, a single thing,” seemingly unconquerable, which reshaped much of world history.92

Could such a revolutionary acceleration of history, though on an incomparably greater scale, happen in the twenty-first century? Most establishment commentators in the hegemonic countries of the world imperialist system would say no, based on their own narrow experience and limited view of history. Nevertheless, revolutions continue to break out in the periphery of the world system and are, even now, only put down by imperialist economic, political, and military interventions. Moreover, the failure of capitalism on a planetary scale today threatens all of civilization and life on the planet as we know it. If drastic changes are not made, global temperature this century will increase by 4° or even 6°C from preindustrial times, leading to conditions that will imperil humankind as a whole. Meanwhile, the extreme capitalism of today seeks to expropriate and enclose all the bases of material existence, siphoning off almost the entire net social surplus and robbing the natural environment for the direct benefit of a miniscule few.

As a direct result of capitalist social relations, the material challenges now facing humanity are greater than anything ever seen before, pointing to an accumulation of catastrophe along with the accumulation of capital.93 Hundreds of millions of people under these circumstances are already being drawn into struggles with the system, creating the basis of a new worldwide movement toward socialism. In his book Can the Working Class Change the World? Yates answers yes, it can. But it can only do so through a unifying struggle by workers and peoples aimed at genuine socialism.94

It may be objected that socialism has been tried and has failed and hence no longer exists as an alternative. However, like the earliest attempts at capitalism in the Italian city-states of the late Middle Ages, which were not strong enough to survive amongst the feudal societies that surrounded them, the failure of the first experiments at socialism presage nothing but its eventual rebirth in a new, more revolutionary, more universal form, which examines and learns from the failures.95 Even in failure, socialism has this advantage over capitalism: it is motivated by the demand for “freedom in general,” rooted in substantive equality and sustainable human development—reflecting precisely those collective social relations, borne of historical necessity and the unending struggle for human freedom, crucial to human survival in our time.96

The great conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter, who, as Austrian finance minister in Red Vienna, had allied himself for a time with the socialist government and found himself attacked on all sides, once wrote that capitalism would perish not because of “the weight of economic failure,” but rather because its “very success” in pursuing its narrow economic ends, had undermined the sociological foundations of its existence. Capitalism, Schumpeter exclaimed, “‘inevitably’ creates conditions in which it will not be able to live and which strongly point to socialism as its heir apparent.”97 He was, it turns out, in many ways correct, though not entirely in the way he expected. The global development of monopoly capitalism and financialization spearheaded by the very same counterrevolutionary neoliberalism that first arose in response to Red Vienna in the interwar years—at a time when Schumpeter himself was a major actor—has now undermined the material bases, not so much of capitalism itself, but of global society and planetary ecology. The result has been the emergence of an “atmosphere of almost universal hostility” to the prevailing social order, though, playing out in the confused context of the present, less as opposition to capitalism itself than to neoliberalism.98

It is capitalism’s undermining of the very basis of human existence that will eventually compel the world’s workers and peoples to seek new roads forward. An inclusive, class-based movement toward socialism in this century will open up the possibility of qualitative new developments that the anarchy of the capitalist-market society with its monopolistic competition, extreme inequality, and institutionalized greed cannot possibly offer.99 This includes the development of a socialist technology, in which both the forms of technology utilized and the purposes to which they are put are channeled in social directions, as opposed to individual and class gain.100 It introduces the prospect of long-term democratic planning at all levels of society, allowing decisions to be made and distributions to occur outside the logic of the cash nexus.101 Socialism, in its most radical form, is about substantive equality, community solidarity, and ecological sustainability; it is aimed at the unification—not simply division—of labor.

### 2NC – Bioimperialism Alt

#### The refusal of the aff’s imaginary in favor of the world presented by the alt is the only mechanism capable of reversing the bioimperialist trend

Gwen Shuni D’Arcangelis ’21, is an associate professor of gender studies at Skidmore College, “Bio-imperialism : disease, terror, and the construction of national fragility”, Rutgers University Press, 2021, accessed via pdf – email caitlinp96@gmail.com for a copy

The solution, I submit, lies in imagining alternatives to imperialist military-health configurations. Recall that the critical health practitionerscholars I mentioned in the first section of this chapter critiqued the imperial and transnational dimensions of U.S. biodefense. Their critique of the militarization of health revolved specifically around the way in which it negatively impacted global health equity—by diverting resources from pressing endemic global health problems. They were concerned with the way the U.S. national security apparatus pulled focus from global health. Nurses’ organizations also took on a global focus in their critiques of the NSVP—they were concerned not solely with the risks of the smallpox vaccine to the U.S. national population, but also with the global implications of supporting a biodefense program that would fuel an unjust war against Iraq. The Massachusetts Nurses Association stated: “We must use our health care abilities to build an international commitment to peace and human rights. Let the example of smallpox eradication be used to further cooperation.… We have pledged first to do no harm.… We will accept the smallpox vaccination when it is part of a worldwide effort to eradicate the disease. In that event the health care workers of Iraq would be inoculated as well” (“Vaccinate against War, Not Smallpox” 2003). This statement centered health care as a means to build international relations founded on peace and human rights, rather than militarism and oppression. It suggested an alternative to biodefense, rebuking the narrative of Iraq as a threat whose citizens deserve no protection as well as the complementary notion that the U.S. population is uniquely deserving of health and security. The nurses’ statement proposed that Iraqi health and lives be accorded utmost consideration. In doing so, the statement opposed bio-imperialism in the most fundamental sense—it called out the power dynamics between the United States and Iraq, advocating that biological resources, namely, the vaccine (in theory), not be hoarded by the United States, but should also benefit Iraqis. This rejection of U.S. hegemony over biological resources paved the way for health and security systems aimed at global equity.

#### Collective action of the alt generates subjects capable of challenging and dismantling the bioimperialist virus-sharing scheme – proves the alt solves the entirety of the aff

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Collective action had brought about a profound restructuring in global health governance, allowing significantly less powerful actors to be relatively successful against more powerful ones. Discourse-making, moreover, was vital to their accomplishments. The strategic displacement of “virus sharing” to “benefits sharing” destabilized the entire discursive scaffolding of “global health security.” Benefits sharing reversed the construction of vulnerability: if the existing view was a Eurocentric one premised on the notion that the Global North needed to be protected from the diseases of the Global South, the new paradigm highlighted that it was the Global South that was made vulnerable through the North’s biocolonial extraction of disease data and samples. This was a hard-won paradigm shift, as illustrated by the U.S. pushback in the struggle to obtain MTAs for originating countries. The United States had a strong stake in a system that gave global powers prime access to the data and samples furnished to the WHO. Accordingly, the United States rejected the Global South’s attempt to redistribute power through the MTA regime. At the World Health Assembly meeting in May 2007, the United States presented its draft resolution, which argued that adding MTAs would hinder the unfettered, immediate transfer of materials, and thus negatively impact vaccine production (Franklin 2009; Khor 2007; WHO 2008). In essence, the United States stuck to the notion that vaccine production was the sole goal, ignoring the crucial step that followed—how those vaccines would be distributed. The paradigm shift to benefits sharing also challenged another fundamental premise of global health security—that international authorities should supersede national ones. Benefits sharing repositioned national sovereignty over biological resources as the key mechanism for giving impacted nations control over their health outcomes. The focus on national sovereignty was, in the terms of sociocultural anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2008), a strategic insertion of “the nation as a scale of ethical exception to the global commodification of health” (126). The concept of national sovereignty prioritized the well-being of peoples actually affected by H5N1, and interrupted the predatory extraction of samples from the Global South. Thus, national sovereignty was articulated not as selfish or provincial, but as key to ensuring the health of those most impacted. The discourse of national sovereignty also chipped away at the rhetorics of security that had helped justify pandemic preparedness as a security imperative. It was certainly a difficult battle: the discourse of global health security had not only diminished national autonomy, but also coded nations such as China and Indonesia, who asserted their authority, as security threats. At a March 2007 WHO meeting held in Jakarta, for example, a WHO press release called Indonesia’s withholding of viruses a “threat to global public health security” (WHO 2007). This married false universalism (a disaggregated globe) with alarmist security rhetoric to sideline the equity issues that had been highlighted by Indonesia and its allies. U.S. government officials, along with much of the U.S. popular press, had also frequently deployed these security frames in response to Indonesia’s actions. Prominent public health journalists Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett, in their denouncement of Indonesia’s position, published an article in August 2008 in the Washington Post that described Indonesia’s failure to provide viruses as posing a “pandemic threat to all the peoples of the world.” The authors followed this with further security discourse: “Disturbingly, however, the notion [of viral sovereignty] has morphed into a global movement, fueled by self-destructive, anti-western sentiments” (Holbrooke and Garrett 2008; emphasis added). This characterization invoked the trope of the West-hating terrorist, but also the post-9 / 11 frame that was its complement—U.S. vulnerability, here aimed at cowing Global South nations that refused to comply with the North-led international system. The authors ended their article by calling on Indonesia to conform to the demands of “globally shared health risk,” further coding Indonesia’s challenge to the international health system as a global threat and upholding the myth that the international pandemic preparedness regime—and its fortification—benefited all nations. Indonesia finished what China had started when the latter briefly staged a flu sample sharing stoppage. The shift to benefits sharing and national sovereignty, and away from the rhetorics of global health security, diminished both the discursive and the institutional power of the North-led international system. Indonesia, along with its allies, interrupted the biocolonial extraction of resources from the Global South and altered the system itself, institutionalizing a redistribution of power to give the Global South a greater role in global health governance.

#### It aligns with grassroots organization and activism that is actively challenging bioimperialism

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In order to sever science and public health from U.S. empire—with its trappings of militarism, racism, and sexism—those centrally involved and directly impacted must play a key role. This book has recounted that U.S. scientists failed to resist the Bush era specter of bioterrorism. As the Bush administration expanded the biodefense industry and secured the research therein from “restricted persons”—that is, foreign nationals hailing from “state sponsors of terrorism” and other groups criminalized under the USA PATRIOT Act—bioscience became yet another arena stoking a racist, nativist post-9 / 11 imaginary. Scientists who objected to the new restrictions on accessing and transferring research materials did so largely because such restrictions hampered their “scientific freedom.” Their actions reflected the ideology that science is neutral and value-free, and that scientists should be free to pursue any and all research for the sake of technoscientific progress, while taking no responsibility for the consequences and political dimensions of their work. Criticism of science’s role in the war on terror came instead from outside the scientific establishment. Progressive journalists and organizations concerned with science, such as biodefense watchdog group the Sunshine Project and bio-artist collective Critical Art Ensemble (to which Steve Kurtz belongs), were vital to holding the biodefense industry accountable. They critiqued the role of science in U.S. war and empire, but also the fact that the U.S. public could obtain little information on these projects (the increasing purview of the post-9 / 11 U.S. national security apparatus was directly proportional to decreasing public transparency). These groups made the clandestine activities of the U.S. biological warfare industry and its hazards publicly visible. Pushing past the barriers of technical jargon and the secrecy shrouding security practices, they trespassed into realms typically reserved for the technocratic elite. In doing so, they accomplished an important first step toward public accountability. In 2014, the activist organization Science for the People revived its sixties-era mission to “mobilize people working in scientific fields to become active in agitating for science, technology, and medicine that would serve social needs rather than military and corporate interests.”3 The organization had emerged out of the antiwar movement in 1969, after science students at MIT organized a moratorium on war research, leading to protests at other universities. Out of that activism came Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action, which later changed its name to Science for the People. The organization critiqued the mainstream scientific establishment’s complicity in war, as well as sexism, racism and capitalism. Members waged protests and boycotts, and until 1989 published more than a hundred issues of a bimonthly magazine, focusing on topics such as biological determinism and farm worker mechanization. In its current twenty-first century form, Science for the People continues to organize scientists, along with activists, students, and scholars interested in science, to take control of the scientific agenda and direct it toward “a more humane and liberating vision of science in society” (Science for the People n.d.b). The organization’s working groups agitate against the status quo of military, corporate, and elite interests directing science.4 They connect to radical left movements, from Black Lives Matter’s opposition to state violence against black bodies to immigration justice organizations’ fight against ICE’s dehumanizing, violent actions at the border ordered by Trump’s openly racist, xenophobic regime. Science for the People has engaged in solidarity pickets, most notably with tech workers calling for companies Microsoft, Google, and Amazon to stop supplying technology platforms to ICE (Science for the People n.d.c). It has also held events in support of the Green New Deal, legislation that foregrounds the differential impacts of climate change on women, indigenous peoples, peoples of color, and the Global South (Science for the People n.d.d). This renewal of sixties-era mass, organized movement holds the promise to repurpose science and technology for social justice. In rejecting the ideology of unregulated technoscientific progress and attempting to decouple technoscientific practices from their imbrication with militarism, racism, and sexism, theirs is a radical vision that holds scientists and tech workers accountable for the consequences of their labor—research and development practices should be rigorously evidence-based as well as socially meaningful. It entreats scientists and tech workers to reconsider the ends to which they ought to put their labor power: “Knowledge is won with our labor and can be used to advance common goals” (Science for the People 2018). From Local to Global Wellness: Building Intersections, Practicing Solidarity When Obama inherited the biodefense budget of his predecessor, he conserved its levels, but rerouted funding from biodefense to prevention of naturally arising diseases (Tucker 2010).5 Unlike bioweapons attacks, infectious disease remained a very real occurrence. The H1N1 “swine” flu emerged in April 2009 in Mexico and the United States (California).6 Less than two months later, the World Health Organization (WHO) labeled it a pandemic. The Obama administration met it with the pandemic preparedness regime set in motion under Bush, but scaled back the contested role of border controls—foregoing travel restrictions—and deemphasized militarization as a means to secure public compliance (The 2009 Influenza Pandemic 2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) turned to equitable vaccine distribution, prioritizing populations most at risk for severe illness (pregnant women, caregivers for young children, healthcare workers and ER personnel, children and young adults, and people with health conditions) (CDC n.d.c). U.S. efforts experienced some stumbles—H1N1 vaccine stocks ran out as pharmaceutical production slowed. Even so, flu vaccines are not a perfect solution—strains mutate and make vaccines less effective or obsolete. U.S. dependence on vaccines as the primary response to flu, moreover, can distract from addressing underlying structures that cause potentially pandemic human flu strains to emerge. Industrial factory farming has produced large-scale animal outbreaks—the densely packed, highly susceptible animals then pose a threat of infection to their human handlers (Greger 2006); these farms also create large quantities of animal waste that frequently contaminate nearby waters with viruses and other germs that humans may consume, which can lead to strains that can then infect and transmit among human populations (Singer 2009). In addition to vaccination being an inadequate prevention strategy, as long as health interventions rely heavily on vaccines and pharmaceutical production, they remain entrenched in the agendas of global corporate institutions. Yet, we must look to the incredible strides Indonesia and its allies in the Global South made when they banded together during the H5N1 epidemic to drastically transform a flu virus-sharing system that was both deeply beholden to pharmaceutical corporations and structured around the health priorities of the Global North. They bucked the profit-driven, neocolonial virus-sharing system through a combination of systemic analysis, strategic resource-leveraging, and alliance-building. Through these sustained activities they built a global flu system that foregrounded benefit sharing and the health of nations most impacted by flu, which culminated in the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework adopted by the WHO. Although broader inequities in pathogen sharing have remained, as North-based pharmaceuticals continue to find ways to acquire the South’s disease samples without providing adequate compensation,7 the reformed global flu regulations nevertheless constitute an extraordinary success for health equity. The way that national governments in the Global South were able to redistribute the international balance of power in flu preparedness serves as a valuable model for achieving global justice. But social movements and movement-based organizations remain pivotal in effecting transnational change. The Third World Network, an independent nonprofit international research and advocacy organization based in Malaysia, supported Global South governments’ efforts to rebalance the WHO global flu system;8 they were also vocal advocates for indigenous groups, which face marginalization in the Global South and North alike in access and benefitsharing systems because these systems prioritize state sovereignty—rather than indigenous people’s sovereignty—over biological resources (Saez 2018).9 The nurses’ organizations active in countering the 2003 National Smallpox Vaccination Program offer a U.S.-based exemplar of localized change-making that connects to global justice. When they challenged the vaccination program, calling it out as more harmful than healthful, they built on years of organizing through professional associations and unions for safer working conditions and better pay within male- and corporatedominated medical establishments in the United States (Reverby 1987). And when they charged the Bush administration with devising the vaccination program to boost its war-mongering agenda against Iraq, they connected with broader struggles against U.S. empire, acting in solidarity with the Iraqi people. In 2009, the California Nurses Association, the Massachusetts Nurses Association, and the United American Nurses joined to form the broader National Nurses United (NNU), becoming the largest organization of registered nurses in the United States.10 They have continued to fight in solidarity with progressive movements globally. Under Obama they were at the forefront of fighting for universal health care (Healthcare-NOW 2009), and under Trump’s austere health care vision they have continued to lobby for Medicare for All (National Nurses United 2012).11 They have also been quick to take action against the Trump administration’s perpetration of humanitarian and health crises: they have worked at the U.S.-Mexico border in refugee support, advocated against the gun epidemic, denounced the administration’s tacit support of white male / white nationalist violence, and promoted the global movement for climate justice (National Nurses United 2014, 2019a). The world’s health problems remain daunting, as many governments around the world continue to disinvest in disease prevention and health infrastructure, as well as over-rely on vaccines and other pharmaceutical treatments—made worse by corporate monopolies and widening access disparities. I continue to heed the organizations and movements working to disentangle health care from profit and militarism, and how they ground their struggle in coalition building with other movements against injustice. These groups, I believe, will persist in making significant inroads on a structural level—and on a global scale—to transform health care into a comprehensive, equitable, and accessible public service.

### 2NC – AT: Transition War

#### Peaceful transition is possible but try or die for recovery post conflict if there’s war.

Hanappi '19 [Hardy; 1/7/19; PhD in Economics from the University of Vienna, chair for Political Economy at the European Commission and director of the Vienna Institute for Political Economy Research; "From Integrated Capitalism to Disintegrating Capitalism. Scenarios of a Third World War," <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91397/1/MPRA_paper_91397.pdf/>]

It should not come as a surprise that a change of the dominant mode of production of human society takes place by a clash of brute forces, of worldwide war. Limiting his attention to the aspect of equality of men the anthropologist Walter Scheidel describes in fascinating historical detail how wars always preceded the setup of large scale new organization of society, see [Scheidel, 2017]. To which extent such a war again is on the agenda today - contrary to the existence of DC - clearly is a question of forecasting. The previous section of this chapter used a scenario technique to sketch some contours of a possible third World War. These scenarios are not independent, mixtures of them are to be expected, e.g. a common strategy of a player in scenario 1 is to stir up national civil war (scenario 2) in a satellite country of its opponent (e.g. Yugoslavia); or to use the rhetoric of scenario 3 to support the fight of national class struggle (scenario 2). But will WW3 happen at all?

Not necessarily, but with a frightening high probability. Some counterstrategies already have been mentioned along the discussion of the scenarios. The immediate candidate, of course, is a global peace movement. This movement already played a pivotal role in ending the Vietnam War, being an incubator for the worldwide cultural revolution of 1968. As the short life and the macroeconomic impotence30 of this rebellion showed, any movement with durable impact needs not only roots in personal perceptions and feelings, it also needs a very sophisticated and well-developed blueprint of the overall working of a global democratic society. A mode of production is a complicated political economy entity, which needs a complicated system design. Fortunately, the explosive accumulation of human knowledge, of science, should be able to provide just that – if it were not handcuffed by the singular tasks tailored by Disintegrating Capitalism. The next best counteraction thus is to organize the carriers of this knowledge, e.g. scientists, in a progressive global class. Even if WW3 happens, chances are that a restart is possible and the blueprint of a better mode of production is needed. In this case Umberto Eco’s vision of an upcoming new Middle Ages31, with monasteries (today: universities?) preserving and developing secret knowledge, might become reality.

### 2NC – AT: Not Possible

#### “No alternative” is an elite fallacy---grassroots activists are laying the seeds for the end of capitalism, but global commitment is key.

Grubačić et al. '20 [Andrej; 9/24/20; Professor and Department Chair of Social and Cultural Anthropology at California Institute of Integral Studies; Brett Wilkins, Bridget Meehan, Cynthia Peters, Don Rojas, Elena Herrada, Mark Evans, Medea Benjamin, Michael Albert, Noam Chomsky, Oscar Chacon, Paul Ortiz, Peter Bohmer, Savvina Chowdhury and Vincent Emanuel; "Greenwashing Capitalism Won’t Heal the Planet," https://truthout.org/articles/greenwashing-capitalism-wont-heal-the-planet/]

Our Future Must Be One Without Economic Growth

So focused on serving the needs of the wealthy elites, most governments, political leaders and policy-makers are stuck in the certainty that “there is no alternative” and their plans lie at the core of that belief. The proposals support “business as usual” with a coat of greenwash and a nip and tuck here and there. They fail to recognize that economic growth is in direct conflict with decarbonization, slowing down global warming or redistributing wealth, and that we must eliminate or vastly reduce certain activities altogether.

It is time to expose the extreme fallacy behind mainstream policy positions regarding the climate crisis. Decarbonization that will slow global warming is going to require more than a few tweaks to the system and nods to green investment. It will demand that we jettison our current economic paradigm altogether and replace it with a more socialist, participatory and democratic paradigm that puts social and environmental needs at its center and massively redistributes wealth. We are only kidding ourselves if we think it can happen any other way.

Many millions of us have already come to this realization. Recent polls conducted in Britain, for example, showed that just 6 percent wanted to go back to the economy as it was before the COVID-19 pandemic and 82 percent wanted to prioritize health and well-being over economic growth. Grassroots activists and movements are busy creating and implementing the alternatives to the status quo. “Ordinary” people are light-years ahead of the governments and political leaders in taking these courageous steps.

Despite the heroic efforts of everyday people working at localized levels, there are three hard truths we must face. The first is that our governments and political leaders are a major barrier. They may be pathetic but they hold the levers of power, albeit on behalf of the elites. The second hard truth is that efforts at localized levels are insufficient. Solving the climate crisis will necessitate the end of capitalism and that necessitates action on a global scale through global coordination, planning and regulation. Both of these truths, therefore, make it critical for our governments and leaders to catch up and start working for and with us.

### 2NC – AT: Capitalism Inevitable/Resilient

#### Capitalism has primed you with cognitive bias---the belief that capitalism is inevitable or natural is a myth that ignores decades of interdisciplinary science---organization without privatized profit is both possible and naturally aligned with human nature.

Raymond '20 [Robert; 1/5/20; contributor to Truthout, Senior Producer, Designer, and Creative Director of The Response; "How Economists Tricked Us Into Thinking Capitalism Works," https://truthout.org/articles/how-economists-tricked-us-into-thinking-capitalism-works/]

These days, it seems like someone is always trying to privatize something. One day it’s the Trump administration contemplating the privatization of the Department of Veterans Affairs. The next it’s the Tories looking to sell off the U.K.’s National Health Service, or economists promoting “market-based” solutions to the climate crisis. In this age of neoliberalism, the rallying cry for politicians and economists alike is always for “More privatization! More markets! Sell it all off to the private sector!”

Of course, much of the time this faith in the market is used as a cover by those looking to simply make a profit — or by the politicians representing their interests. But this is not always the case. There are many who actually believe, wholeheartedly, that markets are the most efficient and even the most ethical way to run a society. And because this is the worldview that is taught in the vast majority of economics departments throughout the world, it’s not surprising that this is the dominant worldview among those in power.

It’s an ideology that was carefully crafted during the time of the early Western economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Homo sapiens are actually Homo economicus, the theory goes: selfish, competitive, rational agents who are all constantly seeking to efficiently maximize their own personal well-being.

No need to despair, however, because economists have figured out that these inherent traits can actually be utilized for good, through a social relation known as the market. By its nature, the market encourages competition and efficiency, and thus, by relying on the self-maximizing behavior of individuals, market capitalism is the only economic system that truly accepts human nature for what it is. And in fact, it’s the only system uniquely situated to actually channel this nature into a net positive outcome for society.

How does this all work? Well, when they are free to make choices that maximize their own interests, people in a market system negotiate on a price and quantity of a product or service until a sort of equilibrium is established. It’s a natural process of compromise that leaves everyone satisfied and also leads to an efficient way of producing and distributing goods and services. Everyone wins. And, the theory goes, it just so happens that the process aligns perfectly with human nature. It’s a fascinating theory. The only thing is, it’s completely wrong.

The foundation of this theory relies on an assumption about human nature that has been discredited over and over by research across multiple scientific disciplines. It turns out that Homo economicus is a fairytale, an outdated misconception, a gross distortion of reality. Yet, it still serves as the theoretical foundation of our entire economic system.

Studies have determined that the Homo economicus personality is an extremely rare one. Instead, most humans are marked by a deep capacity for reciprocity, cooperation and selflessness. For example, research shows that by 14 months of age, children are already beginning to help each other by handing over objects that others are unsuccessfully reaching for. This empathic behavior only increases as children grow older and begin to share things that they value with others and even object to other people’s violation of social norms.

These are all early signs of prosociality — behavior that is marked by an intent to help or benefit others. And importantly, this behavior is motivated by a genuine concern for others and not by selfishness.

Evolutionary biologists have also largely debunked the theory of Homo economicus. Researchers like David Sloan Wilson and others have determined that more prosocial groups will robustly outcompete less prosocial groups, meaning that prosociality was an advantageous trait when it came to the natural selection of early humans. And these theories are not new. Over a century ago, the anarchist theorist Peter Kropotkin wrote convincingly on how the survival of our species has depended more on cooperation than on the heroic efforts of isolated individuals. It certainly is difficult imagining an early human taking down a woolly mammoth without engaging in highly coordinated prosocial behavior. How else could the human species evolve to dominate the globe if not by cooperating with one another to overcome the many challenges our species faced?

Another place where we see the myth of Homo economicus debunked is in the research that comes out of post-disaster communities. In her landmark book, A Paradise Built in Hell, Rebecca Solnit presents a thesis arguing that humans have an innate capacity toward collectivism — and that these traits tend to reveal themselves most strongly in community response to disasters. Far from resorting to antisocial behavior after a disaster (a myth which the media tend to elevate), Solnit’s book outlines enumerable instances where communities demonstrate prosocial behaviors like cooperation, solidarity, sacrifice and generosity instead.

“In the wake of an earthquake, a bombing, or a major storm, most people are altruistic, urgently engaged in caring for themselves and those around them, strangers and neighbors as well as friends and loved ones,” Solnit writes. “Decades of meticulous sociological research on behavior in disasters, from the bombings of World War II to floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, and storms across the continent and around the world, have demonstrated this.”

Yet, despite the overwhelming evidence contradicting it, we’ve come to accept Homo economicus as the truth. Perhaps not always consciously, but it haunts our dreams, our imagination. It confines our sense of possibility and imposes boundaries as arbitrary as those that carve up ecosystems and communities into nation-states.

Market capitalism has been imposed onto us, often at the point of a gun, and as a result, we’ve been forced to internalize the idea that we are a selfish, competitive and greedy species. Well, that’s just human nature, we’ll acquiesce when we hear about the profiteering of pharmaceutical companies or the greed of investment bankers. But the thing this, that’s not human nature — it’s just what we’ve been coerced into thinking by an unfeeling economic system that dominates every facet of our life. And in many ways, Homo economicus is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It’s been demonstrated that studying economics actually makes you more selfish. Studies have shown that economics students are much less likely than other students to donate money that was given to them into a common pool; that they are more likely to “freeride” and are also more likely to defect than to cooperate; that they are more likely to participate in deception for personal gain; and even that they are more likely than their peers to rate greed as “generally good,” “correct” and “moral.”

And it’s not just students: economics professors give less money to charity than professors in other fields — including history, philosophy, education, psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature, physics, chemistry and biology.

When faced with the overwhelming evidence that Homo economicus — and thus the whole neoclassical economic project — is nonsense, the defenders of the status quo tend to rely on another myth: that there is no alternative. Margaret Thatcher famously uttered those words over 30 years ago, paving the way for an age of neoliberalism that has seen the dismantling of the social safety net, the stagnation of wages and the rise of extreme inequality.

But the thing is, there are alternative ways of organizing society that reflect the human capacity for reciprocity, selflessness and cooperation. The worker cooperative model promotes equity and democracy by giving workers ownership and control over their workplaces. It does so in a way that not only aligns with our inherently human traits, but in a way which has been shown to be more efficient and productive than the traditional workplace models.

There is also the commons model that reflects how communities organized themselves for thousands of years before they were torn off their land in the enclosure acts of 17th-century England. The commons are a way of organizing production and distribution where resources are held in common and are accessible to every member of society to be managed collectively for the benefit of all.

In fact, the political economist Eleanor Ostrom actually won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for disproving the long-held belief known as the “tragedy of the commons,” a theory which held that resources held in common by communities would naturally be overused and depleted. Ostrom’s work demonstrated that this assumption is false, and that it is in fact very possible for resources to be managed collectively without privatization.

There are many ways that community resources can be collectivized instead of privatized, from land trusts that take land off of the market to policy proposals like Medicare for All, which represents a major shift in how we view our collective responsibility when it comes to health care, or the Green New Deal, which recognizes our collective responsibility to prioritize climate justice in the fight against climate change.

The alternatives to market capitalism are out there — and the thing is, they actually align much more closely to the natural human tendencies toward reciprocity and sharing. The theories behind modern economics have left us with a burning planet and with skyrocketing inequality — it’s time to put them to rest.

And whether economists and politicians choose to accept it or not, the days of Homo economicus are limited, because a society based off of a lie cannot go on indefinitely.

### 2NC – AT: Military Fights the Alt

#### Veterans and active military members are sympathetic to communism due to the military’s failures

Mary Esch ’18, Associated Press, “US Army boots West Point officer who touted communist revolution during graduation ceremony”, 6/19/18, USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/06/19/us-army-boots-west-point-officer-who-touted-communism-during-graduation/713286002/

Less than a year after Rapone’s images drew a firestorm of vitriol and even death threats, the second lieutenant who became known as **the “commie cadet” is officially out of the U.S. Army** with an other-than-honorable discharge.

Top brass at Fort Drum’s 10th Mountain Division accepted Rapone’s resignation Monday after an earlier reprimand for “conduct unbecoming of an officer.” Rapone said an investigation found he went online to advocate for a socialist revolution and disparage high-ranking officers and U.S. officials. Officially, the Army said in a statement only that it conducted a full investigation and “appropriate action was taken.”

An unrepentant Rapone summed up the fallout in yet another tweet Monday that showed him extending a middle finger at a sign at the entrance to Fort Drum, accompanied by the words, “One final salute.”

[Embedded Tweet Removed]

“**I consider myself a revolutionary socialist,**” **the 26-year-old Rapone told** The Associated Press in a series of interviews. “I would encourage all soldiers who have a conscience to lay down their arms and join me and so many others who are willing to stop serving the agents of imperialism and join us in a revolutionary movement.”

**Rapone said his journey to communism grew out of his experiences as an Army Ranger in Afghanistan before he was accepted into the U.S. Military Academy.** And those views only hardened during his studies of history as one of the academy’s “Long Gray Line.”

He explained that he took the offending selfies at his May 2016 West Point graduation ceremony and kept them to himself until last September, when he tweeted them in solidarity with NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick, who was taking heat for kneeling for the national anthem to raise awareness of racism. Many other military personnel also tweeted in favor of Kaepernick, although most were supporting free speech, not communism.

West Point released a statement after Rapone posted the photos, saying his actions “in no way reflect the values of the U.S. Military Academy or the U.S. Army.” And U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, called on the secretary of the Army to remove Rapone from the officer ranks.

“While in uniform, Spenser Rapone advocated for communism and political violence, and expressed support and sympathy for enemies of the United States,” Rubio said Monday, adding “I’m glad to see that they have given him an ‘other-than-honorable’ discharge.”

One of six children growing up in New Castle, Pennsylvania, Rapone said he applied to West Point, which is tuition-free, because he couldn’t afford college. He was nominated out of high school by then-U.S. Rep. Jason Altmire in 2010.

“He was an honors student, an athlete, a model citizen who volunteered in the community,” recalled Altmire, a Democrat. “During the interview, he expressed patriotism and looked just like a top-notch candidate. There were no red flags of any kind.”

But he wasn’t accepted to West Point, so Rapone enlisted in the Army. He was deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 and was assigned as an assistant machine gunner in Khost Province.

“We were bullies in one of the poorest countries on Earth,” **Rapone said**. “We have one of the most technologically advanced militaries of all time and all we were doing is brutalizing and invading and terrorizing a population that had nothing to do with what the United States claimed was a threat.”

Toward the end of his deployment, he learned West Point fulfills a certain quota of enlisted soldiers every year. **Despite his growing disillusionment about the military, he applied and got in**.

“I was still idealistic,” he said.” I figured maybe I could change things from inside.”

**In addition to classic socialist theorists such as Karl Marx, Rapone says he found inspiration in the writings of Stan Goff, a retired Special Forces master sergeant who became a socialist anti-war activist**.

Even while still a cadet, Rapone’s online postings alarmed a West Point history professor, who wrote Rapone up, saying his online postings were “red flags that cannot be ignored.” Rapone was disciplined but still allowed to graduate.

Greg Rinckey, an attorney specializing in military law, said it’s rare for an officer out of West Point to receive an other-than-honorable discharge. He added that it’s also possible the military academy could seek repayment of the cost of Rapone’s education because he didn’t serve the full five-year service obligation required upon graduation.

“I **knew there could be repercussions,” said Rapone, who is scheduled to speak at a socialism conference** in Chicago next month. “**Of course my military career is dead in the water. On the other hand, many people reached out and showed me support.** There are a lot of veterans both active duty and not that feel like I do.”

### 2NC – AT: Not Concrete

#### There’s no one-size-fix-all alternative---our task is shaping the best proposals into a unified alternative to capitalism.

Monbiot '19 [George; 4/25/19; columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science); "Dare to declare capitalism dead – before it takes us all down with it," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/25/capitalism-economic-system-survival-earth/]

So what does a better system look like? I don’t have a complete answer, and I don’t believe any one person does. But I think I see a rough framework emerging. Part of it is provided by the ecological civilisation proposed by Jeremy Lent, one of the greatest thinkers of our age. Other elements come from Kate Raworth’s doughnut economics and the environmental thinking of Naomi Klein, Amitav Ghosh, Angaangaq Angakkorsuaq, Raj Patel and Bill McKibben. Part of the answer lies in the notion of “private sufficiency, public luxury”. Another part arises from the creation of a new conception of justice based on this simple principle: every generation, everywhere, shall have an equal right to the enjoyment of natural wealth.

I believe our task is to identify the best proposals from many different thinkers and shape them into a coherent alternative. Because no economic system is only an economic system but intrudes into every aspect of our lives, we need many minds from various disciplines – economic, environmental, political, cultural, social and logistical – working collaboratively to create a better way of organising ourselves that meets our needs without destroying our home.

Our choice comes down to this. Do we stop life to allow capitalism to continue, or stop capitalism to allow life to continue?

### 2NC – AT: Scenario Planning

#### A Marxist economy could be implemented through participatory economic planning which solves scenario planning

**Eagleton 11**[Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *Why Marx Was Right*, 2011, Yale University: New Haven, CT, p. 25-26]

Education and state monitoring might diminish these dangers, but some Marxists look instead to an economy which would be neither centrally planned nor market-governed.π On this model, resources would be allocated by negotiations between producers, consumers, environmentalists and other relevant parties, in networks of workplace, neighbourhood and consumer councils. The broad parameters of the economy, including decisions on the overall allocation of resources, rates of growth and investment, energy, transport and ecological policies and the like, would be set by representative assemblies at local, regional and national level. These general decisions about, say, allocation would then be devolved downwards to regional and local levels, where more detailed planning would be progressively worked out. At every stage, public debate over alternative economic plans and policies would be essential. In this way, what and how we produce could be determined by social need rather than private profit. Under capitalism, we are deprived of the power to decide whether we want to produce more hospitals or more breakfast cereals. Under socialism, this freedom would be regularly exercised. Power in such assemblies would pass by democratic election from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Democratically elected bodies representing each branch of commerce or production would negotiate with a national economic commission to achieve an agreed set of investment decisions. Prices would be determined not centrally, but by production units on the basis of input from consumers, users, interest groups and so on.

#### Utopian specifics are bad – produces a psychological investment in narrow-minded visions that foreclose change

**Eagleton 11**[Terry, Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, *Why Marx Was Right*, 2011, Yale University: New Haven, CT, p. 64-67]

 ‘‘So will there still be road accidents in this Marxist utopia of yours?’’ This is the kind of sardonic inquiry that Marxists have grown used to dealing with. In fact, the comment reveals more about the ignorance of the speaker than about the illusions of the Marxist. Because if utopia means a perfect society, then ‘‘Marxist utopia’’ is a contradiction in terms. There are, as it happens, far more interesting uses of the word ‘‘utopia’’ in the Marxist tradition.∞ One of the greatest of 64 65 English Marxist revolutionaries, William Morris, produced an unforgettable work of utopia in News from Nowhere, which unlike almost every other utopian work actually showed in detail how the process of political change had come about. When it comes to the everyday use of the word, however, it should be said that Marx shows not the slightest interest in a future free of suffering, death, loss, failure, breakdown, conflict, tragedy or even labour. In fact, he doesn’t show much interest in the future at all. It is a notorious fact about his work that he has very little to say in detail about what a socialist or communist society would look like. His critics may therefore accuse him of unpardonable vagueness; but they can hardly do that and at the same time accuse him of drawing up utopian blueprints. It is capitalism, not Marxism, that trades in futures. In The German Ideology, he rejects the idea of communism as ‘‘an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself.’’ Instead, he sees it in The German Ideology as ‘‘the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.’’≤ Just as the Jews were traditionally forbidden to foretell the future, so Marx the secular Jew is mostly silent on what might lie ahead. We have seen that he probably thought socialism was inevitable, but he has strikingly little to say about what it would look like. There are several reasons for this reticence. For one thing, the future does not exist, so that to forge images of it is a kind of lie. To do so might also suggest that the future is predetermined—that it lies in some shadowy 65 66 realm for us to discover. We have seen that there is a sense in which Marx held that the future was inevitable. But the inevitable is not necessarily the desirable. Death is inevitable, too, but not in most people’s eyes desirable. The future may be predetermined, but that is no reason to assume that it is going to be an improvement on what we have at the moment. The inevitable, as we have seen, is usually pretty unpleasant. Marx himself needed to be more aware of this. Foretelling the future, however, is not only pointless; it can actually be destructive. To have power even over the future is a way of giving ourselves a false sense of security. It is a tactic for shielding ourselves from the open-ended nature of the present, with all its precariousness and unpredictability. It is to use the future as a kind of fetish—as a comforting idol to cling to like a toddler to its blanket. It is an absolute value which will not let us down because (since it does not exist) it is as insulated from the winds of history as a phantom. You can also seek to monopolise the future as a way of dominating the present. The true soothsayers of our time are not hairy, howling outcasts luridly foretelling the death of capitalism, but the experts hired by the transnational corporations to peer into the entrails of the system and assure its rulers that their profits are safe for another ten years. The prophet, by contrast, is not a clairvoyant at all. It is a mistake to believe that the biblical prophets sought to predict the future. Rather, the prophet denounces the greed, corruption and power-mongering of 66 67 the present, warning us that unless we change our ways we might well have no future at all. Marx was a prophet, not a fortune-teller.

### 2NC – AT: Soviet Union failed

#### Soviet failure doesn’t disprove our alternative, but the aff – the aff still consolidates the military industrial complex by maintaining the leadership of the military as being credible and worth spending money on – the alternative consolidates socialist and communist thought around peace

Adams ’02 – is the coordinator of the Culture of Peace News Network. He retired in 2001 from UNESCO where he was the Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, proclaimed for the Year 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly (Dr. David, “THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENTS CHAPTER 8: THE ROOT CAUSES OF WAR”, Pg 25-27, http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-25.html)

In the 1985 edition of this book the argument was made that the socialist countries were escaping from the economic causation of war. In comparison to the capitalist countries, they did not have the same dynamic of over-production and cyclical depression, with periods of enhanced structural unemployment. As **for exploitation and imperialism, despite the frequent reference in the American media to "Soviet imperialism," the direction of the flow of wealth was the opposite of what holds true under capitalist imperialism**. Instead of the rich nations extracting wealth from the poor ones, which is the case, for example between the U.S. and Latin America, the net flow of wealth proceeded from the Soviet Union towards the other socialist countries in order to bring them towards an eventually even level of development. According to an authoritative source associated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, the net outflow from the Soviet Union amounted to over forty billion dollars a year in the mid-1980's. In one crucial respect, however, the 1985 analysis was incorrect. **It failed to take account of the military-industrial complex that had grown to be the most powerful force of the Soviet economy,** a mirror image of its equivalent in the West. The importance of this was brought home to those of us who attended a briefing on economic conversion from military to civilian production that was held at the United Nations on November 1, 1990, a critical time for Gorbachev's program of Perestroika in the Soviet Union. The speaker, Ednan Ageev, was the head of the Division of International Security Issues at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked by the Gorbachev administration to find out the extent to which the Soviet economy was being used for military production. Naturally, he went to the Minister of Defense, where he was told that this information was secret. Secret even to Gorbachev. In conversation, Ageev estimated that 85-90% of Soviet scientific researchers were in the military sector. **That seems high until you realize that the Soviet's were matching U.S. military research**, development and production on the basis of a Gross National Product only half as large. Since about 40% of U.S. research and development was tied to the military at that time, it would make sense that the Soviets would have had to double the U.S. percentage in order to keep pace. How could the Gorbachev administration convert their economy from military to civilian production if they could not even get a list of defense industries? Keeping this in mind, **along with the enormous militarization of the Soviet economy, it is not so surprising that the Soviet economy collapsed, and with it the entire political superstructure.** Th**e origins of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be traced back to the Russian revolution which instituted what Lenin**, at one point, **called "war communism".** **He warned that war communism could not succeed in the long run and that instead of a top-down militarized economy, a socialist economy needed to be structured as a "**cooperative of cooperatives.**"** **But war communism was entrenched during the Stalin years, carried out of necessity to an extreme during the Second World War, and then perpetuated by the Cold War. The economic causation of the war system is not new**. It originated long before capitalism and socialism. From its beginnings in ancient Mesopotamia, the state was always associated with war, both to capture slaves abroad and to keep them under control at home. As states grew more powerful, war became the means to build empires and to acquire and rule colonies. In fact, the economic causation of war probably extends back even further into ancient prehistory. From the best analysis I know, that of Mel and Carol Ember, using the methods of cross-cultural anthropology, it would seem that war functioned as a means to survive periodic but unpredictable food shortages caused by natural disasters. Apparently, tribes that could make war most effectively could survive natural disasters better than others by successfully raiding the food supplies of their neighbors. While particular wars can be analyzed, as we have done above, in terms of immediate, short-term causes, there is a need to understand the war system itself, which is as old as human history. Particular wars are the tip of a much deeper iceberg. Beneath war, there has developed a culture of war that is entwined with it in a complex web of causation. On the one hand, the culture of war is produced and reinforced by each war, and, on the other hand, the culture of war provides the basis on which succeeding wars are prepared and carried out. The culture of war is a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that consists of enemy images, authoritarian social structure, training and arming for violence, exploitation of man and nature, secrecy and male domination. Without an enemy, without a social structure where people will follow orders, without the preparation of soldiers and weapons, without the control of information, both propaganda and secrecy, no war can be carried out. The culture of war has been so prevalent in history that we take it for granted, as if it were human nature. However, anthropologists point to cultures that are nowhere near as immersed in the culture of war, and it is the opinion of the best scientists that a culture of peace is possible. Peace movements have not given enough attention to the internal use of the culture of war. The culture of war has two faces, one facing outward and the other inward. Foreign wars are accompanied by authoritarian rule inside the warring countries. Even when there is no war threat, armies (or national guards) are kept ready not just for use against foreign enemies, but also against those defined as the enemy within: striking workers, movements of the unemployed, prisoners, indigenous peoples, just as in an earlier time they were used against slave rebellions. As documented in my 1995 article in the Journal of Peace Research (Internal Military Interventions in the United States) the U.S. Army and National Guard have been used an average of 18 times a year, involving an average of 12,000 troops for the past 120 years, mostly against actions and revolts by workers and the unemployed. During periods of external war, the internal wars are usually intensified and accompanied by large scale spying, deportations and witch hunts. It would appear that we have once again entered such a period in the U.S. We are hardly alone in this matter. Needless to say, the culture of war was highly developed to stifle dissent in the Soviet Union by Stalin and his successors of "war communism." The internal culture of war needs to be analyzed and resisted everywhere. For example, readers living in France should question the role of the CRS. **The internal use of the culture of war is no less economically motivated than external wars**. The socialists at the beginning of the 20th Century recognized it as "class war," carried out in order to maintain the domination of the rich and powerful over the poor and exploited. **Not by accident, it has often been socialists and communists who are the first to be targeted by the internal culture of war in capitalist countries**. And they, in turn, have often made the most powerful critique of the culture of war and have played a leading role in peace movements for that reason. **Their historical role for peace was considerably compromised, however, by the "war communism" of the Soviet Union**. **With its demise, however,** there is now an opportunity for socialists and communists to return to their earlier leadership against war**, both internal and external, and to insist that a true socialism can only flourish on the basis of a culture of peace**.

### 2NC – Collapse Now = Better

#### Time frame is everything – collapse quicker is better than later.

Read and Alexander, 19—reader in philosophy at the University of East Anglia AND lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne (Rupert and Samuel, “Crisis as opportunity,” *This Civilisation Is Finished*, Chapter 13, pg 52-53, dml)

SA: You alluded earlier to the saying that every crisis is an opportunity—from which the optimist infers that the more crises there are, the more opportunities there are! Of course, this statement must not be seen to be romanticising or desiring crisis like some dreamyeyed fool. In fact, our entire dialogue seems to have been based on a deep pessimism about the prospects of smoother and less disruptive modes of societal transformation. So perhaps crisis might be our best hope for disrupting the status quo and initiating the transition to something else.

When the crises of capitalism deepen, as they seem destined to do in coming years and decades, the task will be to ensure that such destabilised conditions are used to advance progressive humanitarian and ecological ends rather than exploited to further entrench the austerity politics of neoliberalism. I recognise, of course, that the latter remains a real possibility, as did the arch-capitalist Milton Friedman, who expressed the point in these terms:

Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.

It is not often that I am in agreement with Friedman. With reluctance I have come to the conclusion that it is probably only through deepening crisis that the comfortable global consumer class will become sufficiently perturbed that the sedative and depoliticising effects of affluence might be overcome. In fact, I feel it is better that citizens are not in fact protected from every crisis situation, given that the encounter with crisis can play an essential consciousness raising role, if it triggers a desire for and motivation toward learning about the structural underpinnings of the crisis situation itself.

RR: Yes, the danger, if we are protected from crisis for too long, is that we wait even longer than we would have done otherwise before addressing it. This is why Jared Diamond and others have emphasised the grave danger of highly unequal societies (such as, disastrously, the one we now inhabit): for the elite in such societies can fool themselves into thinking that things are basically OK way past the point of no return, while the masses suffer and start to experience collapse; and then it is surer that the society as a whole will collapse.

#### Crisis galvanizes existing movements

Alexander, 15—lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne (Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy* pg 150-152, dml)

The largest empirical analysis of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement (Alexander and Ussher, 2012) shows that there could now be as many as 200 million people in the developed regions of the world exploring, to varying degrees, lifestyles of reduced and restrained consumption. This signifies an emerging social movement of potentially transformative significance, especially if it were ever to radicalise and organise itself with political intent. Notably, that same empirical study showed that the movement was developing both a ‘group consciousness’ and a ‘political sensibility’, features that are arguably necessary for any social movement to use its collective power in influential ways. As more people are exposed to the type of reasoning unpacked by Kevin Anderson – that is, as more people see that responding to climate change actually requires consuming less – the Voluntary Simplicity Movement could well grow in size and influence, perhaps with surprising speed.

Interestingly, the justification for embracing a lifestyle of voluntary simplicity does not begin and end with ecological or humanitarian arguments. In recent decades there has been a huge amount of literature exploring the relationship between income and subjective wellbeing (see Alexander, 2012b), and the results undermine the culturally entrenched assumption that ‘money buys happiness’. Although the empirical debate is not over, the weight of evidence strongly suggests that money and material wealth is important at low levels of income, but once basic material needs for food, shelter, clothing, etc. have been met, money has fast diminishing marginal returns. In other words, beyond the basic needs threshold, the things that really contribute most to human wellbeing are not monetary or material, but instead things like socialising, creative activity, meaningful work, and other nonmaterial sources of meaning and satisfaction. This literature is arguably a ticking time bomb for consumer culture, because if more people came to see that consumerist lifestyles are not a reliable path to a happy and meaningful existence, they would presumably give up the consumerist lifestyle and seek happiness and meaning in realms other than consumption. Although this culture shift might be motivated primarily by self-interest, clearly it would have beneficial social and ecological implications. The point is that a very strong case is developing for people to explore post-consumerist lifestyles of reduced or restrained consumption, suggesting that the conditions for a cultural revolution are ripe.

It is also worth acknowledging a new and controversial analysis presented by David Holmgren (2013), co-originator of the permaculture concept, which provides further grounds for thinking that the Voluntary Simplicity Movement could have disruptive potential. Voluntary simplicity has always been an implicit feature of the permaculture worldview, insofar as permaculture is about designing a way of life that minimises waste in order to work with nature rather than against nature (Holmgren, 2002). But Holmgren recently placed voluntary simplicity at the centre of his thinking, and arrived at a theory of change that has received a vast amount of online attention.

Always doubtful of the prospects of convincing politicians to lead the necessary transition to a low-carbon world, Holmgren has grown increasingly sceptical that any mass movement at the social level is going to produce significant change either. Accordingly, his pessimism has driven him to conclude that the best we can hope at this late stage is to deliberately ‘crash’ the existing fossil fuel-based system and build a permaculture alternative as the existing system deteriorates. His provocative theory, to oversimplify, is that if a new, relatively small social movement of anti-consumers were able to radically reduce their consumption, this reduction in demand for commodities could destabilise the global economy, which is already struggling. More precisely, Holmgren hypothesises that if merely 10% of people in a nation could reduce their consumption by 50%, this could signify a 5% reduction in total demand, which, although small, would likely cause havoc with any growth-based economy. It is important to emphasise that Holmgren does not romanticise the process of collapse; he acknowledges the worrying risks his strategy poses. First and foremost, it is unpredictable in its consequences. Nevertheless, he argues that whatever risks his strategy poses, there are greater risks – both socially and environmentally – in letting the existing system continue to degrade planetary ecosystems. What is most interesting about Holmgren’s strategy is that it does not rely on a mass movement. He believes that a relatively small but radical anti-consumerist movement could be a truly disruptive force.

# AFF

## Impact Turns

### Cap Good/Transition Bad

#### Spreading capitalism creates global prosperity and environmental sustainability. Abandoning it is disastrous.

Rhonheimer, 20—teaching professor at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Martin, “Capitalism is Good for the Poor – and for the Environment,” <https://austrian-institute.org/en/subjects-en/catholic-social-doctrine-2/capitalism-is-good-for-the-poor-and-for-the-environment/>, dml)

It is not social policy but capitalism that has created today’s prosperity.

What is important is that what made today’s mass prosperity possible – a phenomenon unprecedented in history – was not social policy or social legislation, organised trade union pressure, or corrective interventions in the capitalist economy, but rather market capitalism itself, due to its enormous potential for innovation and the ever-increasing productivity of human labour that resulted from it.

Increasing prosperity and quality of life are always the result of increasing labour productivity. Only increased productivity enabled higher social standards, better working conditions, the overcoming of child labour, a higher level of education, and the emergence of human capital. This process of increasing triumph over poverty and the constantly rising living standards of the general masses is taking place on a global scale – but only where the market economy and capitalist entrepreneurship are able to spread.

From industrial overexploitation of nature to ecological awareness

The first phase of industrialisation and capitalism was characterised by an enormous consumption of resources and frequent overexploitation of nature, which soon gave the impression that this process could not be sustainable. Since the end of the 19th century, disaster and doom scenarios have repeatedly been put forward, but in retrospect they have proved to be wrong: The combination of technological innovation, market competition, and entrepreneurial profit-seeking (with the compulsion to constantly minimise costs) have meant that these scenarios never occurred. The ever-increasing population has been increasingly better supplied thanks to innovative technologies, ever-increasing output with lower consumption of resources less harmful to the environment – e.g. less arable land in agriculture, or oil and electricity instead of coal for rapidly increasing mobility. More recent disaster scenarios, such as those spread by reputable scientists since the late 1960s and in the 1970s, have also proved to be inaccurate.

The reason things developed differently was the always underestimated innovative dynamism of the capitalist market economy, a growing ecological awareness and, as a result, legislative intervention that took advantage of the logic of market capitalism: As a result of the ecological movement that had come out of the United States since 1970, wise legislation began to use the price mechanism to apply market incentives to internalize negative externalities. Environmental pollution was given a price-tag.

This led to an enormous decrease in air pollution and other ecological consequences of growth, which is only possible in free, market-based societies, because the production process here is characterized by competition and constant pressure to reduce costs, i.e. to the most profitable use of resources. On the other hand, all forms of socialism, i.e. a state-controlled economy, have proved to be ecological disasters and have left behind destruction of gigantic proportions, without providing the population with anything that is near comparable in prosperity, often even by destroying existing prosperity, such as happened in Venezuela.

Capitalist profit motive combined with digitalization as a solution: Increasing decoupling of growth and resource consumption

Moreover, technological innovations combined with capitalist profit-seeking and market competition have led to a new and surprising phenomenon over the past decades, which is still hardly noticed in the public debate: the decoupling of growth and resource consumption (“dematerialization”). In a wide variety of industrial sectors, the developed countries, above all the U.S., are now achieving ever greater productive output with increasingly fewer resources. This has a lot to do with technology, especially the digitalization of the economy and of our entire lives.

As the well-known MIT professor Andrew McAfee shows in his book More from Less, published in October 2019, this process also follows the logic of capitalist profit maximization. To get it going, we do not need politics, even though wise, properly incentivizing legislation can be helpful and sometimes necessary. Above all, however, it is the combination of technological innovation, capitalist profit-seeking, and market-based entrepreneurial competition that will also solve the problem of man-made global warming.

In addition, property rights and their protection are decisive for the careful use of natural resources. And where this is not possible, legal support for collective self-governing structures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, are important—as is analysed by Nobel Economic Prize winner Elinor Ostrom. By contrast, the growing ideologically motivated anti-capitalist eco-activism, and the policies influenced by it, are leading in the wrong direction, distracting precisely from what would be best for the climate and the environment—and distracting us from what could help protect us against the inevitable consequences of global warming.

### Cap Solves War

#### The spread of capitalism causes world peace!

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin's Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states' alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states' interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states' behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other's regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

### Framing

#### Two framing issues:

#### If we win the direction of recent trends, we win. Our arg isn’t that things are good enough, but that they will get better.

McAfee, 19—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “Getting So Much Better,” *More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next*, Chapter 11, pg 223, Kindle, dml)

Before I show the evidence, I want to be clear about one thing: I'm not trying to make the case that things today are good enough. Because they’re certainly not. The world has too many poor, hungry, and sick people. Too many children are malnourished and uneducated. Too many people, despite the laws on the books, are forced into indentured servitude and slavery. We continue to pump greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, dump plastic into the oceans, kill rare animals, cut down tropical forests, and otherwise befoul our planet.

But we can document improvements without saying or implying that everything's okay now. We should document the improvements because they tell us something critically important: what we're doing is working and therefore we should keep doing it instead of contemplating huge course changes. As Lomborg wrote in The Skeptical Environmentalist, 'When things are improving we know we are on the right track.... Maybe we can do even more to improve... but the basic approach is not wrong."

The basic approach we've taken in recent decades— letting the four horsemen of the optimist gallop faster around the world—is far from wrong. It's causing some startlingly fast and broad improvements. So we need to encourage them to ride faster and farther. We need to step on the accelerator, not yank the steering wheel in a different direction.

#### Problems with capitalism aren’t inevitable, but emerge where there isn’t enough of it.

McAfee, 19—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “Adam Smith Said That: A Few Words about Capitalism,” *More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next*, Chapter 8, pg 170-171, Kindle, dml)

But hasn't capitalism also let people down in Latin America and the world's other less developed regions? Perhaps its failures haven't been as rapid and grotesque as socialism's in Venezuela, but hasn't it still failed? Ricardo Hausmann argues that it hasn't. It's worked quite well where it has taken hold. The problem, he points out, is that it hasn't been allowed to spread widely. As he puts it, "The capitalist reorganization of production petered out in the developing world, leaving the vast majority of the labor force outside its control. The numbers are astounding. While only one in nine people in the United States are self-employed, the proportion in India is nineteen out of twenty. Fewer than one-fifth of workers in Peru are employed [in] private businesses... In Mexico, about one in three are." In the rich world self-employed people are often freelancers or consultants, interacting professionally with companies when they choose to. In the developing world, however, the great majority of the self-employed would love to have a job with a company, but none are available. So people have to try to make a living as solo farmers, merchants, or tradespeople.

Hausmann has observed that different regions in developing countries have different economies, and he notes a fascinating pattern: where there is more capitalism, there is more prosperity. In the Mexican state of Nuevo León, for example, two-thirds of the people are employed by companies. In Chiapas, meanwhile, fewer than 15 percent are. Average incomes in Nuevo León are nine times higher. Hausmann doesn't think this is a coincidence: "The developing world's fundamental problem is that capitalism has not reorganized production and employment in the poorest countries and regions, leaving the bulk of the labor force outside its scope of operation. "

### Growth/Innovation Good

#### Innovation and growth are good – any less capitalist or less growth-oriented model wrecks it, which impoverishes society and ensures violent conflict

Tudoreanu ’20 [Mihnea; 9/23/20; doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; David M. Kotz; professor emeritus of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; "Stable Jobs or iPhones? The Dilemma of Innovation in Socialism," Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 52, Vol. 4, p. 642-649]

**Note: DPS = Democratically Planned Socialism**

One of the advantages for innovation in DPS is that it can effectively take into account social and environmental costs, including the jobs lost or disrupted by the introduction of a new technology.8 But this can also be problematic, in that it is likely to make innovation slower in socialism than in capitalism. Democratic majorities are not immune to some of the same factors that caused Soviet managers to be technologically conservative.

On the one hand, DPS should not suffer from taut planning, unrealistic plan targets imposed from the top down, or an incentive structure that discourages risk-taking by trying out new technologies. But on the other hand, innovation is always disruptive in any kind of economic system. As old technologies are superseded, product lines become obsolete and production processes are changed, and as a result certain kinds of jobs are no longer needed. Even with an employment guarantee, the loss of one’s job may have to involve retraining, changing careers, or moving across the country. So, it is reasonable to expect that workers will resist new technologies.9 Yet at the same time, in their capacity as consumers, they will demand new and better products.

This is the “Stable jobs or iPhones?” dilemma. We can prioritize cutting-edge consumer products, or we can prioritize stable employment, but perhaps not both.10 In DPS, the people will be able to decide between one and the other, on a case-by-case basis, so that some innovations will be pursued, others will be scrapped because of their disruptive effects, and some will be introduced at a deliberately slow pace. Meanwhile, capitalism always comes down in favor of the iPhones despite the conflict with stable jobs. Since socialism will not always do this, it is likely that socialism will have more job security but fewer cutting-edge consumer products than capitalism.

If there is an international rivalry between socialism and capitalism, the citizens of the two kinds of societies will be able to compare their lifestyles with those in the other economic system. Workers living under capitalism may be attracted by the stable jobs, shorter working hours, democratic workplaces, and social benefits provided by socialism. However, those living under socialism will likely also be attracted by the rapid introduction of new consumer goods under capitalism. Moreover, as long as the speed of innovation in socialism is lower than that in capitalism, the “consumer gap” with capitalism would grow over time.

This may not be considered a problem for socialism if most of the population value stable jobs more than iPhones, but there would likely be a minority who do not. If the consumer gap is large enough, and/or that dissenting minority has an overriding preference for new consumer goods, then we have a category of people with a material interest in supporting capitalism, which values a new technology over job stability, even though they are part of the working class.

A common response to the flaws of Soviet socialism has been to propose other models of socialism that would not have those flaws. But the trade-off between job security and innovation is not one that can be easily eliminated within socialism. It is not due to the overly centralized or undemocratic nature of Soviet socialism.

Furthermore, there is a military aspect to the innovation problem. Innovations that aid the military are also likely to have a disruptive effect on employment, as in the case of consumer-oriented innovations. This is a problem because it might put DPS at a military disadvantage with respect to capitalism, which would hurt the socialist side in international relations even if no military conflict takes place. If one side knows it would lose any war that did take place, then that side will act timidly and avoid even nonviolent confrontation, so as to avoid provoking the other side into war. For both sides to stand a good chance of success in a peaceful rivalry, they must be more or less evenly matched militarily, so that neither feels that it can do whatever it wants with impunity or that it must tread lightly to avoid confrontation.

The Cold War was a multifaceted struggle between two different systems. Any future socialist economic order will most likely face capitalism in a somewhat similar struggle. Can such a struggle be won by socialism without matching capitalism’s rate of technological development? That is the question.

## Link Defense

### AT: Cyber

#### Cyber threat is legitimate---means and motive exist.

Wintch ’21 [Timothy; April 30; active-duty major in the United States Air Force, M.A. in Military Studies from the American Military University; Homeland Security Today, “Perspective: Cyber and Physical Threats to the U.S. Power Grid and Keeping the Lights on,” <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/>]

Among critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., energy is perhaps the most crucial of the 16 sectors defined by the Department of Homeland Security. This sector is so vital because it provides the energy necessary to run every other critical infrastructure sector. However, the U.S. power grid, the backbone of the energy sector, is built upon an aging skeleton that is becoming increasingly vulnerable every day. Whether from terrorists or nation-states like Russia and China, the power grid is susceptible to not just physical attacks, but also to cyber intrusion as well. However, much of this threat can be mitigated if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps to safeguard the power grid and avoid a potential catastrophe in the future.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism on U.S. soil has been at the forefront of American consciousness. Critical infrastructure provides an appealing target because of the disproportionally large impact even a small attack can have on the sectors. In particular, the power grid represents a particularly lucrative target, both in terms of the ease of access and the large impact it can make. The National Research Council stated that the U.S. power grid is “vulnerable to intelligent multi-site attacks by knowledgeable attackers intent on causing maximum physical damage to key components on a wide geographical scale.”[[1]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn1) Additionally, the physical security of transmission and distribution systems is difficult due to the dispersed nature of these key components, which in turn is advantageous to attackers as it reduces the likelihood of their capture.[[2]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn2) From 2002-2012, approximately 2,500 physical attacks occurred against transmission lines and towers worldwide and approximately 500 attacks against transformer substations.[[3]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn3) Terrorists have the motivation to attack the U.S. power grid but the very nature of the grid makes it highly vulnerable. The power grid is not only at risk from physical attacks, but also nation-state cyberattacks.

One nation that has shown both the capability and intent to use attacks against critical energy infrastructure is Russia, as demonstrated in their 2015 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. A Russian cyber threat group known as Sandworm, which used its BlackEnergy malware, attacked Ukrainian computer systems that provide remote control of the Ukraine power grid.[[4]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn4) This attack, and another in 2016, each left the capital Kiev without power, prompting cyber experts to raise concern about the same malware already existing in NATO and the U.S. power grids.[[5]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn5) In any conflict between Russia and NATO, not only would similar cyberattacks pose a threat, but so would potential physical attacks severing fuel oil and natural gas lines to Western Europe. Russia has both the capability and intent to attack critical infrastructure, particularly power grids, during future conflicts in their “hybrid warfare” approach.

Another nation that has the capability to attack critical energy infrastructure is China, representing a threat to not just the U.S. energy infrastructure but also that of our allies whose support would be vital in a major conflict. A recent NATO report highlighted this threat from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, stating that “[China’s] foreign direct investment in strategic sectors [such as energy generation and distribution] …raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military.”[[6]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn6) Like Russia, China has been active with cyber intrusions in U.S. energy infrastructure. The Mission Support Center at Idaho National Laboratory characterized these as attacks as “multiple intrusions into US ICS/SCADA [Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] and smart grid tools [that] may be aimed more at intellectual property theft and gathering intelligence to bolster their own infrastructure, but it is likely that they are also using these intrusions to develop capabilities to attack the [bulk electric system], as well.”[[7]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn7) China, therefore, has both the capability and intent to conduct cyber intrusions and attacks for myriad reasons.

Another arm of this threat is the reliance the U.S. energy industry has on imports from China, especially transformers. In early 2020, federal officials seized a transformer in the port of Houston that had been imported by the Jiangsu Huapeng Transformer Company before sending it to Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque. Sandia is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy for mitigating national security threats.[[8]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn8) The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mike Howard, chief executive of the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility-funded technical organization, said that the diversion of a huge, expensive transformer is so unusual – in his experience, unprecedented – that it suggests officials had significant security concerns.”[[9]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn9) Previously destined for the Washington Area Power Administration’s Ault, Colo., substation, the transformer is believed to have been seized due to “backdoor” exploitable hardware emplaced by the Chinese prior to shipment.[[10]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn10) Shortly after these events, President Trump issued Executive Order 13920, “[Securing the United States Bulk-Power System](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-system/),” essentially limiting the import of Chinese-built critical energy infrastructure components due to concerns about cybersecurity.[[11]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn11) Interestingly, Jiangsu Huapeng “boasted that it supported 10 percent of New York City’s electricity load.”[[12]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn12)

Franklin Kramer, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce subcommittee during an energy and power hearing in 2011 and said that a “highly-coordinated and structured cyber, physical, or blended attack on the bulk power system, however, could result in long-term (irreparable) damage to key system components in multiple simultaneous or near-simultaneous strikes.” He added that “an outage could result with the potential to affect a wide geographic area and cause large population centers to lose power for extended periods.”[[13]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn13) Even the inclusion of features such as smart grids to the overall grid structure poses new vulnerabilities through their connectivity. Kramer stated that “such connectivity means that the distribution system could be a key vector for a national security attack on the grid.”[[14]](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure-security/perspective-cyber-and-physical-threats-to-the-u-s-power-grid-and-keeping-the-lights-on/" \l "_ftn14)

#### Private telecom is key---their alt wrecks global cybersecurity

Marar ’20 [Satya; October 17; policy analyst at Reason Foundation and a Young Voices tech policy fellow; “5G nationalization will leave America behind,” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/521502-5g-nationalization-will-leave-america-behind]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently considering a proposal that’ll effectively nationalize 5G technology and networks in the United States. By abandoning the market-driven strategy that won the 4G race for the nation, America would merely be undermining its own progress — and losing to China.

This is especially concerning since China sees itself as a rival to U.S. hegemony and is increasingly exerting its diplomatic and military influence in a brazen way. It has launched cyberattacks and attempted to acquire sensitive military secrets and intelligence. It has already made strides in the 5G race and is rapidly acquiring key 5G patents. Its flagship telecommunications giant is propped-up by $75 billion in subsidies and was slated to build the UK’s 5G network this year. The British government only reneged after U.S. diplomatic pressure.

Concerningly, Chinese laws effectively compel Huawei to hand over user data and to assist it in industrial espionage and state surveillance. If the world becomes increasingly reliant on Chinese government-controlled and operated telecommunications infrastructure, then that will leave U.S. manufacturers and innovators at an ever-increasing disadvantage. With 5G technology expected to contribute $2.2 trillion, roughly 5 percent of global GDP, to the world economy within 15 years, this is a race America must win.

Troublingly enough, the DOD suggests a move that mirrors China in many ways. It’d replace the existing Federal Communications Commission (FCC) plan to auction off frequency ranges within the mid-band spectrum to private companies who can then develop the necessary infrastructure networks, which is ideal for 5G development. Instead, a network built and deployed by the U.S. government would act as a wholesaler to telecommunications companies who could turn around and sell 5G plans to retail consumers.

But national 5G networks are already being built across the country with private investment totaling billions of dollars. Why would taxpayers pay such a hefty sum for something that American companies are already developing? Conversely, government agencies have already compromised the nation’s position in the 5G race by allocating mainly less-than-ideal low-band and high-band frequencies for 5G development. Unlike the mid-band spectrum that the U.S. military largely monopolizes, low-band frequencies mean slow connections. High-band frequencies are localized and require significantly more infrastructure investment to cover the same range. By contrast, China has utilized its mid-band spectrum for 5G deployment.

This is why a lone Chinese cellular tower now covers the same range as 100 high-speed American towers.

The U.S. should be auctioning frequency ranges within the mid-band spectrum to companies that are already equipped to build infrastructure. If the U.S. wants to “catch-up” with China, then it should be taking advantage of the already robust American private sector instead of adopting China’s strategy of state control, debt-funded subsidies and loans.

A federal government 5G network could take decades to build and could be replete with setbacks — at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.

Take a look at South Africa and Mexico for proof. Those are two countries where nationalized telecommunications networks failed.

Or look to Australia, where the “National Broadband Network” turned into a financial disaster. Originally projected to cost $29.5 billion in 2013, it was completed only this year, with the final cost running past $51 billion. And that’s not counting a recently announced $4.5 billion upgrade since the technology is out of date already. But it’s not politicians and bureaucrats’ own money they’re playing around with. It’s taxpayers’ dollars on the line.

Conversely, proponents of a nationalized 5G network claim that auctioning off spectrum to private network builders could leave consumers worse off, since there’s theoretically nothing stopping them from charging high prices once they own the network. After all, American mobile services are relatively more expensive than those in many European nations.

Yet, this can hardly be blamed on privately owned network infrastructure when infrastructure in European countries with significantly cheaper mobile service is also privately owned. After all, American prices are influenced by the relatively higher costs of extending coverage across a nation that’s so vast, unevenly populated and geographically diverse.

Moreover, European regulations that are designed to lower prices for consumers by boosting retail competition (such as the UK rule requiring network owners to sell access to competitors at cost) come at the expense of decreased network investment that left Europe years behind the United States in 4G development. This trade-off may be undesirable, given how important fast, reliable and expansive 5G networks are for keeping innovative companies and industries in the United States competitive.

Nationalization also won’t uphold security since a single nationwide network, government-owned or otherwise, is even more vulnerable to hacking. Furthermore, infrastructure builders and equipment providers who raise national security concerns are already prohibited from purchasing spectrum licenses.

### AT: Biotechnology

#### Capital is crucial for biotechnology – solves a laundry list of impacts

Chris Edwards ’21, Director of Tax Policy Studies and Editor, Down​siz​ing​Gov​ern​ment​.org, “The Triumph of Biotechnology and Private Capital”, CATO, 9/24/21, https://www.cato.org/commentary/triumph-biotechnology-private-capital

People often claim that capitalism focuses only on short-term profits. **But the venture capitalists and angel investors who fund firms such as Moderna and BioNTech are hugely patient, and they lose money on most of their investments**. Typically, their model rests on the calculation that a small percentage of their investments will generate a sufficiently high return on going public or being sold to both “pay” for those that — as will often be the case in a very tricky sector — lose money (or make very little) and make the sort of good money that they and their clients are expecting when putting together an investment portfolio.

**In biotechnology and other leading-edge industries, after-tax investor gains are often reinvested in the next round of risky startups, thus creating a virtuous cycle**. If the government had taxed away the Struengmanns’ capital gains from selling Hexal, they might not have had the cash or incentive to invest in BioNTech. One of the reason that nearly all high-income countries keep capital-gains taxes low is to help ensure that investors and entrepreneurs are incentivized to take the risk of committing time and resources to ventures that can offer no promise of a good return, the sort of ventures, in other words, so typical of ventures relying on scientific and technical innovation. Those who take high risks should be rewarded, if that risk works out, with high rewards.

Unfortunately, that logic eludes President Biden and congressional Democrats. They not only would like to raise capital-gains-tax rates, but some of them would also like to broaden the capital-gains-tax base, including by taxing gains before they are realized. If applied to startup investing, that could do terrible damage to the ability of early stage companies to secure the patient capital that they need. Punishing capital gains makes no sense if we want investors and entrepreneurs to pursue valuable but risky growth opportunities.

Some cynics are griping about the big profits that Moderna and BioNTech are now making, but investors in those firms absorbed losses for a decade. **Besides, there is no better place for profits to flow right now than to biotech firms and their research**. **BioNTech announced that it will build on its mRNA advances to develop shots against malaria and tuberculosis, which together kill more than a million people a year. And numerous biotech firms are now aiming to create more effective influenza vaccines based on mRNA technologies**.

One of the key moments in the development of the biotech sector as we know it today was the launch of Genentech in 1976, backed by venture-capital firm Kleiner Perkins. The success of that pioneering firm “gave credence to the view that scientific research, infused with start-up firm spunk, could be a critical component of economic growth,” noted a history of the industry by Walter Powell and Kurt Sandholtz.

To undermine an approach that has worked so well, and delivered so much, by raising capital gains makes no economic sense. **Worse still, as we consider the lives saved or improved by companies in biotechnology and other innovative sectors, companies that relied on private risk capital, it may well come at considerable human cost, too**.

### AT: Artificial Intelligence

#### AI regulation is good! Positive benefits solve extinction.

Tzimas ’21 [Themistoklis; 2021; Faculty of Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki; Legal and Ethical Challenges of Artificial Intelligence from an International Law Perspective, “Chapter 2: The Expectations and Risks from AI,” p. 9-32]

Therefore, it is only natural to be at least skeptical towards a future with entities possessing equal or superior intelligence and levels of autonomy; the prospect even of existential risk looms as possible.7

AI that will have reached or surpassed our level of intelligence make us wonder why would highly autonomous and intelligent AI want to give up control back to its original creators?8 Why remain contained in pre-deﬁned goals set for it by us, humans?

Even AI in its current form and narrow intelligence poses risks because of its embedded-ness in an ever-growing number of crucial aspects of our lives. The role of AI in military, ﬁnancial,9 health, educational, environmental, governance networks-among others—are areas where risk generated by AI—even limited— autonomy can be diffused through non-linear networks, with signiﬁcant impact— even systemic.10

The answer therefore to the question whether AI brings risk with it is yes; as Eliezer Yudkowski comments the greatest of them all is that people conclude too early that they understand it11 or that they assume that they can achieve it without necessarily having acquired complete and thorough understanding of what intelli- gence means.12

Our projection of our—lack of complete—understanding of the concept of intelligence on AI is owed to our lack of complete comprehension of human intelligence too, which is partially covered by the prevalent and until now self- obvious, anthropomorphism because of which we tend to identify higher intelligence with the human mind.

Yudkowski again however suggests that AI “refers to a vastly greater space of possibilities than does the term “Homo sapiens.” When we talk about “AIs” we are really talking about minds-in-general, or optimization processes in general. Imagine a map of mind design space. In one corner, a tiny little circle contains all humans; within a larger tiny circle containing all biological life; and all the rest of the huge map is the space of minds-in-general. The entire map ﬂoats in a still vaster space, the space of optimization processes.”13

Regardless of what our well-established ideas are, there are many, different intelligences and even more signiﬁcantly, there are potentially, different intelli- gences equally or even more evolved than human.

From such a perspective, the unprecedented—ness of potential AI developments and the mystery surrounding them emerges as not only the outcome of pop culture but of a radical transformation of our—until recently—self—obvious identiﬁcation of humanity with highly evolved and dominant intelligence.14

The lack of understanding of intelligence and therefore of AI may be frightening but does not lead necessarily to regulation—at least to a proper one. We could even be led into making potentially catastrophic choices, on the basis of false assumptions.

On top of our lack of understanding, we should add a sentiment of anxiety as well as of expectations, which intensiﬁes as an atmosphere of emergency and of expected groundbreaking developments grows. The most graphic description of this feeling is the potential of a moment of singularity, as mentioned above according to the description by Vinge and Kurzweil.

As the mathematician I. J. Good–Alan Turing’s colleague in the team of the latter during World War II—has put it: “Let an ultraintelligent machine be deﬁned as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the ﬁrst ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.”15 This is in a nutshell the moment of singularity.

The estimates currently foresee the emergence of ultra or super intelligence—as it is currently labelled—or in other words of singularity, somewhere between 20 and 50 years from today, further raising the sentiment of emergency.16 We cannot even foretell with precision how singularity would look like but we know that because of its expected groundbreaking impact, both states and private entities compete towards gaining the upper hand in the prospect of the singularity.17

Despite the fact that such predictions have been proven rather optimistic in the past18 and therefore up to some extent inaccurate, there are reasons to assume that their materialization will take place and that the urgency of regulation will be proven realistic.

After all, part of the disappointments from AI should be blamed on the fact that certain activities and standards, which were considered as epitomes of human intelligence have been surpassed by AI, only to indicate that they were not eventu- ally satisfactory thresholds for the surpassing of human intelligence.19 Partially because of AI progress we realize that human intelligence and its thresholds are much more complicated than assumed in the past.

The vastness’s of deﬁnitions of intelligence, as well as its etymological roots are enlightening of the difﬁculties: “to gather, to collect, to assemble or to choose, and to form an impression, thus leading one to ﬁnally understand, perceive, or know”.20

As with other relevant concepts, the truth is that until recently our main way to approach intelligence for far too long was “we know it, when we see it”. AI is an additional reason for looking deeper into intelligence and the more we examine it, the most complicated it seems.

The combination of lack of complete understanding of intelligence, the unpredictability of AI, its rapid evolution and the prospect of singularity explain both the fascination and the fear from AI. Once the latter emerges, we have no real knowledge about what will happen next but only speculations, which until recently belonged to the area of science ﬁction.

We are for example pretty conﬁdent that the speed of AI intelligence growth will accelerate, once self—improvement will have been achieved. The expected or possible chain of events will begin from AI capacity to re-write its own algorithms and exponentially self—improve, surpassing human intelligence, which lacks the capacity of such rapid self—improvement and setting its own goals.21

We can somehow guess the speed of AGI and ASI evolution and possibly some of its initial steps but we cannot guess the directions that such AI will choose to follow and the characteristics that it will demonstrate. Practically, we credibly guess the prospects of AI beyond a certain level of development.

Two existential issues could emerge: ﬁrst, an imbalance of intelligence at our expense—with us, humans becoming the inferior species—in favor of non-biological entities and secondly a lack of even fundamental conceptual communication between the two most intelligent “species”. Both of them heighten the fear of irreversible changes, once we lose the possession of the superior intelligence.22

However, we need to consider the expectations as well. The positive side focuses on the so-called friendly AI, meaning AI which will beneﬁt and not harm humans, thanks to its advanced intelligence.23

AI bears the promise of signiﬁcantly enhancing human life on various aspects, beginning from the already existing, narrow applications. The enhanced automation24 in the industry and the shift to autonomy,25 the take—over by AI of tasks even at the service sector which can be considered as “tedious”—i.e. in the banking sector—climate and weather forecasting, disaster response,26 the potentially better cooperation among different actors in complicated matters such as in matters of information, geopolitics and international relations, logistics, resources ex.27

The realization of the positive expectations depends up to some extent upon the complementarity or not, of AI with human intelligence. However, what friendly AI will bring in our societies constitutes a matter of debate, given our lack of unanimous approach on what should be considered as beneﬁcial and therefore friendly to humans—as is analyzed in the next chapter.

Friendly AI for example bears the prospect of freeing us from hard labor or even further from unwanted labor; of generating further economic growth; of dealing in unbiased, speedy, effective and cheaper ways with sectors such as policing, justice, health, environmental crisis, natural disasters, education, governance, defense and several more of them which necessitate decision-making, with the involvement of sophisticated intelligence.

The synergies between human intelligence and AI “promise” the enhancement of humans in most of their aspects. Such synergies may remain external—humans using AI as external to themselves, in terms of analysis, forecasts, decision—making and in general as a type of assistant-28 or may evolve into the merging of the two forms of intelligence either temporarily or permanently.

The second profoundly enters humanity, existentially—speaking, into uncharted waters. Elon Musk argues in favor of “having some sort of merger of biological intelligence and machine intelligence” and his company “Neuralink” aims at implanting chips in human brain. Musk argues that through this way humans will keep artiﬁcial intelligence under control.29 The proposition is that of “mind design”, with humans playing the role that God had according to theologies.30

While the temptation is strong—exceeding human mind’s capacities, far beyond what nature “created”, by acquiring the capacity for example to connect directly to the cyberspace or to break the barriers of biology31—the risks are signiﬁcant too: what if a microchip malfunction? Will such a brain be usurped or become captive to malfunctioning AI?

The merging of the two intelligences is most likely to evolve initially by invoking medical reasons, instead of human enhancement. But the merging of the two will most likely continue, as after all the limits between healing and enhancement are most often blurry. This development will give rise, as is analyzed below, to signif- icant questions and issues, the most of crucial of which is the setting of a threshold for the prevalence of the human aspect of intelligence over the artiﬁcial one.

Human nature is historically improved, enhanced, healed and now, potentially even re-designed in the future.32 Can a “medical science” endorsing such a goal be ethically acceptable and if yes, under what conditions, when, for whom and by what means? The answers are more difﬁcult than it seems. As the World Health Organi- zation—WHO—provides in its constitution, “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or inﬁrmity”.33

Therefore, why discourage science which aims at human-enhancement, even reaching the levels of post-humanism?34 Or if restrictions are to be imposed on human enhancement, on what ethics and laws will they be justiﬁed? How ethically acceptable is it to prohibit or delay technological evolution, which among several other magniﬁcent achievements, promises to treat death as a disease and cure it, by reducing soul to self, self to mind, and mind to brain, which will then be preserved as a “softwarized” program in a hardware other than the human body?35

After all, “According to the strong artiﬁcial intelligence program there is no fundamental difference between computers and brains: a computer is different machinery than a person in terms of speed and memory capacity.”36

While such a scientiﬁc development and the ones leading potentially to it will be undoubtedly, groundbreaking technologically-speaking, is it actually—ethically- speaking—as ambivalent as it may sound or is it already justiﬁed by our well— rooted human-centrism?37

Secular humanism may have very well outdated religious beliefs about afterlife in the area of science but has not diminished the hope for immortality; on the contrary, science, implicitly or explicitly predicts that matter can in various ways surpass death, albeit by means which belong in the realm of scientiﬁc proof, instead of that of metaphysical belief.38

If this is the philosophical case, the quest for immortality becomes ethically acceptable; it can be considered as embedded both in the existential anxiety of humans, as well as in the human-centrism of secular philosophical and political victory over the dei-centric approach to the world and to our existence.

From another perspective of course and for the not that distant philosophical reasons, the quest for immortality becomes ethically ambiguous or even unacceptable.39 By seeking endless life we may miss all these that make life worth living in the framework of ﬁniteness. As the gerontologist Paul Hayﬂick cautioned “Given the possibility that you could replace all your parts, including your brain, then you lose your self-identity, your self-recognition. You lose who you are! You are who you are because of your memory.”40

In other words, once we begin to integrate the two types of intelligence, within ourselves, until when and how we will be sure that it is human intelligence that guides us, instead of the AI? And if we are not guided completely or—even further—at all by human intelligence but on the contrary we are guided by AI which we have embodied and which is trained by our human intelligence, will we be remaining humans or we will have evolved to some type of meta-human or transhumant species, being different persons as well?41

AI promises tor threatens to offer a solution by breaking down our consciousness into small “particles” of information—simplistically speaking—which can then be “software-ized” and therefore “uploaded” into different forms of physical or non-physical existence.

Diane Ackerman states that “The brain is silent, the brain is dark, the brain tastes nothing, the brain hears nothing. All it receives are electrical impulses--not the sumptuous chocolate melting sweetly, not the oboe solo like the ﬂight of a bird, not the pastel pink and lavender sunset over the coral reef--only impulses.”42 Therefore, all that is needed—although it is of course much more complicated than we can imagine—is a way to code and reproduce such impulses.

Even if we consider that without death, we will no more be humans but something else, why should we remain humans once technologies allow us be something “more”, in the sense of an enhanced version of “being”? Why are we to remain bound by biological evolution if we can re-design it and our future form of existence?

Why not try to achieve the major breakthrough, the anticipated or hoped digita- lization of the human mind, which promises immortality of consciousness via the cyberspace or artiﬁcial bodies: the uploading of our consciousness so that it can live on forever, turning death into an optional condition.43

Either through an artiﬁcial body or emulation-a living, conscious avatar—we hope—or fear—that the domain of immortality will be within reach. It is the prospect of a “substrate-independent minds,” in which human and machine consciousness will merge, transcending biological limits of time, space and mem- ory” that fascinates us.44

As Anders Sandberg explained “The point of brain emulation is to recreate the function of the original brain: if ‘run’ it will be able to think and act as the original,” he says. Progress has been slow but steady. “We are now able to take small brain tissue samples and map them in 3D. These are at exquisite resolution, but the blocks are just a few microns across. We can run simulations of the size of a mouse brain on supercomputers—but we do not have the total connectivity yet. As methods improve, I expect to see automatic conversion of scanned tissue into models that can be run. The different parts exist, but so far there is no pipeline from brains to emulations.”45

The emulation is different from a simulation in the sense that the former mimics not only the outward outcome but also the “internal causal dynamics”, so that the emulated system and in this particular case the human mind behaves as the original.46 Obviously, this is a challenging task: we need to understand the human brain with the help of computational neuroscience and combine simpliﬁed parts such as simulated neurons with network structures so that the patterns of the brain are comprehended. We must combine effectively “biological realism (attempting to be faithful to biology), completeness (using all available empirical data about the system), tractability (the possibility of quantitative or qualitative simulation) and understanding (producing a compressed representation of the salient aspects of the system in the mind of the experimenter)”.47

The technological challenges are vast. Technologically speaking, the whole concept is based on some assumptions which must be proven both accurate and feasible.48 We must achieve technology capable of scanning completely the human brain, of creating software on the basis of the acquired information from its scanning and of the interpretation of information and the hardware which will be capable of uploading or downloading such software.49 The steps within these procedures are equally challenging. Their detailed analysis evades the scope of this book.

Some critical questions—they are further analyzed in the next chapters—emerge however: how will we interpret free will in emulation? What will be the impact of the environment and of what environment? How will be missing parts of the human brain re-constructed and emulated? What will be the status of the several emulations which will be created—i.e. failed attempts or emulations of parts of the human brain—in the course of the search for a complete and functioning emulation? Will they be considered as “persons” and therefore as having some right or will they be considered as mere objects in an experimental lab? How are we going to decode the actual subjective sentiments of these emulations? Essentially, are emulations the humans “themselves” who are emulated or a different person? Even further what will human and person mean in the era of emulation?

From a different perspective, the victory over death may be seen as a danger of mass extinction, absorption or de-humanization. In this new, vast universe of emulations will there be place for humans?50

From the above—mentioned discussion, it becomes obvious that at a large extent, the prospect of risk or of expectation is a matter of perspective, for which there is no unanimous agreement in the present. This may be the greatest danger of all, for which Asimov warned us: unleashing technology while we cannot communicate among us, in the face of it.

The existential prospect as well as the risks by AI may self-evidently emerge from technological advances but are determined on the basis of politico—philosophical or in the wider sense, ethical assumptions. This is where the need for legal regulation steps in. Such a need was often underestimated in the past in favor of a solely technologically oriented approach—although exceptions raising issues other than technological can be found too.51 The gradual raising of ethic—political, philosoph- ical and legal issues constitutes a rather recent development, partially because of the realization of the proximity of the risks and of the expectations.

The public debate is often divided between two “contradictory” views: fear of AI or enthusiastic optimism. The opinions of the experts differ respectively.

Kurzweil, who has come with a prediction for a date for the emergence of singularity—until 2045—expects such a development in a positive way: “What’s actually happening is [machines] are powering all of us,” Kurzweil said during the SXSW interview. “They’re making us smarter. They may not yet be inside our bodies, but, by the 2030s, we will connect our neocortex, the part of our brain where we do our thinking, to the cloud.”52

In a well-known article—issued on the occasion of a ﬁlm—Stephen Hawking, Max Tegmark, Stuart Russell, and Frank Wilczek shared a moderate position: “The potential beneﬁts are huge; everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magniﬁed by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of war, disease, and poverty would be high on anyone’s list. Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history. . . Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks.”53

## AT: Alt

### Perm

#### The perms solve best – restructuring capitalism is possible

Mazzucato ’21 [Mariana; Jan 28; Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London where she is the founding director of the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose; “Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” p. 204-10]

This book has applied what I believe is the immensely powerful idea of a mission to solving the ‘wicked’ problems we face today. In it, I have argued that tackling grand challenges will only happen if we reimagine government as a prerequisite for restructuring capitalism in a way that is inclusive, sustainable and driven by innovation.

First and foremost, this means reinventing government for the twenty-first century – equipping it with the tools, organization and culture it needs to drive a mission-oriented approach. It also means bringing purpose to the core of corporate governance and taking a very broad stakeholder position across the economy. It means changing the relationship between public and private sectors, and between them and civil society, so they all work symbiotically for a common goal. The reason for the emphasis on rethinking government is simple: only government has the capacity to bring about transformation on the scale needed. The relationship between economic actors and civil society shows our problems at their most profound, and this is what we must unravel.

We can start by recognizing that capitalist markets are an outcome of how each actor in the system is organized and governed, and how the different actors relate to one another. This holds for the private and public sectors and for other sectors such as non-profits. No particular kind of market behaviour is inevitable. For example, the market pressure often cited as forcing a business to neglect the long term in favour of the short term, as too many companies do today, is the product of a particular organization of the market. Nor is there anything inevitable in government bureaucracies being too slow to react to challenges such as digital platforms and climate change. Rather, both are outcomes of agency, actions and governance structures that are chosen inside organizations, as well as the legal and institutional relationships between them. It is all down to design within and between organizations.

Capitalism is, indeed, in crisis. But the good news is that we can do better. We know from the past that public and private actors can come together to do extraordinary things. I have reflected on how, fifty years ago, going to the moon and back required public and private actors to invest, to innovate and to collaborate night and day for a common purpose. Imagine if that collaborative purpose today was to build a more inclusive and sustainable capitalism: green production and consumption, less inequality, greater personal fulfilment, resilient health care and healthy ageing, sustainable mobility and digital access for all. But small, incremental changes will not get us to those outcomes. We must have the courage and conviction to lift our gaze higher – to lead transformative change that is as imaginative as it is ambitious, aiming for something far more ambitious than sending a man to the moon.

To do this successfully, governments need to invest in their internal capabilities – building the competence and confidence to think boldly, partner with business and civil society, catalyse new forms of collaboration across sectors, and deploy instruments that reward actors willing to engage with the difficulties. The task is neither to pick winners nor to give unconditional handouts, subsidies and guarantees, but to pick the willing. And missions are about making markets, not only fixing them. They’re about imagining new areas of exploration. They’re about taking risks, not only ‘de-risking’. And if this means making mistakes along the way, so be it. Learning through trial and error is critical for any value-creation exercise. Ambitious missions also have the courage to tilt the playing field.

If government is indeed a value creator that is driven by public purpose, its policies should reflect and reinforce that. Too many green policies today are just minor adjustments to a trajectory that still favours the old waste-prone behaviours and the financial casino that worsens inequality. A healthy economy that works for the whole of society must tilt the playing field consistently to reward behaviours that help us achieve agreed and desirable goals. That means achieving coherence in a multiplicity of fields, from taxes to regulation, from business law to the social safety net.

As emphasized throughout the book, it is key to not pretend that social missions are the same as technological ones. With challenges that are more ‘wicked’ it is essential that moonshot thinking is linked with support to underlying government systems. For example, a moonshot around disease testing or health priorities must interact closely with the public-health system, not replace or circumvent it. Similarly, a moonshot around clean growth must interact with transport systems and planning authorities and understand behavioural change. Thus it is critical to perceive missions not as siloed projects but as being intersectoral, bottom-up, and building on existing systems (such as innovation systems, among others).

Governments cannot pursue missions alone. They must work alongside purpose-driven businesses to achieve them. As I’ve argued in this book, this requires addressing one of the biggest dilemmas of modern capitalism: restructuring business so that private profits are reinvested back into the economy rather than being used for short-term financialized purposes. Missions can accelerate this shift by shaping expectations about where business opportunities lie and also getting a better return for public investment. In this sense they can begin to walk the talk of stakeholder value. This means creating a more symbiotic form of partnership and collaboration in different sectors, whether in health, energy or digital platforms. A market-shaping perspective requires governing these interactions so that intellectual property rights, data privacy, pricing of essential medicines and taxation all reflect what needs to happen to reach the common objective. In health that must mean health innovation driven by the mission of better health care for all; in energy it must mean divestment from fossil fuels and the creation of public goods like green infrastructure and green production systems that protect the earthly oasis that Armstrong referred to; and in the digital domain it must mean the use of digitalization to improve the access of all people to the power of the technologies of the twenty-first century – while ensuring both data privacy and that our welfare states are strengthened, not weakened, by digital platforms.

Doing capitalism differently requires reimagining the full potential of a public sector driven by public purpose – democratically defining clear goals that society needs to meet by investing and innovating together. It requires a fundamentally new relationship between all economic actors willing and able to tackle complexity to achieve outcomes that matter.

#### Capitalism’s not monolithic---regs solve their impacts and preserve positives.

Laura Tyson and Lenny Mendonca 21. Laura Tyson, former chair of the US President's Council of Economic Advisers, is Professor of the Graduate School at the Haas School of Business and Chair of the Blum Center Board of Trustees at the University of California, Berkeley. Lenny Mendonca, Senior Partner Emeritus at McKinsey & Company, is a former chief economic and business adviser to Governor Gavin Newsom of California and chair of the California High-Speed Rail Authority. "Capitalism We Can Believe In". Project Syndicate. 1-15-2021. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-to-do-about-declining-trust-in-us-capitalism-by-laura-tyson-and-lenny-mendonca-2021-01

Growing distrust of capitalism follows from its failure to address major socioeconomic challenges, not least climate change and inequalities in opportunity, income, and wealth. While private incentives under capitalism are good at stimulating efficiency, growth, and innovation, they also generate unequal income and wealth distributions (even in a context of intense competition), often at odds with social norms of fairness. Moreover, capitalist systems tend to underinvest in public goods like education, health care, and social insurance – all critical factors in the pandemic response – while also discounting negative externalities such as greenhouse-gas emissions.

These shortcomings of capitalism are predictable, but they are remediable through public policies and institutions. Tax and transfer policies and minimum wages can reduce income and wealth disparities, just as public investment in education, training, and health care can enhance opportunity by providing access to good jobs and fostering the creation of new enterprises. Likewise, a price on carbon dioxide and regulations limiting or banning carbon emissions can help the world avert the existential threat of climate change.

Critics of capitalism often miss (or choose to ignore) that there is no single canonical model. Europe’s various “social market” models differ significantly from the neoliberal variant in the US. And even within the US, there are important differences between states and localities.

Some of these distinctions have been highlighted in the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and recession. All advanced economies have deployed unprecedented levels of fiscal and monetary stimulus in the face of “K-shaped” or “dual” recessions in which lower-wage workers have suffered disproportionately more than other cohorts. Unlike the US, Germany and several other European countries have deployed measures specifically designed to keep as many workers as possible in their jobs. Because these countries have generous social insurance and benefits, including sick leave and family leave, workers and their families have been able to cope with both COVID-19 and sudden drops in their incomes.

Differences in national health-care models have also become more apparent. Unlike European capitalist systems that provide universal coverage, 14.5% of America’s non-elderly population (ages 18-64) remains uninsured. Moreover, owing to America’s heavy reliance on employer-based insurance, the pandemic has pushed at least 15 million more workers at least temporarily into the uninsured pool.

With their strong public-health systems, many European countries were also better equipped to carry out widespread testing and vaccine distribution. The US, meanwhile, has utterly failed to contain the virus, and is now delegating the vaccination campaign to under-resourced state and local authorities.

In another contrast with the US, Europe has dedicated about one-third of its massive stimulus program to investments aligned with its commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. America’s federal stimulus measures have been silent on climate with few conditions of any kind.

Within the US, individual states’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis reflect different variants of capitalism. In California, Governor Gavin Newsom’s recent 2021-22 budget proposal reveals some distinctive features. In terms of health-care coverage, California remains a national leader with a Medicaid program covering more than 13 million people. Despite the pandemic-induced recession, the state is increasing its minimum wage to $14 per hour in 2021, on track to realize the target of $15 per hour in 2022 for all businesses employing 26 or more workers; many municipalities, including Los Angeles and San Francisco, have already achieved or exceeded the $15 target. (On January 1, 2021, 20 other states also raised their minimum wages, whereas the US federal minimum wage has remained unchanged at $7.25 per hour since 2009.)

California has also expanded coverage of its Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Young Child Tax Credit to include undocumented workers who are otherwise denied the benefits of federal stimulus packages. Together, these tax credits applied to 3.6 million California households in 2020, adding $1 billion in total income. The state also passed new legislation significantly expanding unpaid family-leave rights. Employers with as few as five employees now must provide this option as well as more time for paid sick leave for workers forced to self-isolate or quarantine as a result of COVID-19 exposure or diagnosis.

Looking ahead, Newsom has proposed an additional $600 one-time cash payment to all taxpayers who are eligible for the state’s EITC in 2021. His proposed 2021-22 budget also earmarks $372 million to expedite the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, and includes $4.5 billion for programs to drive economic growth and job creation once restrictions on normal activities have been lifted. These programs include $575 million in grants to small businesses and nonprofits, in addition to the $500 million for such grants implemented in late 2020 amid forced business closures. The proposal also allocates up to an additional $50 million for the California Rebuilding Fund, a public-private partnership, to support up to an additional $125 million of low-interest loans to underserved small businesses throughout the state.

California’s distinctive approach to market capitalism also emphasizes climate sustainability, using both carbon pricing and efficiency standards to achieve ambitious decarbonization targets. Under a 2018 state law, 60% of electricity must come from renewable resources by 2030, and 100% by 2045. California runs the world’s fourth-largest cap-and-trade system and will be setting even lower caps (and thus a higher carbon price) next month. In September 2020, Newsom announced an executive order requiring that zero-emission vehicles account for 100% of new car sales by 2035. His proposed budget seeks $1.5 billion to accelerate the infrastructure investment needed to achieve this goal.

President-elect Joe Biden has just announced a $1.9 trillion emergency rescue plan to counter the pandemic’s surge and provide substantial relief to workers, families, small businesses, and state and local governments. Prompt congressional passage of this plan is a critical first step in the renovation of America’s outdated neoliberal version of capitalism. As the economy recovers from the deep and uneven COVID-19 recession, the US must “build back better” by strengthening its social safety net, increasing public investment in education, health care, and other public goods, and rejoining the global charge against climate change. Lessons from the more successful variants of market capitalism in Europe and California point the way forward.

### AT: Alt---Environment/Sustainability

#### The alt locks in extinction if they’re right about environmental sustainability---there isn’t time for a global transition from capitalism and no certainty it ends emissions.

Polychroniou et al. '20 [CJ; 9/16/20; PhD in Political Science from the University of Delaware; Noam Chomsky, Professor & Professor of Linguistics emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert Pollin, Professor of Economics and Co-Director of the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts; "The Political Economy of Saving the Planet," https://bostonreview.net/science-nature-global-justice/noam-chomsky-robert-pollin-c-j-polychroniou-political-economy-saving]

There are important elements of truth in such views, but we should also be careful to not push this point too far. Some commentators have argued that one silver lining outcome of the pandemic was that, because of the economic lockdown, fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions plunged alongside overall economic activity during the recession. While this is true, I do not see any positive lessons here with respect to advancing a viable emissions program that can get us to net zero emissions by 2050. Rather, the experience demonstrates why a degrowth approach to emissions reduction is unworkable. Emissions did indeed fall sharply because of the pandemic and the recession. But that is only because incomes collapsed and unemployment spiked over this same period. This only reinforces the conclusion that the only effective climate stabilization path is the Green New Deal, as it is the only one that does not require a drastic contraction (or “degrowth”) of jobs and incomes to drive down emissions.

A genuinely positive development of the pandemic and recession is that progressive activists around the world have fought to include Green New Deal investments in their countries’ economic stimulus programs. It is critical to keep pushing the development and success of these initiatives.

In support of that end, we must seriously consider how to best maximize both the short-term stimulus benefits and long-term impacts of Green New Deal programs. I know the importance of such considerations from personal experience working on the green investment components of the 2009 Obama American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, in which $90 billion of the $800 billion total was allocated to clean energy investments in the United States. The principles underlying these investment components were sound, but the people who worked on the program in its various stages, including myself, did not adequately calculate the time necessary to execute many of the projects. We knew that it was critical to identify “shovel-ready” projects—ones that could be quickly implemented on a large scale and provide an immediate economic boost. But relatively few green investment projects were truly shovel-ready at that time, as the green energy industry was still a newly emerging enterprise. Therefore, the backlog of significant new projects was thin. It is only moderately less thin today.

This means that people designing Green New Deal stimulus programs must identify the subgroup of green investment projects that can realistically roll into action at scale within a matter of months. One example that should be applicable in almost every country would be energy efficiency retrofits of all public and commercial buildings. This would entail improving insulation, sealing window frames and doors, switching over all lightbulbs to LEDs, and replacing aging heating and air conditioning systems with efficient ones (preferably heat pumps). These programs could quickly generate large numbers of jobs for secretaries, truck drivers, accountants, construction workers, and climate engineers. They could also save energy and reduce emissions quickly and relatively cheaply. Building off of such truly shovel-ready projects, the rest of the clean energy investment program could then accelerate and provide a strong foundation for economies moving out of recession and onto a sustainable recovery path.

CP: Eco-socialism is becoming a major tenet of the ideological repertoire of green parties in European countries and elsewhere, which may be the reason for their increasing appeal with voters and especially the youth. Is eco-socialism a cohesive enough political project to be taken seriously as an alternative for the future?

NC: Insofar as I understand eco-socialism—not in great depth—it overlaps greatly with other left socialist currents. That being said, I don’t think we’re at a stage where adopting a specific “political project” is very helpful. There are crucial issues that have to be addressed, right now. Our efforts should be informed by the kind of future society that we want, and the kind that can be constructed within our existing society. It’s fine to stake out specific positions about the future in more or less detail, but for now these seem to me at best ways of sharpening ideas rather that platforms to latch on to.

A good argument can be made that inherent features of capitalism lead inexorably to the ruin of the environment, and that ending capitalism must be a priority of the environmental movement. But there’s one fundamental problem with this argument: time scales. Dismantling capitalism is impossible in the time frame that we have for taking urgent action, which requires national and international mobilization if severe crisis is to be averted.

Furthermore, the whole discussion around eco-socialism is misleading. The two efforts—averting environmental disaster, and dismantling capitalism in favor of a freer and more just society—should and can proceed in parallel. One example is Tony Mazzocchi’s efforts to forge a labor coalition that would not only challenge owner-management control of the workplace, but also be at the forefront of the environmental movement while attempting to socialize major sectors of U.S. industry. There’s no time to waste. The struggle must be, and can be, undertaken on all fronts.

CP: Bob, in your view, can eco-socialism coexist with the Green New Deal project? And, if not, what type of a politico-ideological agenda might be needed to generate broad political participation in the struggle to create a green future?

RP: In my view, details of rhetoric and emphasis aside, eco-socialism and the Green New Deal are fundamentally the same project. The Green New Deal, as we have discussed the term, offers the only path to climate stabilization that can also expand good job opportunities and raise living standards in all regions of the world. It defines an explicit and viable alternative to austerity economics on a global scale. My coworkers and I have worked on this issue—advancing the Green New Deal as an alternative to austerity economics—in different country settings over the past few years, including in Spain, Puerto Rico, and Greece. In my view, the Green New Deal is the only approach to climate stabilization also capable of reversing rising inequality and defeating global neoliberalism and ascendant neofascism.

Beyond the Green New Deal, I don’t know what exactly “eco-socialism” could mean. Does it mean the overthrow of all private ownership of productive assets for public ownership? As Noam suggested, do people seriously think that this could happen within the time frame we have to stabilize the climate, that is, within less than thirty years? And are we certain that eliminating all private ownership would be workable or desirable from a social justice standpoint—i.e. from the standpoint of advancing well-being for the global working class and poor? How do we deal with the fact that most of the world’s energy assets are already publicly owned? How, more specifically, can we be certain that a transition to complete public ownership would itself deliver zero net emissions by 2050? To me, the overarching challenge is trying to understand alternative pathways to most effectively building truly egalitarian, democratic, and ecologically sustainable societies—putting all labels aside and being willing, as Marx himself insisted, to employ “ruthless criticism” toward all that exists, including all past experiences with Communism and Socialism. And, for that matter, being open to criticizing all authors, including Marx himself. Indeed, my favorite quote from Marx is “I am not a Marxist.”

### AT: Alt---Transition Wars

#### Alt fails---transition wars and domestic pressure means the alt abandons fidelity to the environment.

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism]

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines.

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major asdasd upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.

Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards have improved substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher).

In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power.

The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free cement production and so on. The best climate policy plans all involve technological improvement as a key feature.

## Other

### AT: Inequality

#### Inequality is decreasing at unprecedented rates by every metric.

McAfee, 19—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “The Global Gallop of the Four Horsemen,” *More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next*, Chapter 10, pg 235-240, Kindle, dml)

In 2016 the economist and columnist Noah Smith reviewed the evidence on poverty around the world, and his conclusion was notably exuberant: "This is incredible—nothing short of a miracle. Nothing like this has ever happened before in recorded history." A graph created by Max Roser clearly reveals the "miracle" Smith was talking about, and how right he was that the improvement is without precedent. The graph doesn't show the percentage of people living in poverty, but instead something even more important: the total number of extremely poor people on earth.

Chart

Description automatically generated

The World's War on Poverty

The total number of poor people in the world peaked right at the time of the first Earth Day in 1970, then started to slowly decrease. But the real miracle came when this happy decline accelerated during the twenty- first century. In 1999, 1.76 billion people were living in extreme poverty. Just sixteen years later, this number had declined by 60 percent, to 705 million. Hundreds of millions fewer people are living in poverty now than in 1820, when the world's total population was seven times smaller than it is today.

Much of this decline is reflective of what occurred in China, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, threw off economic socialism beginning in 1978 and let capitalism work its poverty-reducing miracles. But the story of global poverty reduction isn't a purely Chinese one. As the graph below shows, every region around the world has seen large poverty reductions in recent years. The speed of the recent decline indicates that it's no longer ridiculous to talk about completely eliminating extreme poverty from the planet. The World Bank thinks this might be possible by 2030.

It's not just incomes that have improved. As I consult Our World in Data and other comprehensive sources of evidence, I struggle to find even a single important measure of human material well-being that's not getting better in most regions around the world.

Here are recent trends in a few key areas.

Daily Bread

Chart, diagram

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

As recently as 1980, the global average number of available daily calories wasn't enough to permit an active adult male to maintain his body weight. Less than thirty-five years later, however, every region in the world met this standard of twenty-five hundred daily calories.

Clean Living

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

More than 90 percent of the world's people now have access to improved water;VII in 1990 only a bit more than 75 percent did. The situation is similar for sanitation: in 1990 only a bit more than half of the world's people had it; now, more than two-thirds do.

Young Minds

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

The trend in secondary education enrollment around the world is similar to the one for sanitation, but even sharper: in 1986 fewer than half of the world's teenagers were in school; at present, more than 75 percent are.

One Thing We Say to Death: Not Today

By now the pattern should be familiar: life expectancy at birth has gone up around the world in recent decades:

Diagram

Description automatically generated

As we saw in chapter 1, global life expectancy was about 28.5 years in 1800. Over the next 150 years, that number increased by 20 years. Then, in the years between 1950 and 2015, it increased by 25 more. These gains are now universal; Southern Africa has regained the 10 years of expected life lost during its terrifying AIDS crisis.

One of the reasons life expectancy has gone up so quickly is the collapse in both child and maternal mortality around the world:

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

I find these mortality declines especially fast, large, and broad. Today, we still have desperately poor regions, failed states, and the decimations of war. But in no region today is the child mortality rate higher than the world's average rate was in 1998.

Convergent

Trends in maternal and child mortality highlight a critical fact that's often overlooked: around the world, inequality in most important measures of human material well-being is decreasing. Poor countries are catching up to rich ones, and gaps that were once large are shrinking. Inequalities in income and wealth dominate the news, and in many places these gaps are large and growing. They re also important, so well look at economic inequality in the next two chapters.

But it's true, too, that there are other kinds of inequality that we should care about as we examine the human condition: inequalities in health, education, diet, sanitation, and other things that matter deeply for the quality of a person's life. Here the news is profoundly good; these inequalities are collapsing. As the four horsemen have galloped around the world in recent decades, they've made life better not only for those people and countries that were already rich but for just about everyone else. Everywhere, fewer mothers and babies are dying, more kids are getting an education, more people have adequate nutrition and sanitation.

It's essential to acknowledge these global victories because they show us that what we're doing is working. Tech progress, capitalism, public awareness, and responsive government are spreading around the world and improving it. It's often said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over but expecting different results. The corollary might be that ignorance is not examining the results of what's being done. Over and over, when we look at the evidence, we see that the four horsemen are improving our world.

### AT: “Neoliberalism

#### Neoliberalism is a useless concept—reject it and their answers that this is just propaganda

Dunn, 16—Department of Political Economy at the University of Sydney (Bill, “Against neoliberalism as a concept,” Capital & Class, November 23, 2016, dml)

This article argues that the left should abandon the concept of neoliberalism. As such, it contributes to a growing discontent with the term but makes a specific argument about its use by those opposed to what they characterise as neoliberal, those on the political left, who gain little by invoking it. The term is not recognised by our opponents, whom it fails to challenge, and it provides little help identifying strategic tasks for the left, muddying rather than clarifying political choices.

As the next section elaborates, neoliberalism has been understood in diverse ways to characterise a huge range of social practices. Often writers are talking about similar things, but there is no essential core meaning and in at least some cases rival interpretations become something close to opposites. This conceptual sprawl is well documented elsewhere. Here, brief illustrations merely demonstrate the range of practices claimed as neoliberal and two particularly striking antinomies: in idealist and materialist interpretations and in depictions of neoliberalism alternatively as state retreat and as a policy of strong states. It is suggested that while the social change and the social complexity underlying the diverse characterisations are real, the blanket term becomes an obstacle to critical social scientists’ efforts to identify the relations between different social practices and the main drivers of change. Social science cannot be precise and many concepts are contested, but here the diversity of usage is particularly great with as yet little indication even of any movement towards establishing means of adjudicating between rival interpretations. This discussion is substantially unoriginal but provides a necessary background for the second part of the article, which asks why and for whom the term is being used.

This second section argues that neoliberalism is almost exclusively a term of the left, which gains no advantage by invoking it. It is used by opponents, mainly elite or academic opponents, of the phenomena it claims to characterise. This builds barriers rather than bridges to a dialogue with our intellectual opponents. Nor does the term help to orient political strategy. Taken literally, neoliberalism tends to exaggerate the novelty and liberal character of many contemporary social practices, while the sheer diversity of phenomena to which it has been applied obstructs rather than helps to identify strategic priorities. A tendency to mirror a libertarian binary, which posits the state and market as bad and good, is particularly unhelpful.

A few preliminary disclaimers are probably in order. First, with well over 400,000 academic publications having now used the term, it is impossible to engage with more than a tiny fraction of even the most influential sources. There have been some heroic efforts to review the literature as a whole, but these risk simultaneously oversimplifying the work with which they do engage and ignoring vast swathes of material. No such a comprehensive appraisal is attempted here. Second, this should underline that the criticisms here are not directed against any and every particular interpretation of neoliberalism. Many authors are internally consistent in their usage and unambiguous in the political practices towards which they point. The problem remains that if other accounts, including many of the most influential, use the term in a different way, the cogency of such particular interpretations might be better understood as emerging despite, rather than because of, the invocation of the term. Third, it should therefore be clear that no attempt is made to assert yet another, new and improved, interpretation of neoliberalism. That would merely add to the confusion. Fourth, this is not an argument that ‘it’ does not exist. The different accounts can point to real social phenomena; the criticism is directed purely at the designation. Fifth, objections to the use of the term should not somehow be taken to imply an approval of the numerous practices identified as neoliberal. To query the term is not to accept, as some have implied, a right-wing position (Venkatesan 2015: 911). It will be argued here that right-wingers do reject the term and that we should take their objections seriously, but their standpoint is not mine, which is that of revolutionary Marxism.